European foreign fighters, than number of American Foreign fighters. The size of problem is completely different. European setting france, estimated 1200 individuals. Germany, the u. K. , in the six, 700s. Even smaller countries like belgium with staggering 400 individuals. Eastern European Countries, kosovo, very tiny country, 3, 400 individuals. These are completely different numbers from the u. S. Where the latest numbers given by the government, the fbi, talking about 200 individuals traveled or attempted to travel to syria. So, were talking about a much, much smaller number. A lot of people have actually been intercepted. People that went and fought there, that 200 number should be further reduced. I think numbers are deceiving from another perspective, here in the u. S. , there are legal tools, more general a certain attitude from Law Enforcement which is significantly moring a agressive than in most European Countries. A lot of very effective tactics that the fbi use, sting operation, so on, are not really used in europe. I say they skew the numbers significantly. I would probably suspect if any european Law Enforcement agency were to use tactics, the numbers of people arrested in every country would skyrocket, completely different. So why are the numbers so different between the europe and u. S. I dont think there is just one explanation. I think it is a combination of factors. The first one is logistical difficulties arguesably. From europe it is very easy to reach turkey and then eventually syria. Some people have called it easyjet jihad from the lowcost airline. Takes 100 euros. Leave in the morning. Many country, you dont need passport. You need Identity Card and reach Turkish Border with syria. It is slightly more complicated and more expensive from the United States. The second reason has to do with the fact in the u. S. We do not see the recruiting networks that we see in europe. Im not saying they are completely nonexistent in the u. S. But in europe we have significantly more established and sophisticated structures of recruiting networks that do not exist in the United States. Even both internet, social media to some degree, substitute itself, recruiting networks, a lot of people argue it doesnt completely substitute facetoface interaction. You dont join isis just with a online interaction with somebody. The vast majority of the cases you join isis and other groups you have some personal connection to somebody who has connections there. The third reason, which is more of a macrolevel, has to do with very Different Levels of radicalization, between european and american muslim communities. I do not want to overstate the problem in europe. I think periodically when we see analysis, for example, in the postcharlie hebdo environment i think some of the analysis of the social situation of the integration of muslim communities and radicalization of segments of it were exaggerated but unquestionably there are problems of radicalization in europe that are significantly higher than in the United States. We do not see in the United States the groups like sharia four, all these groups that have been instrumental in european setting in radicalizing and mobilizing a lot of people for syria. We barely see them in the United States or we actually do not see them in many cases. So the numbers are the first big difference between the u. S. And europe. I would argue that there are a lot of differences also in terms of dynamics between the two sides of the ocean. In europe, im simplifying things a lot and generalizing i think we see a lot of clusters and a lot of peertopeer radicalization and mobilization. As i said the online propaganda, social media, has a huge role to play here but the personal relations that people have are unquestionable. People who radicalize and eventually leave for syria and iraq. If you look at maps where individuals who go to syria and iraq from different European Countries come from, you will see they are not evenly divided in any country but they come from certain towns, certain cities and actually certain neighborhoods in both cities and generally bears a human factor there, there is a connection. There are two or three guys that go first. Then they call friends, cousins, classmates. They talk to them through social media. Social media is the conduit, the means which they reach out to people back home but it is that personal connection that predates the contact on social media. That is a different dynamic many cases from the United States where you see more scattered individuals here and there. Less clusters and greater role of the internet but again i think in the United States we should be a little bit more nuanced. There is a spectrum. On one hand we do see quite a few cases of individuals that have no physical connection whatsoever to isis. They radicalize online. They decide to mobilize because of interactions they have online. If you read some of the very good journal list i can reporting been down in some cases in the United States, there was excellent New York Times article some two or three weeks ago about this girl in rural Washington State. Was completely groomed, that is the right term being used often, online. This is somebody with no human, no personal interaction with any cluster. We also see in the United States several cases of small clusters. Not on the size what we see in europe but we see groups of people that radicalize together, mobilize together. There has been attention on this, as frank was saying that is a problem that dates back to 2006, 2007, somalis in minneapolis. We see the same sort of clusters of somalis, mobilizing for syria now. But small clusters throughout the countries have been dismantled. Bosnians centered in st. Louis. Recently in the last few weeks a group of young individuals in the new yorknew jersey area. Some Smaller Group in the boston area. A group of central asians in brooklyn. So we have seen these small clusters. Again nothing of the size and sophistication of the european dynamics but we have a spectrum also in the United States. It is a bit of a misconception to just see the American Foreign fighters seen as scattered individuals here and there just radicalized on social media. I think that is an oversimplification. It is indeed more difficult, as i said, to travel to syria and we do not see the clusters we see in the u. S. I think thats one of the reasons that explains why in the states we have seen in comparative terms, compared to europe disprognat number of disproportionate numbers of small attacks, some of them linked to isis. Im talking about garland and shooting, attempted attack on the cartoon attack in garland, texas. But also other acts are difficult to categorize. It is difficult to find a clear jihad it footprint. Im thinking about chattanooga. Im thinking about the hatchet attack in new york. Think about the beheading in oklahoma. Very strange cases which, very difficult to categorize. Clearly there is some inkling of jihad it ideology there but there are a lot of other issues having to do with mental health, personality disorders and so on. One could argue, again this is purely on the hypothetical level, that a lot of these individuals in europe would find it much easier to mobilize in the direction of syria and iraq. Here for one reason or the other, they can not find that outlet that easy and they might basically let that anger and that radicalization out in a different, in a different way. The final point, im going to wrap it up here, i think most interesting part here is the q a part for sure. It is the different approach from the governments point of view on the two sides of the ocean. On both sides, particularly those on the european side there has been a strengthening of the harder part of the counterterrorism spectrum. Legislations have been enhanced on both sides of the ocean but i would argue particularly in some European Countries major efforts have been made. So if the europeans felt they need to catch up a bit in tightening some screws and being a bit harder on the traditional counterterrorism side of things. On the u. S. Perspective where there is a Legal Framework that is generally speaking much tougher than in most European Countries, what has been somewhat lacking on the u. S. Side is the cb side of things, counter balance side which is increasingly seen not only in europe but in the United States as crucially important and program, i apologize for the shameless pitch here. Weve been focusing on this aspect. We issued a report when we launched last june about the status of counter imbalance extremeism in america. Basically what we eggerred the United States lacks behind most European Countries when it comes to cbe for a variety of reasons. There is a strategy, poorly implemented, disjointed, severely underfunded. And it is clear, and this is something that was said in testimony in congress by a variety of top Law Enforcement officials recently, we in United States, where legislation is tougher, we can not arrest our way out of this problem. There are cases in which it is very difficult to operate with a traditional Law Enforcement tools which are in many cases extremely effective, dont get me wrong, but in some cases are inadequate. Im thinking about increasing number of minors that are involved in mobilizing for isis. Sometimes very difficult to use from a legal, and from aeth challenge point of view traditional Law Enforcement tactics with them. There is lack of evidence in many cases, im thinking about all the cases of returning foreign fighters. This is a european problem but also an american problem where it is sometimes very difficult to bring charges from people that come back from syria where it is clear from an intelligence point of view that person went to syria and did not go there to do sightseeing. But nonetheless bringing charges in a court of law, obviously it is much more difficult and we have seen cases obviously where that was very difficult. One case was very interesting of this convert in california who went to fight in syria. Was with isis and nusra but there was no evidence to charge him with. Came back to the United States and no evidence to charge him with. He was approached through the traditional fbi sting operation and convinced to join al qaeda in pakistan. He was arrested for that. So you have the paradox of something not arrests what he did, fighting in syria but he was planning to do and going to pakistan to join to fight with al qaeda. That worked out. The system one way or the other worked but it is clear that in some cases there is a problem with evidence of returning foreign fighters and the cbe aspect is not obviously the silver bullet. It doesnt work in all cases but obviously it is something in the United States that need to be strengthened. There is a lot of talk about it and a lot of constructive dialogue within the administration about it but probably some more tangible resources should be put to it. I will leave it at that. Thank you, lorenzo and one of the things, peter and fernando i hope you pick up on, if not during your comments in the q a, the returning foreign fighter phenomena is an issue. I think the public numbers approximately 40 returned to the United States. How does europe handle this since the scale and dope of numbers are much greater. Can you turn some around to be defectors and part of the counter narrative . Also they should be criminally prosecuted. I would be curious in how europe is addressing this and. Peter over to you. Thank you, frank and lorenzo. Happy to be here. The reason were talking about this my team and i discovered about 2 1 2 years ago that brits were going to syria to fight there and not only were they doing that, they went there and they maintained their on line social media profiles. Maintained twitter accounts, tumblr and became possible to follow them. We found exciting and interesting because they were almost like posting a diary from the battlefields. We started broadening that out. We do have a database containing 700 online social media profiles of fighters in syria and iraq. We have communicated with 100 of them and weve done field work in the border, on the border with syria. So we have a pretty good and pretty comprehensive idea of this population and what im saying now is, you know, greatly, you know, is to a large extent based on what we have learned from this. On the numbers first, lorenzo is absolutely right. This is a phenomenon that exceeds and surpasses everything that we have seen before and in the case of europe which represent perhaps about 20 of the overall foreign fighter population in syria and iraq, i. E. , approximately, 4 to 5,000 people, what is particularly interesting is that smaller European Countries are disproportionately affected. So if you look at the distribution of foreign fighters across European Countries, of course the largest European Countries are producing the greatest numbers but it is particularly the smaller countries that are heavily affected. Countries like belgium, denmark and holland, norway, sweden. So thats worth keeping in mind. There are really three points that i want to talk about. The first is motivation. The second is the idea of online recruitment. Thirdly i want to hit on what frank was asking me to talk about in terms of how they have been returnees, and how they have been dealt with. First on the motivation and it is very important to make the point there is no monolithic foreign fighter at least not in western europe, at least not among the people we have looked at. There are a number of different motivations and they have changed over time. It is perfectly fair to say that the people went to syria and iraq in 2012, early 2013, were not necessarily all committed extremists. They all had a very strong sunni Muslim Identity. They went there because they feared that what was going on in syria was essentially a genocide of the sunni population of syria carried out by a conspiracy led by bashar alassad, supported by iran, supported by hezbollah. And they were being told by radical preachers on the internet being muslim means anything to you at all you now have to come and defend your brothers and sisters because america is not helping. The arabs are not helping. We are on our own and we need you now. That was the principle recruitment narrative in the early phase of the conflict and indeed, if you look at the literature on foreign fighters, you will see throughout history and throughout different idealogical movements, the defense against existential threat has always been a great mobilizer. However of course in 201314 the narrative shifted and that of course can be linked with the rise of the socalled Islamic State and a second peak of recruitment happen ad year ago in the summer of 2014 when the Islamic State declared its caliphate and a string of literally successes which motivated people who were really interested in building the caliphate. They were thinking, it is coming now. It is real. We have to go there and be part of it and that second wave of recruits arguably was more extreme in orientation and intent than the first wave of recruits that i described before. In addition to that what weve also seen since last year, since about august, the start of the western air campaign, we have also seen a reemergence of the west versus islam narrative that had not been as dominant even a year ago when we were doing field work in border towns, meeting with fighters. You almost had to remind them that they were also hating the United States and its western allies which was an ironic experience for someone who has been interviewing these people for 10 or 15 years. What is also right what lorenzo said, especially for europeans geographic proximity makes it easy for people to travel, however, i should also point out, and this is particularly topical considering what is happening over the last few days, it has been very easy for them to cross the border from turkey into syria. I can tell you we were doing field work there in april 2014 in border towns like kilis and every taxi driver could tell you where the foreign fighters were staying, were praying. In takia, there are three or four uniform shops. One guy asks you what group you are with. He says isis. They give you the isis uniform. This is happening almost totally in the open. It is almost inconceivable turkish authorities were not knowing about this. It is perfectly plausible they were not wanting to crack down on this, out of fear that there may be a retaliation against them. I hope something is changing about this now but my fear is the infrastructure of these groups is so embedded within that sanctuary, it becomes very, very hard for the turks to really do something about this in a substantive way. My second point is about online recruitment. Online recruitment is something that has featured very prominently. We know isis has a massive social Media Campaign but in our experience at least, as far as western europeans are concerned, really online recruitment assecond is not the most important one. What is new about what isis is doing on line . It is not slick videos. We had slick videos from jihadist organizations for many, many years. Also it is not beheads. We had beheadings from al qaeda in iraq 10 years ago as im sure you all remember. What is new that is something not