Iranian Foreign Policy . Theres a strong case to make that thats the case. Rouhani was elected based on the fact that it was allowed to come to power by the Supreme Leader based on the fact that he would get the sanctions relief, get the nuclear agreement. Hes going to have tremendous credibility now and be leverage. We have parliamentary elections in iran next march. It will be an interesting time in terms of the sanctions relief calendar that richard just laid out to see if the pragmatic faction can pick up more seats inside the iranian system. And were going to have to see i do think rouhani and zarif could have potentially more influence in other areas of iranian Foreign Policy where they havent had as much effect. On the other hand, you can also make the argument that the hard liners are going to double down, that theyre going to want to bat batten down the hatches and not see it lead to more liberalization. Theyll take a harder line. Theyll use some of that money that comes in to increase their support for some of their activities in syria and iraq and yemen and elsewhere in the region. Thats going to happen too. I would argue the most likely scenario is both scenarios will happen where youll end up with them very likely for the next few years. Its a very tense political competition amongst the various factions who ultimately make the final decisions. This is someone who leads towards the hard liner perspective. Very skeptical of the United States, iran, but hes also somebody who rules by consensus. If all of his people come to him and all the key factions come to him and say, boss this is what we should do he usually zsh hes going to pass on this. Think before the expiration of this deal given his health and age. At that moment were going to see what has this agreement done. Who is his successor. What kind of system comes after him. 1989 its been a long time. This will be a major moment to indicate if were going to see a fundamental shifting in irans Foreign Policy. Whether the fundamental shift happens or not, the deal is still implementable. The agreement still happens. This is a potential huge benefit we have to watch over the next few years. Second challenge is israel. What happens there. Obviously the israelis are close partners of ours. I spent years at the pentagon working on iran where one of our primary interests was in dealing with israel reassuring israel talking to them about the Nuclear Program especially at a time where speculation was much more rife that they might consider taking things into their own hands. What i found from those exchanges was a couple of things. One, the israelis its a small country surrounded by a lot of unfriendly neighbors in a very tough part of the world. And the approach that they take is based on the absolute worst Case Scenarios. The joke that american Foreign Policy makers, we do our Contingency Planning on worst Case Scenarios. Israelis do it on worst Case Scenarios and policy based on worst Case Scenarios. This is where you get the difference in perception that has led to i think, the break that weve got here with israel. Its unfortunate that we have this break. I think part of it is personal between president obama and Prime Minister netanyahu and their personal styles. Part of it is the problem weve had historically with israel on differing Risk Perceptions. I think Going Forward one of the unfortunate side effects has been that i always found engaging with the israelis was incredibly useful because they would come in with a group of very smart people who spent all of their time working on this. They would give you all the worst Case Scenarios. They would red team it really effectively and sometimes you could say, well, i dont really believe that thats credible. We dont believe that scenario is credible. Sometimes you could say, well, actually, thats something we didnt think about. It helps improve american policy. Its unfortunate weve had this split and divide which has limited that over the next few months. What happens next there Prime Minister has made very clear that hes going to oppose this agreement and try to yuntd mine it in congress. I think that is a big mistake because i think the end of the day i dont think its very likely that hell succeed. What hes doing by doing that is really hes taking a bipartisan issue and turning it into support for israel into a wedge issue inside the u. S. Congress which i think is very damaging for israels longterm interests. Look, theres a lot of people the political establishment in israel is absolutely against the agreement because Prime Minister netanyahu set the conditions where its impossible to be for the agreement. Even his political critics will say, i dont like your approach to how youre dealing with the americans but i hate this deal. The security establishment is different. Theyre much more subtle about it. I think because they also take that lower Risk Perception theyre ultimately uncomfortable with some elements of the agreement. What were likely to see there is what they do also are very concerned about is the way the Prime Minister has decided to handle himself, very public confrontation with the president going directly into the american media, going directly to congress on this and trying to circumvent the executive branch and thats something that causes a lot of anxiety for israelis. Iran might be an existential threat but fraying of the u. S. israel threat is more existential and more of a threat for the longterm security for many of them. I think the big question is what happens after the 60 days. What happens after the congressional vote. Do the israelis finally say does the Prime Minister which hes being encouraged by many to do finally say im going to take my disagreements quietly and well start quietly engaging with the administration and seeing if the United States can find ways to fill this security gap or does he decide to write off the president and spend the next year and a half publicly confronting him. I would hope he chooses the former and not the latter. There are a lot of people in israel that would hope to see that, too. Well have to wait and see. The president has reached out. President obama reached out to Prime Minister netanyahu in april and tried to bring him back into the fold and take our conversations quietly back to the back channels that we often consult in those closed rooms as opposed to public spat. He was rejected at the time. I believe he tried to do that again earlier this week and was rejected. Well see if the Prime Minister changes in september. Finally theres a third element which is saudi arabia and the gulf states. They view things differently than the israelis. They have some overlaps and differences. Israel is focused on the Nuclear Program and cares about Irans Nuclear behavior. Saudi arabia is focused on the regional questions. They care about iran support for terrorism. They view whats hatching in theppening in the region as them picking up support. Thats the major anxiety. They speculate that saudi arabia will respond by starting to build its own Nuclear Infrastructure infrastructure. I dont think thats the problem. Thats unlikely. Thats expensive. That takes time. There are costs that come to them in terms of International Reactions and in terms of their relationship with the United States. I think the real concern is that theyre feeling they have this concern that the United States is pivoting to iran and we are rearranging the Alliance Dynamics in the middle east which is not what the Obama Administration is going to do. We have a lot of things were disagreeing with. But feeling that concern the saudis start to lash out in some destabilizing ways and take steps that we think are against our interests and against their interests in the region and i think the best example of that might be what theyve done in yemen recently with this intervention without really a clear Strategic Plan about what happens after you start bombing the houthis and pretty much putting a blockade on yemen with really no end game in sight. So thats i think the more fundamental question for the saudis and one that the United States is going to have to wrestle with both this president and the next because the reality is its going to be hard for this president to do it. Any president whos the one who cuts the deal with iran, which i think we needed to do is going to take a big hit in the gulf and in israel as president obama has done. In some ways its almost the next president who has to come in and start to really do the big hug with some of our partners. So what do we do Going Forward to address these challenges . I would argue there are three or four things. Take advantage of the fact that we have this channel of communications with the iranians for the first time in 35 years. That is meaningful and important. The fact that they have email numbers and phone numbers, there is a channel. Weve wanted to and we were at the pentagon find ways to communicate to the iranians, whether it was lets avoid a conflict here, knock it off, youre about to do something that youre going to regret if we go in that direction. So having those chance i think is very important. Talking is always better than not talking. Seeing if there are ways to start working together on some discrete issues. Interests in afghanistan, maritime and avoiding potential escalation or inadvertent escalation in the gulf are interesting areas for early pursuit. Even as we do that, especially as the sanctions are coming off, it makes sense to push back more forcefully on some of irans destabilizing activities in the region through joint efforts with our partners showing up in saudi arabia for example with the high level delegation maybe led by ash carter and john brennan saying were here to talk, not about the Nuclear Program and not about how we deal with isis were here to have a serious and Strategic Communication with you about how we deal with iran in the region. Lets talk about steps together, joint covert action, aggressive interdiction. Potentially more serious efforts to train sunni opposition in syria and in iraq, sort of partners that we can work with in both those countries. Things like that that will signal to our partners that we mean it when we say were going to push back and important signals to the iranians that, you know, the nuclear deal doesnt give you free range over the region to pursue all of these activities. Were going to push back. One thing ill tell you when the United States pushes back against iran, iran backs off. Iran has no interest in the direct fight with the United States. Sometimes you do need to flex your muscles to show deterrence. I think thats another key thing we have to be doing and the third element, obviously needs to be just reassurance of other forms beyond those two, which for our partners i dont think we need to be selling the saudis f35s. They already out spend the iranians dramatically. Its not about big weaponry. Its about the small stuff, about training them to actually counter some of this low end asymmetric work. Security assurances to some extent. Things like that that we can be doing with our partners and set of activities also with the israelis that can signal to them that were sticking around, that this isnt a fundamental strategic pivot that well push back even as we engage. We can do both. Ill just close by saying that you know, its a very complicated balancing act to pull Something Like that off. Its been some mixed messages. This has worked on irans Nuclear Program. We spent the last five, ten years using a combination of pressure and engagement to get the iranians to the table and get this deal. One on its own wouldnt have worked. Take the basic philosophy and apply it to the problems we face to iran in the middle east and our partners i think you can get there with this combination of tools. Ill stop there. Thank you very much. As i said at the beginning of this agreement this process is complex. This is consequential and i think weve given you quite a bit to contemplate. Its now your turn to ask us some questions for us to answer. I want to start out with some of the journalists here. Virginia, theres a question up here in front if youd bring the mic up. Identify yourself and tell us who you would like to answer the question. Thanks. Michael 2k3w0rd done, New York Times. I have a question on the sequencing of sanctions relief, a technical question but just to clarify it in this 150 plus page document. The broad conclusion to be issued by the iea is not going to come for a period of years but the director general amano on the day the agreement was promulgated presented a roadmap thats to lead to an assessment by december 15th and he articulated a number of steps that are to be taken. As you understand the agreement, what sanctions relief can be provided prior to this december 15th assessment of where iran stands on possible military dimensions and what sanctions relief can only be provided after this assessment is completed and if its a favorable resolution . Richard . So thats a great question and its ee special whether i complicated because weve now got two processes that are working simultaneously. I would say very simply i dont see any sanctions relief happening before pmd has been laid to rest. Thats in part because the obligation on iran is somewhat different than the obligation that the iea has taken unto itself, right . The timing of the obligation that the iea has accepted is that it gets iran compliant, irans cooperation by the 15th of october, right . Well based upon the structure of the Implementation Phase of the deal, there is zero chance that any sanctions relief can happen before that cooperation has been given, right . Its written into the document as an obligation of the iranians to have done this by adoption day and so as a consequence of that, if they didnt provide the cooperation, the United States and p 5 plus 1 partners would be in a position to say, you youre not fulfilling the terms of the deal. They could walk away you could theoretically go to the dispute resolution process, so on and so forth. Bottom line, i dont think theres any chance that any additional relief could be given. There is potentially a theoretical world in which adoption has taken place the iranians speed through implementation, right, and the director general has not issued his report by the 15th of december. I can see that as a theoretical possibility. I think that is highly unlikely. I put it almost at impossible because of how long it would take them to do things like removing centrifuges but that is something that could theoretically happen. This then goes to the question of what are you going to get out of a report from the director general, right . There are only two conclusions that could potentially come out of the report. Iran had a Weapons Program iran didnt have a Weapons Program. In either circumstance we think we know the answer to the first and we think its the first. So theres nothing really thats going to change the timing of relief and the timing of what goes forward because we already know the answer to it and the access and transparency to verify its not ongoing will already have begun. I dont see in reading the documents that there is an explicit bit of sanctions tied to the explicit bit of p and d but i think the way the sequence works and what the requirements are on each party of this means that there wont be any relief until irans done its part and then the report itself will be icing on the cake. Let me just ask you, richard to clarify one aspect of this which is when we say iran does its part with respect to the iae investigation, that means what . As i understand it, and im reading it that means the iranians need to provide the cooperation, the information, the access that the iaea believes is necessary for it to close out its investigation, right . But not necessarily the time it would take for the agency which could take a long time, to draw conclusions from that information. Is that correct or what is your am i wrong on this . Well, according to the roadmap, iran has to provide the International AtomicEnergy Agency with the information at best to answer all of the concerns that the agency laid out in the annex to its november 2011 report and it needs to provide that information by august 15th. Then iran or the iaea will evaluate that information and by september 15th if they want to ask iran any followup questions, then that information can then be then iran has some time to follow up with that information and ideally this process is all concluded by october 15th. Then by december 15th the iaea has said it will issue its assessment about the sort of the full system of irans past pmd work. So thats according to the separate roadmap that the iaea in iran agreed upon and announced the same day as the deal, which was tuesday. Okay. Thanks for the clarification. All right. Other journalists with questions . Yes, maam . Thank you. Jessica shulberg huffington post. This is mainly for richard. Theres a contradictory message that can be said if congress imposes any