Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics And Public Policy Today 20160104

A Technology Perspective is an incubator to continue. Particularly for the sorts of technologies that are can be sized for special operations, special operations units. But at some point i think to the extent the growth of special operations will whether it continues or not, i think that has much more to do probably with the evolution in the future security environment as anything and that the more those sorts of forces are seen as the optimal sort of instrument to deploy in a particular conflict the more likely we are to see them grow but i suspect the rest we might see some growth in the rest of the world. Since jerrys right that the russians arent only using precision strike reflects their interests, and when they use force might be slightly different than the United States in some cases. But mimicry certainly happens and to the extent that the countries in a military sense sometimes do wish to emulate the american model, i think you do see a little bit of that in the growth of special operations forces. I would jump on that, too. Point out that essentially with the advent of the Nuclear Weapon and Strategic Deterrence that goes along with that, the middle ground has been vacated in that even though we like to size our large land forces for the big ig battle or maneuvers in the desert and so on, fact of the matter is both vietnam, as well as the our last 11 years 14 years of experience have really been counterinsurgents softlike operations. So that occupation with the strategic sense that going big in war ends up in places we dont like to talk about has driven us towards this. Despite those very long experiences in vietnam as well as in iraq and afghanistan, its seeming as soon as we get ourselves out of that, we want to get our force back toward large maneuvering combat elements and that is unwise. I would say one of the things that struck me is that naval forces tend to think more almost softlike in a sense that were always out, were always deployed, were always in the neighborhood. We get to know people, the local actors, and we tend to interact on a more consistent basis which is more in line with soft doctrine than perhaps the land battle doctrine. Yes, maam. Okay. Strategic deterrence in a new era. I wonder if the new era is possibly a little ahead of what weve been describing here, and thats been reaction to iraq, the russians, the ukraine, that kind of thing. If youve been listening to ted koppell, if youve been hearing about the homegrown, now being called terrorist attacks on the home front, that was not just the recent one, it was also boston, there seems to be a great possibility, as i see it, for just a tremendous upheaval over something that doesnt seem to be getting a lot of attention in terms of deterrence. My confusion is, is there a line . Is there a specialty between home front security to protect us from this versus the military, and how do we look at it . If im reading things correctly, the new era is in these Little Pockets that can just cause havoc if our grid, our electric grid, our transportation grid goes under, it can paralyze the whole country here. Im curious to get some response on that, please. Look, were dealing with a multifacetted security environment, threats coming from a number of vectors. This is apropos of these forces, were probably going to deal with several categories of challenges one of which is radical islam and the terrorist threat, including weapons of mass destruction, mass effect, including potential Cyber Capabilities if theyre able to be used at that scale, but also more traditional weapons of mass destruction. But at the same time, were going to be dealing with great Power Dynamics in a more geopolitical environment. I think the possibility of an attack by radical islamic terrorists or other terrorists is probably a lot higher, but the scale of a full the potential cost of a major war between the United States and russia or the United States and china dwarfs the median kind of threat from a radical islamic source. I think the bottom line is well have to do both, and my sense is that we should focus our capabilities on maintaining our conventional and our strategic advantages where possible to continue to sustain what we used to call the free world from attack or coercion which is high end conventional forces, nuclear forces, aerospace dominance, et cetera, and at the same time invest in forces, department ship building, designed to both deter, negate, eliminate, et cetera, threats from radical sources that are likely to persist for the foreseeable future, unfortunately. So were going to have to degrade and destroy where we can and contain where we cant. I think the bottom line, though, is were going to have to i think what were talking about here is a subject that in these kinds of quarters gets a hearing, but in the broader political conversation, it tends to be drowned out, surprisingly to some degree legitimately by these concerns about islam and these very seriously need and require very focused and serious attention. But on the other hand when were thinking about our national strategy, it doesnt quite make the news on a day to day basis may actually be more consequential in certain ways in terms of our budgetary decisions, in terms of our policy and the most risky and costly outcomes. Yes, sir. Right here in front. Last question. You have the honor of being our last question. Lucky me. In the late 70s, early 80s, as our conventional forces improved in their capabilities, that was seen as contributing to a more stable deterrent capability. So my question for the panel is, if we are going to improve our conventional forces, is that stabilizing or does it have a risk associated with it . Very interesting question. You know, i think stability is something ive thought about a lot, and the notion behind strategic stability and stability of all kinds is the two powers that are in some degree of hostile relationship can find some basis for stability, for a tolerable equilibrium that is somewhat plastic enough to adapt to geopolitical conditions. In practice, both sides are seeking confidence, so on. In the70s and 1980s i think its worth remembering that it was assumed well into the 1980s that the soviets could be in the English Channel in the course of about three weeks. So a lot of what the conventional return and practice was aimed at was refreshing. Maybe there was a vision in the 1990s and 2000s, they could make defeat the pack in outward conflict, assuming the pack just didnt dissolve on contact. But i dont think anyone ever thought airline battle was still kind of a series of charts in the mid80s. Falling on forced attack. But it was successful in a sense. If it freaked the soviets. In that sense it was stabilizing in the way that today things will be stabilizing because it was intended to plug a hole, and the hole deputy secretary work recognizes or pointed to was parity, and nato would be the one that would say, if you cross the germany border, well blow up the world. Its not a very credible strategy when they have a retaliatory capability. The proof in the retaliatory capability stabilized the situation by making it much less attractive. I think today we face a situation where the russians are nowhere near the red army but nato is nowhere near where nato was. There was an article, i think general scales put it in the journal that even u. S. Forces in nato dont have basic air defense capabilities. They have tmd kind of capabilities but they lack shorter range air defense capabilities. Americans forces are not fought with air superior since korea or world war ii. This is a situation in which the russians have very formidable air defenses and strike capabilities of their own. Meanwhile, the germans are practicing doing military exercises with broomsticks. Its an unfair story but theres also a lot of truth in it. What i worry, and i sometimes think i talk about the baltics too much, but then i think, wait a minute, the russians could be there very quickly, and the americans in order to fight back would have to suppress enemies on russian territory, would have to blow a lot of things up, would have to do a lot of nasty stuff and would take us a lot of time. So i think the stabilizing thing is to plug, if not fully plug, make that hole a lot less attractive. I think its stabilizing. Im sure the russians have a different view, but im sure im right. Its kind of interesting, history being 20 20, we look back at the late 1970s, early 1980s as a period of stabilizing. As probably the only person on the stage that can remember that time frame, you know, it was a time of a lot of instability. In fact, we know from looking at the soviet archives that antropov was convinced reagan was going to come in 1938 and we were going to get allout war at that time. It was a destabilizing era because of the rapid growth of our buildup. And i think its interesting that if we take the defsecs snap of the chauling line as 20132014 as kind of a turning point, keep in account that the detainment era was never as clear to those who were participating in its formulation as what it appears to us now in hindsight. And so as we feel our way through, not into a Great Power Competition between us and the soviet union, but actually at least a threelegged stool right now between us, china and russia, if europe can manage to get its game together and step it up above 2 of gdp, then maybe they can play in this, too. Then i think that were still trying to figure out what the new equilibrium point is going to be. As we go through some sort of a buildup that buildup may be in hightech, that may be built up in broader forces. We dont know how to build that up yet. I appreciate the Leadership Division that the def sec work, thats coming, and i do hope that essentially since he asked today, whoever the next Administration Takes up this initiative and continues to move it forward, i think its the only responsible thing to do from a bipartisan standpoint that we need to move forward with some of these initiatives. I think the hole now is the risk of selfdeterrence, because we risk that others are catching up in a way that thus makes the u. S. Less comfortable deploying certain assets with potential areas in the pacific being with the carrier and chinas developing an antiballistic missile being an example of this. So the development of new conventional military technologies, i think, is unlikely to be destabilizing, except insofar as the adversary would rather they didnt have great military tech, of course, but it will be stabilizing insofar as it fixes genuine capabilities hole that seems to be developing that could make it a lot harder for the United States to execute its strategy and project power around the world. Well, i know there were a number of other questions, and i apologize we werent able to get to all of them, but im afraid our time is up. Thank you very much for joining us, and please do stay with us for the preview of citizen soldier. [ applause ] we need to know how many people are reading us, we need to know how theyre coming to us. For example, if theyre not coming directly to our website, if coming through facebook, twitter, snapchat or any of the other venues, we should know that. Sunday night on q 13 a, the Washington Post executive editor marty barron talks about the changes since he took over in 2013. He discusses depikds of his work as editor in chief of the boston globe in the movie spotlight. I think its quite faithful to the broad outline of how the investigation unfolded. It important to keep in mind, its a movie, not a documentary. You had to compress within two hours sevenmonth plus investigation, including things that happened afterwards. And you had to introduce a lot of characters and had to introduce the important themes that emerged over the course of the investigation. Sunday at 8 00 eastern, on q a. A Senate Committee recently examined issues concerning u. S. Strategy in afghanistan. Witnesses include richard olson, a former u. S. Ambassador to pakistan, and now the state Department Special representative for the region. This Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing is about 2 1 2 hours. Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. We want to thank our witnesses for being here and certainly all of our committee members. I think in lieu of reading my normal Opening Statement, i just want to make a general statement. And that is that yesterday we had a classified briefing. What we hear in classified briefings about the direction and signals and all the things that are occurring in afghanistan directly contradict some of the rosy public statements that are made about what is happening within the country. I think its actually alarming to go to a classified session and then to hear reports about those discussions in the Armed Services committee itself. So, with that backdrop, i just want to say to each of you, all of us obviously want our nation to be successful. In its efforts in afghanistan. I know theres been a debate about the numbers of troops on the ground. Theres been some arbitrary numbers that have been thrown out. I know today we have 9,800 troops there. And yet from what i can tell were continuing to lose territory, lose momentum. The status in afghanistan is today were moving in a very negative direction on the ground. So, obviously thats concerning. We know that the president , we know he has a vast amount of experience. Know hes somewhat of a technocrat. Knows there are issues that need to be dealt with appropriately within the country, but when you look at all of these Security Issues that are being dealt with, certainly it takes away from his ability to implement those. So, were concerned about security. I think were concerned about any type of reconciliation thats taking place. We understand the concerns that exist relative to pakistan. And lets face it, to a degree hedging their bets. But from the outside, as you watch whats happening there, the taliban is gaining ground. And that is just a fact. So, i hope this hearing today, which will be obviously the first public hearing weve had in some time on this topic, will help us be illuminated. We thank you both of you very, very much for your service and for being here and we thank you for your willingness to help us with understandings as to what is actually happening there on the ground. With that, ill turn to senator cardin. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And thank you for calling this hearing, and i want to thank our witnesses for being here. I just im going to follow the example of the chairman and just lay out some basic concerns i think that came out as a result not just of yesterdays briefing but as weve seen of late, and that is that how we doing on the security front in afghanistan. It seems like were losing ground. What happened was a major concern. It showed real shortcomings in the Afghan National defense and Security Forces to provide security to a region. What have we learned from that and how are we Going Forward. Secondly, the reconciliation process, whether there can be a stable government in afghanistan representing all the interests of the country and the role that pakistan is playing in that regard. Are they are they a sincere partner in peace or are they just trying to protect their interests in its relationship in that region. Third, the Development Progress in afghanistan since 2001, the resources that weve put into afghanistan, theres certainly been a question. Their economy is not performing anywhere near at a level that would be acceptable for sustainability and progress. And then today or yesterday the New York Times an article that raises a question as to whether the taliban is key to u. S. Aid projects, which i would hike to get some answers on as to what is the shortterm, longterm gains and whether our investments of u. S. Taxpayer dollars are really being beneficial in afghans future. Then lastly, the anticorruption efforts. We know the president made very strong commitments for anticorruption and yet we see virtually no progress in dealing with the corruption issues in afghanistan. So, what i hope we will do, weve been there for a while, whats gone right. Build on that. Weve done a lot of good things in afghanistan. I think we all acknowledge that. This is not the country it was in 2001 and thats a positive note. But things have gone wrong. And have we learned from whats gone wrong so that we can take appropriate adjustments to make sure that we have an effective policy for afghans future and u. S. Policy interests. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you, sir. Well now turn to our witnesses on the first panel well hear from two administration witnesses representing the state department and usaid whose portfolios include both afghanistan and pakistan. The second Panel Includes three informed experts on afghanistan and the region. We thank them for being here. So our first witness is the respected Ambassador Richard olson, the United States special representative for afghanistan and pakistan, and recently returned as our ambassador from islamabad. We thank you very much for a career in Public Service and Foreign Service and for being here today. Our second witness is donald l. Sampler, jr. Assistant to the administrator for pakistan and afghanistan at usaid. We thank you for what you your cohorts do around the world to further our u. S. Interests, so with that, ambassador olson, if you would begin, we appreciate it. I will just say, as a courtesy to my fellow panelists here, the deadline for a couple issues is 21 minutes relative to the other thing were working on. I may step in and out a little bit, and miss a little bit, not out of disrespect. Thank you. Chairman corker, Ranking Member cardin, members of the committee, its an honor to appear before you today to discuss the u. S. afghanistan relationship and our continuing effort to support afghanistans progress toward security and selfreliance. Ta allow me at the outset to thank the members of this committee and the American People for their generous and steadfast for our efforts in afghanistan. In particular, i want to honor thousands of military personnel, diplomats and Development Professionals who have served and continue to serve in afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, i recently returned from my first visit in my current position as special representative for afghanistan and pakistan to kabul and islamabad. And i can report to you that we are at a critical moment in our work in afghanistan and the region as we push for the launch of an afghanled Peace Process during the traditional winter lull infighting between afghanistan and the taliban. The Administration Remains committed to a stable and secure afghanistan. And we remain convinced that a negotiated settlement between the government of afghanistan and taliban is the surest way to end the conflict. The government of National Unity which came to power in the first peaceful and democratic transition of power in afghanistans history, embodies the potential that afghanistan has to thrive for. It has weathered tremendous adversity in its first year but retains its democratic mandate and has demonstrated a commitment to be a partner with us in addressing our Common Security interests. Its no secret that the bilateral relationship between afghanistan and pakistan has been difficult. But president gani and the Prime Minister have demonstrated true leadership in trying to bridge the divide. Both sides show readiness to engage, to put differences aside, and to build on the meeting between Afghan Government and taliban representatives that took place in july of last year. Now the taliban have a choice, to join goodfaith negotiations for peace or to continue to fight a war they cannot win and face the consequences. A negotiated afghantoafghan settlement while difficult is possible and can be accomplished while preserving the gains made in education, health, and the rights of women and minorities over the past decade. Even as we push for progress on peace, the United States has a Critical Role to play in supporting continued development of afghanistans security capabilities. President obama announced in october that well maintain 9,800 troops in afghanistan through the end of 2016 to train, advise, and assist afghan forces. I believe we are pursuing the right course in afghanistan but i want to be candid that great challenges remain. While the security in afghanistan remains volatile, we must give credit to the Afghan National defense and Security Forces for demonstrating tenacity, ability, and resolve in countering attacks. While much work on development remains, over the past decade u. S. Assistance has made a significant and tangible difference in the lives of the Afghan People and has been critical to maintaining stability. Per capita gdp has more than quadrupled and for the first time afghans and access to reliable electricity, health care and independent media and are connected to each other and the world through communications technology. According to the u. N. , we and other donors have helped afghanistan achieve a greater increase in its standard of living over the last decade than almost any other country on earth. The last decades progress also is contingent upon continued support for afghanistan. Next year at the warsaw nato summit in july and the brussels ministerial on Afghan Development in october well have an opportunity to work with our International Partners to lay out a plan for future security and economic assistance. Of course, our assistance comes with Clear Conditions and the concept of mutual accountability remains firmly in place. Advancing the fight against corruption will be of particular importance in that regard. The Peace Process track cannot succeed unless it is paired with a strong and credible commitment to afghanistans security and to its economic priorities and its political leadership. Addressing these challenges will not be easy. But i look forward to working with you on them in the weeks and months to come. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. Sampler . Chairman corker, Ranking Member cardin, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and discuss usaids civilian assistance activities in afghanistan. Let me also begin by thanking the individuals present today who have served in afghanistan as well as their families. And im proud to include among those brave americans diplomats of the u. S. Department of state, aid workers from the usaid and the thousands of men and women working shoulder to shoulder with us as partners in afghanistan over the past decade. I would also like to recognize the afghans who continue to work and to sacrifice to make their country a place that is safe, secure, and a Good Neighbor in the region. The thousands of afghans working both in and out of government to secure a Bright Future for themselves and their families matter. And any strategy we discuss here today is predicated upon their continued dedication and our resolute support. Our work in afghanistan reflects usaids mission. We partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing americas own security and prosperity. Usaid civilian assistance programs in afghanistan are a critical component of our core u. S. National security objective of a stable afghanistan that al qaeda and other terrorists cannot use as a base to threaten the United States, our interests and our persons abroad. We remain committed to assistance programs in afghanistan that are effective, accountable and sustainable. In my written testimony submitted for the record, i detail some of the rigorous oversight and monitoring methods that usaid has implemented to prevent waste, fraud and abuse, and to ensure that American Investments in afghanistan are making a lasting impact. Usaids central goal in afghanistan is to promote a stable and prosperous country. During the past decade, afghanistan has made Remarkable Development gains across multiple sectors. Thanks to the whole of government efforts of the United States along with our International Partners, the Afghan Government and the Afghan People. The key elements of usaids strategy call for making durable the significant achievements in health, education and the gains of women. Focusing on Economic Growth and fiscal sustainability of the government of afghanistan, and supporting is you legitimate and effective afghan governance and in turn promoting stability. Usaids strategy Going Forward will be founded on our successes, formed by our failures and shaped by our consultations with the government of afghanistan, other donors and the u. S. Inner agency. The successes have been in some cases remarkable. Specific examples include Life Expectancy has increased in afghanistan from 42 years to over 62 years. Maternal mortality rate has declined by 75 and Child Mortality has decreased by 62 . In 2002 there were less than a million afghans in school anywhere. Now, there are over now there are millions of children in school and over a third of them are girls. In 2002 there were virtually no telephones in afghanistan. Any Call International had to be made over a handheld satellite phone. Today the combined phone Company Coverage is 88 of the afghan population. The Telecommunications Industry is afghanistans greatest source of foreign direct investment. It is the largest remitter of taxes to the government of afghanistan and it is the biggest employer in afghanistan employing over 138,000 afghans. In 2002, when i first arrived in afghanistan, only six percent of afghans had access to electricity. Today more than 30 of the population is committed to the grid. The government with the support of usaid established afghanistans electric utility ba dabs just about six years ago. Today dabs no longer receives a subsidy from the Afghan Government and has turned a profit each year since 2011. While its never comfortable to talk about failures in an engagement as complicated and difficult as afghanistan failures are inevitable. What is important that the failures be recognized as quickly as possible and that remedies be put in place to correct the failure and prevent its recurrence. Usaid works hard all around the world to be an agile, adaptive and learning organizations. Since 2002 in afghanistan in virtually every sector of our portfolio weve had to make adjustments based on our own monitoring and evaluation or on the observations of various auditors or the media. Examples of the kinds of modifications, in education we designed and launched a communitybased Education Program that was going to be implemented by the ministry of education. But we quickly discovered the ministry was not yet capable of executing this program so no funds were dispersed and instead we recognized a different mechanism. The award was made to unicef, an international organization, which resulted in over 800 communitybased schools and over 700 accelerated learning centers for outofschool youth. The strategy Going Forward will be shaped by the government of afghanistan, our inner Agency Partners and others. In 2014, the london ministerial revisited those commitments and pointed the way towards a conference next year in brussels where we will again revisit our mutual accountability. Finally in conclusion usaid knows well the risks and sacrifices that americans, our troops and diplomats and families face every day serving in afghanistan. Since 2001 451 civilians working for our partners have been killed and close to 1,000 have been wounded. I have attended the funerals for u. S. Civilian employees in afghanistan who were killed. We take very seriously the investment in blood and pressure made in afghanistan and we work hard to be good stewards of the resources provided to us. As usaid looks to 2016 and beyond the agency is committed to making every effort to safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that Development Progress in afghanistan is maintained and made durable in order to secure our Overall National security objectives. Its an honor to be able to share with you today a small glimpse of what aid is doing in that regard and i look forward to your questions. Thank you very much for that testimony. Im going to do some interaction along the way and turn at present to senator cardin for questions. Well, once again, thank you both for the role that you have played in the development in afghanistan. Its certainly a much different country than it was in 2001. A lot of progress has been made. But theres reason for concern about its future, so let me ask a couple questions. Ambassador olson, first, let me ask, what are the Lessons Learned from kudans . Have we made strategic changes in the security arrangements in order to prevent a similar episode from occurring in the future . Thank you, senator. The attack on kunduz was representative of a real challenge that the government of afghanistan faces. The taliban have been waging a very particularly Aggressive Campaign in 2015 throughout the fighting season. And as you know, the Afghan National defense and Security Forces were forced to temporarily cede territory in parts of helmand as well as in as well as in the city center of kunduz. And over the course of two weeks, the taliban occupied kunduz. And, you know, as general as general campbell has acknowledged, this was a Public Relations victory for for the taliban. It is important to note, however, that the Afghan National Security Forces did retake kunduz. And as the country has and has maintained control of Government Forces have maintained control of kunduz since that time. The government of afghanistan is in the process of looking at Lessons Learned from that experience. And there has been a report that has been prepared with the government of afghanistan, and they are considering the responses that theyre going to make. My understanding is it includes greater lashup between provincial authorities and central authorities, which is perhaps one of the contributing factors to the weakness in kunduz. I would, of course, have to defer to my colleagues from the Defense Department on any specific response in terms of military developments and the train and assist program. Mr. Sampler, let me turn to the question i raised during my opening comments, the troubling article that i read in the New York Times that indicate that the usaid programs are very much maybe depend upon taliban support and therefore taliban getting more support as a result of usaid perhaps strengthening their hold, contrary to our objective in the tribal areas. Are we focused theres shortterm gains to try to help in regards to our military objectives. Theres longterm Development Goals that were trying to achieve in afghanistan. And when we confuse the two, sometimes we get into trouble. Are we getting our dollars value . And is there any truth to the report that the taliban is taking credit for the aid coming into the tribal areas . Senator, thank you for the question. Headlines like the one you cited are not like how i like to start my mornings as i wake up each day and look through the paper. Jim reese ens work is good, and the New York Times stories are typically fact based. This one has some issues that i will challenge. There was a study done that this report was based on, on measuring the impact of stabilization activities in afghanistan and this was requested by usaid and it was our own attempt to [ inaudible ]. They studied over 5,000 villages. They conducted over 100,000 interviews and of the 5,000 villages they studied either 5 or 13, depending on how you run the math, they found a correlation, not causality, but they found correlation between our programs and an increase in taliban support. So, the story focused unnaturally in my opinion on what is basically onetenth of one percent of the work that we did in afghanistan, where, in fact, we discovered ourselves there may have been a correlation between our work and support for the taliban. Whats not mentioned in this story is the other 99. 9 literally the programs which either showed no change or showed an actual improvement in support for the government. In afghanistan, as is the case everywhere, all politics are local, so these local projects are important to give afghans in the villages a sense that they are part of the community and afghanistan. With respect to the second half of your question about short term versus long term, part of the challenge of being a Development Professional in a place like afghanistan is making sure that the important initiatives that are done to achieve shortterm gains correspond with and support longterm development objectives. Thats not always easy and in some cases its actually problematic. But the other part of my job, of which im quite proud, the team that i have in afghanistan that works for ambassador olson and mckinley do an excellent job in making sure we do get a return on our investment and when we dont, we stop the program to find out why we arent. Thank you. Ambassador olson, i dont think were going to make progress in afghanistan unless we really have changes in anticorruption activities. I know the president s made pretty strong statements about fighting corruption, but we havent seen much action in fighting corruption. A later witness will give us some specific recommendations such as a confirmed attorney general or providing a strong monitoring and evaluation committee, passing laws that provide stronger penalties and implementing the eiti. Do you have a game plan for Holding Afghanistan to accountability on their anticorruption efforts and not just the statement of the president . Which i think is sincere, but has not been backed by any action. Thank you very much for the question, senator. We are indeed intent on holding the government of afghanistan to its promises to address the question of endemic corruption in afghanistan. Just to review a little bit what has happened so far we were encouraged by president ganis decision to reopen the investigation in to the Kabul Bank Scandal and the effort of the government of afghanistan to recover assets. We were then, i must say, discouraged by the fact that one of the main coconspirators was released from prison and started working on kabul Housing Development projects. And at this point we understand that mr. Ferozi is back in jail and the deal has been invalidated, and we will continue to watch that. But more generally, the government of afghanistan under president gani and with the full support of ceo abdullah has improved anti Money Laundering regulations, prosecuted judges complicit in the release of a drug trafficker and has established a National Procurement commission which halted a series of illegal procurements in the ministry of defense and interior. Going forward, i think we really need to continue to condition our assistance to the updated mutual accountability framework that was decided at tokyo. That will be an important part of our discussions with the government of afghanistan as we prepare for the big conferences coming up this summer, first in warsaw, dealing with security assistance, and then in brussels in october dealing with development assistance. And i think we need to update the mutual accountability framework and come up with very specific conditions for future assistance. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator purdue . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for thank both of you for your service. But i want to focus on a couple reports that are just coming out. You know, when i was there in april and i had a i was honored to meet with general campbell, president gani, ceo abdullah and our ambassador, ambassador mckinney. And i have to tell you just some seven or eight months later, its shocking to see the difference in taking two polaroid shots of the situation. They were just coming getting ready to go into the fighting season, and, of course, now general campbell just last month, or in october rather, says and this was a testimony to congress. There was no winter at all in fighting. Since february the fighting has been almost continuous. The violence has moved beyond traditional insurgent strongholds such as today over hatch of the 398 districts are under high or extreme taliban threat today. Im coming to a quick question. But kunduz we know about. Then the pentagon today just released its report to congress, and i know we dont have a dod rep here, but i want to get from the state department your perspective on not only that report but the situation as it stands right now. The report says that taliban attacks were given higher casualty to afghan forces. The afghan Pakistani Border region is a haven for various groups. I was shocked at the number of groups it talks about in that report. And then dr. Fred kagan in an aei report testified that hes not real sure and i quote, not confident there will actually be an afghanistan when the next president takes office. Thats a severe description of the picture. But given the situation right now and the fact that, you know, weve got i guess the military in afghanistan has some 180,000 troops. We still have 9,800. General campbell won that argument. But were moving to a situation where were about to have 5,000 or so u. S. Troops there. My question is, what does next year look like . What does this fighting season look like . And how deep is this threat . Isis has grown dramatically as we see in the reports just since april. In april it wasnt even a major conversation. Now it is a primary part of any dialogue you have with people in afghanistan. So, from a state department perspective, what is our strategy right now in afghanistan . Thank you very much, senator, for that question. I would say looking back at the, the past few months and, of course, im not really in a position to describe the military response, which is the responsibility of my colleague and friend it general campbell, but i will say that it strikes me at a political level that part of the reason we saw such a strong taliban offensive over the course of the past few months what in part a reaction to the revelation of the death of mullah omar, and i think that there was intense competition amongst various taliban commanders, which played itself out in part in increased violence. It is very clear and i was just in kabul last week and met twice with president ghani and he is absolutely determined that 2016 cannot be a repetition of 2015. And in particular, the question of reduction of violence is hugely important to him. In that regard, i think this raises the question of a reconciliation process, and afghanled and afghanowned reconciliation process at a heart of asia conference in islamabad last week we held a trilateral meeting between the heart of asia conference in islamabad last week we held a trilateral meeting between th at a heart of asia conference in islamabad last week we held a trilateral meeting between that heart of asia conference in islamabad last week we held a trilateral meeting between the so i think that we have to use the remaining time and the lull to work on getting an afghanled, afghanowned reconciliation process going, there was much more a meeting of the minds between president ghani and the pakistani leadership on this issue than there has been in some time. So were moving towards a negotiation . There really isnt a strategy being talked about, about how to defeat the taliban . Is that what i hear . To be very clear, i would not say that there is no, there is no strategy for fighting taliban, but im saying thats not my particular piece of this puzzle. I think that a political settlement is an important element of, in working towards a political settlement is an important element of our multidimensional approach to afghanistan. It has been for some time. It has been at least since president obamas bagram speech of may 2012 and even before that, the reconciliation led by the afghans is an important element of what were trying to do. Can i ask you briefly with the time remaining, the iranian influence with the taliban has grown this year, according to several reports. Can you speak to that, and what is the Afghan Government doing and as a corollary to that, there have been outreaches from kabul to mass cow from a state department perspective, can you speak to both of the iranian support for afghans, growth of isis and the third piece, the overtures that afghanistan is making to moscow . Well, weve weve seen the reports with regard to the iranian actions, of course. We dont understand why the iranians would be involved with the taliban and we dont think its productive, and we think that all of all of afghanistans neighbors should commit to noninterference in respecting pakistans territorial integrity. With regard to russia, this is also a topic that we have discussed with, with the afghans. I met last week with my russian counterpart in islamabad. It was a preliminary meeting, but he pledged that he would, that russia would engage constructively, and continue to cooperate with us. I think we have to test that proposition as we do all such propositions, but well intend to work with the russians where we can, consistent with our overall russia policy. Thank you. Senator murphy . Thank you very much, mr. Chairman. You believe in the limits of american powers as a catalyst for change abroad absent a local commitment to do so, the last 25 years of afghanistan are certainly proof of concept. You guys have really hard jobs, and im glad that youre here briefing us, but mister, ambassador olson, you talked about this idea that we are prepared to hold the afghans accountable for their lack of progress on anticorruption efforts. With all due respect, i dont think theres any evidence to suggest that thats actually true. I dont think over the last 15 years theres any evidence to suggest that the United States is willing to do things and send messages to the afghans to telegraph that were serious in any way, shape or form about them getting serious about anticorruption efforts. We seem to have made an independent decision that we have National Security interests at stake in afghanistan, that we are going to commit the amount of resources necessary to stop afghanistan from becoming a safe haven, again, for terrorists, and that we are going to prioritize that, which involves a significant amount of American Resources there, with or without a commitment from the Afghan Government to sort their own mess out, and so it seems to me, having gone to afghanistan, you know, four times, five times, having heard the same story over and over again about how we were pressuring them to take on corruption and how little progress weve seen that we should just admit that our priorities actually is not to encourage local political change. Our priority is to commit just enough resources to stop afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and admit that thats ultimately our number one priority, and it means that it often forces the secondary goal of local political change to become subverted to that first priority. Tell me, im sure you think im wrong, but tell me why for those of us who have heard people tell us that were going to Start Holding the afghans accountable for a lack of progress on corruption, why any of us should believe that were actually ever prepared to send the tough message to them necessary to get them to change . Well, thank you, senator, and first of all let me thank you for your kind words at the outset. We do have hard jobs, but theyre important ones, and were committed to following through on them. I think that one thing thats worth noting is the tokyo conference in the summer of 2012 did establish this framework for mutual accountability between the donors and the government of afghanistan. And that from, i think from that moment forward there has been greater conditionality on the part of not just american assistance but the international communitys assistance. And this is a recognition in order for the government to have the legitimacy that it needs to carry out Counterterrorism Operations and establish security throughout the country that it needs to address the perception of corruption. So i dont see the goal quite as much in contrast perhaps as you do. The other point is, i think theres a great willingness under this government, in particular under president ghani, to actually address the issue of corruption, and he recognizes the challenge that it represents for his, for his administration. So i think in the overall interest of good governance, which is a hugely important part of counterinsurgency, that it is, that it is essential that we continue to apply conditionality on these issues. Id like to ask, if youre agreeing with my colleague, mr. Sampler, has anything to add on this, let me ask another question, you can maybe answer this one as well. Then i would be interested for you to articulate what you think ra given the taliban this political space in which to operate . Because if you read through the litany of progress we absolutely have made on the number of afghans who have access to schooling, to the number of homes that now have access to electricity, right . That should suggest a level of economic stability and Economic Opportunity that would give local populations faith in aligning themselves with local, regional or federal governance, and theyre not doing that, which suggests that the political space is being created perhaps by a lack of faith in the legitimacy of the government, because of corruption, and so its sort of hard, again from your perspective, from usaids perspective, to hear all the progress weve made, but then to have no evidence that its actually resulting in less support for the taliban when you look at the breadth of their operations over the course of the year. Interesting in your perspective in terms of what you think is giving the taliban the political space, if you accept the notion there has been a lot of progress made in terms of the programming that weve delivered. Well, you know, i have to say, one of the challenges here is, attempting to peer in from the outside and figure out what the taliban motivations actually are and what the taliban grievances are, and i think our knowledge on this is, frankly, imperfect. I do think it is one of the reasons why it is important to have an afghanled and afghanowned reconciliation process Going Forward so that these issues can be identified, and we can attempt to, attempt to identify what some of the grievances may be. But i would defer to larry on the questions of assistance. Senator, thank you for the question. With respect to corruption, two observations. If you dont mind ill answer the second question. First is how president ghani takes the corruption issue anecdotally. I sat in a meeting he personally chairs every saturday night and are incredibly painful because president ghani based on world Bank Experience and personal experience in afghanistan understands how hard it is to eradicate and has to be, as the ambassador said, by his government. At the mack tomorrow level hes personally involved. One example, usdia has been helping president ghani with customs collections. Most of the corruption is facetoface corruption where a Truck Drivers approached, extorted for money, not once or twice in some cases as many as six times by individuals saying they represent the government in taking money. By allowing them to do their customs payments electronically, the facetoface engagements are no longer necessary and president ghanis expects to reduce corruption both at the customs houses and increases revenues and we have early indications where they have instituted electronic transfers they have, in fact, increased the customs collections at those three border crossings. The problem hasnt gone away by any stretch of the imagination, but with the election of president ghani and ceo abdullah there is an issue and theyve addressed that to you and me. To your point about political space, with all due respect i would describe it differently. The Asia Foundation has done a survey of the afghan population that doesnt show population in the increase of taliban, in fact, they are less popular than ever before. By use of force, Taliban Forces them physically into spaces theyre not welcome. The afghan population at the individual family level learned over decades of combat how to survive, and it may be in their best interests or perceive it in their best interests at the moment to acquiesce to the taliban control of their area, but im fairly confident and i will actually yield to ali jalali. Its good you have an actual afghan here today to talk how afghans see these problems. I dont necessarily think theyve taken advantage of political space. They have taken advantage of the governments inability to project force to every corner of the country at the same time. Senator barrasso . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Ambassador olson, i want to talk more about whats happening with isis and you were just in afghanistan last week. I was the there for thanksgiving up in northern afghanistan, and hearing more and more about the spread of isis across the middle east, its obviously serious concern to us in regard to National Security. Yesterday the department of defense warned about the growth of isis in afghanistan. The report from the department of defense stated that isis has progressed from its initial exploratory phase to a point where theyre openly fighting the taliban for establishment of a safe haven and becoming more operationally active. It went ton say that isis claimed responsibility for the ied attacks against United Nations vehicle, attacks against i think ten checkpoints in september when i was in kabul. As you know, theyre not taking vehicles back and forth to the embassy. Things are now by helicopter just because of this increased concern. Can you talk about the best estimates and the number of isis fighters in afghanistan . Thank you, senator. I will have to get back to you on a number, on our estimate. I dont have that with me today. We are aware of the emergence of daesh in Nangarhar Province in particular, and this is something that weve had as part of our on going dialogue, not just with afghanistan, but also with pakistan and we take very seriously the potential emergence of daesh in afghanistan and pakistan. That said, our understanding of the right now is that, in fact, these are disaffected taliban factions and commanders who have switched allegiance to daesh. Thats not to underestimate the danger that this represents, buts it is also to suggest that there is not necessarily a direct linkage and flow of materiel or fighters from the middle east to the afghanistan pakistan region. So far daesh has been confined to the southern districts of nangarhar, and well continue to work with afghanistan and pakistan to the extent we can work with them jointly to ensure that they are responding to this emerging threat. I wonder if you could help us, because ive heard the same thing when i was there and asked some of these questions and the same thing. Some of these are disaffected taliban members heading over to isis. The issue of pay came up, and could you talk a little bit about how different people are paid differently in afghanistan . I mean, the pecking order seemed to be that isis was getting the most money, the people that were willing to fight for isis. The next level down from there was the taliban and the level below that was the afghan army and then the level below that was the afghan police. So for people that are focused on the monetary aspects of this, there was actually a pecking older of which side you were on and how much you got paid . Yeah. Well, i have heard these stories as well, about the relative pay. These are questions that i think need some, to be seriously addressed. You know, one of the questions, of course, that we will be addressing at the International Level in warsaw in july is continuing sustainment of the Afghan National security and defense forces, and i also think it highlights the continued importance of dealing with the financing of these organizations. Does it did you see any evidence that either taliban or isis is interested in actually governing afghanistan or simply want to be left alone in their own safe havens or just create more problems . The taliban . Yeah. Their rhetoric certainly suggests that they intend to try to once again rule afghanistan as they did during the 90s. Their official title, of course, is, they call themselves the Islamic Emirate of afghanistan, and so we have seen, including in such preliminary, the preliminary talks that took place in murray in july, that the taliban does, indeed, assert national aspirations, but its perhaps not surprising that they would do so. In terms of troop level and, senator perdue asked about specifically the troop level of the 9,800 troops currently until the end of 16. The administration originally it was only about 1,000 troops by the end of 16. Given the current security situation, the increased violence, does the state department believe that the United States should go down to 5,500 troops after 2016 . Or 1,000 . Or what are your thoughts on the numbers . Well, as the president has announced, we will have 9,800 troops through most of 2016, through the bulk of the fighting season. And we believe that the commitment of the 5,500 for the period beyond is important for the continued train and assist mission, continuing ct mission in afghanistan, and i think it also sends and important regional signal, a signal that the United States remains engaged and committed in the region, and i think it also sends an important signal to the taliban which will be helpful as part of a reconciliation process. Final question. Could you just give me your assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces . The Afghan National Security Forces, National Security and defense forces, have faced great challenges over the course of the last year. They have, however, shown a marked willingness to fight. There continues to be they continue to need support in logistics, sustainment, all of the enablers that actually make an army able to fight. In other words, they need some of the ministry of defense functions, and in that regard, it would be helpful to have a minister of defense. Thank you mr. Ambassador. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Senator kaine . Thank you, mr. Chair and thank you to the witnesses. It is a very, very challenging service, and i appreciated mr. Sampler, your going into some of the metrics of improved quality of life in afghanistan that have been achieved with a tremendous amount of work by americans and Coalition Partners and i especially acknowledge that you acknowledged our troops and also of all the civilians and usid and ngos, a comprehensive effort in things like the Life Expectancy expansion are nearly revolutionary if you look at what that has meant to afghanistan, but i we all want that progress to not be a temporary phenomena to continue and thats why were here. One of the things that troubles me, i think the chairman in his opening comments talked about the divergence between what we often hear from afghanistan in classified and unclassified settings and i had an opportunity yesterday to be with others in a classified setting on afghanistan, and i was struck by the divergence between different classified settings i go to, and in particular the divergence between classified information conveyed by folks in the Intel Community versus classified information conveyed by folks in the Armed Services committee, im on the Armed Services committee, too. And i think a little bit of tension between the Intel Community approach and the Armed Services approach is not that unusual, but i will say, and ive only been here three year but in three years here ive never heard as broad a convergence and i dont think i can say the issues without jeopardizing what may be classified but i dont think ive heard as broad a divergence between classified accounts between the intel, community and the Armed Services community, in any other instance, except current status of a number of issues really important, really fundamental, really Critical Issues about the state of affairs in afghanistan, and its very, very troubling. Let me ask you a couple of questions. You each have joint bill its with afghanistan and pakistan and im really interested in your thoughts about the current afghanistan and pakistan relationship and we know it doesnt have to be from a classified hearing, from Public Accounting of taliban activity in pakistan that taliban have used pakistan as a safe haven over time and theres a very important agreement to which pakistans cooperation with afghanistan and vice versa is critical to stability in afghanistan. What is your current perception from your, from each of your respective roles about the degree of cooperation between the afghan and pakistan governments, especially when it comes to these issues of security and the counterterrorism effort . Thank you, senator kaine. Theres im just coming out of three years in pakistan, and i can assure you that this has been at the center of our dialogue with pakistanis, and i think its safe to say that there was no conversation that i had with the security establishment in pakistan that did not include a very direct, very frank discussion about specifically the Haqqani Network and the taliban in general, and we will continue to have those very frank discussions. The pakistanis have taken action against the ttp. They launched operation in june of 2014 and have largely cleared North Waziristan agency, which was a longstanding objective for us, to get their Sovereign Authority reestablished over all of their, all of their territory. But they have focused more on the ttp, the Pakistani Taliban, than they have on external terrorist actors. That is to say actors that threaten their neighbors, whether afghanistan or india. So we will have to continue to push them on these, on these particular points. That said, i think there is a recognition in pakistan that there has been bleedover between the Pakistani Taliban and the afghan taliban, and its not so clear that even if they wanted to distinguish between good and bad anymore that they can. So thats one of the i think that creates an opportunity that we will want to, you know, per pursue as much as possible. Moving quickly to the state of afghanistan pakistan relations, we feel last week was actually fairly significant. President ghani went to the heart of asia conference. Prime minister anwar sharif committed to representing sovereignty, territorial integrity, respect for the government and its constitution, which was important language for the afghans. In the trilateral session we conducted, they committed to resuming a Peace Process as soon as possible and to using all available means against those members of the taliban who did not join the Peace Process. So i think, although theres a long history of tension between afghanistan and pakistan, i think after last week we feel that relations are at least somewhat improved. Please, mr. Sampler, and then i have one more question. Senator, thank you. With respect to demonstrated collaboration and cooperation between afghanistan and pakistan, and i would add the other nations in the region, recently casa 1000 was signed, an Energy Corridor running from central asia down through afghanistan and pakistan with enormous, positive consequences for all the member countries and while just this week Broken Ground on tapi Energy Corridor also have connective resonance for the countries in the region. I think this is one of those places where the security focus and the commerce focus are going to overlap. To the degree that we can get the countries in this part of the region working together on Economic Growth, they have skin in the game to provide stability, and vice versa, to provide, they have to provide the stability in order to see the Economic Growth. There is also an increase in crossborder trade with respect to things as simple as fruits and nuts. Afghanistan is expecting in 2015 to see 36 million worth of their produce being shipped abroad largely to pakistan. So its there. I would like to add, i very much appreciate your observations about the divergent opinions with respect to observes places like afghanistan. Shared as a young soldier first exposed to classified information, information isnt classified because its more correct than other information, and other perceptions. Its classified because of how it was collected. And what i get from my implementing partners on the ground in afghanistan is that the afghanistan they see and touch and live in every day differs depending when province and district theyre in, some provinces they would absolutely agree with the intelligence communitys fairly dire estimates, but in others they are actually making progress on value changes, exports, being able to educate sons and daughters. Its not, in my humble opinion, as simple as it sometimes portrayed but i very much appreciate your defining that. Thank you. Thank you, senator udall. Thank you, mr. Chairman, and thank you both for your, your service to the country. We really appreciate all of the hard work and what are very, very difficult circumstances. Ambassador olson, you mention in your Opening Statement here, the Administration Remains committed to a stable and secure afghanistan, and we remain convinced that a negotiated settlement between the government of afghanistan and the taliban is the surest way to end the conflict. And i im wondering, i have the same impression, that that senator kaine does. Im not on the Armed Services committee, but that theres a very stark difference here between, between some of the intelligence, but that aside, let me ask, if were wanting to get them to the peace table in this afghanled Peace Process, isnt the taliban have to be at a point in their situation, in the conflict, where they feel theres a reason for them to come to the table . Where theyre and looking at it, from my perspective, your testimony and others here, that theyre resurgent. Theyre doing better. Theyre capturing cities. Theyre releasing people from prisons. I mean, theyre making major gains, and so what is, and were drawing our forces down. I mean, what convinced me that they really want, in good faith, to come to the table, and the questions addressed to both of you. Yes, senator udall, thank you so much. Thats a very thoughtful question. It strikes me that there are a couple of things that give us some leverage in this situation. First of all, the the taliban do seem to desire some degree of International Political legitimacy. They recognize, apparently, and i have to i will say at the outset that i think we have to be cautious about what we know about the taliban and what we presume, but it does appear that as a result of their historical experience when they were governing in the 1990s and were isolated and cut off from the outside world, and afghanistan is a country that has always been reliant to some extent on external assistance. I think that they look to International Legitimacy as an important objective, and the only way that that could be achieved is through some kind of political settlement. The second element is what i alluded to before, which is the question of pressure, and i think its significant in this regard, that we have the language coming out of the trilateral Statement Last week, in islamabad, talking about the use of all available means against those who are not prepared to reconcile. The mr. Sampler, do you have any comment on the sides of this from your perspective, from aid and the, that indicate to you that theres a real sincere effort on the part of the taliban to be a part of a Peace Process . The only observation i would be able to make is that in order to be a player in the Economic Growth we hope will occur in that part of the world, as the ambassador said, they have to be a legitimate partner and player and in no way considered legitimate at this point. A very indirect measure but the only input i would have. You know, as you talk about economic development, i mean, the security, securitys affected afghanistans economic im trying to probe now. If on their economic outlook, if the whats the status of some of the major, mining, energy and other Capital Projects that investors such as china and india have subscribed to . What projects are under way in producing revenue, if any . Which projects are stalled . And why are they stalled . You talked about the exports to pakistan, but im talking about these bigger projects that youre aware of, im sure. Certainly. One of the things that encourages me about president ghanis cabinet, he brought in younger technocratic ministers. You asked about mining, ill use mines he told me he had 390 vacant Civil Service positions, and i said, well, how many have you filled . He said theres about 20 that are filled, but 390 are vacant. So the ministry was very much a potemkin ministry. Strength at the top, nothing behind it. With this ministry he was expected to pursue fair, open and transparent procurements for mineral rights, for gas rights, and for exports of the same. What hes done is hes filled about half the vacancies at this point in time. Hes moved forward on a gas pipeline in the north of afghanistan that for 12 years prior that had not been moved on. He has identified some very lowhanging fruit and not the most lucrative mining sectors, to be honest. Talc powder is not considered sexy or lucrative but it is an area he believes, the state will be able to exercise monopoly on and collect taxes and tariffs on the mining of talc. Another is lap pass, Precious Minerals found only in afghanistan. So theyre focusing on finding ways to achieve quick results, but these are not things that are typically done quickly. The u. S. Interest has been the ministry build the capacity to do it equitably and transparently, and i think president ghanis ministers are focusing on doing that. Thank you. Please, ambassador . Yes, senator, i would just add what my colleague larry had mentioned before, which is the Forward Movement on both tapi, the pipeline, turkmanistan, afghanistan, pakistan, india pipeline, india, a project in fruition for Something Like nearly 30 years, and is now much closer to actually moving forward. I mean, thats quite significant. And the other is casa 1000, which doesnt have quite as venerable a history but has been around for a while, but the power purchasing agreement was just signed within the last week. So i think those are positive indicators. Of indian, india or china involved in either one of those . Well, the ultimate concept for tapi is that it would go on to pakistan and india. I believe that the latest agreement is between turkmanistan, and afghanistan. So there is still some negotiations to be done, but the indication is very positive. None sec tour, but i would remiss if i didnt note that tomorrow in nairobi, afghanistan will be accepted into the world trade organization. That is not in and of it is in and of itself and accomplishment. Its been several years in the making but begins a very difficult journey for afghanistan to make the kinds of procedural and legal adjustments they have to make in order for the kinds of programming youre describing to be both productive in a short run and sustainable. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator isakson . Thank you, mr. Chairman, and i apologize i had to go in and out and missed some of the questions and may be redundant, and i apologize for that. Mr. Sampler, did you serve in usaid when we in iraq . Yes, sir, i did. Were you ever part of the reconstruction teams ever part of what . No, sir. I served in baghdad. Mr. Olson, were you involved when we were involved in iraq . Yes, sir. I served in iraq from december of 2003 to march of 2004. In a governorled team in iraq, a predecessor to the prts. Correct me if im wrong. The title of this hearing is administrative strategy in afghanistan. But i want to reflect back to iraq for a second in my experience there. Our strategy in iraq obviously stabilize the country through the use of soft pow around things like usa id and construction teams to win the people over leave enoughs a residual force for security in the country and hopefully win them over to be an independent, free democracy in a dangerous part of the world. Wasnt that about right to describe our strategy . Yes it is i dont have responsibility for iraq right now. This is not a trick question. Im just feel free to correct me if im wrong in any of this because im trying to get to a point. Yes, sir. What worries me, i read general campbells statements about the growth of isil and strength of the taliban and reflected back to iraq. I walked in the streets of gaza with a u. S. Rifle company handing out micro loans and helping Small Businesses grow through the prts and really winning the country over and then we left. And our military presence left and isil came in. I know the president decided to leave 5,000, i believe thats the right number, of troops in afghanistan. Is that not correct . Is that enough to prevent what happened in iraq, from happening again in afghanistan . Where theres so little protection we cant let the soft power we want to use to win the people over actually take hold in terms of our strategy . Thats the question im getting to. Thank you, senator. I think there are some important differences between afghanistan and iraq. I would highlight a couple of them. One is that we do have a bilateral Security Agreement with afghanistan, and that is what allowed the president to make the decision he did to allow troops to stay longer in afghanistan. Of course, we did not have that in iraq. I think its also fair to say for all of the challenges that the government of National Unity faces in afghanistan, it is a more inclusive government. And brings together more elements of the population, and so i dont think you have the situation where there is one particular ethnic group in afghanistan that is feeling marginalized as a group. Obviously, its a complex ethnic situation, and but the political differences tend to cleave across sectarian lines rather than in alignment with sectarian lines, and i think thats probably its most important point that i would make. This is, of course, a very soft subject, and its probably more impressionistic than anything can you reduce to a metric, but there is a very definite sense of Afghan Nationalism as, that all afghans or most afghans subscribe to, and the country does not have a tradition of let me not overstate this. There is not as much of a tradition of sectarianism, ethnic and religious sectarianism in the country and a very strong sense of National Identity in history, which helps to bring people together. That means the conflict is more about whos going to run the place than whether the place is going to fall apart. I really appreciate that answer, and this is an observation ill make. The reason afghanistan has been at war for 300 years because that strong sense of National Unity, they want to be in control of their own destiny and fought whoever fought to control them. Is that correct . Yeah. Afghan history is a complex subject. But National Security is one of the contributing factors, is it not . Yes, well, there is a very strong sense of nationalism, mobilized against foreigners at various times. Its worth noting in that regard that over the past 14 years the Afghan People have been remarkably welcoming of our forces. And i think they are more welcomed than any predecessor Foreign Forces in afghanistans history and thats a remarkable achievement, credit to our armed forces, by the way. Thanks to both of you for your service and thank you for answering the questions. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. And were about to close out and have another panel. Just out of curiosity, to followup a little on senator kaines comments about the diverging views. I will say for what its worth, i know i had a private meeting with you, ambassador olson. We had the classified briefing and for what its worth, while you obviously speak in a more statesmanlike manner, the views of what is happening in afghanistan were very aligned. The meeting we had in our office, class briefing yesterday was very much aligned. We got some issues we need to deal with. Why do you think there is that divergent view on the other side that takes place . I know that you work closely with our Armed Services. How could it be as involved as you are there, both of you, that we have an alignment over here at the state department and with our intelligence, but a disalignment, if you will, over on the other sectors . Well, all i can say, senator, is that we really we really do try, particularly in the afpak arena where i have been working for the last four years to bring about a whole of government approach, not just in terms of our operations and what were trying to do, but also in our, in our assessments. Its evident to me from your comments we have work to do in a that regard and probably owe you some better alignment on how we are thinking. I actually found the alignments we had yesterday to be very good. But so i just the taliban issue now, obviously we came into afghanistan in 01. The issue was to end the talibans existence and dominion over government at the time. Now they are making, theyre changing the facts on the ground. Is that fair . To some extent. Yeah. I think i dont think we know yet how much those facts on the ground have actually been changed. And there are discussions about over time i mean, weve made some accommodating comments, publicly, our government has, relative to their potential involvement in the government down the road. I mean is that fair to say . We have committed to an afghanled, afghanowned reconciliation process, but the terms of the kind of political settlement that youre talking about would have to be led by the afghans. Thats not for us to announce. Im stepping in and out. I greatly apologize. My understanding is a statement was made at present theyre not exhibiting the characteristics that would be appropriate for them to be a part of that. Is that correct . I believe my colleague, larry sampler, made that comment, with which i would fully agree. The point was, i think, that the taliban does seek a degree of International Legitimacy, and this may be one of the reasons that they have been willing to come to the table. At least at murray and be in july of last year. But they have a long way to go before they would in any way be considered legitimate, and i think for us we have been careful not to establish preconditions for negotiations, but we support the afghan end conditions, which are renunciation of violence. Acceptance of the constitution, including its provisions related to women and minorities, and a complete break with international terrorism, especially al qaeda. Those are the end conditions of the negotiating process. And so thats the end state that the Afghan Government is looking towards. I think its good that we have an established preconditions ourselves. What would be, though, the characteristics the taliban would need to exhibit from your standpoint, to be legitimate entity for the Afghan Government to begin negotiations with . Well, i think we would not want to establish preconditions. For for the yeah. Just your observation would be yeah. I think what is important is that at the end of the negotiating process, those three outcomes are guaranteed, and that is what we seek. A process that generates those three outcomes. And do you think based on what you know the taliban has the capacity to reject terrorism and violence . They have its always very difficult, and im always very cautious about what we think the taliban is thinking. Its a very its a very fraught subject. One of the reasons that a negotiating process would help to bring some of this out, but there have been some indications in some of the statements issued in mullah omars name, turns out we thought at the time may have been issued by mullah omar that suggests some movement on some of these, on some of these issues. But whether thats actually something prepared to, can only be determined through a negotiating process. A come more just brief questions. You know, we had a a decent meeting with the Prime Minister of pakistan, and their military leadership. You know, they gave us strongly worded statements about the isis involvement in how 1,000 were committed to dealing with the taliban, dealing with other groups that are housed in the region and securing they did everything they could to be sure that afghanistan was stabilized. On the other hand i get the strong sense thats maybe not 100 accurate. Theyre watching what is happening on the ground. They want to have the proper relationship, if you will, with the, the ultimate Leadership Group that exists in afghanistan, and what theyre seeing right now is a situation where theyre not sure what that outcome is going to bes my sense that is instead of them actually carrying out what they said here in our presence, that they are hedging their bets, and theyre trying to calculate, if you will, what afghanistan is going to be over time. Right now we have 9,800 troops ourselves in afghanistan. Theres been a sort of an arbitrary date of numbers of troops that will be there over the course of this next year. I think dropping down to about 5,000. But it seems to me weve got our hands full asis. That its incredibly difficult for us to to keep violence down and stability in place at present, and im just, just out of curiosity does that raise questions to you as to when we need to be deciding ultimately what our Security Force totals are going to be in afghanistan . If i could start, senator, with the first piece on pakistan. I mean, first of all, pakistan has moved in a significant way on its own terrorism threat. It has largely cleaned out North Waziristan. Agency, something we had long desired, its reestablished control over most of northern waziristan, and i think there is increasingly a recognition on the part of the government of pakistan that there is significant bleed over between the Pakistani Taliban and the afghan taliban, and that this is one of the motivations for their desire to, you know that it is no longer simple for them as it may have been in the past, even if they in principle agree to distinguish between good and bad taliban. The other important point is, i think that theyve recognized at the outreach that president ghani has made to pakistan, and recognize that this is a historic opportunity, and they would like to seize on that. Thats why we think that there is some, one of you know, among several reasons, that there is possibility for moving forward on a reconciliation process now, because theres a greater degree of alignment on these issues between afghanistan and pakistan than there has been for some time in the past. What about the seconds part of the question . Well, the second part, sir, you know, the president s decision is to go to the 5,500 troops after the end of 2016, and i think will be, it will be for the next administration to determine what troop levels it wants to support. And i have no desire, i respect you, i think you and i may have traveled together to the waziristans, i if remember correctly. We did, sir. I dont want to create a divergence between you and the administration, but lets just say at present, i mean, things could change certainly between now and the end of the year. Our Security Forces have their hands full in working with the Afghan Military to try to create a secure environment. Is that correct . They yes, they have a challenging assignment, but i have talked to my colleague and friend general campbell, and hes confident that he has what he needs at the moment. At the moment. Yeah. Well, listen, ive certainly appreciate your service. I appreciated your candor yesterday in our office. I appreciate the service you provided in multiple settings, and certainly yall have been helpful to us today, and i do think that it would be fair to say based on the entirety of yesterday, today and just other interaccesses we had, we should all be very concerned about outcomes in afghanistan and understand that tremendous diligence and effort is Still Necessary and leadership on their part, to cause a successful outcome to occur. Would you agree . I think we all face a lot of challenges, sir. Absolutely. Thank you both. Appreciate it. Well, now may i ask the second panel to take their place. Okay. We thank all of you for being here. Our first witness today will be the former u. S. Ambassador to afghanistan james cunningham. Someone we all know well. Now hes senior fellow at the khalilzad chair on afghanistan at the south asia center of the atlantic council. We thank you for being here. The second witness will be former afghan minister, mr. Ali jalali. Thank you so much for being here. We all know you, also. Now distinguished professor at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the National Defense university. Our third witness will be jodi vittori. A senior policy advisor at the global witness, at global witness. He has also served in the u. S. Military in afghanistan. Thank you for that service and in countering corruption in the defense and Security Sector i know is a big job. So we thank you all for being here. We think this is a very distinguished panel. If you could keep your comments to around five minutes, without objection, your written testimony will be entered