Okay. Good morning. Good late morning, everyone. This is im going venture to be bold and say this is going to be the most exciting panel of the day. Because were all about solving the problems that you guys have been hearing about this morning. Im very happy to have an International Panel. It sh rufrpg by one individual because the professor is ill. So she couldnt join us. Ill try to channel her as best i can with my own personal twist. We have an International Panel that im excited about. Though thought long and hard about lou to counter disinformation especially in the context of dealing with russia. To my right, to my reed right, i have ambassador renee niberg. He is a distinguished former finnish ambassador to russia which is relevant here. And former chief executive of east consulting. He is also served as ambassador to germany for four years, actually, from 20042008. He also was head of finlands delegation to the ose which obviously also deals a lot with these types of issues. And then he was, of course, also finlands ambassador to austria. He has a long distinguished career. I wont list all of the other things hes done in all of the other accolades hes received. But he is well poised to help us think about how we in the United States and other countries can deal with the russian challenge. To had is right, professor ashley dekes. She has a long career now working in the legal area with regard to cybersecurity. She is from the university of law school at their center for National Security law. And thats her area of emphasis. She focused on International Law and National Security, intelligence and laws of war. She also served as an academic fellow at the Colombia Law School for two years. She served in the government so she has the academic and the government expertise in the department of state, in the office of Legal Adviser for a year 20072008 aand, of course, shes also a cfr alum. She was an International Affairs fellow in 2017 so she did the state Department Work there. Shes extensively published and again in the area of International Legal security. What i would like to do is as the panelists to give us description. We heard about the threats that we face. We know very well from firsthand experience and from research what the threats are. Can you i would like to hear from each of you what your prescriptions are, what you think we should do with the United States should do as a matter of Foreign Policy and then i will try to add to the discussion by talking a little bit about how i think the russian government might respond to your prescriptions. My perspective on the russian Foreign Policy, there is a framework or a lens through which you might listen to their prescriptions. From my perspective, the russian government is not likely to respond to a soft request for negotiation on the legal front. Theyre not likely to respond to anything except for a real strong, firm policy. So i think that its important to note that from the russian perspective, if they think that what theyre doing is bringing them success, they will continue doing what theyre doing until essentially we force them, and i dont mean by force, but we essentially have to force them to recognize that the price is too high for their existing Information Operations against the United States and our allies and that they need to change course somehow. There are a number of ways you can do. That well hear from two of them from the panel here. Obviously, we welcome your input with regard to other ideas you might have. I think i want to just lay that out as a foundation. That from the perspective of dealing russia, its really important to raise the price for them wlch them, whether its kplek, political, or otherwise and raise the price is what were aiming to achieve. If i could, ambassador, ill start with you. Please give us your best advice. Thank you very much. Im reluctant to come with that advice of the United States. But i can talk politics and i can talk russia. I can reflect on what is going on and what theyre doing, how theyre doing that. But let me start with a political comment which is doesnt have flig to do with cyber. That is this you think about the United States a year ago, there were three people who were stunned by the outcome. The first one was stunned was donald trump. He didnt expect to win. The second one that is stunned is expected to win. The third one is putin who was absolutely sure that the devil he knows would win. That is hillary. And cyber comes after that. And so its not a technical issue. There are a lot of politics. Now im reluctant to talk about the americans and what you should do. If im looking at the panel before us, i very much agree that it is question of resilience. Its a question of education. Its understand wlag all this is about. Now i had dinner the other night with a New York Times kpanlt correspondent and i surprised him by saying him a couple days back a quite a famou famous ger price, a famous german journalist already dead ten years ago. Her price was awarded to the New York Times. A German Foundation which usually awards prices to individual journal iflts and awards it to a newspaper like the New York Times. And this actually reflects the interests in countering everything which we dont everything which is false that you have serious newspapers, you have serious news sources. And it is a fact that the europeans do read more newspapers. It is geared to be kind of more in immune to fake news. And actually there was an eu study about superstition. And the level of superstition is different in countries. It turned out that fin land turned out to be the lowest level of people who are superstitious. Okay. Thats it . Yeah. Okay. Thats great. I think but i think thats wonderful. I think resistance and resilience is the most important thing. And well get back to that a little bit in the q a. Im going to take a different tact as a lawyer. Im going to be technical here and offer a number of buckets of tools i think that was the United States and its allies have to take little bites at this problem. I think the last panel was relatively pessimistic about the success on this. Im not going to be much more wildly open mystic than they were. I will just put on the table what i think the tools are that the u. S. Government and the allies and the nato allies have. So the first bucket would be are there legal tools that we can employ . And i think the answer there is yes, there might be two different kinds of legal tools. One is International Law and the other is domestic law. So let me say a little bit about International Law. There have been lots of discussions going on for the past five or six years at the u. N. And something called the group of Government Experts thats asking not just cyber questions related to elections or election interference but broader cyber questions about how can we think about whats appropriate behavior as between countries in cyberspace . They were make going progress. There was a general consensus that the basic principles of International Law embodied in things like the u. N. Charter were relevant to cyberspace. What happened in 2017 was this basic sort of consensus that well understood norms of international allow applied to cyber broke down. The cubans were the sort of most vocal cause of the breakdown. But i think its well understood that the russians and chinese also diverted this consensus for entirely political results. So then what is left for International Law to do. One thing might be to try to engage the russians very directly in a bilateral discussion about certain kind of behavior that takes place in cyberspace. So that will be challenging. We can talk about whether or not that could ever happen. There is a model for that. And that model is between the u. S. And the chinese government. So it was a real problem. Something we were skeptical that chinese would agree to and, yet, we got into a position where there was a bilateral mou with an adversary agreeing that a particular norm should attach to our bee halfor especially as it applied to cyberspace. Can we as like minded states, that is sitting down with our nato allies, for instance, try to articulate in some level of detail what norms we think are acceptable. What do we stand for . We could come together as nato countries and identify what our val udz are as reflected in behavior in cyberspace. So that would be another pots built. There is a domestic angle too. There are indictments of people overseas including foreign oefdz for activities theyve engaged in cyberspace including hacking. There are people from the Peoples Liberation army. That might have motivated them to enter into an mou with us. And there may well be indictments of there are news stories that at least six russian officials who were involved in the Election Hacking are being investigated in potentially going to be indicted by the United States. Is it likely theyll show up at jfk airport so we can arrest them and prosecute them . Not likely. It cabins travel for people. It hadz proven very it complicates their lives, i think. In important ways. And so i would say watch that space for whether the Justice Department decides to indict named russian officials, six probably more for activities like this. A couple of other buckets. We have seen sanctions imposed by the Obama Administration. It is Something Congress has been very impressed with related to sanctions. Imposed on individuals associated with the election interference. That is another way to make people feel pain in their pocketbooks. A fourth category, intelligence sharing, we and our nato allies, germany, italy, the brits, lots of these countries, monlt nag row, have experienced election interference. So i think there are important ways in which we can share with our allies and they can share with us what are we sneeg what tools are being used . What are the new it ragss of tools weve seen before . And come together and think a little bit more coherently about lou we can respond in sib eastern Information Operations. I understand nato created a center of excellence related to counter propaganda. And then the fifth bucket is counter measures. Ive described is fine and good and well recognized and at least public are there things that we can and should be doing less publicly . So to take a nonrussia example, north korea engaged in a hack against sony. Reports suggest that the various Media Companies in north korea what were forced off line for some period of time. I have no internal knowledge about what happened. But you might speculate that the United States made it difficult for those Media Companies to get online for some period of time. So theres this other bucket of activities, tool kit that the u. S. Government could and probably is thinking about using. Thank you very much to both of you. I think theres a lot in there for us to process. I think i want to start with the United States and the United States resilience. It does relate to the legal realm. In some sense we need to be legally resill yenlt as well as being resill yenlt as a culture to false information and to cyber operations. And ready to also take action. But in terms of building resilience, its easy in the swedish context because its a small country. You all more or less can find some Common Ground you mean the finnish you said swedish. Almost the same. That was a terrible mistake. Im so sorry. On the finnish case. And when were talking about the United States today, we have a very divided political arena. We have unfortunately i would argue although i havent seen any data on this, but i have seen reporting indicating that our civic literacy, if you will, is lower than certainly than it should be and perhaps lower than it has been in recent past. So youre dealing with a landscape that is perhaps not similar enough to finlands landscape. Can you comment on a little bit about what lessons you might draw from your countrys experience that could be relevant here . It would take some time if youre starting with primary education. I like the comments from the second panel where he made a couple of important principle points. The first is we dont i mean the answer already in during the period was that we do not have a propaganda ministry. We dont play use the same playbook back. We dont act this way. And its also important this is very much in our case. But it is also this should not be antirussian. It is a larger problem. And we should also remember that thomas reid who said that this is, of course, they say pretty social media even hacking or breaking codes, et cetera, on stealing or reading other peoples mail. This is not a new phenomenon. Its on different scale and different method today. Im reading a book now starling waiting for hitler. I have 700 pages to go. He has a wonderful example which actually is worth quoting. And the famine which ravaged ukraine and kazakhstan in the early 1930s, in 1932, Russian Media was not allowed to use family. They did publish a thing about family saying that there is famine in poland. The starvation in poland and its not a crisis. The villages are dying in china t hunger despite a good harvest and the United States red lines. So there is nothing new about this. The question here is soviet propaganda had a very low credibility. Its effect in the west is actually very, i have at the end, there is propaganda and failed also to convince its own population later in the late period of the soviet union. The situation with russian prop ganlda is different and much more smarter. This is, of course, the challenge. Im not an expert on cyber and on the technical part. There is an interesting thing is there are hybrid operations where Information Operations come in. We had a case in case which was quite exceptional, quite sensational in the fall of 2015. All of a sudden, russians led third Country Nationals without documents cross over to norway. 5,000 people crossed over. After that, 1,000 crossed over to finland. The only the only reference you can make is it is they just could not resist playing with the scare of the migration crisis in europe. I think your foreign minister at the time called it the same term that we had our military officials calling it, the weaponization of refugees. Correct. It was absolutely that. But it was also accompanied by a media campaign. It died down. Maybe the only really infective argument we had with russians is asking them, is this the view that you have about your border that you allow criminal organizations operate on the russian border . And this border is the best border. Were facing all kinds of different things. And this is why this is the reason why the finnish government put up something which was mentioned in the early panel. European center of excellence were countering hybrid threats. Theyre informing the people and trying to analysze what is goin on. That is an interesting example which we dont have time to get into in too much detail. I think its interesting to note at the same time that this was occurring that these refugees were basically being told to go to the bored eastern cross into these scandinavian countries, we had the big refugee flows which were already a problem for the europeans coming from syria and from afghanistan, aftrica, et cetera. So it was open opportunistic. I think that is important to note again because they will be open opportunistic. However, in this case, it doesnt actually work. And in part it didnt work. We dont many of you probably dont know about it. In essence, that was a failure for them. Had there been a greater human cry in your country and of course regionally and internationally, they may well have succeeded in obtaining the objectives which had nothing to do with the refugees per se. It had more to do with having us fight one another, European Countries fight one another, fighting russia, fighting across the atlantic. And passing the message that we can harm you. Right. Kind of flagging that this is watch out, we can harm you. There is one point which is very important. And this is the borders. There is no country that can control a border without a partner. Think about the russia and chinese border. I wont speak about the mexican border. Thank you. Think about it. There is no way you can control a border without a partner. And violating this and playing with this is not something which is forgotten. So they didnt achieve their aim on the contrary. Left a very bad taste. Ashley, if you could comment on the first question and then also obviously legal resilience from a legal perspective and also earlier in the greenroom you mentioned sort of future threats we might face like tampering with information. If you could, i hope im not asking you to go too far forward looking at what we might base on the future and how we can respond from a legal perspective. Sure. So on the resilience point, i mean, i guess one way to think about a resort to nato and sort of the like minded democracies theyre in is a form of resilience. Right . Its a form of employing existing tools and we understand each other very well. We know what each others capacities are and we have curr