Transcripts For CSPAN2 Stephen Kinzer All The Shahs Men 2024

Tonight, we have tremendous honor of hearing one of the most veteran world reporters feels a little silly he has an incredible, incredible record and id like to share of Stephen Kinzers background with you. He joined the New York Times in january of 83 after serving several years as latin american correspondent for the boston globe. From 1983 to 89, stephen was firsttime bureau chief in nicaragua. He covered war and social upheaval in central america. He next spent six years in germany as chief of the New York Times bureau in bonn and in berlin. He covered german unification and events in other parts of europe including wars in the former yugoslavia. In 1996, the New York Times opened a new bureau in istanbul in order to provide readers with insight into turkey, a country which as you well know has become increasingly important in world affairs. Times named Stephen Kinzer as the first Istanbul Bureau chief. Prior to moving, stephen spent four years in istanbul for the New York Times. From his experience there, he wrote crescent and star, turkey between two worlds. In that book, he took a personal and upclose look at turkey, and we have it in the library and would highly recommend its reading to you. For his outstanding work in latin america, Columbia University awarded stephen the award in 1989. The American Turkish Council gave him the media award in 1998 citing him for reporting that offers a portrait of turkey that is broadly defined, balanced, comprehensive and accurate. A few years ago, stephen was named a National Correspondent of the New York Times based right here in chicago. To our delight he settled in our own, very own park. He not only lives here but uses the services of the oak park public library. And in writing his newest book, all the shaws men, an american coup and the roots of middle east terror he even mentions us in the credits. Oh, my goodness, the librarians were thrilled beyond belief. What you hear tonight may not make you proud of the plan that our own president eisenhower and britains churchill had some 50 years ago this year, but you will walk away tonight with a better understanding of how and when the fundamental Islamic Revolution began and what impact those longago actions had on our world today. I am very, very pleased to present to you Stephen Kinzer. Thank you. Its great to be here, in oak park. Not just being here in the library where i did do a good deal of the research for this book, but also being in the hometown of Ernest Hemingway for a writer cannot fail to stir some emotion. I actually live only about two blocks from the home in which Ernest Hemingway lived while he was in high school and did his first writing. Im hoping that some of the karma will blow over towards my part of the block. The readers will have to be judge whether any of that succeeded. I doubt that hemingway ever found a story really that was as exciting as the one that i uncovered and tried to put together while writing this book. It was just 50 years ago in august of 1953 that the c. I. A. Overthrew a government for the first time. That was the democratically elected government of mohammed mosadek, the Prime Minister of iran. Now, that episode was hardly noticed in the world press, and certainly the involvement of the United States, the truth of what really happened was completely unknown at that time. At the time this coup was launched, it seemed like like a success for the United States. We had gotten rid of someone we didnt like and we put in someone we did like. Indeed for 25 years the period that the shah was in power, we could still from the perspective of the u. S. Government consider this operation to have been a success. Its only now, looking back on it from the perspective of 50 years of history that we can begin to understand what a fundamental turning point this 1953 coup was. This was an episode that really shaped the whole second half of the 20th century and had a great influence on the violent currents that are racing through the world today. It would not have been possible to realize this, even a few years ago. Its only now that were able to understand the meaning of this episode. For that reason, it teaches us a real object lesson in the longterm consequences of foreign intervention. This isnt just a story about Foreign Policy though. This is a wild spy story in which a reallife james bond set out almost singlehandedly to overthrow the government of a foreign country. The cast of characters is truly amazing. And one of the things that i had the most fun doing in writing this book was piecing together all the different accounts and the different interviews and the different mentions in various books and articles that had been made of this episode. And try to reconstruct almost on an hour by hour basis what happened during those days and nights in august of 1953. I had always asked myself how one actually does go about overthrowing a government. If you have the assignment to go into a foreign country and overthrow the government, what do you do . What do you do on the first day . Then what do you do on the second day . Now i know. In fact, im available for consulting. Let me talk first about why this coup took place. Then i want to talk a little bit about how it happened. And finally, look back on it from the perspective of today. Along the way i want to try to introduce you to the larger than life characters who populate this fascinating drama. In the years after world war ii, in the late 40s and early 50s, the currents of nationa nationalism and anticolonialism were sweeping through africa and asia and latin america. Now, in iran, nationalism had one meaning it meant the desire of iranians to retake control over their own oil resources. Iran sits on one of the greatest seas of petroleum in the world. It was very early in the 20th century that a small group of visionary british politicians led by the Young Winston churchill who was at that time first lord of the admiralty realized that oil was going to be the key to domination in the 20th century. Winston churchill saw world war i on the horizon. He knew that he was going to have to transform his ships from coalfired to oilfired. He knew that the country that controlled oil would have the decisive advantage in the coming war, and that it would also have the ability to dominate the world after the war. But britain does not produce any oil. Nor did britain have nicolenies that produced oil. This led churchill and a group of other british officials to concentrate great attention on this problem. It was in iran that they managed to seize control of a huge newly discovered oil resource. The british did this by the simple expedient of bribing the three iranian negotiators at the table and they signed a fantastically lucrative agreement which gave them 100 monopoly on all of the production, extraction, refining and sale of iranian oil. In exchange for this, they were to pay iran 16 of the profits. These profits were kalt collated after the company were calculated after the company had paid a huge tax to the government and since it was owned principally by the british government, this was essentially paying taxes to the company itself. So even when the iranians asked to see the books as to how the 16 of what was remaining was calculated, they were not allowed to do that. So naturally during the period of the late 40s and early 50s as iranians became more and more aware of the injustice of this arrangement, seeing the british at the peak of world power while iranians lived in some of the worst conditions anywhere in the world, their resentment began to grow. Winston churchill knew exactly what he was getting when he signed this very unequal agreement. He called iranian oil a prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams. And with it was that oil that maintained britain in a High Standard of living all throughout the 30s and 40s. The iranians chafed at this and it was the biter thes than propelled to powter remarkable figure of mow maam mad most adeck. He shook the world at the middle of the 20th century. In 1951, Time Magazine chose him as its man of the year. They chose him over winston churchill, harry truman, Douglas Macarthur and Dwight Eisenhower. And they were right, because during 1951, mosadek had a greater influence on the world than any of those other men. He rose to power at a time when he was already advanced in age. He was a highly sophisticated intellectual. He had been educated in europe. He was first iranian to win a doctor of law at a european university. He came from a royal family. He was known as highly incorruptible, never accepted a salary from the government. His political flat form had really only two planks. One was democracy. Which meant in iran that the shah should rule as a figurehead National Symbol like the queen of england, while political power would be exercised by the elected parliament and Prime Minister. The second was nationalizing the arannian oil company which had been making fabulous profits by sucking out the most valuable resource in iran. On the day that mosadek was elected by parliament to be Prime Minister, before accepting the honor he made a condition that the parliament should vote for the bill that he had prepared nationalizing the british oil company. The parliament did so unanimously. Mosadek rode into power on a huge wave of popularity. It was based principally on the consensus that he would be the one who would carry out this transcendent act of nationalizing the british oil company. Now, besides being a visionary nationalist, mosadek was also a highly unusual personality. He was extremely emotional. He would break down into tears literally on the floor of the parliament while giving speeches about the suffering of iranians. Sometimes hed even faint dead away from the strain. Although on occasion he was known to wink at the doctor from the floor. He had a great sense of political theater. And although he had many physical ailments, all during the period i was writing this book i was never really able to tell where the physical ended and where the psychosomatic ones began. He spent a lot of time in bed and he used to receive diplomats in his pajamas. Theses a pebs of his personality were used in the west to ridicule mosadek and make him seem like an unserious person. But actually in iran, where centuries of shiite religious practice have sensitized people to public displays of emotion that are far beyond anything with which were accustomed in the west, these aspects of the personality only seemed to endear him even more to iranians. He seemed to suffer with them even as he was chastising them. Mosadek offered the british the chance to carry out the nationalization of the oil company according to british law. If you can remember, in the late 40s and early 50s, they were nationizing many of the industries at home. They were nationalizing the coal and the Railway Industry and hay they had an elaborate system for deciding who had to compensate who. So mosadek offered to them, lets put it in front of your one of your tribunals and we will decide who owes who money. Know, the management of the oil company was famously obstinate. For years the friends of the british in iran and the friends of the Anglo Iranian Oil in iran had urged them to compromise to avert the crisis. The American Consortium known as the aryanamerican oil company reached a deal right around this period with saudi arabia and they gave saudi arabia a 50 50 split. This was an agreement that had the air of fairs than a common person could understand, and many of the probritish people in iran urged anglo iranians to make this concession. The chairman of the company flatly refused, and simply said when they need more money, they will come crawling to us on their bellies. Now, how did the british react to the you know unanimous vote of the Iranian Parliament carrying out the nationalization of their oil company . This oil company, bear in mind, was the largest British Commercial enterprise in the whole world. Its principal asset was the Largest Oil Refinery in the world. This was not some outpost of the british empire. This was an operation that was central to british, political, social and military power. The first british reaction was disbelief. They thought mosadek was trying to blackmail them for a few extra million. That turned out not not to be true. It became quickly clear. When its became clear to the british that mosadek was deadly serious, they decided as they had been conditioned to do over centuries of colonialism, they would simply invade iran and take back the oil field. I discovered two invasion plans. They had one plan to take over all of iran and a more limited one to take over the oil fields and the refinery. But when harry truman heard about this, he went nuts. He told the british this was absolutely out of the question, the americans could never tolerate britain landing troops in iran. Then the british decided they would bring the matter to the Security Council. Americans warned them not to do this. The americans told them, you know, if your case comes forward and the iranian case comes forward, you wont look good. But the british dismissed this objection. They believed that their case was prima facie, that they had been robbed of an oil company and everyone would understand this. Well, back in tehran, mosadek loved the idea of the whole thing being taken to the u. N. He liked it so much that he decided he personally would fly to new york and present the iranian case. When he got to new york, he caused a media sensation. He was sort of an eccentric figure, baldheaded with enormous arms a very big nose. One of his american translaters said he makes Jimmy Durante looks like an an amputee. He gave a lot of speeches on american tv. Comparing the nationalization of the oil company to the american revolution. He seem very much like your very endearing if mildly eccentric uncle. And americans really took to him on tv. He made a huge impression at the Security Council. Bear in mind, that this was more or less the first time that the voice of a poor country had ever been raised in such an august setting. Challenging the governing rule of law in the world. He made such an impression that the Security Council refused to accept the british resolution. It was first defeat for major british resolution in the history of the u. N. After his triumph at the u. N. , he was invited to come to washington to negotiate and consider the possibility of compromise a compromise which was never a last alas, reached. The scene of mosadek arriving at the train station in washington is a wonderful example of the way mosadek carried himself. Mosadek often seem on the at deaths door, completely unable to move or even speak. So it was as he was carried off the train at union station. He was leaning heavily on a cane and his son was also his doctor was essentially carrying him on his left side. He gingerly was brought down to three steps on to the platform, and was able just to raise his head a bit. As he looked down the platform, he saw that to everyones surprise, an official delegation had come to meet him and who was at the head of the delegation, none other than the secretary of state, dean after usen. Well, he had never met after ason, but admired him from afar. He leapt up, pushed his son aside, threw his cane on to the Railroad Tracks and skipped merrily down the platform and embraced me. During the stay in washington, no compromise was able to be reached. The british, after their defeat at the u. N. , decided to stage a coup and overthrow mosadek. They ordered their agents to arrange such a coup and the agents made the appropriate contacts. Mosadek, however, caught wind of this. He heard of what was going on. And he did the only thing he could have done to protect himself, he closed the british embassy. And he sent all the british diplomats home. Among them, of course, were all the secret agents who were planning the coup. Now, the british had nothing. They could not invade. They had no diplomatic tools left. Even the world court had thrown out their case. And they had no agents on the ground to stage a coup. They had lost their oil company. The only thing left to them was to appeal to the americans. And Prime Minister churchill then 77 years old and starting to fade, but still a real product of the imperial tradition, longtime lover of Clandestine Operations appealed directly to president truman. Truman turned him down. Truman resisted all of churchills pressures. He essentially told him the c. I. A. Has never overthrown a government before. We dont want to get into this business. We dont understand that country we are not going violently to intervene in its Political Development without understanding it. Truman was worried about the c. I. A. And what it might become. In one of of his diary entries what used the phrase american gestapo to what he feared the c. I. A. Could develop into if it were left unchecked. So now, the british were finished. They lost their oil company, they had no tools to get it back and the americans wouldnt help them. The story might have ended there had it not been for the American Election of november 1952. In that election, Dwight Eisenhower came was elected, and brought with him a team that had during the campaign denounced the incumbent Stephen Kinzer<\/a>s background with you. He joined the New York Times<\/a> in january of 83 after serving several years as latin american correspondent for the boston globe. From 1983 to 89, stephen was firsttime bureau chief in nicaragua. He covered war and social upheaval in central america. He next spent six years in germany as chief of the New York Times<\/a> bureau in bonn and in berlin. He covered german unification and events in other parts of europe including wars in the former yugoslavia. In 1996, the New York Times<\/a> opened a new bureau in istanbul in order to provide readers with insight into turkey, a country which as you well know has become increasingly important in world affairs. Times named Stephen Kinzer<\/a> as the first Istanbul Bureau<\/a> chief. Prior to moving, stephen spent four years in istanbul for the New York Times<\/a>. From his experience there, he wrote crescent and star, turkey between two worlds. In that book, he took a personal and upclose look at turkey, and we have it in the library and would highly recommend its reading to you. For his outstanding work in latin america, Columbia University<\/a> awarded stephen the award in 1989. The American Turkish Council<\/a> gave him the media award in 1998 citing him for reporting that offers a portrait of turkey that is broadly defined, balanced, comprehensive and accurate. A few years ago, stephen was named a National Correspondent<\/a> of the New York Times<\/a> based right here in chicago. To our delight he settled in our own, very own park. He not only lives here but uses the services of the oak park public library. And in writing his newest book, all the shaws men, an american coup and the roots of middle east terror he even mentions us in the credits. Oh, my goodness, the librarians were thrilled beyond belief. What you hear tonight may not make you proud of the plan that our own president eisenhower and britains churchill had some 50 years ago this year, but you will walk away tonight with a better understanding of how and when the fundamental Islamic Revolution<\/a> began and what impact those longago actions had on our world today. I am very, very pleased to present to you Stephen Kinzer<\/a>. Thank you. Its great to be here, in oak park. Not just being here in the library where i did do a good deal of the research for this book, but also being in the hometown of Ernest Hemingway<\/a> for a writer cannot fail to stir some emotion. I actually live only about two blocks from the home in which Ernest Hemingway<\/a> lived while he was in high school and did his first writing. Im hoping that some of the karma will blow over towards my part of the block. The readers will have to be judge whether any of that succeeded. I doubt that hemingway ever found a story really that was as exciting as the one that i uncovered and tried to put together while writing this book. It was just 50 years ago in august of 1953 that the c. I. A. Overthrew a government for the first time. That was the democratically elected government of mohammed mosadek, the Prime Minister<\/a> of iran. Now, that episode was hardly noticed in the world press, and certainly the involvement of the United States<\/a>, the truth of what really happened was completely unknown at that time. At the time this coup was launched, it seemed like like a success for the United States<\/a>. We had gotten rid of someone we didnt like and we put in someone we did like. Indeed for 25 years the period that the shah was in power, we could still from the perspective of the u. S. Government consider this operation to have been a success. Its only now, looking back on it from the perspective of 50 years of history that we can begin to understand what a fundamental turning point this 1953 coup was. This was an episode that really shaped the whole second half of the 20th century and had a great influence on the violent currents that are racing through the world today. It would not have been possible to realize this, even a few years ago. Its only now that were able to understand the meaning of this episode. For that reason, it teaches us a real object lesson in the longterm consequences of foreign intervention. This isnt just a story about Foreign Policy<\/a> though. This is a wild spy story in which a reallife james bond set out almost singlehandedly to overthrow the government of a foreign country. The cast of characters is truly amazing. And one of the things that i had the most fun doing in writing this book was piecing together all the different accounts and the different interviews and the different mentions in various books and articles that had been made of this episode. And try to reconstruct almost on an hour by hour basis what happened during those days and nights in august of 1953. I had always asked myself how one actually does go about overthrowing a government. If you have the assignment to go into a foreign country and overthrow the government, what do you do . What do you do on the first day . Then what do you do on the second day . Now i know. In fact, im available for consulting. Let me talk first about why this coup took place. Then i want to talk a little bit about how it happened. And finally, look back on it from the perspective of today. Along the way i want to try to introduce you to the larger than life characters who populate this fascinating drama. In the years after world war ii, in the late 40s and early 50s, the currents of nationa nationalism and anticolonialism were sweeping through africa and asia and latin america. Now, in iran, nationalism had one meaning it meant the desire of iranians to retake control over their own oil resources. Iran sits on one of the greatest seas of petroleum in the world. It was very early in the 20th century that a small group of visionary british politicians led by the Young Winston<\/a> churchill who was at that time first lord of the admiralty realized that oil was going to be the key to domination in the 20th century. Winston churchill saw world war i on the horizon. He knew that he was going to have to transform his ships from coalfired to oilfired. He knew that the country that controlled oil would have the decisive advantage in the coming war, and that it would also have the ability to dominate the world after the war. But britain does not produce any oil. Nor did britain have nicolenies that produced oil. This led churchill and a group of other british officials to concentrate great attention on this problem. It was in iran that they managed to seize control of a huge newly discovered oil resource. The british did this by the simple expedient of bribing the three iranian negotiators at the table and they signed a fantastically lucrative agreement which gave them 100 monopoly on all of the production, extraction, refining and sale of iranian oil. In exchange for this, they were to pay iran 16 of the profits. These profits were kalt collated after the company were calculated after the company had paid a huge tax to the government and since it was owned principally by the british government, this was essentially paying taxes to the company itself. So even when the iranians asked to see the books as to how the 16 of what was remaining was calculated, they were not allowed to do that. So naturally during the period of the late 40s and early 50s as iranians became more and more aware of the injustice of this arrangement, seeing the british at the peak of world power while iranians lived in some of the worst conditions anywhere in the world, their resentment began to grow. Winston churchill knew exactly what he was getting when he signed this very unequal agreement. He called iranian oil a prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams. And with it was that oil that maintained britain in a High Standard<\/a> of living all throughout the 30s and 40s. The iranians chafed at this and it was the biter thes than propelled to powter remarkable figure of mow maam mad most adeck. He shook the world at the middle of the 20th century. In 1951, Time Magazine<\/a> chose him as its man of the year. They chose him over winston churchill, harry truman, Douglas Macarthur<\/a> and Dwight Eisenhower<\/a>. And they were right, because during 1951, mosadek had a greater influence on the world than any of those other men. He rose to power at a time when he was already advanced in age. He was a highly sophisticated intellectual. He had been educated in europe. He was first iranian to win a doctor of law at a european university. He came from a royal family. He was known as highly incorruptible, never accepted a salary from the government. His political flat form had really only two planks. One was democracy. Which meant in iran that the shah should rule as a figurehead National Symbol<\/a> like the queen of england, while political power would be exercised by the elected parliament and Prime Minister<\/a>. The second was nationalizing the arannian oil company which had been making fabulous profits by sucking out the most valuable resource in iran. On the day that mosadek was elected by parliament to be Prime Minister<\/a>, before accepting the honor he made a condition that the parliament should vote for the bill that he had prepared nationalizing the british oil company. The parliament did so unanimously. Mosadek rode into power on a huge wave of popularity. It was based principally on the consensus that he would be the one who would carry out this transcendent act of nationalizing the british oil company. Now, besides being a visionary nationalist, mosadek was also a highly unusual personality. He was extremely emotional. He would break down into tears literally on the floor of the parliament while giving speeches about the suffering of iranians. Sometimes hed even faint dead away from the strain. Although on occasion he was known to wink at the doctor from the floor. He had a great sense of political theater. And although he had many physical ailments, all during the period i was writing this book i was never really able to tell where the physical ended and where the psychosomatic ones began. He spent a lot of time in bed and he used to receive diplomats in his pajamas. Theses a pebs of his personality were used in the west to ridicule mosadek and make him seem like an unserious person. But actually in iran, where centuries of shiite religious practice have sensitized people to public displays of emotion that are far beyond anything with which were accustomed in the west, these aspects of the personality only seemed to endear him even more to iranians. He seemed to suffer with them even as he was chastising them. Mosadek offered the british the chance to carry out the nationalization of the oil company according to british law. If you can remember, in the late 40s and early 50s, they were nationizing many of the industries at home. They were nationalizing the coal and the Railway Industry<\/a> and hay they had an elaborate system for deciding who had to compensate who. So mosadek offered to them, lets put it in front of your one of your tribunals and we will decide who owes who money. Know, the management of the oil company was famously obstinate. For years the friends of the british in iran and the friends of the Anglo Iranian Oil<\/a> in iran had urged them to compromise to avert the crisis. The American Consortium<\/a> known as the aryanamerican oil company reached a deal right around this period with saudi arabia and they gave saudi arabia a 50 50 split. This was an agreement that had the air of fairs than a common person could understand, and many of the probritish people in iran urged anglo iranians to make this concession. The chairman of the company flatly refused, and simply said when they need more money, they will come crawling to us on their bellies. Now, how did the british react to the you know unanimous vote of the Iranian Parliament<\/a> carrying out the nationalization of their oil company . This oil company, bear in mind, was the largest British Commercial<\/a> enterprise in the whole world. Its principal asset was the Largest Oil Refinery<\/a> in the world. This was not some outpost of the british empire. This was an operation that was central to british, political, social and military power. The first british reaction was disbelief. They thought mosadek was trying to blackmail them for a few extra million. That turned out not not to be true. It became quickly clear. When its became clear to the british that mosadek was deadly serious, they decided as they had been conditioned to do over centuries of colonialism, they would simply invade iran and take back the oil field. I discovered two invasion plans. They had one plan to take over all of iran and a more limited one to take over the oil fields and the refinery. But when harry truman heard about this, he went nuts. He told the british this was absolutely out of the question, the americans could never tolerate britain landing troops in iran. Then the british decided they would bring the matter to the Security Council<\/a>. Americans warned them not to do this. The americans told them, you know, if your case comes forward and the iranian case comes forward, you wont look good. But the british dismissed this objection. They believed that their case was prima facie, that they had been robbed of an oil company and everyone would understand this. Well, back in tehran, mosadek loved the idea of the whole thing being taken to the u. N. He liked it so much that he decided he personally would fly to new york and present the iranian case. When he got to new york, he caused a media sensation. He was sort of an eccentric figure, baldheaded with enormous arms a very big nose. One of his american translaters said he makes Jimmy Durante<\/a> looks like an an amputee. He gave a lot of speeches on american tv. Comparing the nationalization of the oil company to the american revolution. He seem very much like your very endearing if mildly eccentric uncle. And americans really took to him on tv. He made a huge impression at the Security Council<\/a>. Bear in mind, that this was more or less the first time that the voice of a poor country had ever been raised in such an august setting. Challenging the governing rule of law in the world. He made such an impression that the Security Council<\/a> refused to accept the british resolution. It was first defeat for major british resolution in the history of the u. N. After his triumph at the u. N. , he was invited to come to washington to negotiate and consider the possibility of compromise a compromise which was never a last alas, reached. The scene of mosadek arriving at the train station in washington is a wonderful example of the way mosadek carried himself. Mosadek often seem on the at deaths door, completely unable to move or even speak. So it was as he was carried off the train at union station. He was leaning heavily on a cane and his son was also his doctor was essentially carrying him on his left side. He gingerly was brought down to three steps on to the platform, and was able just to raise his head a bit. As he looked down the platform, he saw that to everyones surprise, an official delegation had come to meet him and who was at the head of the delegation, none other than the secretary of state, dean after usen. Well, he had never met after ason, but admired him from afar. He leapt up, pushed his son aside, threw his cane on to the Railroad Tracks<\/a> and skipped merrily down the platform and embraced me. During the stay in washington, no compromise was able to be reached. The british, after their defeat at the u. N. , decided to stage a coup and overthrow mosadek. They ordered their agents to arrange such a coup and the agents made the appropriate contacts. Mosadek, however, caught wind of this. He heard of what was going on. And he did the only thing he could have done to protect himself, he closed the british embassy. And he sent all the british diplomats home. Among them, of course, were all the secret agents who were planning the coup. Now, the british had nothing. They could not invade. They had no diplomatic tools left. Even the world court had thrown out their case. And they had no agents on the ground to stage a coup. They had lost their oil company. The only thing left to them was to appeal to the americans. And Prime Minister<\/a> churchill then 77 years old and starting to fade, but still a real product of the imperial tradition, longtime lover of Clandestine Operations<\/a> appealed directly to president truman. Truman turned him down. Truman resisted all of churchills pressures. He essentially told him the c. I. A. Has never overthrown a government before. We dont want to get into this business. We dont understand that country we are not going violently to intervene in its Political Development<\/a> without understanding it. Truman was worried about the c. I. A. And what it might become. In one of of his diary entries what used the phrase american gestapo to what he feared the c. I. A. Could develop into if it were left unchecked. So now, the british were finished. They lost their oil company, they had no tools to get it back and the americans wouldnt help them. The story might have ended there had it not been for the American Election<\/a> of november 1952. In that election, Dwight Eisenhower<\/a> came was elected, and brought with him a team that had during the campaign denounced the incumbent Truman Administration<\/a> for not being tough enough on communism and other threats to American Security<\/a> abroad. Well, news of the American Election<\/a> electrified the British Foreign<\/a> office and the British Secret<\/a> service. They were so excited that they could not even wait for eisenhower to be inaugurated before making their appeal again. Two weeks after the election, the british sent one of their top agents, actually a guy who had been the chief of the British Intelligence<\/a> station in tehran before mosadek closed it to washington. His job was present the plan for the coup to the new group, the incoming eisenhower administration, and see if you can persuade them to embrace the project that the Truman Administration<\/a> had rejected. Now, the agent who came to make this appeal later wrote a memoir that i quote in my book. In this emory, he in the memoir, he mentions the mission. This is what he writes. I knew that our traditional argument would not move the american. Our traditional argument was mosadek took away our oil company, please overthrow him so we can have our oil company back. This was not an argument that would move americans. So he wrote, i knew i needed a different argument, and i knew what argument to use. I would say that mosadek was opening iran up to the possibility of a communist takeover. Sure enough, theres the argument that this agent used. The dulles brothers, secretary of state designate John Foster Dulles<\/a> and his brother alan, the incoming c. I. A. Director, jumped at this argument. Before even allowing that british agent to go home, more than two months before the inauguration they had given him an informal sign that the United States<\/a> would now change its policy. Sure enough, over the next few month, president eisenhower and all the other members of the administration who had a voice in these matters agreed to carry out this coup, jointly with the british, in planning but alone on the ground in iran. Now, as i said earlier in my book, i have reconstructed in great deal everything that happened in iran during those weeks of august 1953. I dont want to go through all the detail news but let me give you a general idea of the way that the coup was carried out. The c. I. A. Chose one of its most intrepid agent, Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> actually, the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt<\/a> to sneak into iran in late july 1953 and begin organizing the coup. Now what can he do . First of all, he began bribing newspaper editors and columnists and reporters to write all sorts of defamatory lies about mosadek in the newspaper. Secondly, he began bribing members of parliament, and leaders of Political Parties<\/a> that were part of mosadeks coalition so they would quit the coalition or begin to denounce mosadek. He began bribing mule whats so that a tri at friday prayers in the mosque, people would hear denunciation of mosadek as being against the islamic faith. He also threw the military attache and began bribing midranking military officer, so they would be ready with their units to join the coup when the moment came. One of the most Brilliant Ideas<\/a> that he had was to sew upheaval on the streets of tehran. He got into the mobs are us business. He was able to recruit several street gang leaders including the most famous and flamboyant one in tehran, shaban the brainless who ran a protection rack net the Vegetable Market<\/a> and had a lot of tough guys around him who were always looking to earn a few extra bucks or a few extra riyals as it was at that time. This is the assignment that he gave to shaban. I want you to get several hundred men, and i want them to rampage through the streets of tehran. I want them to beat up anyone they see. I want them to smash shop windows, fire their guns into mosques and shout we love mosadek and communism. Long live peoples republic of iran. Well, this would naturally have the effect of turning any decent hue many man being against mosadek. Then in the further inspiration, roosevelt hired another mob to attack this mob. Thereby, giving the impression that the streets of tehran were in chaos, and mosadek had completely lost control of the situation. During this time, Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> was sneaking into the royal palace at midnight, concealed under a blanket in the back seat of a car to meet quietly with the shah and secure his participation in the coup. The shah who was at that time a very meek and cowardly and indecisive figure was terrified of getting into anything that might endanger him, given the power of u. S. And britain he had no choice in the end. But Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> had to use a lot of means to twist his arm. He brought several people in to apply pressure on the shah. One of them was none other than general h. Norman schwarzkopf, the father of the gulf war general. General schwarzkopf had been a flamboyant military figure in iran during the 1940s when the shah was a young man and still had great influence over them. The meeting was amazing. The state department had given schwarzkopf a cover mission of visiting american installations in the rege son his visit to iran wouldnt arouse suspicion. Although pravda figured out what was up and printed a story denounssing its. He went in to meet with the shah in the royal palace, but the shah was so terrified of microphones that he wouldnt say a world to schwarzkopf. He just gestured. He then pulled a table away from the wall, and felt in the grand ballroom of the palace, he pulled it out into the middle of the room, presumably furthest possible away from the microphones. He climbed up on the chair, he gestured to general schwarzkopf who came up and sat with them and they conducted their conversation by whispering to each other on that table. Through these and a series of other pressures, the shah was finally brought on board, and his job was to sign a dekri dismissing mosadek from office. This was a highly dubious legality, since only the parliament had the right to hire and fire Prime Minister<\/a>s. But nonetheless, the order to the officer who was to deliver this decree was when mosadek resists as he surely will, you will arrest him and then we proclaim our own guy as the Prime Minister<\/a>. The c. I. A. Had chosen a ka shirred iranian officer as the savior of iran. What happened on the night of august 15, 1953, the officer who had been chosen to deliver this decree came to mosadeks door, and out of the shadows come other soldiers and they grab him. It turned out that the coup had been betrayed. The Security Services<\/a> had found out about it and the officer who was supposed to arrest mosadek was himself arrested. So now the coup had failed. The shah had only signed this decree on condition that he could leave tehran immediately. He wanted to be near an airport. He was a pilot himself. Sure enough, at 6 00 a. M. When he heard that mosadek was still in power, he literally ran across the tarmac into his little private lane with just a little have a hes, jumped into his plane and flew to baghdad and later on to rome where he told people hed be looking for work since he wasnt able to go back to iran any time soon. Now back in tehran, mosadek and the people around him assumed that the shah had been behind this coup. After all, he was the one that had signed the decree. Now, the shah was gone. So as far as they knew, the danger was over. Mosadek never had any idea that there even existed such a person as Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> working inside the u. S. Embassy and paying somebody thousands of dollars and working so intensively to overthrow him. I honestly believe if mosadek could come back to life and read my book, hed be shocked. He had no idea till his dying day in 1957 of how involved the plot was that resulted in his overthrow. After the first coup failed on august 15th, the c. I. A. In washington sent an urgent cable to Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> telling him you better get out of there in a big hurry before they find out who you are and kill you. But roosevelt decided i can still do this. I was here to overthrow this guy and i still have some tools. I want to try again. Bear in mind, this was a time when c. I. A. Agents operated mainly by their wits. They were not in moment to moment communication with langley or anywhere else. And Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> now having to ditch the plan that had taken british and american spymasters weeks to draw up came up with another plan of his own. After four more days of rioting and denunciations of mosadek from various quarters, he struck again. On august 19, 1953,28 or more by the iranian calendar, a fateful day. The streets of iran were full of rioters and protesters, many of them paid by roosevelt, directly or indirect limit but i think many joining in without realizing what was going on. There were gun battles as military units whose leaders had been bribed joined the fight. The climactic battle happened at night in front of mosadeks house. 100 people were killed in that battle alone. By midnight, mosadeks house was in flames, he had fled, and the coup had succeeded. A couple of days later just before leaving iran, Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> stopped in to meet the shah for one last time. This time, he was able to come sitting up in the back seat in the car in a suit instead of hiding under a blanket. And the shah toasted him and said this. The shah having come back to from rome where he was sitzing in a restaurant when he learned of the success of the second coup. I owe my throne to god, my people, to my army and you. Which was exactly right. I think he might have reversed the order. Now, Kermit Roosevelt<\/a> came back to washington to great acclaim. He gave a briefing at the white house. President eisenhower later denied in his memoir took place, but in actual fact he pinned a medal on roosevelts chest. And roosevelt later wrote about this session in the white house. He said one member of my audience, secretary of state John Foster Dulles<\/a>, had a wide grin on his face and was purring like a giant cat. My instinct told me he was planning. Sure enough a few weeks later kermit voz veld was called in to his boss office, you did such a great job overthrowing mosadek in iran, we decided we dont like that guy down in guatemala. Couldnt you go down there and do it again . Well, roosevelt demurred, but another group was found and less than a year after the elected government of iran was overthrown, the elected government of guatemala was overthrown. With also heinous consequences leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths and a savage civil war that lasted over 30 years. This set the United States<\/a> out in the direction of covert action and regime change. Its hard to imagine today, but it was not inevitable that the c. I. A. Become an agency that was involved in overthrowing governments and destabilizing country countries. Inform, it became so only after the established policy of the u. S. President was reversed by the eisenhower administration. So much of history stemmed from those few weeks in tehran. Let me talk a little bit about what i mean. As i said earlier, that coup could have been considered a success from the American Perspective<\/a> for the whole next 25 years. That was the period when the shah was in power and served as faithful ally of the United States<\/a>. But lets look at it from the perspective of today. The shahs repressive regime shut off all political alternatives for anybody who was against the dictatorship. The only place that had a principled opposition and that was rooted in the iranian masses was the fundamentalist branch of islam. Fundamentalism began do attract many people who were disillusioned with the impossibility of change. The shahs repressive regime led to the explosion of the late 1970s that we call the Islamic Revolution<\/a>. That revolution brought to power a group of fanatically antiamerican clericses who proceeded to launch a campaign of terror against american and other western targets. That regime also inspired fundamentalist in many other countries, including next door afghanistan. Where the taliban came to power, and gave sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden<\/a> and al qaeda. This is why i think you can say that its not farfetched to draw a line from the 1953 coup in iran through the shahs dictatorship and the Islamic Revolution<\/a> to al qaeda and the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center<\/a> in new york. The world has paid a terrible price for the lack of democracy in the middle east. Why is there such a lack of democracy there . When the United States<\/a> there are many reasons, of course. As i was studying history in college, i was always warned not to draw direct cause and effect relationships in history. I hope my teacher is not in the room. We sent a message in 1953 that resounded throughout the middle east. The message was the United States<\/a>, which is the rising power to replace the fading british in this region, does not want to see the emergence of democratic governments. We want strong man rule, and thats what we got. A whole generation of rising leaders in the middle east understood that if they wanted to build regimes that were going to be supported by the United States<\/a>, they could not go in the democratic direction. They needed to go in the direction of iran. Strong man rule that would guarantee support for the u. S. And cold war conflict, and also guarantee access for American Companies<\/a> to the oil that is the middle easts most important product. So from that one episode, a deepseated antiamericanism grew in iran that spread throughout the middle east. I want to talk a little also about the comparisons between this operation and the operation recently in iraq. Now, i do believe that every regime change and covert action operation that we have launched in 50 years has some similarity to the one in iran. This is where it all began. There are a couple of obvious differences between the iran operation of 53 and the recent iraq operation. One obviously is that one was a covert operation, the other was a military invasion. And in iraq, the victim was the month strouss tyrant, whereas in iran the victim was an elected democratic leader. But there are many similarities. Let me tick off a couple of them. First of all, one of the main reasons that both of these operations were launched was because the United States<\/a> felt the need to strike back against a global enemy. Communism in the early 50s and terrorism in the modern age. In both cases, we were not able to get to our real enemy. In the 50s we could not invade moscow or drop bombs on beijing. So we found a country that would do. We were not able recently to capture those responsible for the attack on our soil, so we turned our sights elsewhere and launched an invasion or operation in another country that we also had problems with. Another reason that i think is behind both of these operations is a very fundamental strategic one. The United States<\/a> has always wanted a country in the middle east to be its strategic platform from which it can extend influence. Iran was that platform for 25 years. Thats long gone, and with saudi arabia looking shakier every day i think its clear that people in washington now want iraq to play that role. Another similarity is certainly oil. The access of western Oil Companies<\/a> on terms they consider reasonable to middle eastern oil is a fundamental aspect of u. S. Policy toward the middle east. Of course, its naive to believe that big powers ever intervene in the middle east without oil being a factor. Another comparison between these two operations was the exaggeration of intelligence. Eisenhower was fed reports about the imminence of communist takeover in iran. I quote in my book a school oar who went out and actually found the c. I. A. Agent and two diplomats who were posted at the u. S. Embassy in tehran in 1953 with the job of monitoring communist party and leftist movements, and they told him we completely exaggerated the strength of these movements because we knew thats what the people in the white house wanted to hear. The comparison to the weapons of mass destruction argument before the iraq operation is obvious. But id say the greatest and saddest perhaps, most awful similarity between the two operations is that we were so determined to achieve a shortterm goal that we never stopped to think about what the longterm consequences of our intervention might be. Now, as i was writing my book, i was very conscious that although this story for americans is a somewhat intellectual exercise, a story about Foreign Policy<\/a>, and u. S. middle east relations and the direction of american policy in the world, for iranians it is something different. I have been speaking before a number of iranian american groups lately and i can see for iranians, this episode is not intellectual at all. This is something very visceral and something very emotional and very painful. I had an email from an iiranian woman who wrote to me, i was in tears when i finished your book, because it made me think of everything we lost and everything we could have had. When you try to imagine what it would have meant to have a democratic country in the heart of the middle east, all these 50 years, i must tell you that i myself cant even wrap my mind around what such a middle east would look like because its so completely different from everything that we know. But bearing in mind that this is an ianian story as well as american story, i wanted to go back to iran and do some research for my book. Not in libraries and books since the real information is here. This is where the coup was planned. But among ordinary iranians. I tried to get a Research Visa<\/a> to get into iran, but after many months of trying, it was clear to me that that was not going to succeed. My goal was to get to tehran and actually to mosadeks house on the 49th anniversary of the coup. That was august 19th of 2002. When i realized that my journalist visa was not going to be approved through a round about way, i dont want to implicate my companion in crime, i managed to get in as a tourist. I knew the iranians were on to me though when i arrived at my hotel and they said, your room is ready, mr. Kinzer, it is room 911. When i protested, i was told that out of the thousand rooms in this hotel, its the only one available for you. I took that as a message that some people knew that i was there and werent so happy about it. The present religious regime in iran likes the idea of mosadek having been overthrown because that sits in as the paradigm of it being overthrown by outsider, by they didnt like mosadek so they dont want to promote projects that gives him a higher profile. But i wanted to ask ordinary iranians after 50 years when its has been more or less forbidden to speak or write ultimate about mosadek, what do you think about him . What do you know about him . I asked this question to a lot of people. Everyone i met. I got two answers. The first answer everybody gave me was he nationalized the oil. Everybody knows that. And the second answer i got from a lot of people was we were free then. You could say what you wanted, not like today. I had great difficulty getting out to mosadeks house. American tourists in iran as i was only a tourist of course, have to travel where a guide. And when i told my guide i wanted to go to amadabad, the village where mosadek spent the last years, i was told this was impossible. The they have a list of where they go and this isnt one of them. No one has ever asked to go there. In fact, even this guy who had written books on islamic architecture and iranian history had never been there. Anyway, a long story, but finally i managed to get permission to go out there and sure enough on august 19th of last year, the 49th anniversary of the coup, i was at mosadeks house, the only visitor. After the coup, mosadek was arrested and tried for treason, convicted, and at the shahs direction was given a sentence of three years in solitary confinement, and the rest of his life under house arrest at his village. He lived in this village which is an an hours drive from tehran for more than a decade before his death in 1957. I walked around the grounds to this country estate, and it had a long path of maybe 100 yards leading down to a twostory brick ed aphis, certainly the nicest house in town but nothing unusual by world standards. This was the compound that mosadek never left for the last 10 years of his life. Hes actually buried under the floor of the sitting room where he used to receive a few guests that he was permitted. This is a small marker over the spot where he is buried. I have to tell you that while i was researching my book, after learning that mosadek had been on the cover of Time Magazine<\/a>, with some difficulty i went out and got a copy of that january 1952 issue of Time Magazine<\/a>. I had it framed and i had it up on the wall in my office where i write all the time when i was writing this book. It gave me the feeling not only was i resurrecting an unknown episode, but i was bringing back to life a fascinating figure who is all but lost to history, despite the fact that he had such a big impact on the 209 century. Being there in that house completed the experience that i began of coming to intellectual and perhaps even some kind of emotional contact with mosadek. I laid my hand on the little memorial covered by the simple green banner and recited that simple air bic line that invokes the mercisy and compassion of god is as customary. The room has various pictures of mosadek that had been brought by admirers. I went outside and walked around the grounds of it, and against the back wall of the compound i noticed something interesting. I went over to it, and it was a gate. It was not a gate that was set into the wall. Just leaning against the wall. I was curiously looking at i and i noticed it had a big dent in the bottom. And suddenly, something dawned on me. Six months before he was overthrown, the british tried another abortive coup and a jeep carrying none other than our friend shaban the brainless smashed through mosadeks front gate in an attempt to get into his house. I realized this is the gate from mosadeks house in tehran. The house was burned down, and the whole neighborhood is completely changed since then. But this gate still survives. What history this gate has seen. How many ambassadors and dignitaries came through this gate to pay call on the bedridden mosadek . Through this gate, he walked out to meet the shah, through this gate he went out to his historic trip to the United Nations<\/a> in washington. This is where great crowds chanted the support for his nationalization and ultimately where the crowd gathered that defeated him. I lay my hand on that gate, and held it there for a long time. At that moment, i felt that i was about as close to mosadek as i was ever going to get. My experience talking to iranians, however, made me realize that mosadek is very much alive in their hearts. In iran today, it is illegal to call for any form of government other than islamic regime. But when you hold up a picture of mosadek, that is exactly what youre doing. You dont need one single word or one single slogan underneath it, because just his photo represents the hope for a democratic iran. The large majority of iranians detest the regime under which they live. They want to return to the democratic past from which they were so violently forced 50 years ago. And when they do, im convinced that mosadek will once again be revered, that that house that i visited will not be empty any day of the year. That it will be filled with schoolchildren coming on field trip that foreign dignitaries will come there and lay wreath that mosadeks picture will hang in every Public Office<\/a> as he will be recognized as the man who laid the basis for modern democracy in iran. And that perhaps when that happy day comes, it will be time for americans to realize as harry truman put it in the epigraph i used for my book there is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know. Thank you. Thanks a lot. Thank you all. Thank you. I have had a request to announce that our friends from cspan would like to bring the microphone over to the questioners. So if you could just wait a second for the microphone to arrive i think everybody would be happy. What role did the elder general schwarzkopf play in creating that later in the shahs era tortured an kills hundreds, if not thousands of people . The c. I. A. . And the mossad worked together. The question was whether general schwarzkopf sr. Played a role in the creation of creation of shavat, the secret police. He did create a unit that was the forerunner of shavat. Schwarzkopf was another fascinating figure in this drama. He was a west point graduate. And he had gone on to become commander of the new jersey state police, and in that capacity, he became a National Celebrity<\/a> with the investigation of the lindbergh kidnapping. He parlayed that celebrity into radio stardom. He became the radio voice of gang busters, very popular crime show of the 1930s and 40s. He reenlisted in the army when world war ii broke out. He was sent to iran. His job was to create a constabulary that would work for the shah, and he created the first puff military unit there. He was the scourge of bandits and separatists, but also dissidents and opponents to the shah. He created a unit aimed at ferreting out political opponents, and it was on the basis of that unit that the secret police was built. It is amazing to think about the second general schwarzkopf returning. You know, i dont think history really does repeat itself, but history delights in patterns and the idea that general schwarzkopf would play such a and then 40 years later, his son also general schwarzkopf would return to the region also to play a decisive role is a wonderful little joke played on us by history. [inaudible]. The organization of information and the and security. It was established during after his police chief was kidnapped, tortured to death by the opposition, mostly religious. There is evidence that those who murdered the police chief were in at least indirect contact with British Intelligence<\/a>. The british wanted to or lets say agents working with the british wanted to destabilize most of the government by assassinating some of his close ministers. The defense minister and the interior minister and the chief of staff proved to be too well guarded, so through a trick, they managed to get to the police chief of tehran and his assassination did help to contribute to the destabilization. Any other questions . According to a doctor, i was a witness to the day of coup. I was in tehran. I witnessed the whole thing. It was not inevitable. It was a very very weak to begin with, and it grew gradually it was quite defeatable. When i think back, i think it was, totally. Let me just react to that. He was too naive. He had come from living in switzerland. He believed that everybody should be allowed to speak. Everybody should be allowed to demonstrate. I didnt matter if you were being paid by British Intelligence<\/a>. You could have your own newspaper. You could print whatever you wanted. Anybody should be able to have demonstrations in the street, no matter how violent. He had no idea, as i said earlier, that so much of the opposition to him was artificially fomented. And i think if he had realized that, he would have been able to marshal his forces and defeat the coup. He was actually doing the opposite. He called the leaders of his own coalition the day before the coup and warned them dont put any people on the streets. We want to calm the streets down and we dont want anyone out there. On the night before the coup when some of his people did go out, he actually sent his own police to beat them up, so he had no idea of what was about to happen to him. One of the things i realized when writing this book is how easy it is for a rich and powerful country to throw a weak poor country into chaos. He was fooled the night before the coup by henderson who was an American Ambassador<\/a> who came and told him that tomorrow the communist party are going to attempt the coup. So as the commanderinchief of the army at this point, he was the only one who could allow the tanks to come out of the barracks, out into the streets and told him let the tanks go and defeat this coup, and he was fooled and let the tanks go, and that what was his undoing. What do you think about that . As i understand it happened a little differently. This was a brilliant psychological operation devised by roosevelt. He got the American Ambassador<\/a> to go and visit. This was two days before the coup. And feigned outrage that american citizens were being attacked and even receiving obscene phone calls when children would answer, they would be told terrible things on the phone that children should never have to hear. This was a great insult to america, and that if this couldnt be stopped immediately, americans would be ordered out of iran. Well, he was actually a very much a gentleman was quite shocked at the idea that the americans were being treated discourteously in iran and he immediately called his police chief in the presence of ambassador henderson and told him i want you to crack down on all those people that are dem demonstrating on my behalf on the street. This worked like a charm. Later Time Magazine<\/a> described as a crucial moment in the coup because as they put it he disarmed himself. He was completely taken in by what was actually quite a transparent and silly ruse. Yes, sir . A little bit of trivia. In august, 1953, i was in the National Security<\/a> agency school, and my instructor was a cia agent, and i believe it was on current events, and my topic was this. I gave a report and i said hes a little cooky but he seems to be a good enough politician, and my cia instructor was very angry and dissatisfied with my report, so it took me 15 years to realize what i had wrong. [laughter] you were out of the loop. [laughter] im first generation iran american and my dad was witness to the coup. I want to thank you for writing this book to give me a little more awareness of what was happening in iran. I was born and raised here and never had the opportunity to live there. I wanted to ask you, did you read anything specifically about University Students<\/a> and how they got the University Students<\/a> to react and to contribute overthrowing the coup . There seems to be a trend in iranian culture to bring the students out on the streets and make them be the voices for the older generations. Thats an interesting question. Actually students did not play a role in this coup. That i think is a phenomenon that began with the 1979 uprising. This brings i think another point. During the research for this book, i had a chance to read a lot of iranian history, and i have a chapter that kind of sets the scene and takes you back all the way up to 1890. It is about one word per decade, i think, of persian history. One thing i found very odd, when we today think of iran, we think of a government thats dominated principally by the emotion of fanaticism. When we think of a visual image of iran, our most vivid image is the crazy students shouting and screaming. But actually, fanaticism is not a characteristic of iranian or persian culture at all. In fact, the early persian emperors were masters of what we would today call multiculturalism. Many of the kingdoms that cyrus conquered, he didnt even conquer militarily. He persuade them. He built alliances, if we can use that phrase. How did fanaticism come to take over the iranian body politic . I dont know the answer to that, but i ask myself, did the fact that the countrys normal Democratic Development<\/a> was so violently interrupted in 1953, and that 25 years of Political Development<\/a> was so brutally stunted help contribute to the fanaticism with which we now associate iran . While i was researching this book, i came across a fascinating article, written by a middle aged Iranian University<\/a> professor, that would mean way older than me, i guess. This guy turned out to have been one of the hostage takers. He was one of the militants who stormed the u. S. Embassy in 1979 and took our diplomats hostage. And in this article, he writes, why we did it. Well, i was fascinated to read that because im not sure i ever really grasped why they did it myself. And what he wrote, which i quote in my book is absolutely fascinating. He wrote, there was only one thing in our mind as we planned the embassy takeover, 1953. What happened in 1953 . The people of iran forced the shah to flee. The cia operating with agents inside the u. S. Embassy organized the coup and brought the shah back. Now, we flash forward, it is 1979. Once again, the people of iran have forced the shah to flee. Hes been admitted into the United States<\/a>. History is about to repeat itself. We were afraid that cia agents operating from inside the u. S. Embassy building would organize a coup and bring the shah back again. We had to prevent 1953 from happening all over again. The reason was obvious. Well, its only obvious if you even realized that this episode ever happened and also appreciated how intensely the memory of it still burned in the hearts of iranians. I ask myself, whether the american policymakers, who brought the shah into the United States<\/a> were even fully aware of what had happened in 1953 and what would immediately come to the minds of any politicized iranian. I dont know whether its worth if they did know or if they didnt know. But certainly at that time we made tremendous misjudgments based on our failure to appreciate what the longterm impact of this episode had been in the hearts and souls of many iranians. Yes, sir . One of the theories i had about our utter surprise in the overthrow of the shah is the fact that our intelligence was essentially flawed. In other words, we did not believe in the use of people who were trained in anthropology, other scientists and that, the United States<\/a> Embassy Staff<\/a> was very skeptical about what anyone could tell them about what was going on in that country. In other words, we isolated ourselves almost completely from what was going on on the popular level. I was just wondering what your thoughts are about that. I think you are quite right, and id add that theres an opposite side to that coin. Not only did we not fill our embassy with anthropologists and sociologists and historians, but instead, we filled it with covert operatives. It was another result of the direction that the u. S. Government took after 1953. When we were sending people abroad, we were sending people who were not expected to maintain contact with the grassroots but with the elite, and thats certainly as you say one of the reasons why we met that great disaster in iran. Yes, sir . As you said, we had 25 years of the shahs support after the 53 coup. And then you drew parallels to the iraq situation today. Would you comment on what will happen in the next 25 years . All i can say is this, i shutter to think that 50 years from now somebody will be standing in a forum like this, looking back at our iraq intervention and seeing even a fraction of the horrific aftereffects that we have seen from the iran operation. We have been caught up in what i see in a way of a clash of fundamentalism. We are facing a fundamentalist enemy but we are fundamentalists ourself. We have taken the view that god has given us such a great country and such great freedoms that it is our duty to go to other countries and share this and spread this and transform them in our image. We have still not learned how to manage dominance. We have become dominant so quickly. The british empire, spanish empire, roman empire, persian empire became dominant over generations and centuries. The population of those countries and the political elite had a long time to accustom themselves to the use of power. The United States<\/a> has come to this position of dominance so suddenly that our ability to deal with it, to manage it has not caught up. When we enter world war i, there were less than 150,000 americans under arms. In 1939, when world war ii broke out, the United States<\/a> was the 19th biggest military power in the world. We were just weaker than bulgaria and one step ahead of portugal. So this position we find ourselves in now is so dramatically new and so dramatically different from anything that living memory has experienced, that i think weve rushed very fast ahead of our ability to comprehend how to deal with this dominance. Yes, sir . Sorry, yes, maam, you were asking first. First of all, thank you for your comments regarding historical and political history of the coup, and one other issue that i would like to bring up is the loss of iran for the iranians. Many of us are here because of this coup. We have lost our country. We cannot go back, and the emotional and personal loss as a result of this coup and the brain drain that has happened since and the fact that if that coup had not happened, where would iran be today . It breaks our hearts, and i want you to comment on that from your perspective as an american. One of the things that was most painful for me in writing this book was to see how beloved the United States<\/a> was in iran up until 1953. The iranians were very resentful of the british and the russians and the french and the other powers that had come only to suck out their resources. But for more than a half a century, american doctors and teachers and Development Workers<\/a> had been coming to iran working completely selflessly. They had never sought to convert people from their religion or exploit the countrys resources. One Young American<\/a> teacher was actually killed fighting alongside the revolutionaries in the constitutional revolution of 1906, in iran. He was idolized as the american lafayette. We were viewed as the country that would be the great model and the great supporter because we seem to be the logical ally for a democratic iran. Thats what makes this coup so heart breaking. When i look at iran told, and look over at history over the last 50 years of tyranny, i think to myself, put aside all of the people that have been murdered and tortured by those two repressive regimes. Think about the millions upon millions of ordinary people, generations who were never able to fulfill themselves, who were never able to live the normal lives to which every citizen should be entitled. Iran was a country that was really on the way to developing something very very important and very positive. It could have been tremendously helpful also for the United States<\/a> and for american ideals. But to see how violently that process was interrupted is both political tragedy for the United States<\/a> and the west and certainly a very emotional and a very personal tragedy for countless millions of iranians. It occurs to me that another disturbing parallel between whats happening now and whats happening then is the role of the cia. Bob woodward in his book bush at war details the role of the cia using tens of millions of dollars brought in suitcases by the cia to bribe various Northern Alliance<\/a> chiefs, etc. , to orchestrate the war in afghanistan. And im also disturbed at how this unelected secret government, without accountability for these tens of millions of dollars are operating without any oversight appare apparently. This just occurs to me. I dont know if you have a comment about that. I just make one statement about afghanistan, since you mentioned it. I like to hold up the iran coup as one of the great examples of the unintended consequences of intervention. But afghanistan is perhaps an even more vivid example because we have lived through the whole cycle. We had a shortterm goal, which was the overthrow of the regime in kabul, and we were willing to do anything to reach that goal, including arming large bans of radical fundamentals in afghanistan, training them in terror techniques and in the use of very dangerous weapons and including biological and chemical ones. When we achieved our shortterm goal, the overthrow of that regime in afghanistan, our attitude was well, were finished here now. Were going home. None of the processes that we set in motion, by arming all these fundamentalists and drug traffickers is ever going to have any effect on us. It is never going to come back to bite us. Well, what happened . We got a very rude awakening. We did get bitten. What happened on september 11th, was not just an airplane crashing into a building. For us, it was the world crashing into our living rooms. It was a lesson to us that the United States<\/a> is not isolated from the rest of the world, and the processes that we helped set in motion can have terrible effects for us. We need to think about this more seriously before we begin launching those processes. Yes, sir . [inaudible]. Speaking of fundamentalism, the fundamentalists who are running this country right now, i cant say us because i cant identify myself with them. [inaudible]. The selfelected president gets his cue from a fundamentalist priest every morning. They are beefing up the shiite fundamentalists right now we are talking. They are barring women on the streets. No women has the security to go anywhere. [inaudible]. I dont want to say anything positive because theres nothing positive to say about the deposed regime in iraq. But if you were a fundamentalist in iraq, most likely youd be under 6 feet of ground. There was no tolerance for fundamentalism at all or for any form of political dissent in iraq. Today i think iraq is becoming a real center of fundamentalism. Thats one of these longterm trends that i think is going to come back to haunt us. Yes, sir, in the back. Hi. I came to the United States<\/a> two years ago. I was one of the students that contributed to the reformist campaign. I think that the people in iran still havent realized i mean dont have the hatred of the United States<\/a>. They are defying a regime thats against the United States<\/a>. So i dont think that the realization of whats happened in 1953 and the feeling of the United States<\/a> is still there. I think that day that regime is gone, then the hatred of United States<\/a>, you know, shows up, and the United States<\/a> should be ready for that day. And second, its really painful for all of us to think about the 1953 and what the United States<\/a> did to us, but it is more painful and its very very hard to be in the United States<\/a>, listen to what Administration Says<\/a> about iran, about the Nuclear Weapons<\/a> again, and the most painful thing is to see the general public of the United States<\/a> still doesnt understand, doesnt get it, what is going on, and, you know, youre talking to people, and theyre supporting the administration, and this is the most painful thing ive ever had in my life, i think. Well, that was very eloque eloquently spoken eloquently spoken. You are right i think, that the anger towards the United States<\/a> that is naturally still strong in iran is tempered by still a residue of admiration and respect. I think if the United States<\/a> can be patient and not and resist the temptation to try to push things along in iran, which will only mess up the whole project, democracy will come back to iran. Now, you know more about iran than i do, obviously, but when i was there, i asked a lot of people a question that people have asked me here, and that is this its such a large percentage of iranians despise the regime, why dont they rise up and overthrow it . And iranian after iranian gave me the same answer. This is what they said in the late 1970s, we all banded together against the shah, from the communists through the democrats and the supporters, all the way to the most crazy fundamentalists, we all joined together under the agreement, the understanding nothing can be worse than this. Lets overthrow this. And whatever comes next will be better. Well, guess what . Something was worse. And now iranians have really learned a lesson. I think it is a painful lesson, but it is an important one, for a sophisticated political population, which is what iran has, and the lesson is dont start overthrowing governments with the idea nothing can be worse. They will always come up with something worse. Lets wait until we have a blueprint and we know where were going before we start processes in motion. Maybe they learned a lesson from watching the terrible effects of some other regime change operations. Yeah, over there. You hear from time to time that the shahs son, you know, is sort of waiting in the wings and hoping, and im sure there are plenty of people who wouldnt be surprised if he has backers and positions of power so that he might find his way to power. Do you think thats completely out of the question . And also, wouldnt it be natural for the iranians to see as you mentioned about the 79 event, you know, that here the United States<\/a> might use that as, you know, a means of imposing youre right, he wants to be shah. Hes living in a suburb of washington, d. C. As a successful businessman, had a lot of Investment Capital<\/a> i guess when they came over. He has talked about the possibility of playing a role in the future of iran. Some of the things he has said sound intriguing. He has sometimes used the example of King Juan Carlos<\/a> in spain as a person who could facilitate the transition to a constitutional monarchy. Whether he is sincere or not is something i wouldnt dare to judge. Thats something for iranians. Another scenario i have heard is that in a future, more open iran, he could go back and run for president , which is a largely ceremonial figurehead post. Iranians are going to have to decide this question. And i just close with this the result that we all want in iran, a return of democracy is going to come. The large majority of the people want this. I wouldnt go so far as to try to predict when or how this will happen, but it will happen. The one thing that can prevent it from happening is if the United States<\/a> becomes so eager for it to happen, that we begin to intervene directly. Any politician, any faction, any party that has embraced or supported by the United States<\/a> gets the kiss of death. Imagine what it sounds like to iranians when the americans shake a finger at them and say you are not democratic enough. You should have a democracy over there in iran. Well, they roll their eyes and tell us we had a democracy 50 years ago, but you crushed it. So we dont have clean hands in iran. Many iranians are aware of that. I think we have a role we can play a role in helping to shape events there, but it has to be through coalitions. It has to be through diplomatic pressure, economic pressure. One of the great successes that iran has had in the last few years has been building up a strong commercial relations with europe. Theyre very reliant on europe and very responsive to europe. Same thing is true of russia. Why wont those countries help us pressure iran . Very simply, because we dont help them on anything they are interested in, and when we ask them for favors regarding iran, theyre telling us they are not interested in helping. Why should they agree to join coalitions with us when we want coalitions when they are not listened to when they have concerns about what the United States<\/a> does . Foreign pressure in trying to make sure particularly that iran does not develop an offensive Nuclear Weapon<\/a> capability is something very appropriate, but it is not something the United States<\/a> can ever apply on its own. That will only have the backlash effect of bringing millions of people behind a regime which actually they despise and hope falls very soon. Well, i think with that, we have probably come to the end of our time. I really appreciate you all coming out on such a night. Thank you all. It was a great evening. That was wonderful. It was one of the best. [applause] tucson festival of books. In the West Virginia<\/a> book festival will take place in charlottesville. Watch our previous festival coverage, click the book fair tab on website. Booktv. 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