[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] matthew olson, first of all, welcome. To all of you, all four of you. Matt olsen is cofounder of ironnet cybersecurity. Previously serving as a director of National Counterterrorism center where he briefed the National Security council and reported to president obama on counterterrorism activities. Mr. Olson also previously served as general counsel nsa focusing on surveillance law and cybersecurity. Under the bush administration, mr. Olsen served as acting assistant attorney general, National Security division, doj. Mr. Olsen also served as executive director of Guantanamo Task force special counsel director to the fbi and served as federal prosecutor for more than a decade. Hes a graduate of university of virginia and harvard law school. Adam kleine is robert m gates Senior Fellow Center for new american security, widely published in areas of National Security, surveillance, counterterrorism, law and policy. He was previously an attorney at International Law firm. He was also worked on National Security policy at Rand Corporation and the 9 11 Public Discourse project, the nonprofit successor to the 9 11 commission. Mr. Klein served as the law clerk for justice scalia, it is a graduate of Northwestern University and columbia law school. Elizabeth goiten codirects the Brennan Center for justice, liberty and National Security program, New York University school of law. Previously ms. Goitein served as counsel to the yes, senator russell feingold, chairman of the constitution subcommittee on Senate Judiciary of this Senate Judiciary committee. Ms. Goitein also served as a Trial Attorney in the federal Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the department of justice, and she graduated from yale law school. Elisabeth collins is serving her second term as board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. Previously she was an attorney in private sector at two International Law firms, and served as the republican chief counsel for Supreme Court nominations for Senate Judiciary committee. Ms. Collins was also an assistant attorney general legal policy, doj, where she provided advise and consult relating to National Security and other issues. Ms. Collins is a graduate of the university of chicago and harvard law school. We will proceed to my left to my right, so mr. Olsen, proceed please. Thank you very much chairman grassley bigots honor to be here. Let me but the bottom line upfront come as a former director of the National Counterterrorism center i can attest to the fact that section 702 has significantly contributed to our ability to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and around the world. This is consistent with the testimony that you heard from the panelists, the witnesses in the earlier panel. Similarly as a former general counsel at nsa and as a former Justice Department official i worked to ensure we have limited section seven at you in the that protected the privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. I will make a few brief remarks and i will focus those remarks on three points, all addressing how section 702 has worked in practice. First, the operational value of 702. As this committee is well aware we face a persistent at adaptive threat from al qaeda and isis and other groups. Just since september 2014 isis has claimed credit for 40 terrorist attacks outside of its calories in syria and iraq. The online environment for potential extremist Committee Case isis handlers and with recruiters plays a critical roe in providing the direction to these individuals and mobilizing extremist toward violence. So to combat this dynamic threat our ability to conduct surveillance under 702 has proven vital. The key point is this, our best opportunity to identify and stop these attacks before they occur is the good intelligence. Thats often derived from our surveillance authorities such as 702. As the director of nctc i relied on a daily basis on intelligence, collected under 702 and in our morning briefings the and us often reported a critical piece of information came from section 702. In his landmark report the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board identified approximate 30 specific case or section 702 was the initial Catalyst Enterprises unknown terrorist operatives and plots, and more than 100 cases where several to help to lead to the rest of individuals on terrorism related charges. This is a truly extraordinary record in just the past few years. My second point is oversight. When congress amended fisa in 2008 i was at the department of justice. Congress established an unprecedented and coffee its compliance oversight regime for 702. Under this regime as youve heard all three branches exercise authority to ensure the government is probably using its authority. This oversight has been strengthened over the past several years through both congressional and executive branch action. This rigorous oversight regime reflects the careful balance that congress struck in 2008 to ensure that both the effectiveness of its authority and the protection of privacy and Civil Liberties. In my experience the statute has been effective in doing both. The third point i would like to make is to suggest that calls for major reforms are not warranted. One issue that the committee has written about this morning is the socalled incidental collection issue. A person targeted for surveillance under 7 702 speaksn the phone or send an email, they often maybe communicate with somebody in the United States. This is whats been referred to as incidental collection. Some have raised concerns about such collection. I can tell you the ability to obtain and use these medications has proven vital to the disruption of plots and the rest of al qaeda operatives in the tray. The zazi case and other specific case are examples of the Public Congress should resist calls to restrict the governments ability to acquire and use this information concerning u. S. Persons. I second issue involves ability to search 70 702 information wih u. S. Person identifiers such as names and email addresses. I believe these queries are essential means for analyst identify critical intelligence that would otherwise be inaccessible. From an operational perspective when intelligence analysts and identify terrorist operatives and undercover plots, one of the very first steps is t a check an existing database for potential connections to suspected terrorist. So with the fbi suspects a person here is moving toward violence, the ability to query 702 information enables that guy to go to identify key medications that the government has already lawfully collected to find vital clues for i believe this approach reflects an enduring lesson from the 9 11 attacks. That is of the impairment for the government to effectively integrate and use the relevant information it holds in its databases in order to connect the dots. Some are now urging congress to impose probable cause requirements on intelligence agencies before they can even search section 702 dated with u. S. Person identifiers. In my view this is a monday billy of agents to move quickly to identify terrorist information. At the early stage of investigation it may be impossible to establish probable cause and, therefore, such data would be beyond their reach. And so, mr. Chairman, the authority of congress established under section 702 has played an indispensable role in my view and protecting the nation and canno and in offerins program under strict oversight regime the government has construed it can collect data in a manner that collects privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. Americans. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Klein. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member, thank you for inviting me to testify today. In a recent report to coauthors and offered more than 60 reputation for future sit ins policy including section 702. We concluded section 702 is a a valuable intelligence tool that should be reauthorize with existing statutory authorities intact. We also propose enhancements to oversight, transparency and privacy. The public should know that section 702 is already subject to rigorous multi layered oversight from all three branches of government. Few Government Programs receive such close scrutiny. That said it is worth considering what more we can do to protect privacy and strengthen public trust and intelligence programs. This isnt just a privacy issue. Its also important for National Security. Programs that lack public support will not be politically sustainable in the long term. The challenge is to do this without diminishing section 702 effectiveness as an intelligence tool. Broadly speaking there are three areas of opportunity. The first is to strengthen key institutions that oversee 702 including the fisa court and the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. The secondary is Greater Transparency so about how 702 affects americans, but how agencies query 702 information and about how the government uses 702 information in the criminal justice system. The third area is to strengthen accountability for those who received signal intelligence reporting, to ensure classified material is handled responsibly and never use for inappropriate purposes. Including political purposes. Id also like to mention one thing i hope this process will avoid. One of the 9 11 commissions key messages was Intelligence Agency did to people to connect the dots between various pieces of information been collected. I worked for tom kean and lee hamilton in 2004 during the process that led to the creation of the dni and nctc and i know congress and Intelligence Community have moved heaven and earth since that time to break down information of stovepipes in the ioc. With a great terrorist threats to confronting us at our allies, it would be unfortunate to reverse course on the progress now. We should not create new obstacles that could prevent agencies and connecting the dots and stopping terrorist attacks. Im happy to provide more details during the q a. Thank you and i look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Ms. Goitein. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member feinstein and members of the committee thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Brennan Center for justice. Congress goal when asked the fisa amendments act in 2008 was to give our government more powerful tools against foreign threats. The government has used this authority to monitor suspected terrorists overseas, to trace the networks at interrupt their plots. That is exactly as it should be. We are here today because of the other things that section 702 has been interpreted to allow. The government isnt simply monitoring Foreign Terrorists or powers. Instead its scanning the content of almost all of the International Communications that flow into and out of the United States and acquiring hundreds of millions of key medications each year, including a large although still unknown number of Americans Communications. In addition, despite being required to minimize the retention and use of americans data, the government keeps that data for years and routinely searches it for information to use against americans in ordinary criminal cases. Indeed current roles allow the fbi to read americans email femo listen to the phone calls without any factual predicate to suggest wrongdoing, let alone a want. I dont believe this is what congress had in mind when it passed section 702. Inviting the law congress entrusted the executive branch and the fisa court with significant discretion. For instance, Congress Allowed the targeting of any for a overseas trusting the government to focus its efforts on those who pose a threat to our interests. Congress also left it to the executive branch and the fisa court to fashion pacific minimization rules. I dont mean to imply that this trust was misplaced. In fact, weve seen essentially no evidence of intentional misuse. What weve seen is Mission Creep so that a law designed to protect against foreign threats has become a major source of warrantless access to americans of data and a tool for ordinary domestic law enforcement. This outcome is contrary to only terrifies his original intent but to americans expectations and their trust that congress will protect their privacy and the freedoms. There are several reforms that congress could enact that would show up protections for americans while preserving the core of section 702. The governments ability to collect the communications of suspected terrorists and others who wish us harm without a warrant, even when those key medications transit through or are stored inside the United States. Ill touch on three of the key reforms. First, congress should narrow the scope of surveillance by requiring the government to have a reasonable belief that the target is someone worth targeting such as a foreign power or a suspected terrorist. This would be an integral determination. It would be no probable caution, no fisa court approval. This reform would offer critical protection, not just a lawabiding foreigners, but to americans. When the government can target any for a overseas, that enables a massive amount of collection of innocent conversations between americans and their friends, relatives and associates abroad. Those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling and potentially abuse. This reform is also while for the United States tech industry. The governments ability to target any for a overseas is one reason that european courts have invalidated datasharing agreement between the u. S. And european companies. Thats why 30 major u. S. Tech companies, including google, microsoft and facebook, signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of its section 702 surveillance along with other reforms. Second, Congress Congress should require the government to obtain a warrant before searching section 702 data for Americans Communications. Cant care to what mr. Evan said, restrictions on searches of lawfully acquired Digital Information by the constitutional norms, even when the government has a warrant to seize in search of digital data in a criminal case, it cannot run a different search of that data for Different Reasons without obtaining another warrant. Its really should not have that freedom when it obtained the data without a word based on a promise that its only targets were foreigners. Third, congress should codify the end of the data collection. This practice has no basis in the statute. Its a small part of upstream collection which is itself a a small part of section 702 surveillance. The privacy concerns it raises are uniquely significant this is clearly a case where the risks outweigh the benefits. These basic changes were not only go far toward protecting americans privacy, and also better align the statute with the goals it is meant to serve. Ill stop there and i look forward to taking your questions. Ms. Collins. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member feinstein, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I provide this testimony in my capacity as an individual board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. An independent executive Branch Agency charged with providing advice and oversight with respect to federal counterterrorism actions. From 20132014 our five member bipartisan board conducted an extensive examination of the 702 program. In july 2014 we issued a unanimous report concluding that the section 702 program is valuable, statutorily authoriz authorized, and at its core constitutional. We set forth the legislative foundation for the program, the implement procedures that govern the operation of the program, and extensive oversight structure that accompanies the program. We also unanimously voted out ten policybased recommendations, each of which has been implemented or is in the process of being implemented, and none of which required legislation. My oral and written testimony draw heavily from the boards report which continues to be a valuable resource for understanding and assessing the program. The board conducted both a legal and policy analysis of section 702 program. We unanimously concluded that the program has a limited scope. It does not authorize or result in bulk collection. Instead it authorizes the government only to engage in target collection of telephone and Internet Communications of nonu. S. Persons located abroad who are likely to communicate information about Court Approved foreign intelligence topics with the compelled assistance of providers. Although u. S. Persons may not be and are not targeted, u. S. Person information may be incidentally collected. In that aspect of the program was a core focus of our attention, leading to key recommendations on minimization procedures and transparency. We also weighed the value and the privacy implications of using u. S. Person identifiers to query 702 data. These queries are consistent with years of direction to the Intelligence Community to connect the dots, but also raise significant privacy implications. And we made recommendations designed to address those implications. The board also focus on the judicially approved a targeting and minimization procedures governing the operation of the program. We noted a special protections afforded to u. S. Persons, and made recommendations designed to tighten certain aspects of the procedures. Finally, we considered the expensive and layered oversight that accompanies the 702 program. Oversight occurs in all three branches of government, and can only be described as rigorous. Although we identified no instances of deliberate abuse, there is always the possibility of human or technological error, as with any complex program, and robust oversight is essential. As a legal matter we unanimously concluded that the program is statutorily authorized and that the program is constitutional. Although certain features of the program pushed it close to the limits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Specifically we raised and addressed concerns about into the u. S. Person Elections Come socalled about collection, and use of u. S. Person identifiers as query terms. The board also spent significant time understanding about of section 702. It has helped the United States learn more about the membership, leadership structure, priorities, tactics and plans of International Terrorist organizations. It has enabled the discovery of previously unknown terrorist operatives as well as of the locations and movements of suspects already known to the government. It has led to the discovery of previously unknown terrorist plots directed against the United States and foreign countries, enabling the destruction of those plots. Overall we came to appreciate the flexibility that section 702 affords the executive branch while still within the framework of judicial approval and oversight. The boards report and recommendations are consistent with what has been called a clean reauthorization of section 702. We made serious recommendations, each of which we thought necessary to enhance privacy and Civil Liberties protections, but none of which required legislation. Each of these recommendations has been or is being implemented. I personally do section 702 as a valuable tool in the fight against terrorism, in believe the current framework for section 702 provides the necessary protections to ensure that our American Values are not compromised. I look forward to answering your questions. Let me start with a question for all of you, went to some extent, each of you, or maybe i should see each of you, but some of you touched on this. You heard me mention earlier some suggesting that the government should have to get judicial approval or even a warrant before searching lawfully collected 702 information using u. S. Person information. You all come from this, from different perspectives and you all have different backgrounds. Id like each of you to answer the question, is there any legal or constitutional reason why we should require judicial approval of a warrant before section 702 collection can be searched using u. S. Persons information . Thank you, mr. Chairman. First on the question of legal or constitutional requirement. I think the answer is no. Judge hogan of the fisa court addressed this issue head on. The question of whether or not to require a warrant for searching section 702 and determined that it was consistent both with the fisa statute as well as the Fourth Amendment to remi permit the fbo conduct such searches without going to a court in the first instance to obtain a warrant or for any other judicial approval. I would add that i think its operationally extremely unwise to impose such a requirement and i would point as hypothetical example to the zazi case. The individual in colorado who was in touch with an al qaeda courier in pakistan. The hypothetical i would post is imagine it information about zazi came from a tip come somebody said to the fbi this person zazi is in the midst of plotting to carry out attacks on the new york subway. That would not constitute probable cause in all likelihood, and the fbi would therefore be barred from checking its own databases to see if a communication existed between zazi and his al qaeda courier in pakistan. Thats the first thing that we want the fbi to do when they receive that information, it sent unintrusive are step and it allows the fbi to determine what else they need to do and i would suggest imposing a judicial requirement would bar that information from the fbi being able to access it. Mr. Klein . This is really not a trivial privacy question. That said i agree entirely with mr. Olsons analysis of it. One point i would like to add is we know have some information in the Public Domain about the scale of this problem. How much foreign intelligence information is coming through this channel into the criminal justice process. We know from the most recent ic statistical transference report that it was only one case in 2016 word fbi agent actually hold up so this information in a u. S. Person query in an ordinary criminal case. So given that the skill of this is very limited i think it would be a significant overcorrection with major consequences for National Security potential if we were to impose a court order requirement. There are other ways to get at this problem. It is not a trivial privacy question. We cannot more transparency about why these are necessary. We can have more information precisely but how often the bureau does them and often the return information. We have proposed a possible slight narrowing of disgrace in some cases in my written testimony, but by a large i think the current practices need to continue. Ms. Goitein . Were talking about this of range as if it somehow laid imagine in the governments a database object the government got this information without inquiry award in the first instance even though it knows it will be pulling in americas Committee Case instantly is opposing the fisa court by certifying that its own interest is in the foreign targets, that it has no intention to no interest in any particular note american. It instead went to the fisa court and said our particular note americans whose communications we are hoping to read as a result of this collection, then the government would have to get a warrant. So to me warrantless backdoor searches are a violation of the spirit if not the later of the reverse targeting prohibition. I will also say that i constitutional matter, this is only quite recently been looked at by any court outside of the fisa court, but the notion that once that it is seized the Fourth Amendment is done in the Fourth Amendment doesnt apply to any later searches can is actually not corrected you can tell by analogies to criminal cases in which data may be seized under a wart but if the government wants to use, conduct a separate search later for Different Reasons it does have to go get another word, even though its already collected the data and it is sitting lawfully in the government databases. I can provide the case law. Ms. Collins. Based on the boards analysis i do not is constitutionally required or advisable as a policy matter. We spent a tremendous amount of time on the issue of u. S. Person queries, and we made a number of recommendations designed to enhance privacy protections. These recommendations which have been implemented impacted the essay, the cia and the fbi. But after extensive discussion and consideration, the majority of the board declined even in the most difficult case, which is the instance of a query by an fbi agent in an ordinary case to recommend a warrant requirement. We were concern that such a requirement would raise the threat of rebuilding the socalled wall between intelligence and criminal investigations, and that criminal investigators needed to be aware of potentially relevant information. We did recommend additional restrictions on the use and dissemination of any such queried information. Senator blumenthal, should i call on senator lee while you are getting ready or are you ready . [inaudible] okay, go ahead. [inaudible] first of all, regarding the fisa court and the brief, the role that they play. I have long been concerned about ensuring that the fisa court, which authorizes an overseas government for surveillance activities under section 702, as you know, and other authority has sufficient information about the Civil Liberties and privacy implications of the decisions that it makes. In 2013 i propose legislation to establish a special advocate to assist the court in that task, and i think its fundamental that the fisa court here different perspective and legal reasoning about the way statutory dosages and concerns involve this area. In 2015 Congress National past the usa freedom act which triggered an institutional process for participation of amicus curiae come to provide the fisa court with information about Civil Liberties and privacy concerns when the court is presented with novel or significant questions of law. The court has come understand, appointed five to fill this purpose. So my question is, do you think they have played a helpful role . How could this process be improved . And what do you think are the next steps for fisa Court Reforms in regard to bringing these different perspectives to bear . And bats for the whole panel. Thank you, senatothank you,. This is something ive written about. I agree with you entirely that the amicus development is a good thing. I worked in the space i read the declassified isa court opinions. I read the youth Court Transparency reports so i know the fisa court is doing rigorous oversight. But if you talk to ordinary people, if you talk to law students, they are skeptical. There are two reasons. Because its in secret and i cant change by large office declassified into a good thing. The other reason is because in most cases on the government gets to argue. People used to a court where both sides get to argue. So the usa freedom act was a good thing. Its in the courts discretion and not mandatory. So given the significance of the annual subacute recertification proceeding, one thing i propose that think would help strengthen the Public Confidence that is very rigorous oversight is to require the court to appoint an amicus just in that one category proceedings which is programmatic oversight and is exceptionally highstakes. This is a way to build trust and 702 that people know its getting rigorous scrutiny and it would not affect the governments in limitation of the program which is what were all concerned about one bit. Thank you. Senator blumenthal, i want to thank you for your leadership on that issue specific. I think that was an extremely important contribution of usa freedom act. I think its clear from the act that congress intended for the fisa court to make use and which there was a novel or significant legal issue unless there was some extra a circumstances. For the most part the court has done that. Within a couple of occasions on which the court has thumper suspension inappropriate base on the rational of the court. I dont think thats consistent with what was intended but thats been rare come sunday think this committee should keep an eye on. I do think it makes sense to a participation in the annual certification process be mandatory. The one other thing i would suggest is that there is currently no provision for amici to appeal rulings of the fisa court if the amici arguments were rejected. And sometimes thats important. I think we saw in the fisa courts decision on backdoor searches there were a number of to say the least there a novel legal issues in there that would have benefited from review pics i think congress could usefully add a Provision Requiring automatic certification to the fisa court of review insignificant cases where the amici arguments are rejected. Thank you. The privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board spent a significant amount of time looking at the workings of the fisc and we addressed the fourth Intelligence Surveillance court both a 702 report which is the subject of todays hearing at our section 215 report. We made a series of recommendations which were designed primarily to enhance Public Confidence in the workings of the fisc and oversight that that body provides. We supported the concept of a special advocate. It was one of our recommendations we did ultimately leave it to the discretion of the article iii judges who sit on that court, but to the point can we did also recommend consideration of a mechanism for appeal. Although not as of right. As you know my initial proposal was for a special advocate, and that it be in fact, at the advocates discretion whether to be engaged, not at the courts discretion. So i would welcome thoughts as to how to improve that process. Did you have any comments, mr. Olsen . Thats all right. I would simply add as somebody who has appeared many times before the fisa court on behalf of the government, that the characterization of the court as a rubberstamp or insufficiently cognizant of the array of issues before it, i think has been unfair. That said, i agree with the benefits from a public legitimacy standpoint of including the opportunity for these judges to appoint amici in appropriate cases. So i largely agree with my colleagues here how thats worked out over the past couple of years. We all know that the best judges who are not rubberstamped welcome the advocacy strong and vigorous advocacy on both sides of an issue because it enables them to make better decisions. Their Worst Nightmare in fact, is a defendant who is underrepresented or representing himself in many respects. I agree. So thats the way the system works. Thats the spirit that led me to make this proposal. Thank you all very, very much. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator lee. Thank you very much. When senator lee is that i will just have one question and then i think we will be done. Go ahead. Ms. Goitein, id like to start with you. Why is it concerning the agents decide not to use information that they obtain when doing a backdoor search . Im sorry . In other words, what kinds of concerns doesnt raise when you get somebody to a backdoor search whether they use it or not, why is that a problem . I see your point. Well, the point is that the search itself is a violation of americans privacy. Thats the heart of the fourth and is a government has to have a warrant before intruding on americans result expectation of privacy and whether not they find something as result of that does not affect the privacy intrusion. It has other effects potentially, but if the government enters your house without a warrant and doesnt find anything, there is no argument there that somehow your privacy wasnt in data because the search was fruitless. I think we have to understand the nature of the privacy intrusion when the government is allowed to search Americans Communications without a warra warrant. What kinds of things can information be used for . What kinds of investigations could incorporate information obtained through a backdoor search . What we dont know exactly for a couple of reasons can one reason is because the list of crimes unrelated to National Security, that the department of justice is authorized to use section 702 data when prosecuting, that was not public for all we know is that its serious crimes but we dont know which crimes those are and despite repeated requests that information has not been made public. The other reason we dont know is because the government has spotty complaints at best with the statutory requirement that it notified and will defend its when using evidence obtained or derived from section 702. The governments interpretation of derived from a appears to be quite generous perhaps gri great once again the department has refused to make that interpretation public. Its fighting for your request for that interpretation to the neil. We do know i is that were no notifications given at all until 2013 and then when the government was essentially caught telling the Supreme Court that it notified the senate when it doesnt change its practices. Since then i think there have been eight cases despite the fact that the fbi routinely searches section 702 data and sorely National Security cases, and there have been hundreds of National Security prosecutions during this time. So we have an information deficit here. In fact, we dont really know. We dont really have any idea how often this occurs. Your Organization Recently signed a letter to the director of national intelligence. Expressing dismay as to why he was choosing not to provide an estimate as to the number of americans who are subject to these. Yes. And if i could i would like very much to speak to the notion that this is so infeasible or at least not without drastically vitally americans privacy. There are three kinds of collection under 702. The first is collection of telephone calls. It is a simple matter to assess, to estimate whether someone on one yo end of the call is amerin and has been looking at the country code. Its not perfect but were not looking for perfection. When not looking for an exact count there were looking for estimate. It is sufficient for the purpose and involves no privacy intrusion. The second kind of collection is upstream internet collection. When the government conducts this kind of collection it must first run a filter to try to filter out wholly Domestic Communications. It doesnt do this by doing a a lot of research that invades americans privacy it does this using ip addresses and technical means, thats what the pclob report is coming to do so it manages to filter out enough Domestic Communications that he can comply with the constitution. So its this method to determine the american versus foreign status of the communicant is sufficient for purposes of complying with the constitution, i think it should be sufficient for purposes of getting americans a rough sense of how many of their communications are collected. The Third Program is where there are more complicated issues but even for the program the privacy community is unanimous in saying that conducting a onetime limited sampling under careful conditions would be a net privacy gain. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, id like to spend that letter that i referenced a moment ago for the record. As the letter notes, senator wyden has been requesting this information since 2011. The House Judiciary Committee and privacy groups have been requesting that information now for nearly two years. Members of the house of representatives were promised i believe by director clapper and director coats that the estimate would be forthcoming. So we have yet to receive that information, and sounds like you share my concern with the fact that notwithstanding those assurances notwithstanding the Public Interest in this there is no information yet. There was a lot of progress under the previous administration. There were several meetings that Intelligence Community had with house member scott with numbers of Civil Society in which they discuss methodologies. There are considering congress tremendous amount of progress on this and the letter from members of the House Judiciary Committee confirmed their understanding that the administration had committed to providing that number in early 2017. Hopefully by january. And, in fact, all accounts, public and private come suggested there on the verge of launching that count towards the end of last year. We had a change of administration, and the government has now backed off of its commitment to provide that information. Thank you very much. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Syndicate, i just have one question and it will be for ms. Collins. Moore describes the recommendations is being implemented so this was the question. The boards last report on this was about a year and half. So can you walk us through the specifics of the findings before recommending in this area and provide us an update regarding the status of implementation by the executive branch . When we get our report on section 702 we spent a lot of time on the issues and sat down in collection because it has both policy and constitutional implications. We ultimately did identify five measures designed to provide insight into incidental collection and these are collectively reflected in recommendation nine of the court and it has been partially implemented and without getting into too many details i can address this in further detail tomorrow. To make a point, the recommendation aspect that involves how is known are easier to implement. It is more feasible. I am back to the arguments of the eni and nasa that there are operational that are technological hurdles to providing some of the information that has been requested. Is that there are certain methodologies that suggested increase by these concerns but i would add my voice to those who urge dni and the nsa to continue to find a way to provide some form of identification or some estimates of incidental us collection. I want to thank all of you for your listening and thanks to the audience and all the staff that were dissipated. We will proceed to someplace along the line, thank you very much. [inaudible conversation] south koreas president visited the white house earlier today and after a meeting with President Trump in the morning, the two held a joint conference in the rose garden. Used the opportunity to speak against recent actions by the north korean regime. Heres a look at what he had to say. Together we are facing the threat of the reckless and brutal regime in north korea. The nuclear and Ballistic Missile programs of that regime require a determined response. The north korean dictatorship has no regard for the safety and security of its people or its neighbors and has no respect for human life and thats been proven over and over again. Millions of north koreas own citizens have suffered and star to get. And the entire world just witnessed what they regime did to our wonderful auto, otto warmbier. I think president mode for expressing his condolences. And our thoughts and our prayers remain with his wonderful family. The era of strategic patience with the north korean regime has failed. Many years has it failed. Frankly, that patience is over. We are working closely with south korea and japan as well as partners around the world on a range of Diplomatic Security and economic measures to protect our allies and our own citizens from this menace known as north korea. The United States calls on other regional powers and all responsible nations to join us in implementing sanctions and demanding that the north korean regime choose a better path and do it quickly and a different future for its longsuffering people. Our goal is peace, stability and prosperity for the region. But the United States will defend itself always will defend itself, always. And we will always defend our allies. Part of that commitment we are working together to ensure fair burden sharing and support of the us military presence in south korea, burden sharing is a very important factor. A factor thats becoming more and more prevalent, certainly to this administration. President moon will be talking about us korean relationships at the center for international studies, we will have live coverage of his remarks at 6 pm eastern on our companion network cspan