Transcripts For CSPAN2 Sheila Smith Japan Rearmed 20240714 :

CSPAN2 Sheila Smith Japan Rearmed July 14, 2024

Relations. This is an hour. Welcome to [inaudible] im pleased to japan with the newly published book before we begin the process that makes the policy possible Global Leaders including United Airlines are partners throughout north america wed also like to thank our coer organizers it is a pleasure to be working with them for tonights program. Though its my pleasure to present the cofounder for remarks. [applause] good evening i am the head of the young china watchers new york part of the Leadership Team we would like to think the society for this amazing opportunity to host thisis and thank you for joining us we have a fantastic evening for you. Organization is a Dynamic Group of china focus professionals through roundtables and through the academic policies and communities to provide a chance to engage individuals to interact and discuss the most prescient issues emerging today through a growing Global Network with the next generation of leaders. And why have the privilege of introducing the provider and awardwinning writer and researcher specializinges in International Security and geopolitics and economics appearing in a range of publications including the New York Times and iraq and the Senior Editor where he writes on security and geopolitics and economics in the asiapacific region also senior fellow at the American Federation ofci scientist working on conventional force development with deterrence a nuclear strategy. The director of research of intelligence contributing editor from the morning post and in addition fellow strategist in Carnegie Council on ethics and International Affairs leader without further ado lets welcome. [applause] thank you everyone for coming. Out today to emphasize this lovely venue is not often do affairs talks on International Affairs in this auditorium i have the pleasure to introduce someone who needs no introduction we are all very fortunate to be here today with doctor sheila smith who was the countrys foremost expert on issues related to japan and the alliance and Asian Security issues in general what i am writing about these issues when i go to google her name is next to the topic she has already written something about it. So i look at her record quite a bit from her past writings. From the council of Foreign Relations where she works on japan the author of the book japan rearmed and intimate rivals in her book published a few years ago. Also the author on constitutional change and a regular contributor to Media Outlets in the United States and from the Eastwest Center she directed the multinational Research Team from the us military presence south korea through a visiting scholar before that where she researched form policy to china and the visiting researcher with the security think tanks in the Research Institute for security she is the vice chair and additionally in the Asian Studies department at Georgetown University i invite everyone to welcome sheila smith to the stage where she will talk about her book. Thank you. [applause] thank you. Thank you for that lovely introduction i am delighted to be back many of you may know i was an undergraduate student here. And the Japan Society is very could hang out and be adults. We saw films here and programs like this. We saw the Japan Society has a home away from home where we got to be japan professionals and talk to others who develop careers in the field. I cannot see any of you i have friends in the audience who are behind the big light thank you for coming and looking forward to the conversation also the young china watchers for inviting me months ago in particular to talk to the group and i was delighted m m to have a chance to meet the next generation of movers and shakers so thank you for that. And of course they always make me feel welcome im delighted to be back. I have a new book that takes me back because i began to think about as a graduate student writing my dissertation looking at a country of article nine that said it would not treat military power in the same way that other countries did. And its constitution that japans people as a word to Settle International disputes i kind of wish our constitution said Something Like that but it seems so obvious. About the real question i wanted to research was how does that square to be a principal ally in the postwar era and how does that square with that defining configuration of International Politics that seems like a very long time ago of the cold war but in that time and i got my degree of International Relations and that security class was about nato every security class talked about nato not one focused on asia. And Tom Christiansen is now here but why are we talking about this why are we talking pressures . When we talking about security wire we focused on m europe . Because it was the cold war and that is what we did. But our generation said hold on. The dynamics play out differently in asia. The two hot wars of the cold wars were in asia and our allies feel the divisions of i europe into east and west and north and south of the Korean Peninsula but japan is just offshore of china and obviously the soviet union at thece time. Japan was very resistant to see its own military to play a considerable role in that cold war however it did see great advantage to offer bases to the United States and no self to florence to force one Defense Forces and the essence of what contingency might motivate another country and the framing of the cold war and the Korean Peninsula from the very beginning was a defining possibility that might bring more to the shores of japan because it was then in 1950 and sadly today were armed forces could be used therefore a way that it could become embroiled in war so that doesnt mean all armed forces thought about that contingency because it took a long time in japan for the things we take for granted but like Contingency Planning or what will you do if . It takes a long time for that to be legitimate in postwar japann and that i have one chapter all about the cold war between military and civilian authorities that is very much a part of the early decades of the postwar period that things changed after the cold war ended it with that dissertation and that research the background chapter but the ay that different kinds of realities to shape what i think is a significant transformation. And how they look at their military. Into be structured the way that debate has played out. And this is the early pieces and then to put the military out of the country and in coalition but the cold war brought Defense Forces to the forefront of japanese thinking. It was not the framing even as the Prime Minister to be forthright with the military and then to be in conjunction withth other partners to many in cambodia and those here and that was no diplomat that was japanese. And then they were alongside others around the world to move into a peaceful transition. That was the very beginning under the law of 1991. But today to operate across the globe across with humanitarian or disaster relief. Q war. They are contentious at home but nonetheless thats what happened. They are today operating in the gulf of aiden in the antipiracy. They also the delve Defense Forces today have at the behest of the Prime Minister of course operate in conjunction with the australian military, the indian military, they visit the philippines, vietnam, singapore, many of the places where we think that war memory would preclude the japanese from sending military but night a capacity that is very different than the prewar period. The japanese today are helping the filipino military, especially on maritime capacity building. Theyre helping them make sure they have the ability to defend their own waters. They have visited vietnam at the invitation of the vietnamese government for similar reasoned. Work very closely with australia, all across the western pacific, on intelligence gathering, surveillance, monitoring, all kinds of consultations now on the south china sea. Theyre both maritime partners. But theyre very close security parts of the United States as partners of the United States as well. India another interesting story. The United States and india have been having exercises over the years. We typically think of them as maritime exercises but in fact they now engage all three of indias branch of 0 the military. Japans three branches of the selfdefense force, the maritime care and ground for have a strategic conversation with their friends in new dehli and the exercised are something the japanese have been built into as part of their efforts to increase their security and Strategic Dialogue with india. So you have a very active selfdefense force now in the region, places where you might not think that the Japanese Military would be all that welcome. But in fact the Japanese Military today is one of the best most accomplished militaries in asia and they are also very instrumental in making sure that other countries around the region feel they can turn to tokyo to help them if and when they get challenged by other growing larger parties in the region. Of course the mary time area where is we see he that most conspicuously but not exclusively. Im referring to the chinese but where the Chinese Military operates in southeast asia. So japan is the Japanese Military today is four or five generations after the end of world war ii and a very different military. Its very professional. I think youll know a lot of people have asked me, why did you put that cover on your book . I would hold it inbut i dont have a copy but has provocative there it is provocative cover but the picture aside, the title is something that i thought about a long time because of my work at cfr. I live down in washington, dcs a you know. I spent a lot of time there both in the in obama areas and no he Trump Administration and officials would come to me and still come to me to say are the japanese rearming . Are they going to build a military . Japan has invested considerably in its military capability. Without a doubt. Top 10. That goes back to the 1980s. Today it somewhere around seven or eight depending on how much china is spending at the moment. It slips back and forth. Its ranking within the top 10 may be slightly different yeartoyear. Theres no doubt about it, japan has felt it necessary and important to invest in the military as it instrument of statecraft. Whats more interesting is not three militarizing of japan but the decisionmaking that japan has engaged in the last decade or more about how to use that military. I just walked through one of the chapters with you here about sending the forces abroad in coalition with others. The more difficult issue for japan of course has been defending and making sure their military is ready to defend, should someone put pressure, threaten, coerce or actually attack japan. I think thats the one place where you see a considerable change in japans environment. He see two neighbors, and thinking of north korea and china, who have themselves moved their arsenals into a position of capability or increase their capabilities are sufficient to be japan. That is me north korea is about to attacked the chinese. Doesnt mean abbut both of those countries have invested considerably technologically and financially. In building rapidly military capabilities that undermine japanese security. We saw the most recent indication of that in 2017 when North Koreans were sending barrages of missiles overtop of japan and then resending a larger test missile that could potentially reach the United States actually into japanese airspace or over japanese airspace. Japanese now look at north korea and of course they worry about the Nuclear Peace obviously. Because that will be a test for all our allies, especially our nonnuclear allies of south korea and japan but for the japanese it missile arsenal. It really lays bare the vulnerability of japanese capability. Japan does not have eating,adoe have missile strength of its own. It has very carefully avoided developing the kind of capability, has stayed very much in defensive mode, reactive mode. But as the japanese have watched the koreans and North Koreans develop this kind of capability and proliferate the number and the kind of missiles that pyongyang has accrued over the last 5 to 10 years, it raises what i call in the book, a missile gap, it raises the question for the japanese. Are they continuing, are they going to continue to subscribe to this idea that they should not purchase a strike capability . That they should not do this . This has been part of the political debate in the book. They can read it if its not interested, politicians have debated this avs have people inside the ministry of defense and inside the Defense Forces. Thats a threshold the japanese have yet to cross. Thats one way in which the threat perception which north korea has been doing since the mid1990s has affected the japanese thinking about their own defenses and wants might be necessary. Japan has done, and done with deep investment, is engaging Ballistic Missile defense system. He saw last years the japanese government announced it would expand the capacity of their Ballistic Missile defenses to include an onshore version of what they call the ages of sure which will give japan a much greater capacity to detect, track and if necessary to shoot down any missiles coming from continental asia. There has been a lot of spending on a defensive structure, force posture, to deal with the missile threat from north korea and potentially obviously the missile threat from other parties around japan. The second area where japan has seen its threat perception intensify has been china. Weve seen that in terms of the modernization of Chinese Nuclear forces but we saw the japanese getting very nervous in the mid1990s about chinas willingness to threaten taiwan. With potential use of force during an election campaign. The real challenge, the real wakeup call for japanese security planners and for the u. S. Japan alliance was the island disputed 2010 and again in 2012. abthese islands in the East China Sea have a very strong emotional component, especially for the Chinese People but also the japanese. China and japan have basically avoided a direct clash. Lets just leave those sovereignty issue on the side but by the mid2010 that was no longer possible as you saw it ratcheting up of not government to government tensions really, citizen to citizen tensions, protester demonstrations. Fishing captains. Having a few too many and decided to take on the japanese coast guard. That then galvanized i think the Political Leadership in both countries to a point where they could back down so now you got Government Forces on both sides, coast guard, not yet navy, operating within the territorial waters of those islands, which were for a long time basically were quietly managed by the two governments. Today the aisland drive Japanese Defense planning. But it certainly opened up the possibility for the first time that japan might be the recipient of some kind of pressure, military pressure, from china. Or some kind of military attack may be on these remote islands. Before the United States was involved. I talk a lot about korea, the assumption about a contingency on the Korean Peninsula during the cold war it even after the cold war was always United States would respond in that japan would either be pulled in or want to support u. S. Forces to the bases but never somewhere where japan would be attacked directly, that the initiation of the use of force or conflict would begin with japan. But the san cock island disputed in to raise the prospect that miscalculation, and accident, not deliberate necessary ambition but that kind of escalatory dynamic something we are seeing a little bit over there in the middle east today. That type of wrapping up of tensions can be very hard to manage. The japanese have responded with washington to shore up the u. S. Japan alliance to make sure the United States and japan are on the same page in case something were to happen. And to try to figure out strategies for ds glaciation should there be that kind of crisis. But nonetheless, that challenge with china over the islands really did open the possibility that th

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