Gentlemen. Thank you so much for coming to the American Enterprise institute. Im fred kagan, the direct of the critical project here at aei. And if it is my great honor and privilege to lead this panel, discussing report which is just been released by my colleagues, matt mcinnis, the future of irans security policy, Available Online at aei. Org and where these beautiful copies as well if anyone would like one of those. We have a Magnificent Panel today. We are thrilled to have Lieutenant General tom trask, Vice Commander of headquarters u. S. Special Operations Command in washington, d. C. , and vice admiral retired mark fox, formerly Deputy Commanding general of the nested Central Command along with matt to talk about the report. Without further ado i will turn it over to matt. Thank you, fred. Thank you, general trask and admiral fox and fred, for frankly every thing here at aei yourself put this event together. As well as all the people behind the scenes for the past two, 2 years that a been working with me on this research. This has been a labor of love for many years and inspired not only by my work here at the institute but, frankly, im a number of years working inside the government from my time in the department of defense, and taking my time at u. S. Central command, serving with these two fine gentleman as well as under general petraeus and john allen and particularly under jim maddox where we struggled with these issues of how to understand iran and its behavior, how we can better anticipate what iran will be able to do this is what really pushed me when i came out and i to think about how can we do better. And i think the biggest thing that i ran into when i was engaging in the larger think Tank Community and the larger Academic Community is the challenge of getting past iran as opaque. That iran is too difficult to understand, as well as the idea that iran is irrational. What i consider that mad mullah problem that iran is, the iranian leadership is too crazy. I think both these ideas really handicap us in being able to understand what tehran is thinking about, how it looks at the u. S. , how it formulates its foreign policies, security policies. Naturally the heart of what im trying to do in this monograph is take the face off that confusion and say no, you cant understand this. You can learn about it. What im trying to do is not so much provided whole bunch of policies, policy prescriptions for this administration or for future administrations, but basically provide analytic framework, models if you will, for understand how iran develops its foreign policies, how iran develops its approaches in particular security issues, how it goes to war, how it looks at the u. S. , how it looks it is your come out at its rivals in the persian gulf, out looks at threats such as isis, and in particular how it develops concepts about military doctrine, how would approaches its Defense Budget. These big questions, and this is what i want to provide for the Larger Community here in washington and around the world about ideas of toolkits. Things you can use to develop better policy, so you understand the variables that go into how iran approaches warfare or how iran approaches its foreignpolicy decisions. As things, for example, as the status of irans perspective as the saudi threat increases from their viewpoint, or decreases. Or as gdp increases or decreases. At that point affects their defense spending on how thats going to affect their approach to investing in certain capabilities. This isnt what i want to be able to do with this type of work and provide a Better Foundation for that. What are some of the key findings that we did get from this work, is that fundamentally threat perceptions really does drive irans behavior more than anything else. Once they are on a path they really tend to stick with it. Threat perceptions, and requires a change in threat perceptions to push them off that path. Fundamentally, the u. S. Tries of more than anything else. After that, israel, and then perhaps an extremist groups like isis, after that maybe the saudis and other gulf rivals. Of course more than anything else they could own people and internal instability. Ideology still matters. This of course is a point of contention at times when people wonder is the revolution still alive, does it still matter . I think it does. I think what well see that ideology still an important point in key aspects of their foreignpolicy. It tries what i call geopolitical irrationalities in places like its policy toward israel, its overinvestment in places like the leblanc but in other places it behaves more like a normal state. Especially things like what Islamic Revolution regard core does and its proxy groups like hezbollah, she militia groups, yet understand the interaction of the ideology plus the more normal geopolitical actors. From a conventional military standpoint, iran still is very much disoriented. This is what becomes frustrating at times for people to deal with this very aggressive destabilizing iranian foreignpolicy that we have to its proxy. Combined with a very weak conventional military that is still find my deterred by the u. S. And its reminder the degree of leverage that we have. 201 2016 also appears to be a fundamental Inflection Point where iran is looking at potentially shifting to a more offensive conventional military. Thats being driven i believe my words in syria and iraq where iran is looking to what needs to potentially build a different type of military. Also when i look at in digging into irans Defense Budget and its approach to acquisition and research and development, what i consider the discretionary defense spending and investment is actually somewhat rational. Especially when youre looking at investments that are not tied to existential fights like what you have going on in syria right now. I think this is an important tool for policymakers when theyre looking at how we are going to respond to iran longterm after the implementation of the nuclear deal. That you can understand if you know where irans gdp growth is going to be, if you have a sense of where oil prices are going into understand where irans threat perceptions are, whether its looking at mainly fighting the u. S. And israel or it is mainly looking at regional wars against rivals like saudi arabia or others, or manually at nonstate actors like isis or al qaeda as its main threats, that if you understand the basic variables you can anticipate where iran may be needing to put most of its money. When it comes to is it going to buy new airplanes or ships . Is a going to be investing more in its Missile Program . Is a going to be buying stuff from russia are trying to build that stuff indigenously. Easily the question of where to put all those millions at the nuclear deal, which is of course an important issue for us right now. I think you can understand those broad patterns. From my own Research Iran tends to spend its money in a fairly rational manner when its not tied to what i consider existential fights like we have in syria. And then finally i would say the u. S. Has an overwhelming influence on a rant strategic decisionmaking. I think this is something i cant drive home enough, and i think that with the u. S. As we are looking at what to do, i think we have to remember that iran have chosen to make us the number one enemy. This is not something that we necessarily, we did not create the situation from our perspective. They chose the 1979 revolution, and ideological standpoint to make us there any. They have created from their Strategic Thinking, they build their military first and foremost not only to protect their own regime, to protect them from counterrevolution from your own people, but to protect themselves from us. We still have that degree of influence over their threat perception. Any type of war that we go to with iran, we control escalation and we have to remember that. We can shape the resources that go into their defense industry. Theres a whole spectrum of capacity that we have any think this is something that in many ways should give us greater confidence in approaching iran and that we should not look at i write as ten tall and recognize that iran poses a very significant threat to stability in the region, but we can approach things i think with greater confidence and with greater strategy and, frankly, in a smarter way that we had in the past. Thanks, matt. General trask. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Fred, thanks so much for inviting me to be a to represent so. This is an extremely important topic. I wish that when you and i were working these problems six, seven years ago someone had written this monograph then for us to use as a tool because obviously im no iran expert or middle eastern expert but in a military planner. So from my perspective tools we can use to understand our adversaries are critically important to us as we try to provide options for our government and for our secretary going forward. And i think thats what this product does. Anytime you have an opportunity to get into the minds of your adversary and try to understand decisionmaking processes on their side, it allows you to prioritize your planning in a a way that you couldnt otherwise. In particular with iran, thats particularly important. I took a few specific things away from this as takeaways from a socom perspective and a remind everybody that socom has in a support position to centcom for iran planning. Within the department of defense, centcom is in the process of going through another drill at this time on what our way head needs to be from a dod perspective on iran and socom contributes to one of the things would bring from socom perspective as a global perspective on several issues. The reach of Iranian Networks is certainly one of them and thats one of the ways that our analysts and our planners can help centcom in that regard. Couple things that jumped out at me as important take away. You can if it right off the bat. Probably the most important one, that is if you understand the mindset of this particular adversary, their activities are going to be predictable, and most of the time youre going to be able to look at this. There is enough by of evidence since revolution of 79 to prove i think that as you point out in the monograph that their actions are going to be predictable. The fact they dont match up to a rational that we easily understand in the west doesnt mean they are not predictable if you spend enough time understanding the mindset, what the important aspects are to the regime, what they will do anything to fight for and what are as you call conflicts of opportunity versus ones that are conflicts of survival in their minds. That allows us as planners to develop a list of options for our leadership that are focused on that. The second big take away that i had this kind related to that end its the idea of proportionality. No something that we struggle with a lot when you and i worked together because it didnt seem proportional and that may have been asymmetric, iranian irene e to whatever the issue was. But at least in their minds that it was proportional most of the time to i think thats important thing that we can use anderson had the United States actions will affect iranian activities going forward. So thats probably even more important element as far as planners. Now is the way we have to plan for as many eventualities as possible as military planners pick thats going to be standard to anything that we do. And socom had to prioritize our Planning Efforts were going to continue to plan primarily against that network of proxies and Unconventional Warfare that iran pushes out a way to create that buffer for the regime that you described in the paper very well, and thats going to be the focus. I know theres been a lot of discussion on whether increased Defense Budgets in iran are going to lead to a greater emphasis on conventional military capability. I think you hit it right off the bat what you said that iranians are going to be driven by what they perceive as the threat. More than anything else, probably more than budgetary opportunities or limitations. And so thats the piece that we can still manage the same way, even if they chose to put more money in their defense spending and particularly on the conventional side. Right now i think for us in particular i think your paper supports the idea that for socom perspective where going to stay focused on those proxies and networks, and the reach iran as well past syria and yemen fighting to africa and into south america and into europe as well. And again tha thats part of the nature of my commands charge to look at these problems from a global perspective. I think thats going to be one of the key takeaways. The last point i make and has to do with the last section of your paper on developing an Industrial Base of whether or not its even possible for them to really significantly increase the capability of their conventional force internally, and how much can they depend on getting from others like russia. Ill tell you, in the last few years i worked in a socom area on our budget on how we develop our decisionmaking process and on what we buy, that takes a long time to change. Youve got to really build a significant infrastructure. And right now i tend to agree with your conclusion that thats unlikely to happen. Even though its possible, and as i said as military planners wiggling to make sure that secretary mattis and the president have options in either case. But our focus right now is going to be with an expectation that they will continue to push and if anything increased defense dollars and iran are likely to go toward increasing that network, looking for ways to expand it. Weve already seen evidence of them taking units and officers out of the conventional side that are working with the irgc in syria, and that need be an indication that youre looking to push on that side with the defensive nature of their conventional forces we dont see that being a major change anytime soon. Anyway, i thought a as a tool, e paper is extremely useful. We will make it mandatory reading with our planners down in tampa going forward, and as a set i wish we had it a few years ago. I look forward to the discussion and your questions. Mark . So i approached the iranian question, first of all, thank you for having me here today. From a former fleet commanders perspective, i spent a year in baghdad back in 20062007 timeframe and penetrator network and the malign activities that were going on were striking to me at the time. In thing in my most recent militant islam as the Deputy Commander at Central Command, and theres a consistent theme. In fact, for those of us who have studied this and watched it closely over, since the 79 revolution, weve seen these spasms increased tension with decreased tension, kind of an ebb and flow, and from a western mindset it seems like its a very difficult thing to eat anticipate or protect. From a Navy Perspective they are very much focus on the asymmetric. They like minds, they like small boats, they like a lot of different small submarines. And so the main thing in my mind as a former fleet command is how to prevent miscalculation . Nobody wants to go to war with iran. Nobody wants to have a miscalculation. How do you prevent that, at the same time not taking the first strike . And so when i was a strike group commit a few years when as in the gulf, but then fifth fleet commander said i dont want you to take the first punch i dont want you to start a war. So somewhere in this spectrum of potential activities, or people would ask me how frequently do you interact with iranians . It would be on a daily basis. There is a marked difference between irgc and the without iri in render honors before the u. S. Navy vessels pics of theres entire spectrum and thus merger of her interactions quite frankly has been routine and professional. Then you will hear, refer to it as not routine or unprofessional or aggressive or that sort of thing. In the big spectrum of activities, we watch it closely but youll see contradictions in the midst of the runup to and subsequent to the nuclear deal, as click the escalations and some of the activities, some of the malign activities have increased. Theres been interdiction of force and flow into yemen, for example. Nursing a lot of the coastal cruise missiles. So i ran has very much devoted to proxies and to asymmetry. And they are the masters at keeping it just at or just below the boiling point. So its a home game for them, and we have Rotational Forces that come through. So its always very important that you get your Commanding Officers and the action officers on board ships and aircraft to make sure they understand how to handle this situation and to always be in place where you are prepared. As was briefly mentioned we have a very, we have a dominating ability to escalate and to control a situation but at the same time these are International Waters and there are International Airspace and in the case of the navy, and so they are every bit as much right to be at sea as we do. And so this is something that you watch very carefully. General mattis, when i was fifth fleet, always you to challenge me about our uv boiled frog . Are you the guy whos been in this hot water long enough where its now the norm . So its something that you come you make sure that youre not completely cooked, but at the same time its something that requires thought and reflection on everyday. I thought your piece was really well done and i, too, would add to toms comments but it wouldve been will useful to have had some of these thoughts before. The longer you study the iranian psychology, i guess is a way to put it, over the last 5000 years its only been the last 500 that the west has somehow been they think of themselves as a powerful people, the heirs of the persian empire. Thanks for having here today. Look forward to the discussion. Thanks. Before i turn over to the audience, i want to push a little bit on something that im here in generally which is a Comfort Level with the likelihood of that the iranian focus is going to continue to remain asymmetric and probably not go heavily towards can developing more conventional military capabilities. The critical threats, our analysts who has worked on this extensively and a former analyst is your also, worked extensively on some of the iranian push toward more conventional capabilities, including, i thik we could read the deployment of conventional offices to syria as being a signed a conventional or unconventional activity. But it is also the question of the what point does asymmetric activity become symmetric . If you have enough missiles then theyre not asymmetric anymore. If the iranians were to acquire, say, the and the shipping Missile System from the russians or the missiles and want to buy from the russians, at what point does iran actually crossed the threshold in terms of the kinds of threat it poses to the United States and to our allies . Alas, would be i think sometimes we come to succeed on the fact that we the United States of america can take anything they can throw at us. But that may or may not be enough given that our alliance in the region cant and they may make different calculus. If you want to respond to the. I will begin and pass it to topic i think your points well taken, and that is their symmetry is asymmetry. Thats how theyve done this all along. To see the irgc now in syria, thats their modus operandi. I think you will find a way to try to create the syrian hezbollah and the yemeni hazlett and a little constable follow in the lebanese model. When you Start Talking about new technologies about those take money and the state training, which is another way of saying thats, its probably a conventional capability but it would certainly change your thinking, especially the talk about air defense and the as 400. That is part of their layers of trying to prove that theyre capable of handling anything that we have. Its a sobering problem when you start thinking about the kind of volume of fire that they could generate. That makes you a very, a very intensive reader of warnings and indications. If you are walking down the street and you and a really tough neighborhood and at the dark and there are people around you that you dont trust, your kind of in one stance. If you are happygolucky and some just walks up to a clock you and youre not ready for it, so its our job to be the ones that are always ready for whatever may. I look at the idea that we are seeing more as a mentioned, instead of working in syria, theyre working under irgc orders and towards their goals. I see that more of an extension, the proxy network fight than it do expansion of their conventional capability. It goes back to, im sure matt can cover this in littl in the e detail as well, but it kind of goes to your idea that you truly about what he perceived as a threat. So do they perceive a conventional threat to iran when you look right at the neighbors, or even at the United States intentions of what he believed them to be. I dont know that they see that as creating a necessity to build a more robust capability. Its been the focus of their conventional forces, have been defensive and in the mindset for so long so thats kind of what im talking about is it will be so difficult, it will take a long time to change the mindset of that capability. It all goes down to what to be perceived as a conventional threat. I think what you see happening in places like syria, you know, that iran and the irgc is facing a situation where its capacity, fred, your point is idea we like to call half dependency when you get stuck in what youve done war for so long, where that asymmetry, that asymmetric warfare is not sufficient. Youve seen this slow ratcheting up of what theyve been able to do in syria. Its not been sufficient. They are not winning in syria, frankly. So after almost six years now, past six years, you look at theyve had to depend on russian Close Air Support to be able, and it to other russian capacity in syria and it still not doing it for them. In iraq they are dependent on american Close Air Support. Imagine how humiliating this is likely to the iranians. The fact that for something that is so vital from their perceived geopolitical and, frankly, ideological interest, at least in syria, and iraq, they have a certain jew political interest in iraq, but syria and the lot is a combination. For something that is so vital to them, to depend on superpowers to save them. I can be kind of crude in describing that. Its a very human leading thing for them. I think this is something that change threat perception, the degree of the best way of pushing i think the irgc itself may have to change. Ma have to become Something Different, or they may have to become Something Different with the irgc. I think this is the big question. They are so do with it. I dont think their figured out the answers to these questions. I think thats why we are seeing them, i think 2015 is an Inflection Point does you saw the Supreme Leader talk about these issues, see him talking about offenses. You see them changing the leadership of the Armed Forces General staff to kind of bringing new leadership in creating a new structure their, to exit get these types of campaigns that you see in syria. They recognize its just that working the way theyv they beeg it in the past. But they dont know how to fix this problem necessarily. You kind of look at our expenses and iraq, ten years ago we had change our way of doing business. I think the iranians, it will be really tough for them to do th this. All right. Well go to the audience. The rules are wait for the microphone to come to you, identify yourself and your organization and put your statement in the form of a brief question. Over here. Thank you. Either very quick question. Im a palestinian journalist. At what point or d. C. This administration walking away from the jcpoa . If they dont, if iran is his hearing and hearing completed the obligation, how would the United States at the other partners with agreement to it not fulfill their own obligation to iran . Thank you. How the deal may need to be addressed in the future. Obviously, there has to be concerns about other members of the p5 plus one and how any strategy will be pursued with them or without them in regards to the nuclear deal, but i think that the larger issue i think for the us is that we need to look at iran from a more strategic approach that a nuclear deal should be one component of that. I think its been one of the flaws, frankly, of the Previous Administrations approach that they try to build everything around a nuclear deal and courtney some of our other policies whether diplomatic or security to have everything kind of flow behind in the wake of the nuclear deal and i think that we should be in general looking towards building a more conference of approach to iran in which the need to deal is more subordinate part of that and supporting a larger approach that does address the larger problems that we and our allies half with iran. But, again i think it is still to be determined how the administration will be approaching this. I think its important to remember the nuclear deal as written, not as the iranians have interpreted it and not as a Previous Administration intuited it, but as written it gives the us wide latitude to operate against the threat network, that i rgc for all nonnuclear related activities including sanctions. The us could take those actions without violating the deal. How the iranians would react is an interesting question and something we could talk about, but its important to understand that the deal itself provides a lot of decisions to an Administration Even if he decides not to walk away from it daily beast. First question format. Do you think the fact that their campaign has not been working in terms of warfare that they have to tweak it that they are more likely to continue a secret Weapons Program or be pressured to return to it as soon as possible . For the general, you mentioned that you will probably continue to engage with iranian proxies. Since you arent fighting them directly not that i have heard, but if you are willing to make news for us here, how are you confronting them on the battlefield . Their efforts inside syria, they are going to fight as long as it takes in syria and i think this is one of the things i point out in the monograph at least try to drive home the point that its one of our early failures in us policies in my opinion and many western capitals as well that we underestimated the degree to which iran is committed to assad and that they will do whatever it takes to support assad and i think that the lack of understanding that among those in the Previous Administration and frankly many other western capitals and that may include perhaps even israel as well thats thats what undergirds the belief that assad would essentially fall especially in 2011 and 2012 during that timeframe, which i think helps fuel some bad policy for many states during that period and i think it surprised me frankly during that time because if you understood irans calculus and irans Strategic Thinking you would know that there is frankly almost nothing they could do not due to support assad and we have seen that play out. At the same time iran takes approach toward syria that it doesnt do more than a feels like it has to, so every its a notch, every year its a different level and you see that that they are still not winning in my opinion, i mean, they may still be able to secure inside syria, but it is still not necessarily secure and everything that they want to work i dont know if that pushes them to the point where they are willing to risk something that would be potentially that could be caught especially with this Current Administration that could risk of that type of crisis. I think that is a leap from because the nuclear Weapons Program is tied to a different set of issues, variables and pursuing for the defense of the regime and security of the regime itself that not completely separate, but i think that is something that i would be surprised if that would be the next the. I think we would have to be in a more dire situation where they felt that they had completely disintegrated and that they felt like they had to do a Crash Program that they knew would risk potential allout war with israel and the us and im try to go through the cycle in my head right now. And we have yet to go through any time when trick true iran where in the last 25 years and frankly where they have not been cheating just a little so iran, despite the secretarys recent statement and im not saying the recent Us Government statement there is still issues that are compliance issues that are still of concern and so i think they will always have concerns about iran doing something illegal, something secret whether that doing something that risky that quickly, again, im not sure quite sure at this point. I will give you two points on your question on how we are dealing with proxies. Pers, my comments were primarily focused on a military planner how we build a list of options that we give decisionmakers to use in almost all of them are not direct conflict with ironic and proxies, so no new news here as far as that story goes, but i will refer you to john in his Posture Statement talking about what the real goal is is figuring out the best way using our analysts and our partners to minimize the influence that those proxies are having everywhere, not just in syria, but as far away as Columbia Partners in south america and how they could minimize the influence that those proxies will have in furthering iranian goals, so he called it in his testimony specifically, we have got to get in the great zone everyone is talking about and figure out ways to counter that influence in the gray zone catcher messaging cyber activity that we could minimize the effect of offense of cyber from iran is one of the ways to do that. Those were two dimension in his his testimony this year, but thats really what we are talking about. Right over here. Maam . Given irans influence in baghdad, which has been strengthened as a result of the war against isis and that Popular Mobilization units operating in some of the iranian proxies, how do you think that will affect us planning for its presence in iraq after isis is defeated . Will that prevent the us from maintaining a longerterm presence in iraq . Who would like to field that . Im quite sure that the iranian influence with the mobilization unit is a very serious concern for the administration, as it should be. It will affect decisions about how we went to maintain posture longterm in iraq. We have had comments from the Prime Minister in the past month or so about not 22 have us presence or at least certain forms of us presence past the Current Campaign against isis. For my own knowledge and awareness of how these negotiations go on, i would expect some of that is early posturing and we are going to be going back and forth on this for sometime as we have in the past. Hope we come up with a better arrangement and has been included in previous rounds of this in the past, but i think that the us has an opportunity in iraq to strengthen the iraq he people, to be frankly more selfdetermined because the iraqi people themselves do not appreciate all the iranian influence they have to deal with and i think this is something that as much as iran may have played a role in helping to fight isis and defend against the initial invasion in 2014, that ultimately the iraqi people would like to have frankly more balance in iraq and not have a degree of iranian influence in their Security Forces and would like assistance from us and from our partners in building up their Security Forces and building up political influence there and i think this is a great opportunity for the us to be able to show that we can be strong, effective partners and i think addressing the mobilization units is precisely where we should put a lot of our energy right now and i think because it has a tremendous potential if you are not paying attention to really undermine stability in iraq longterm, reactivate sectarian tensions and conflicts and recreate the environment for the next version of isis for insurgency in iraq. Im going to offer eight the moderate, iraq is more thoroughly integrated into the regional Iranian Security system that its ever been in modern times or as an independent country. There are thousands if not tens of thousands of iraqis fighting in syria under the command of the guard corps as part of that active resistance. Paramilitary organizations and the degree of autonomy thats been granted to the pm you including to an especially iranian control, maybe beyonce and iranian backed, i running control organization and rock that are not responsive to the Prime Minister and its at an unprecedented level and some of the leaders of shia death squads who contribute to the warfare in 2007 are now in prominent ministries within that iraqi government, which in my view basically dooms the prospect of sectarian stabilization in iraq as long as economic and so i think america has been focused on the fight against isis to the exclusion of thinking seriously about how to address these problems and the recapture of mobile mosul as if that in itself will be the thing that ends the threat from isis, which, of course, is wrong and as a result of that we have largely allowed all of this to develop in an extremely passive way and sort of hoping it wont turn into the problem that im pretty sure that it will. I think this is something that merits a lot of attention. Thank you. That segues into my question. Im not in the mind of the iranian regime, but if i were them it would be a nobrainer to get the most bang for the buck for all the money, the hundred 50 billion obama gave them to destroy and eventually fracture saudi arabia. That is the key work why arent they doing more in conjunction with the russians. We certainly have plenty of axes to grind . Why arent they doing more to destroy saudi arabia wax. [laughter] i will take that question to talk about cost imposing strategies because what you bring up is a good point about that we havent talked a lot about yemen and ball rein in some of the other investments that they do their in their strategy in sponsoring partners and proxies if we want to call them that in those places where i think in the general brought this up, which i didnt bring up in my key points, but one of the things i go into about understanding how iran and the force in different complexes discerning the difference between conflicts of opportunity versus conflicts of necessity and a war, if you understand why iran will go to war or why they will throw millions of dollars or billions of dollars at something you have to understand its calculus and a big part of that is how much does it matter to iran . Syria and iraq matter an awful lot to iran and whereas yemen and ball rein matter quite a bit , but dont matter in quite the same way whereas yemen matter an awful lot to our partners in the council on the g sheet gcc particularly to saudi arabia and so even though iran has certain Strategic Interests in those areas they have ideological interest in those areas and obviously have certain religious interest with the shia population in those areas. They want to kind of outreach and build relationships with and influence missionary work as i call it, but fundamentally it doesnt drive their behavior like that existential need they had to preserve things like lebanon and their relationship with assad and their need to protect their interests and investments that they have in iraq, so there investments in yemen and bahrain are cost imposing on the saudis in that the saudis have two from their perspective the saudis feel like to respond in those situations and that i iranians only need to invest a little bit in those places to draws significant reaction from the saudis and other players whereas we, when we are looking at how to respond a kind of drives the larger question and i know secretary mattis and others in the administration struggle with how to prioritize our responses whereas in iraq and syria those are things that are existential to iran. If we are looking purely from the iranian strategy perspective , we could for example do cost imposing strategies on iran because those areas are very important to us, but much more important to iran then as whereas yemen and bahrain are more imported to saudi arabia and i worry iran is doing cost imposing strategies on saudi arabia and the amorous and other countries are as well as we had we careful when we approach those issues, so i this i think this is one of the things i worry about and why its important to understand how it iran approaches issues like yemen and syria. Thank you very much. My question is, do you see any ideology or policy change in iran from the last two elections do you see this as a shia and sunni war in the region and finally if present trumps President Trump policy change is bringing peace [inaudible] going on from the election, which i figure at some point we talk about the election. The recent election that you have to remember the recent elections are within the very limited scope that iran allows for its democratic expression, if you want to call it that. President romani, he is a man of the system. I look at him as someone that is trying to keep this regime going because he recognizes and i think the ayatollah agrees with him on this that there is a lot thats not quite working with the government as it is and i think that they recognize that certain things need to be tweaked. They disagree on with how things need to be changed or tweaked, but fundamentally president romani is looking for ways to reform and even his main competitor who as we like to call in the west the hardline approach and i really try to avoid too much of this kind of moderate high liner hardliner division because i dont like it matters too much, but i think that from their perspective he may be was more in line with how the Supreme Leader thinks, but fundamentally theres a very significant difference. I think my colleague here kind of pointed out in one of her pieces that in reality the only way the Supreme Leader would really lose in an election is if we had another 2009 the people came out on the streets and contested the legitimacy of the entire system. This was an election about legitimacy and thats what the Supreme Leader i think really enjoyed seeing those long lines, the lease what they were able to talk about in the New York Times about showing long lines and we have these great elections in iran. People came out and voted. We are not chaotic like the rest we are this island of tranquility here and i think that story is something that is very important to the ayatollah to be able to promote and that is something that a matter who won the election that was important. Now, whats interesting and this goes back to the larger issue about ideology still mattering is that the ideology i think the average iranian is not a huge fan of the ideology. We go back and forth as to whether on the left here in town kind of thinks the ideology still really doesnt matter. A few people do genuflections to the ideology at the top and it doesnt really matter. Some on the right talk about maybe the terminology one of my good friends describes as a zombie republic, this stage where it really kind of toxic but its still not a lie. I dont know, maybe it is. The ideology is what keeps this certain elite cohort in power and they are not ready to give it up yet. Its what motivates the revolutionary guard corps and their behavior and what they do in the rest of the region and they are not ready to give that up yet. We havent seen any changes in their foreignpolicy yet. Im looking for changes in foreignpolicy and its not happening, so i think this is what for me is essential and whether honey remember has very little influence on foreignpolicy elisa cora foreignpolicy, so i think this is for me i dont see whether iran comes in from the cold and becomes more integrated into the International System pocket of the nuclear deal, which was the hope of the last ministration. The arc of history wont necessarily bring in this government and change it fundamentally, so i think this is what i think is a real challenge that i dont think they are ready for this yet. This is still the founding generation from the revolution. They are still in charge i think frankly they still have to die before you will see a very significant to change in leadership. This may even last past him passing on because the revolutionary guard corps is so entrenched in the system and their perspectives, they still control so much that even if most of the average person it will be hard to see that transition and whether you see this kind of shia sunni dynamic as you are describing i meet i think that iranians dont really want to have great sectarian order. They dont like that. Its not in their ideology, frankly, to do that. Everywhere they go to work, they tend to work with people they went to work with everyone, but they end up working in the end with people they trust in people they end up trusting our fellow shia, so that ends up every time they go into any country to work with anyone ends up creating that set deck secretary dynamic peer. With this at ministration i think there if iran once to change i think there are opportunities to reset, but i think we are not seeing any real changes from iran in their foreign policies and their sponsoring. So, i wouldnt expect this administration to take a different attitude about it. Last question, back here. Im a student from a new york. Im going to read one of the iranian voters in the president ial election. Then, i will ask my question. Very briefly. Sure. Im going to vote for you, but you should know that i didnt have any other choice. You have never been my choice, but me and all of those who come out vote for you is because we had just one choice and we deserve a better president s. It was pretty ironic. I think in his 20s my question is in the recent president ial election we saw a huge turnout supporting reformists, so i want to know extent in the short or longterm goals people can pressure in the democratic way such as election, such as counsel election, such as parliamentary candidate for direct involvement and so can the youth put pressure on the regime . Exactly. Super. If you read the monograph you will find as much as i love the iranian people, i dont find there is really much you can do from the bottom up to pressure foreignpolicy of the iranian state. In the income i think the Supreme Leader really does worry about domestic and stability. He worries about counterrevolution all the time that the elites are constantly freaked out about this kind of revolution. At the same time they dont really worry about whether whether the poll numbers are pro or anti syria engagement or direct involvement or yemen unless he gets very very dire and the only time we had seen this happen was towards the end of that iran iraq war in the 80s when it just became so extreme where they knew they would have to do Something Different because mothers and fathers could not send their sons and their children into the trenches anymore. I think domestic opinion has very minimal impact on particularly with the ir gc does and unfortunately thats how it works in most democracy and iran is not really a democracy. I wish it was. If you have taken anything away from this, i hope you will take away from that project and are discussion here the gravity of the issue and seriousness of it and the fact that it is something we can reasonably undertake to understand and i would close my echoing the initial point of we have paralyzed ourselves for decades thinking about iran as an opaque irrational system governed by crazy who do things for reasons that no normal human being can understand and are therefore we havent tried hard enough to understand of them. When you try and you look at a body of as matt has done so well here, you can discern a lot about what their patterns have been with their patterns of behavior are like to see and this would be a great moment in history for a solid look at that , which matched has provided and a serious look forward about what the us can do in the future and to think about how to address very predicable threats and challenges that we face. I went to thank you for coming and think our panelists for a terrific discussion. [applause]. This from the hill a short time ago, President Trump will pull the us out of the paris Climate Change agreement. The report citing two sources with direct knowledge of said president to trump is working with a group led by epa chief on the exact mechanism of pulling out before announcing his final decision. Cbs news reported President Trump is telling allies about his decision marked a dramatic departure from the Obama Administration who was instrumental in crafting the deal and makes the us an outlier among the worlds nations nearly all of whom support the Climate Change. You can read more at the hill. Com. President trump has just weeded