Letters to authoritarians and we publicly disparage our allies is kind of interesting to think where does the u. S. Turkish relations it in the spectrum from how we treat allies and authoritarians. It seems to fit into every category or maybe none and were going to try to figure out how special is the case of u. S. Turkish relations. Its at the motionless relationship one with the executive branch does not always ci to eye. Is it fundamentally Security Partnership or do we have a stake in the democratic standing and if turkey is questioning and involving with moscow what should the United States to prove this is brought out even mentioning into Northern Syria in the decision by the United States to withdraw troops from Northern Syria. There is just a lot going on in the u. S. Turkish relationship and im delighted we have three such excellent speakers to join us and try to make sense of this. The professor of International Relations at Lehigh University where he served for over a decade as chairman, an adjunct senior fellow in the studies of the council. He served on the department of state cleaning staff and currently an active member of the board of trustees at the american university. Currently a senior policy advisor to senator of new hampshire. But she has moved backandforth between the hill and the executive branch and served in the European Bureau with the department of state and sen spet time on the Digital Forensic research lab, very interesting project that looks at the digital dimensions of International Relations. And many immediate right is a Party Director of the middle east program at the Turkish Program at the middle east institute and adjunct professor at gw. So we just decided to start with all three of our speakers giving their topline analysis of whether u. S. Turkish relations, what is the current state of play, is a different than the past and where do they see it heading. They will each speak for two to three minutes on the broad opening question and i think will start. Thank you all. Thank you again for having me. I know what is probably on everyones mind is a Current Crisis and how our own government is going to do with this one i cant say im coming from the legislative branch and for many years the legislative branch has been pushing for some creative thinking, new thinking on u. S. Turkey relations. Obviously there is a number of different perspectives in congress both in the house and on the senate but a lot of what you are seeing is driven by a sense of frustration among senators and congressmen who feel for many years we have been turning a blind eye to what they refer to as turkish bad behavior much of it is focused on turkish president. I think from a little bit coin back to my time two years ago in the executive branch i have to say i do not think those in the executive branch do not feel that frustration, i think theyre very well aware of it to prebut its more of a longterm thinking to what is going on with turkey and obviously in constant fear that if you push turkey or the president they will go in that direction. The main difference between congress and the executive branch on this issue is that the legislative branch in particular feels as though turkey is already there, the already in russia, authoritarian state and for the most part we cannot do much while turkish president is there to bring turkey back. They are looking at what this has in terms of her own relations with turkey and turkeys relations with europe and this is what is driving what you are hearing now and it comes distinctions, is not solely focused on encouraging and syria. As a much more broader conversation that has been bad for the last few years for the steps that turkey has taken. I will say there is something fundamentally different about the conversation that is taking place right now. Even though i think the legislative and executive branch have not always seen eye to eye on how to respond to turkey, i think the most part the legislative branch did differ to the executive branch for many years on how to go about the relationship, how we should do with turkey and the president. I think sink since october 6 the has been a tangible change. I think what you will see is both republicans and democrats take a very stern turn and look at their own authorities to address some of the issues they feel are not being addressed by the ministration. Added in to the dynamic, democrats are more forward on this issue than republicans but extreme frustration with her own president and not being able to decipher what President Trump is trying to do with his relationship, not just with the president but other leaders with authoritarian. Part of the discussion with sanctions in response to turkey is also related to how we do do we respond to President Trump and what members of congress feel is open ended relationships with authoritarians that dont tie back into the u. S. Interest. Were trying to use what leverage they have and quite frankly we implemented options and sanctions happen to be one of those options. Let me return to sanctions later, when we continue with the topline. I just talk about the frustration on the hill and i think theres something to be said about the nature of the Current Crisis. The partnership survived many creases in the past but this is certainly the most difficult. In the relations. I would like to talk about several factors that make the relationship between these two countries conflict prone and for them to solve problems. The number one problem is centralization of personalization of power in turkey. So the last decade we seeing confirmation of turkey from an institutional to highly personalized. All foreign institutes is centralizing the president ial powers. In the past the United States, the u. S. Policy sought to whether investing in the situations or through regular government contact. These things are not there anymore. The president is the key figure. And you would think this should make things easier because youre dealing with one man. But 30 is not saudi arabia or egypt, despite centralization of power and authoritarianism its Public Opinion and election Still Matters in turkey. Youre dealing with the public that is antiamerican. They think the u. S. Is in decline and become irrelevant. So you combine that very antiamerican Public Opinion with a very personalized system in which there is no one that can put the brakes on his worst instincts. So you get turkey where the worldview and domestic electoral consideration becomes decisive and Foreign Policymaking. In the second thing i want to talk about is the change in Turkish Military. The Turkish Military has been an asset in this relationship. And despite the marginal progress for, its always been very tornado for the United States and a very strong actor that pulled the relationship during difficult times. But now, its become the ideological. Just recently i saw turkey soldiers on their way to syria flashing party signs and some said they were going to the land were a psalm of osama rose. This is something you would never see before. Turkish military has become ideological and also a similar story you see in washington. They are skeptical of the views of turkey and Turkish Military. So the third factor, when we have these problems there was a threat that kept these countries together despite the problems and now not only is there not an overall site. Turkey is working with the groups so i think its difficult to gather and bridge the gap in the last factor i want to talk about is a question of nationalism. He has built his political diplomacy and possessive nationalist antikurdish policy. In the National String is pushing him toward confrontation with the United States. So they are served by the very erratic and strong antiamerican hedging with russia where the anticritters policy. I think in the past fixing relations through government contact and thinking many of the problems that we seen in turkey are in rooted interviews confirmation. Your take on the current and effective state . Some times people say let me take a step back and look at the turkish enema can relationship rate for the most part the one thing that determines and most important factor in the relationship was the real estate people talking about location, location, location. The fact that turkey was controlled and if you look at it from a nato perspective was most eastern part of confronting the soviet union. Thats the conflict break that vision of turkey has not disappeared, it still remains in you still see government or elsewhere in washington you see the notion that turkey is important because the location is crucial to nato and plays a very Important Role in the way people perceive turkey. That said, if security and location was the most important factors in the turkish american relationship that changed for a little while when the turks engaged in very serious reforms because of european process and then a significant change in washington that many would look at turkey as a model country. Heres a Muslim Country going through significant democratic changes on its own and this could be essentially immortal for the rest of the islamic world which the United States had Serious Problems on the democracy side. And that little window of opportunity appeared. Now were essentially in the third phase and i heard the other day general say that turkish geopolitical shift is one of the most significant strategic surprises for the last ten or 20 years until there is a deception that turkey is moving in another direction. That direction is that that direction is of the soviet uniom still 1950s. So with russia and maybe other adversaries of the United States and maybe china. But i would argue, this is not the case. Turkey is not moving towards russia, turkey is making all kinds of deals with russia, we see relationships between russia and turkey but fundamentally, this is about the president , he is trained to create a new turkey in his mind a new narrative for turkey, ambitions for turkey but mostly hes ambitious for himself. And what is really happening he wants to see turkey as a leader, im not sure exactly what, maybe he wants the world around him. But look at his finances, policy options, you saw me last week in the New York Times hes not talking about a nuclear option, he has been saying that for a while. He has been wanting to reform the security in 2017 had detailed plans for the and he thinks they should be a permanent member of the Security Council and the world is greater than the five permanent members. You see very ambitious but this is very much in line with authoritarian leaders with policy. It comes very aggressive and ideological. It is also pragmatic. He knows how much to push and when to stop pushing and went to make deals. And this is to understand he can be stopped. But the most significant aspect of his foreignpolicy is is really domestic, away of consolidating but also making them the most important leaders may be overstating. In the process, he is creating essentially a system that is completely personalized, the state has been deemed institutionalized and he is for facing debt. He needs a message that continues to galvanize and mobilize people. Part of that message is and has to do the intake and is a liberal democracies. You have seen him calling europeans nazis. But of course turkish created with europe, one of his great buddies is nicolas maduro. All of these policies are designed for domestic purposes and especially an amazing amount of interworking comes from the powers by the turkish base basically saying turkey has one big enemy and thats United States. Thank you. I think what we should follow up with, to remarks on the domestic determinants of the u. S. , turkish relationship. An interesting piece in Foreign Affairs about the turkish desire to take over Northern Syria as being driven by specific domestic realities of his hold on power at home. I thought you could say more about that. Ive always argued that turkeys reaction to the conflict in syria must be seen against the backdrop of president to consolidate. Its always been the case. In 2011 his number one priority was division and security wit. At home he consolidated his power. In 2011 his ideology cannot play a role because he was still vulnerable and facing the position. But by 2011 here consolidated his power in the uprising is an opportunity to embark on the process at home. So that shaped his priority in syria and in 2015 that priority changed because in 2015 president and his moving party with the majority after many years and that was thanks to the rise of the party. After the june 2015 elections to hold onto power he decided to strike a deal with the country of the nationalist that is known for the intake turkish dance. After the deal he turned his attention domestically in his priority was to have it at home in the region. So his priorities shifted accordingly starting from 2015 and continuing in Northern Syria became the number one priority. And hopefully the regime took the back seat. In effect he weakened the opposition and for instance turkey actions played a role because turkey decided to end the fighters in the fight against occurs. In turkey worked very closely with iran and the regime started from 2015. Which ended up the regime on the ground. Bigger margins. And the number one reason is obviously, the current downplay. One of the top reasons for the seniors, was the presence of 2. 6 million refugees. Convincing and increasing and National Backlash against the refugees. Snap priority is again, syria. So is now talking about creating a safe zone. That could host up to 3 million refugees. That is his plan. I think that is even more urgent priority for him than containing the syrian currents. He said that we have to clear that area, the northeastern syria. Because it is going to make it difficult for us to establish a safe zone so we can send back the syrian refugees. You can see that his narrative has shifted in the way that he talks about the cards. It is still important but i think his number one priority is the refugees now. Thats why we have seen what weve been staying today. The most recent encouragement and northeastern syria. And russia. Thats what hes been trying to do. I would not think it would be an exaggeration that relations between the white house and congress on Foreign Policy issues is also an estate of some agitation these days. Weather its ukraine or the turkey syria crisis. I wonder if you could fresh out for us a little bit different parts of that conversation and weather veto both in the house and the senate for majority. In this complicated dynamics and crisis in u. S. Turkish relations, theres more than two actors, with much of russia and syrian regime, thinkers deserve a little more attention is a party to this Current Crisis in u. S. Turkish relations. Are you looking at the carnage future looking at within turkey and the activities of the syrian kurds as well is iraqi kurds. Someone or if you want to address how the carnage question has always been part of the u. S. Turkish relationship and weather what is the carnage side of the story these days. For the guards, clearly this is the major setback. They been here before. Everybody knows that the kurds have been betrayed and left right center whenever it was convenient. In the United States in the mid 70s. Theres been numbers of cases. In terms of understanding also, let me just mention a couple of things. Everyone kept staying that this was the white pg. Is a tribute threat, to turkey. But the truth of the matter is, it was never at cost of the never engaged the turks militarily. Never a threat. The americans would also not let them. What is forgotten here is in the elections the municipal elections that you mentioned this year, and one point yet everyone realizing that his party was going to lose and none other than the pkk in jail to see if he could convince armstrong to tell the turkish kurds not to vote for the opposition. So this is part of the pragmatism that i talk about. He is very pragmatic way nick comes to syria, there was a real threat to turkey and syria. It was not necessarily white pg itself. When it was a possibility of the emergence of another autonomous in syria especially after the creation of the kid. Both instances, the midwife of the creation of the kurdish government in iraq, was the United States. United states was doing exactly the same thing in the weight of the turkish perspective. In the process of helping a group that had created no autonomous functioning region and syria. And the logical step is one the syrians and once the civil war is over, with United States hell, that the city syrian cars would grab baton to me and syria. That in and of itself is the strategic step. Was next. In an environment where there is paranoia and what we have seen is the enemy, you see all of the time government officials and just mentioning the fact that what they really want to do, and they were wanting to split turkey up. And turkey being split up, its not real of course but for monday people it is actually a governor rising organizing, pain. It was critical to stop the syrian kurds from achieving anything. That is because they created an autonomous region supported by the United States. W