Transcripts For CSPAN2 Assistant Secretary Of Defense For In

You to our event with the assistant secretary of defense for into security affairs. We have been fortunate to engage him on several aspects of our policy research over the past decade and while he is serving in the Administration Since 2017 and randy thank you for your service to our country an Important Role you play in the administration. Randall shriver was appointed as assistant secretary of defense i President Donald Trump on january 82018 previously having served as Deputy Assistant secretary for Pacific Affairs under which portfolio he covered china taiwan hong kong and australia all the easy stuff. Earlier he held the role of chief of staff to the deputy secretary of state from 2,122,003 and served as an activeduty nato Intelligence Officer deployed in operation Desert Shield and desert storm. Beyond his government career randy has been a leading thinker on wings of issues in u. S. China relationships over two decades and a robust voice on the future of that relationship asking critical crashed questions to manage and shape american policy in the region and with that background we couldnt ask for anybody better to join us today as we roll out our project on global china assessing chinas growing role in the world today well recognized china has emerged as the chick truly global actor impacting every region the in the world on almost every issue. Cast aside in his assertively seeking influence not only in asia but well beyond. The effort of this project is to capture Baseline Assessment of the trajectory of expansive global role that draws on her teeth bench of china and asian experts upon the expertise of our Institution Security strategy Regional Technology in economic scholars to capture the full scope of chinas activity. He will focus on several key areas of Research Competition great power rivalry frontier technologies chinas influence on critical regions and chinas approach to global government announced it will have two sessions. Ryan hass will chair a discussion with randy and then well have a panel to chosun three sets of papers being launched or underway today. Audrye wong contribute to the future of Chinese Foreign policy. Cheng li and Jamie Horsley looking at domestic drivers of chinas influence and rush doshi on strategic operations. Before i invite randy it is of Course Campaign season which means think tank yourself trying to influence political campaigns as well as doing their day day jobs in the brookings we disclose all of that. You can find on the web site or in peoples bios their campaign affiliations. They do that off campus on their own time but its important part of how we think about the policy impact of prayer research into the lifeblood of the campaign and now with scholars advising Foreign Affairs and we also have scholars on leave working in the Trump Administration that all this is part of a long tradition of scholars from the foreignpolicy program serving in the nsc state department of every president since nixon both republicans and democrats. I would like to thank the Ford Foundation for its generous support for this project which has not only allowed us to do this comprehensive research but to communicate broadly to the Scholarly Community and policymakers who will hopefully use the evidence and provide a baseline approach to china policy which i think we all understand will be a defining feature of american foreignpolicy for generations. With that i would warmly welcome Randall Schriver to the stage iv opening remarks. [applause] thanks bruce and thank you for the dictation to return to brookings. I really appreciate being part of this rollout of this impressive project. Ive been following some of the papers that have been released but hearing your two year plan to help us deep dive in baseline this enormous challenge is really encouraging to know that youve got this project underway and thanks for allowing me to speak as a part of that. What i thought i would do is talk about our approach to china , our competition and what i thought it would do is go into a little bit more detail on sort of the fundamentals of his policy. A lot of people sort of jump right in strategic competition or competitive environment without talking about the fundamentals of what are we competing for . How is competition implemented and how is it different from confrontation or conflict . If i could take just a few moments to do a bit of a deeper dive and explain our perspective from the department of defense i hope it would set the stage for discussion that would follow with ryan in the audience. With respect to our strategic competition we believe that it is a major element of our Overall National Security Strategy and international strategy. We feel as though we are in competition fundamentally because we have different visions different aspirations different views of what regional and Global Security architecture should look like. If you are familiar with our national Security Strategy of National Defense strategy and or do you see indopacific strategy and we talk about the free indopacific and are free and open the indopacific vision is founded upon what we regard as enduring principles and symbols that are near universal and why we share and believe they are principles that none of that all countries if countries embrace them. These include respect for National Sovereignty no matter countrysides, fair free and reciprocal trade rule of law and rulesbased order and peaceful dispute resolution. We fundamentally believe each nation must be free to determine its own course and we believe that all countries will benefit as well as participate in preserving a worldbased order. We observed that china under the leadership of the ccp has a different vision and as i said different aspirations. Its increasingly developing the tools pursue its vision and seems willing to accept more and more friction in pursuit of that vision. We are competing with china therefore because we see chinas leaders as in competition with those both their ideas and their capabilities. Globally china seeks to shape a world consistent with its authoritarian model and national goals. We see domestic governance in china is result of the ccp rule is increasingly authoritarian and less respectful for human rights and dignity and that they are even beginning to export some of these tools such as facial Recognition Software and nationwide surveillance capabilities to other countries who are learning from chinas governance model. We are concerned that china has grown more willing as i said to apply pressure against other countries and except friction in pursuit of its vision. We have observed china using influence operations and a fan of domestic politics of other countries undermining the integrity of elections and threatening internal stability using economic origin as we have seen recent examples in countries such as mongolia australia and canada promoting statesponsored military and civilian technologies exporting the most effective tools as i said from its domestic toolkit to other nations for potential use for internal repression. We seen them extending its military presence overseas and expanding military ties with china and we see deploying advanced Weapons Systems to militarize disputed features despite pledges of the seniormost level that they would not do so. In dod we focus on the military component of chinas growing military activity we take china there were that they seek to be a worldclass military by 2049 and they are making progress toward that goal. The department of military developments in china are seeking to erode u. S. Military advantages. They are working to become a preeminent power in the indoPacific Region while simultaneously undertaking plans to expand overseas presence and develop capabilities to sustain operations further from shiny shorts. We see china winning the pla operational reach to match what its leaders considered to be the Global Nature of chinas economic and National Interest. Press reporting indicates that china has sought to expand its military base and access in the middle east Southeast Asia and the western pacific. Chairman xi jinping himself has called for the completion of the Security System for a war to strengthen protection of its overseas interests to ensure the security of major overseas projects and personnel. Chinas defense minister has cited a framework for china to increased its military cooperation with other countries. While the competition with china takes place on various levels of the most fundamental and basic level what we are really competing force to sustain a position within the regional and International System which allows us to promote, support and protect a liberal rulesbased order whose institutions rules and norms have fostered peace for decades. All of this matters because if the ccp and china were to be successful in its authoritarian approach were to become ascendant the world could look much different. States will have less control of their political and economic decisions. Institutions could become less independent and less effective such as asean and other regional organizations. Freedom of the season overflight in the indopacific may be challenged. Freedom of those bodies of water we could also see a normalization of a lack of respect for individual and human rights. All of this portends a less free and less open and more unstable and the Pacific Region with high potential for these trends to manifest on a global scale. As i said we few competition is being different than confrontation and conflict. Compare that strategy is not meant to lead to conflict. The United States seeks to maintain the competition is a stable deterrence that avoid conflicts. While we compete vigorously with china are militarytomilitary contacts are aimed at reducing risk and promoting international marsan standards. We cooperated with china where interest aligned while competing within their rulesbased framework where interest their verge. We will continue to call out chinas behaviors that are counter to their rulesbased order. Briefly dods response and as i said changing our mindset, we seek to regain the advantage and applied towards things that are goes to deter china from to prevail at the outset of a crisis. Meeting the china challenge requires this fundamental shift in mindset of our defense establishment. We are no longer period of overwhelming american dumbness but rather one in which our armed forces are adapting to fight against nearpeer competitor source fielding sophisticated capabilities instead of expecting to dominate an opponent or armed forces are expecting to be contested ratified while achieving political objectives set for them. National Defense Strategy in our indopacific strategy within the department focuses on a couple of pillars that will be key enablers for us to succeed mainly the first two pillars of our National Defense strategy which include building a more lethal joint force and strengthening our alliances and partnerships. The first line of that for preparing a more lethal and resilient joint force takes into account the scope and pace of our competitors and patients in capabilities and prior to us as its investment in modernizing key u. S. Capabilities across a range of domains. A Nuclear Forces space and cybercapabilities, Missile Defense and looks at how our force can be resilient in having more access options dispersal opportunities and adaptive tasing. With m. My office where changing how we organize for longterm strategic competition. In june our deputy secretary proved establishment of the new Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for china. His position is outward looking and inward looking. The inward part helping us drive alignment on china across the departments we carry out our Defense Strategy in its implementation. The second line of effort is our National Defense strategies strengthening alliances and attracting new partners. Americas alliances and partnerships are crucial in durable asymmetric advantage that no other country can match. For a country that values rulesbased order to stop this way we can demonstrate her support for these principles is the action we take individually and together to pull a free and open region. Our alliances and partnerships are important for a myriad of reasons. For example there is an inherent trust and confidence that comes with combined training and interoperability. In this vein the departments expanding collaborative planning prior tasing request for his military equipment to deepen an operability and training for highend combat missions and alliance bilateral exercises. We look to strengthen both traditional partners and relationships such as japan and we are working to integrate a National Defense strategy with japans National Defense program guidelines. We are also working very intently and seriously on important emerging relationships such as with india, singapore and indonesia and vietnam. The 10 asean members in u. S. Navy forces tested an operability command and control and the Maritime Security testit we hope now is annual u. S. Asean the Maritime Exercise last month. Having her engagement in areas such as the Pacific Islands to preserve a free and open border and we have enhanced their engagement in the freely associated states and beyond in that regard. Beyond the indopacific the department is engaging across the globe and we have brought the china challenge into our discussions in europe and the middle east for example. China and others recognize art images and their actively working to disrupt our alliances and partnerships in these key areas but we nonetheless see a strong interest in greater alignment on these challenges from our partners. We are also exercising with our partners in realworld operations to include enforcement of the sanctions against north korea. Japan and uks gun and a command center at the countries that include south korea, australia canada new zealand the United Kingdom japan and france. We are all committed to enforcing the u. N. Security councils resolutions. We are also working with our partners in the maritime spaces to include the South China Sea and are working with partners to build capacity through initiatives such as the Maritime Security initiative which has boosted key partners abilities and help them conduct Maritime Security and awareness operations. We are also part of the whole of government approach which is allied in partner centric response to chinas expanding influence and coercion and their interest in acquiring and advancing themselves under the hightech areas. We have ongoing deep conversations with our allies about protection of the Innovation Base and about the risks associated with new technologies such as 5g. To conclude the unfolding longterm strategic competition with china is the defining challenge of our generation and we embrace the dod. Her current tragic or is largely driven by the ambitions and choices of chairman xi in the ttp elite the acquisition of capabilities to apply toward realizing those ambitions in the current policy choices and actions which demonstrate active pursuit of those ambitions. Remain open to changing this tragic or inner vision for free and open indopacific is inclusive and affirmative for any country china included who choose to support the enduring rentable embedded in our vision but we should be clear we do understand these consequential times and consequential decisions must be taken to the cost associated with complacency could be extremely high. The benefits of competing well in competing to prevail are equally high. With that i look forward to a conversation with ryan and the questions and discussions that may follow. Thank you. [applause] first of all mr. Secretary thank you for being here with us and thank you for your rich and nutritious overview of the work is being done their area of responsibility. I want to give the audience a chance to jump in because i know there a lot of questions but before i turn it over to the group i did want to ask if you have questions building upon your comments today. First he talked a bit about the west china militarytomilitary relationship as wondering if you could take this into the engine room a little bit of that. Hows it working and is it being insulated from ups and downs in the overall relationship or is it a derivative of the . We see from our chinese interlocutors that they want militarytomilitary relationship to be a stabilizing force. We welcome that so we have maintained a level of engagement to include highlevel engagement i think 2018 was the first year on record where there was a sec def visit to china. By that metric our engagement remains robust. Our focus is on how we engage with china in this context of overall competition so that place puts a premium on confidencebuilding m