Transcripts For CSPAN3 Allied Strategy In The Pacific 20150903

Not a place for happiness. Overall, the requirements for invasion of japan was overwhelming air sea superiority and abundant amphibious which we and abundant amphibious which we had in 44, 45. That is among the reasons why the big pacific drive did not get started until 44, 45. We were building lots of ships. Roosevelts global strategy. Although talk building the pacific war, it is evidenced that it was a two front war. Roosevelt always thought about it as a global war. A lot of historians like to compartmentalize it. They anticipated post war relationship with the soviet union. Now, roosevelts strategy, there are different interpretations by it. A lot of people said he had no strategy. He just reacted to events. Others say he was a prisoner of public opinion. Post war critics would say you had virtue kwrous americans looking to win the war. I dont think thats true. And of course there is the cold war arguments that roosevelt should have tried to contain and limit soviet expansion while at the same time fighting germany and japan. Finally, a few authors and i agree with them, say definite vision for the post world war. Was a dupe, apeaser, realist . What spin would you put on it . Complicating matters, he died before he could fully execute th his strategy. When truman took over, he changed it. Roosevelt was secretive. He didnt like diaries. Didnt like notes in his meetings. Deceptive. After the war, you have the outbreak of the cold war, which made the relationship with the soviet union a hot potato. A lot of people had instead had to cover their tracks. The official strategy of allens strategy was Germany First, which they had thought about before the war started. And agreed to december 1941. At that conference they said we would go standard defensive and take the offensive in europe. Almost immediately the angloamerican deviated from that strategy. There has been historical debate why was that . Who is to blame at that . A lot of people like to lay it at the feet of the rich. Who deviated from Germany First and why . I would say the traditional criticisms of British Mediterranean strategy apply to the pacific. For example, in global terms, the Pacific Theater is peripheral. And the mediterranean strategy was a diversion from the second front. In fact, it was deployment to the Pacific Theater that made a second front impossible during 42 and 43. The Pacific Theater hindered the buildup of troops in the United Kingdom. As we shall see, it strengthened june to december 1942 after we had defeated the japanese. Increased another 60 in 44. So the question is, why was this . And i will make the argument that it was a product of roosevelts strategy for the post world war. What was that order . What did roosevelt want to achieve . His overriding drive was to fill the vacuum with a post world war. This would in future decades be known as datante. He sought to meet stalin to establish this relationship. He deferred the second front until he met stalin and secured an agreement on the post world war. Reached the agreement with stalin inial ta. And it is worthy to note this strategy is and his vision was die metric alley opposed. The post order was on u. S. Soviet longevity. He wanted to appease them, rather than contain them. Eliminate the colonial empires. Churchill was against that. Divide germany. Churchill preferred a integrated germany. Weak france versus strong france. And roosevelt wanted to build up china to be a force in the post world war. Whereas church hill simply accepted the reality that china was weak and would stay weak for a long time. Now, if you were going to fight an antisoviet world war ii, you would be fighting the war on the right. But that was not the war we fought. We were fighting the war on the left. Unconditional surrender. This was enunciated casa blanca. We will be discussing it today. Planning for invasion bombardment, blockade was predicated on the need to force the japanese to accept it. And it has created a post war controversy whether we should have modified it rather than dropping the atomic bombs. One purpose was when the germans were allowed to have a conditional surrender. In 1943 the goal was to keep the big three u. S. British soviet alliance together. Stalin had refused to meet roosevelt. And this exploring a separate piece with the germans. Roosevelt kept signaling we were not going to conclude a second piece with germany and japan. I see that yellow font is is probably not that good. The declaration there, china would receive an american guaranty against external aggression. And japan will return man cheer ya, taiwan. And in due course, korea would become free and independent. All of that is roosevelts vision for jerry main as a divide weak germany. And i mentioned this primarily because there is a pacific analog to this that was this itself was never fully realized after world war ii. And the japanese even less so. And at the conference that is when stalin promised to enter the pacific war after germany was defeated. Roosevelt promised to give a strong position in man customer ya. They already had a strong position within china. In mongolia. Korea would be placed under a 40year tutelage. And at the second conference, december of 43, churchill now said that soviet entry into the pacific was unnecessary and he wanted to cancel that and do further operations in the mediterranean. Churchill agreed to this but the chinese army would not now be build up. China would face them a alone without any position. Germany and japan would be divided. Soviet interests in that manchuria would be effective. No american troops would be there. The idea was japan would be divided and both the soviets would have a role in the occupation of japan. Two ideas they had or sketched out in the War Department soviet occupation of tahoku. It was still in play in august 1945. And it is worth mentioning that the soviets would not get there via invasion, which they lacked the capability to do for the most part. But they would be invited to occupy this. This would be similar in effect to our withdrawal from the territories west of the alps in germany. And overall, soviet gains in asia were actually looking pretty awesome. This is ironic. One of the reasons we went to war in the first place. Now, from the Pacific Theater perspective, there is a consistent thread from 43 to 45 that we wanted the soviets to come in. This was not we were not trying to let the soviets or stop them from coming in. We wanted them to come in. We believed that russia would attack gentleman is pan after the war in europe was over. And we knew russia wanted a weak japan and control, dominant influence in china. None of this was a surprise. It was completely predictable what the russians wanted. And the War Department recommended planning to prepare for that. And by 44 we as we were approaching japan, we wanted the soviets to attack and destroy the japanese army. But we knew that the soviets needed a lot of Logistical Support to do that. We kept asking the soviets for air bases in siberia we could use against japan. And we also suggested that the soviets would supply Occupation Forces for japan. The soviet attitude was give us stuff and we are going to go do what were going to do. Operation mile post. We expedited soviet intervention, actively promoted it. From late 44 they requested this low gist cal aid. This was largely by july 45. They would use to eliminate threats. Germany and japan. Soviet intervention in the pacific was not desired but actively promoted and paid for. We wish the soviets would participate. But as we shall see later today, truman decided that it was kind of a little too much and he should rule it back a little bit. Balancing the war in europe and pacific. Throughout the war we had to decide where to send our forces. How much to send to europe and how much to send to the pacific. The admiral king said 15 effort in the pacific. Most is going to europe. We made a 50 effort against the pacific. And the pacific effort never fell below 45 depending how you want to count it. King never explained how he arrived at his 15 . But the obvious question is is this is a little inconsistent with Germany First. So whats going on with that. If you look at the manpower strength in europe and the combat divisions deployed it is is roughly even until mid 1944, which will surprise you if youre aware of the preparations to launch forward in june of 44. It was actually quite favorable to the pacific in 42. Balanced out in 44. But even by june to december 44 when we were fighting the germans in france and belgium, 50 of our aircraft are in the pacific. Thpt shipping transportshiping is evenly divided. As we prepare for amphibious assaults in france, we are preparing in the pacific. The marshall islands. Now, i think this great deployment of manpower is and aircraft to the pacific from june of 42 after middayway to december 43 there wasnt that much payoff. We recovered the aleutians, solomons. Not that we should have expected a big payoff because we didnt have naval superiority yet. But the fact that we sent so much stuff there that it didnt achieve as much as you might half. Naval attrition roughly equal in this period. Which of course favors the country, the United States, which is massively outbuilding its opponent. Big gains in 44. But as i will subsequently argue, i think we were from the standpoint of Germany First, we were overinvested. It is arguable the southwest pacific drive was not militarily necessary. On the plus side, 44 was the year that the Japanese Navy was crushed, the prerequisite for blockade and invasion of japan. What was the cost of these specific commitments . Clearly it is a weaker effort in europe. No invasion to france in 43, 44. Weaker Italian Campaign from 44 to 45. It happened exactly the same month as the invasion of the marshalls. Whatever you think about this is inconsistent with the first strategy. Not saying these are all good ideas but certainly consistent with Germany First. Overall, world war ii was a global broad front. And the approach is is supported two drives. It was understood by military officers. That was part of their professional education in the 20s and 30s. And, yes, at the time they did know where the ideal main effort to be. And i think its in arguable that a failure to concentrate on the global main effort that had been agreed to december of 41 and the theater main efforts slowed down in theater and the war as a whole. It is difficult to find a nonpolitical reason for this. Okay. Pacific plan. Strategic planning in 42, the goal was to defeat the japanese offense, secure the sea lanes. 43 planning, emphasized china. And as we talked about earlier, that went by the wayside. Early plans for invasion of japan said we wouldnt do that until 47, 48. Thats a heck of a long war. Blockade bombardment. Invasion considered in 43. We assumed for planning purposes that bombardment and blockade might cause japan to quit but it might not. So we had to prepare for invasion. Principal went through to 44. In 44, we studied various options for direct results. We studied bypassing the philippines and going straight through to kyushu. We decided on an in decremental approach. Southwest pacific drive. As you can see in early 44 we agreed to attack in the philippines and marianas later in the year. At that time we observed the japanese building up where we planned to invade. So the question was, should we bypass some of the objectives down south and go straight for japan . The ultimate decision was no, we will continue with our planned program. And why that is of interest is that that predictability continued after we took the marianas, they reinforced oujima. They had us figured way before the summer of 45. They had us figured even in 44. Blockade bombardment in 44 and 45 based on the big factor with with is bringing over the necessary troops for the invasion of japan. And bringing the soviets in. What intermediate objectives to take between okinawa and kyushi. Intelligence studies were looking at how long will it take to make japan surrender by blockade and bombardment . We dont know. The assumption behind the air a attack was that we would destroy their internal Transportation System which would of course include food distribution. Overall conclusion was that probably japan would not surrender through blockade and bombing until mid to late 46. And mcarthur and marshall examined this. Ultimately they concluded that we should invade kyushu. Joints chiefs of staff agreed. But throughout those april discussions, the atomic bomb was not yet a factor. Not a lot of them were ready to that. Worth noting from the assistant of subsequent controversy, every single option were looking at has a lot of negative implications for japan. Blockade, going to start bombardment. Going to kill people. Starve them. Going to kill lots of civilians. Theres just no way around it. Battle experience through april 1945, you can see the japanese dont quit. They always take 90 casualties. Most of the guys who surrender are because they were too injured to die in the process. The real numbers down there, they quit after the war ended in september 45. If the work continued, we might have to go kill them all too. Our casualties varied depending upon the operation. You can see iwo jima, 36 casualty. Voted ill for the invasion of gentleman is pan. Summery, we always assumed it might precipitate a surrender. We could not count on it. We did not know how long it would take for them to quit by bombardment. We still dont know that. How do you coerce a country to surrender . There was eufr rpbg to expect it. So the haikido option. I hadnt given a great deal of thaufplt before i was looking at this issue. But in fact, this was started at a very early stage. Mid 43 they were saying the best waive to defeat japan is to go the high hoo kudo. High kudo. Why do you want to do that . They were looking at a division invasion. It was the moment promising step for bombing japan. They noted it would surprise the japanese. Easy to isolate. Hard to reinforce. Fewer enemy air bases in range of the invasion. Minus side, very Long Distance invasion. We would have to build up our area in the aleutians. Weather, terrain, not great. Not good. And we would have to build air bases. So locking down here, fighters from hokkaido. Coverage over the main Industrial Area of japan. Again, this distance is equal to london to berlin or further. So very advantageous base. And so okay. Logistical studies, this is a feasible operation logistically. The beaches and ports and we can build air fields. Its doable. They are in late 1944, we started looking at two operations. I found it actually interesting. An operation in 45. They said an operation against kyushu, we decided not to do that. But one worthwhile point was that if we take southern cue shoe we would not take the northern because it is mountainous. There would be continued engagement with the enemy. So over time there would be incessant casualties on that front. And moreover, hakkaido is a better air base. In october 44 planners recommended invading hakkaido in may of 45. Further studies of that they thought the weather was bad but not bad enough to preclude the invasion and air forces from how kied hokkeido. And, again, recommended the invasion in may of 45. But the ultimate decision was that as we had made as much progress in the south and southwest pacific and by october 44 we were about to invade the philippines. We had the mariana. We built up the southern route from. That point of view it was regarded as more advantageous to be into kyushu after invading the philippines in early 45. So, however, they kept it on the table. They said if the japanese reinforce kyushu we might have to invade hokkaido instead. This issue would occur again in the summer of 45. So the decision in october 44 was to retain hokkaido the possibility that we might have to execute in the future. The leader of the air force at the time was if we are going to invade we need a lot of air support. The best place to do that from is hokkaido. Because we can invade hokkaido in may and build our air bases for three months in time to support an invasion of hanshu in late 45. Whereas we cant invade kyushu until november of 45 and that means we wouldnt have the bases in time to conduct effective air attacks on honshu for the invasion. The commanding general in the Pacific Theater noted that they see us coming. Again, this is late 44. He already says they see us coming. Lets attack hokkaido instead. Not go straight into the face of the japanese defenses. In kyushu. However, that was rejected and the decision was to plan for kyushu. And in early 45, they were thinking about what would we do if we had to post pain the invasion until 46 for various reasons. They recommended going into china. This is like a terrible place to invade. And you sort of get the impression like we are doing this just to do it. All the reasons they had previously dinner still played as far as i can tell, which is the big japanese marching a at you. It doesnt really add much to your bomber capability that you already got. From the philippines and okinawa. But nevertheless, they said planning shall continue for operations against hokkaido. So the summary is it was hokkaido was perceived as a critical objective and a military viable objective. Nonetheless, the decision for kyushu was heavily influenced by prior choices and logistical commitments. The disadvantages of kyushu were wellknown even a year before the japanese started reinforcing kyushu. And the window of opportunity was mid to late 44 in order to attack hokkaido is the spring of 45. In retrospect, they should have done that maybe instead of okinawa. Would it have participated an early surrender and avoid the atomic bombings and soviet intervention. We thought as soon as we land that would make the jab surrender. Maybe, maybe not. But that same argument would apply to hokkaido. The planning continues. Hokkaido remained under consideration in summer of 45. My overall conclusion for today is this had major implications for the end of the pacific war. And for the future of asia. Roosevelt had proposed immense role to the soviets in post war asia. Of course, stalin said, yeah, thats good. And even though the soviets were off the stage to the last few days of the war, they loomed large in roosevelts thinking. He did not get to execute his strategy, but he had laid the groundwork and in particular by providing the supplies that the soviets needed to take the offense, it was that we could not stop the soviets from intervening as of august. 6 and meanwhile, as of april, may of 45 the plans and preparations were in place for an invasion of kyushu. In autumn of 45. And at that point roosevelt died. Ready to take questions. I dont think we have a microphone. If you say your question, talk loudly and then i will repeat the question. Well start from someone up front. The weather in hokkaido is there is a question of summer fog and winter storms. And so the optimum times are early spring. Like may, june or perhaps october november. And obviously a lot of snow in the winter. So if you invaded later in the year, october, that would hold you back from building the air bases you want. Clearly the ultimate time to invade is the spring. Air campaign. You get there during the window, and we fill up the air base. Then we try to fly in bad weather . The question is how good is the weather if youre based in hokkaido for air attacks on hanshu. These plans looked at that carefully in terms of the number of flying days for different types of missions per month for over the course of the year. And actually compared that to kyushu. Ys, it was viable to conduct a Strategic Bombing campaign and Ground Support operations from hokkaido. If you wanted to ip vad honshu in early 46, the weather in hokkaido would be great. I dont know how much time we have for questions. Its hard for me to see the lights shining. But way up there. inaudible . I will post a briefing to our website after today. We have time. Three proposals on roosevelt. What is your opinion . Since i was going to college at the end of the cold war, i had a lot of professors who rumbled about him as a duke, sucker. What he wanted to do was trees on. I personal have my doubts about that tragedy. I dont think he was a complete sucker. But he i think this strategy would have been very challenging to execute in the manner he wanted. It is certainly true the appetite grows with eating. There is abundant historical examples. If you give someone everything they want, they dont just shut up and behave and be satisfied. They start wanting more stuff. Way back. [ inaudible question ]. Could you speak up . There is one question that always puzzles me. There is never, ever any mention about of what . inaudible . It happens to be a piece of land excellent for landing just north of tokyo. The japanese were expecting an American Invasion there. But when you look, there is no mention of such a plan. I find it extraordinary from a military Strategic Point of view. Because if you landed there, the road goes directly to tokyo it is wide open. It would take a couple of days. Who wants to take that . The defenses were very strong in that area. There were two landing sites. That was a possible landing site. What was decided on is the site below tokyo is and a site somewhat further south of what you are talking about. However, they were going to take that site essentially from the ground. They were very extensive in a that area. A that site was going to be one of the supply lines on the forces coming in. They were not going to assault it directly. It was a site for yourself where they were going to be putting in the iron horse floating harbor and so forth. So they were e aware of that assault but they werent going to assault it directly. When you say that site, it was the beach, right . Right. They werent going to assault it directly. But they were going to be using it for subsequent supply forces. It is is protected. There are beaches there. There are defenses there. You still have to drive to the east. And, again, on a map, it certainly looks like it is the quicker route to eto and to the heart of what you want to get at. And you dont have that protected like you do that dennis talked about. It is much more protected. I lived there for six years of my life. It is is much, much rougher over on the other side that youre talking about. I am chris nelson. I write about contemporary issues and the whole question should obama go to nagasaki next year and kyushu. Fascinating discussion. Thank you. I remember being taught very early on, in the 50s that the bombs were dropped in lieu of the invasion. Civilian resistance would be another okinawa and would be mass slaughter. Were going to get to this later in the day. Was the decision not to invade predicated on lets drop a bomb first . Is that what were leading up to here . The question is what is the basis for a decision not to invade. In fact, there is a decision to invade. The directive went out in may of 45 to prepare to invade kyushu in i think november. Forces are moving. So we didnt stop doing that because we decided to drop the atomic bomb. The preparations for invasion continued. [ inaudible question ]. It always looks easier than that on the map. Absolutely. Is there a number about who got the priority of efforts . Did you factor in the lendly shipping and material both for the United Kingdom and for the soviets . Roosevelts decision one of the most were important decisions. Huge consequences for mobilization. So the question is what is the role of inaudible . No. Those numbers are just what the u. S. Is doing. Although obviously were sending a lot of stuff to the british and to the soviets, lesser amounts to the chinese. Jim laceys work and economists inside mobilization planning. And their estimates that related to fdr in marshall about globalization and reality of doing business. The question is concerned about globalization, and my Quick Reaction to that book is hes got it backwards. Were not backing away from mobilization. We didnt back away from the invasion because we lacked mobilization capacity. We turned off mobilization because we decided not to invade to 43 and pushed it out to 44. Given your description of roosevelts post war order and knowing what was essentially signed off of inial ta, the actual agreements themselves pertaining to germany and occupation zones and so on, why was the issue why was the issue of occupation of japan not raised by roosevelt . Had he abandoned it by then, or did he consider it too preliminary . So the question is why was the occupation of japan not formalized . As a means to get further soviet agreement to join the war. Well, i think on the face of it he had given the soviets everything they need to come get it. inaudible . Yeah. But the question would be was there any oral agreement that stalin knew about . Why did he ask for hokkaido in 45 . He must have some reason to think we might do that. inaudible very specific with stalin when stalin looked at the possibility of pushing forces up into hokkaido on a military landing just to have a presence for the signing on the missouri of which the soviets were going to be taking part in. It was real specific that, no, we dont have an agreement. And theyre going to see it as a violation of the agreement. Molotov was pretty blunt that we do not have any its only going to be if truman says, yeah, come on in. Because theres no agreement to do it. And thats why molotov was very blunt. It is also worth noting that truman abided by the written agreements that roosevelt had made. inaudible . So i dont know how much time we have for questions. Where are we at . More . All right. Up there. What changed roosevelts mind so dramatically about the role of china at tehran . Well, i think that the question was why did roosevelt change his mind about the role of china . First and foremost, i think he had gotten his desired deal with stalin. China was not necessarily going to be a factor in the pacific. Oh, sorry. The soviets were a factor in pacific. And once he had reached an agreement at stalin, the other he felt free to discard the chinese. Secondly, in the nature of things, the you dont have to be too much of a military genius to realize the red army is going to be a lot more effective against the japanese in asia than the chinese is. Yeah. Im a little confused about some of the numbers that you had on the pacific front. In 1942. They the seem very large for u. S. Forces. Did that include prisoners of war . Because i work on prisoners of war. Just as an aside, the gentleman who talked about tokyo would be a good resource. He was in japans imperial army. Talked about the sanction . Yes. Are we talking about specifically the u. S. Army in the pacific . Yes. Army and okay. The [ ip inaudible ]. These forces here do not include the guys that surrendered in the philippines. These forces here, we sent from the United States did not go to the United Kingdom. They went to secure the supply lines to australia and to defend hawaii. Those are just the pacific. You are including hawaii in that army in the pacific . Yes. And alaska. Large force. It was, indeed. You mentioned that both richardson and around old. Arnold, yes, supported the invasion of hoikido. Obviously, it never happened. Do you know exactly what nimitz and mcarthur and for that matter marshall and king thought about the plan . I dont know what they thought about the hokkaido plan. I just saw the arnold comments about it. But i its pretty clear that the the navy was not very enthusiastic at all. Both from the standpoint of dividing the fleet to support hokkaido as well as the Central Pacific. The navy was not enthused during this as i was keep doing that. No good anchorages up there, so thats bad. I think probably most important for king and marshall was that he had broke up so much, invested so much in the Central Pacific and philippines that this it seemed natural to persist in that direction rather than take a big leap on this side, not to mention that if you wanted to do this north pacific, you have to back up a long way and Start Building cases in the aleutians and alaska very soon and if you subsequently dont do the hokeido mobilization, then all that effort is wasted, effort to build up forces and base in the Central Pacific are useful for a lot more continue contingencies. You have all these statistics that you were talking about how there was approximately 50 50 between the two theaters of war. And that it that didnt agree with the europe first. But it seems to me that the size and vast distance of the Pacific Theater would actually mean that the equal numbers wouldnt mean equal effort, that you have to supply, you have all these vessels for the navy to do and all this stuff in the pacific that the same amount of people wouldnt equal the same amount of war effort. Im not exactly sure what the measure im trying to say, but its much more concentrated in the the europe theaters so that the numbers dont exactly equate. Even though theyre equal. I the i guess the one observation you would make about that is that what you have described is actually a reason to send more stuff to europe rather than an equal balance. But the i guess from the saying if you were sending stuff to the pacific front doesnt necessarily pay off as big in terms of numbers . Yeah, i guess. Im not exactly sure its like, you know, if you have two people in a room doing a concentrated job and two people in a building trying to do the same job, trying to get less work done, to the people that have the bigger responsibility or i guess not bigger responsibility in terms of, you know, the the whole vast theater part. I mean, a lot of the people were doing moving things from place to place or flying over vast distances over long periods of time. Im not i wish i remembered but the the only thing i can sadly, although john kuehn or Richard Frank may have this immediately on the tip of their tungs. But, for example, its like public release later on was that the invasion of japan, as plan, was going to be involved and this is mainland japan was going to involve something on the order of 5 million american personnel. But i dont think that actual ground i think as far as what was going to be forward in the two invasion sites and immediately supporting it was actually going to be Something Like and, again, an immediate support was going to be in the neighborhood of, what, 3, 3. 5 million in immediate support and on the ground if everything played out. People in the pacific who are doing and further back doing other supplies, other support and i see john seems to have a comment right down there. Youre right. Because of the vastness of the theater, youre going to have a much larger component what we call combat Service Support and in materials of the navy, the shipping, logistics arrangement, Richard Nixon got his meritorious Achievement Medals because he was doing logistics, helping set up logistics in the pacific. So theres the two ratio in the pacific. Roosevelt in 1940, they were doing the draft and all that stuff happens. Theres already a lot of cost in the pacific and we build up some of it to maintain an air bridge into china. There is a huge, long air bridge that goes down into fiji and its up and around and over into india and over the hump. Theres this huge logistical effort. I think the guys name is james williford. He shows how all of these logistics cross and into the pacific before the war even starts. So when the war starts, yeah, Germany First, but youve already got a lot of these and most of them are logistics. Youve got guys manning the air stations along the sea Line Communications from australia to brisbane and sydney and those places. So its a huge effort and the numbers of people that are in support bases and on ships is cement. And thats what the numbers show. My point was that theres an awful lot in the land lease, as well, and i really think you should factor that in, too. I think at this point, we have to move on to our next presentation. Here is some of what were covering in cspan on nurse. The u. S. Chamber of commerce gives its annual labor day briefing on the economy and jobs. Live coverage at 10 00 a. M. And eastern. At 11 00, a look at the Iran Nuclear Agreement with the Heritage Foundation with liam fox. Later, the center for strategic and International Studies host a discussion about the future of iraq with the iraqi ambassador to the u. S. Watch it live at 2 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan. With the sudden death of president harding, Vice President Calvin Coolidge takes office. Grace coolidge was an enormously popular first lady and influenced the taste of american women by becoming a style icon. Although she married a man known as silent cal. She never spoke to the press, but used her office to bring attention to issues she cared about. Grace coolidge, this sunday night at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspans original series, first ladies, influence and image. Examining the public and private lives of the women who filled the position of first lady and their influence on the presidency. From Martha Washington to michelle obama, sunday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern opinion on American History tv on cspan3. Now more from this symposium marking the 70th anniversary of vj day. This part of the event looks at the strategy of Joseph Stalin and the soviet union in the pacific at the end of world war ii. Well heard from david glantz, editor in chief of the journal of slavic military studies. This is just under an hour. First, thank you for the invitation to come down and to return to the beginning because i began my work on the soviet army basically as a result of a trip to japan in 1978, 80 and 81. The questions they had were questions about manchuria and now we are going full circle 30 years 35 years later. My task today is to talk about ending the war in the pacific. A few words about the genesis of what im going to be saying today. Three years ago, i received an invitation to the National Institute for defense studies in tokyo. It was a nice invitation. They said please come over, spend a week for us and talk about whatever youd like. They said pick three topics. I said, well, im going to go ahead and grab a topic that ive been enticed by for years because those of you who have read my works know that im interested in primarily operational military history. The soviet german war in particular. And over time in particular, since the early 1990s, i have noticed that one of the more vexing questions that historians have not been able to answer is the question of staal stalins intent. What were the strategic intentions as he waged war in europe and, of course, later as he waged war in the far east . Of course, there have been views on that mostly well filtered through sensors in the soviet union and even today in the Russian Federation and there have been views on that from afar from the west from the u. S. But weve never really had a good view. The stalin archives, if they exit at all, have not been released. Monumental biography of stalin contains bits and pieces. But in the course of my research, ive noticed that there are documents that stalin planned to sign and that these documents, if looked at carefully and they are basically now being released in great numbers, im referring to directors of high command directives pertaining to all military operations or most military operations and im talking about the fairley large volume of soviet general staff studies done during wartime and post war formerly classified that have been released have been released since the early 1990s and continue to be released today. These have directives that arent in the directors volume. And the directives normally address what we intend to do in a given operation, be it strategic or be it lower level. And generally, they reflect on the political goal of the operations. If for no other way, were going to reach this and that and sometimes they add for this purpose. So this opportunity, this invitation of the japanese gave me a chance to put that together. I presented a paper in japan, about 80 pages long on the topic. 80 of it dealt with the war in the west. About 20 with the war in the east. The japanese have now published that in the nids annual this ar