Next, ran export themes that shaped policy. The exporting of concepts like progress and civilization in the 20th century and the lack of diversity and thought among u. S. Policymakers during the cold war. This discussion was hosted by a conference was part of a organence hosted at the at oregon state university. , i first realized how brilliant he was when i was at the university of pennsylvania. A dissertation entitled which was awarded the 2016 allen evans prize. Be ook manuscript will a book will be based on it by the Harvard University press. He is a great scholar to lead us off. Help me in welcoming him. That is a very generous introduction and i feel like i have a lot to follow since you gave a great summary of what im doing. Thank you all for coming out here and thank you everyone for reading my paper. Im excited to be able to aesent this work in such diverse audience, people who are doing work different from the stuff i normally do. For me i kind of live and breathe in a time when the United States isnt a thing, and isnt a thing anyone imagined would ever be a thing. Being able to talk about a moment where the place that i think about all the time, the n set modern north america of societies we are jostling around, thinking about that as a transition every moment to what becomes the United States is really what im trying to do here. Ofticularly through the lens colonial and native relations. Hereaper i submitted entitled indian subject and british populism in america, it is sketching out a long history of evolution of native american subject hood, from the beginning of connell getting of colonization 2 oris not just objection domination. It is the early form of political membership, which is basically defined by the relationship between the subject and the sovereign, a direct vertical relationship. This is in contrast to what we think of in terms of modern citizenship, more or less a horizontal relationship among part people, who are all of the policy in the same kind of way. The subject made possible in the early modern world to have gated groups of subjects who are not necessarily like each other. The only thing that really mattered where their personal relations to the monarchs. That made it possible for things that madetle nobility it a more complicated set of Political Rights and responsibilities that defined the nature of subject hood. Varietyacity to enclose is what made subject hood a handy tool for colonizers to incorporate native americans into the expanding english empire in the 17th and 18th century. It why virginians in plymouth conducted trees that transformed the leaders of the palace out and Wampanoag Indian nations to battle king james the first. Was a Political Court political ploy, a cover for conquest. Embraceus people could objection. In part because membership in the British Empire offered all kinds of advantages, ranging from access to trade network to military allies and their own indigenous rivalries. Subjecthood could be marshaled as a source of power. Native americans could also exercise the cherished right of every subject, the ability to petition the king for address of grievances, sometimes with a surprising degree of success. In thearkable petitions historic record that were written by native leaders or written on their behalf by colonists revealed indigenous understanding of subjecthood that contained a duality, a tension. In which they both come on one hand, acknowledge themselves as members of the imperial politics, and at the same time claiming status as a sovereign nation, whose sovereignty had beforetended long europeans ever put boots to north america. And therefore to assume that British Imperial officials would not tolerate that indigenous understanding of subjecthood in a way that was compatible with their own tribal nationality. Imperial officials endorsed that view with relatively few reservations. In 1743 the british attorney general and board of trade concurred that the mohegan nation was politically equivalent to the colony of connecticut virtue of their subjection to the king. They were essentially equal subsidiary units of the larger empire. Himhat scenes seems like seems like an anomaly, it is not. For example, scotland and ireland were politically distinct in the 17th century, they each had parliaments and each of their people was politically distinct with separate sets of rights. In the colonies, the concord ,orth populations of dutch swedish, finnish, and german people, who are prior and habitants because of new sweden, they also possess special rights, such as the ability to worship in their own churches. That was a right other british subjects did not have. And they had a exemptions from duties that english subjects had. For example, all of those people in the form areas of new netherland and sweden were not required to arm their countrymen. Legal pluralism was possible because of the hierarchal relationship. Be ts did not need to part of my point is the case of indigenous subjecthood was not at all anomalous, we need to see this as normal in the early modern world before the United States comes around. It is one aspect of a patchwork of semi autonomous jurisdiction in a multicultural British Empire. The problem if this sounds overly rosy, it is. Im glossing over a tremendous amount of conflict and violence here, in part because thats what previous historians have focused on. Im trying to recover a story about the possibilities of indigenous inclusion in the empire before we reach a historical moment. That happens in the middle of the 18th century, with the conquest of new france during the seven years war, the British Empire gained control on paper of a vast swath of the continent, a continent full of native american nations who had never acknowledged themselves as subjects of the british king, and most of them had no interest in doing so and resist any imposition upon them. British officials try to extend the same ambiguous nation within empire model that they had honed over the previous entry, by treating those native groups as subjects. What they try to do is treat foreign indian nations as though ,hey were domestic tributaries considering them subjects to be governed, rather than sovereign nations that warranted diplomacy. In 1760 three this provoked a vigorous defense. To theological challenge model of sovereignty, the model that defied sovereignty that characterize the British Empire did not come from metropolitan policymakers. It came from marginal actors on the western frontier. The example that i think is most 1764,ant here happened in when a group of pennsylvania settlers massacred the last indians nearestoga lancaster, pennsylvania. In the pretext that they were an danger. They deployed a vernacular quasiconstitutional argument. The indians were the commonwealth inside the empire, and they argued inhabiting the commonwealth was a political absurdity. They and others like them argued that a British State with indian subjects threatened their rights as englishmen. I 1765 they were willing to engage in Armed Struggle against the Indian Military to protect those rights as they saw them. British insistence on maintaining divided sovereignty, which is to say a subject status within the empire, provoked a crisis in the west at the same time as the stamp act crisis. Colonists came to see the struggles as intertwined because of their common connection with his tyranny. They viewed it as an assault on their rights as englishmen as taxation without representation. In their mind, the struggle with indian nations in the struggle with the British Empire essentially became the same thing. I think the upshot is that as colonists began forging new bonds of citizenship, one of their axioms were the indians could not be a part of that civic brotherhood. In the end, what i want you to take away from all of this is Indian Subjecthood in the colonial era was subject to the constitutional and theoretical debates into major malaise. The first is even as americans reinvented a political theory of divided sovereignty, which is to say federalism, they erase the possibility of native sovereignty for indigenous rights. Old as americans kept the ambiguity of Indian Subjecthood, which Supreme CourtJustice Marshall codified, the citizenship that was explicitly linked to whiteness. Just to conclude, i want to offer some thoughts in the spirit of speaking to the paper and the larger theme here. If there ise that if there is such a thing as u. S. Intermediary Foreign Policy it comes right here. And its defining feature was a commitment to center colonialism. I think its important to remember the first Foreign Policy crisis was not in the atlantic but in the ohio valley. And as the foreign policies in question were not britain or france or spain, but the shawnee and the pottawatomie nations, part of the larger western indian confederacy, who collectively destroyed two u. S. Armies in the 1790s, and represented a viable alternative to american expansion into the northwest. The crisis was not provoked intentionally by any cadre of elite foreign officials, but by settlers like the paxton boys, who is willing to overthrow any Foreign Authority that threatened indian rights. Ofpropelling this engine colonialism was White Supremacy, creating opportunities for whites. And White Supremacy may have been the only solid bond linking poor settlers in the west to policymakers in the capital. Those officials chose to treat what were in fact foreign spaces as domestic ones. By the alchemy of ideology, transmuted invading settlers into endangered citizens, who are entitled to the protection of the federal government. People whoed native were defending their homelands into rebels against the legitimate authority of the United States. I think thats fiction as foreign as domestic woven into the dma when it was just an. Mperial zygote thank you. [applause] thanks so much, that was fantastic. Fiction of foreign as domestic. Be an assistant professor of history at wake forest university. I met him when he was in grad school when he was finishing a brilliant first book, legalist empire and International Law and Foreign Relations in the early 20th century, published by Oxford University press, received an honorable mention. He is currently focusing his work on questions of the history of economic stations economic sanctions. Hes a great speaker and historian. Please join me in welcoming him. I would like to begin by thanking chris, danny and david for putting this together and thank you in advance for your comments and questions at the end. A side project. Im looking at the ideology of civilization in u. S. Or in relations. If you look back throughout the language of american Foreign Policy you will see many references to civilization from the 18th century onward. As tempting to see this as fig leaf or power. As i was working on my first book, which looked at law and empire in the early 20th century, i came to see that the historical actors werent simply using civilization as a historical tool, but it was functioning as an ideology. It was a way how they made sense of the world. This ideology civilization. Earlyer and empire in the 20th century and attempting to build an expanded rule of International Law. These two projects were brought together under the ideology of civilization. These folks believed that civilization was sort of and exorbitantly expanding overtime. Empire byexpand this expanding civilization spatially. You can make a case that civilized nations would willingly accept the decisions of International Court because they were becoming more civilized and rational and aware of their International Rights and responsibility. It seems to me that the turn of the 20th century was a time in which the idea of civilization was a master concept or master ideology. Wrote in a book that this didnt really survive world war i. When europe, which is sort of the birthplace, the heart of civilization, is destroying itself using weapons that are themselves the product of civilization. There is this irony of modern technology being turned not to turn things up but to destroy them. I have a feeling this was not the whole story. It persists as western civilization during the well during the cold war. Have a clash of civilization in reference to present trumps President Trumps need to defend western civilization. I want to get a sense of how civilization persists and change over the period of American History. The problem is there are difficulties in doing this, because civilization is a huge capacious term. If you want to write a textbook called 5000 b. C. E. To the present, it covers everything. Where would you look for sources . They want to have some empirical basis for research. What i decided to do is look at the Public Statements of american president s. There is an excellent database available, the american presidency project run by you see santa barbara. They have digitized almost every Public Statement from american president s. There are 129,000 documents on there. I searched for civilization and its various permutations, civilized, civilizing, civilize or, and i came across 3000 documents. There are limitations to this approach. One is what american president s say in public is not necessarily what they say in private what they believe in private. This is only a small segment of the american population, the white male segment. And theres also the problem if you are looking for use of the term civilization, you may miss it is discussed but not the term itself. I want to start thinking about the public meaning of the term and exploring it over a longer time period. What did i find . When american president s talk about civilization, they are doing it almost exclusively in one of three ways. They are talking about civilizing native americans or who is or not following the norms of civilized warfare, or they are using it as a kind of vaguely neutral descriptor term. There is a reference to civilized nations and civilized world, in which they mean the United States. Europe and the United States. You get the rise and prevalence of civilization to justify imperial expansion and oversees territorial expansion. And famouslyinley calling for work in spain because for a war in the name of civilization. Theodore roosevelt more than any other president has civilization as a fundamental ideological concept in his Foreign Policy. Yourgues, for instance, if look at relations between the civilized nations, the laws going to be a useful way of maintaining peace between them, and he vacillates on whether germany or japan are civilized or not. These civilizations need to maintain their armies in order to please the uncivilized or savage people of the world. Noticed ah century, i shift in how civilization deployed, increasingly in defense of terms. Its not about civilizing the rest of the world, its about defending from various calamities. He then says in retrospect this is a war to preserve and dispatch to preserve and defend civilization. Depression and world war ii are also seen as fundamentally menacing. Fdr rhetoric is interesting because he tends to add adjectives before the term civilization. When he talks about the depression he says modern civilization, and modern methods are necessary, by which he means new ideas of the role of the state. He sometimesapan, has civilization as a whole, other times he says they are a threat to our civilization or American Civilization or our American Civilization or democratic civilization, no more national sense of this. Suggesthe is trying to the unity between american and global interests, such that if you want to defend your home, if you want to defend American Civilization, that means defending global civilization as a whole. Aat is one way of working on globalist ideology, which sets the groundwork for american policy during the cold war. It doesnt disappear, but it doesnt seem to decline in frequency, and it was interesting for me to see that the president never talked about the soviet union as presenting a threat to civilization. They certainly dont talk about fighting a soviet union war for civilization. Nuclear war in particular, thats what represents the threat to civilization. As lbj puts it in the lbj fashion, one impulsive reckless move could incinerate our civilization and wipe out the lives of 300 million men before you could say scattered. This is a threat here. The end of the cold war opens up new possibilities, the collapse of alternative model makes it possible to think of a universal civilization. Alternatively we have a clash between multiple civilizations. Bush casts the war on terror as a civilization fight, with terrorists as savage or barbarous enemies. This active describe in terrorism or kidnapping has a savage threat to civilization 1970s. T to the President Trump has recently about explicitly defending western civilization. What can this history tells about ideology and u. S. Foreign relations . I will make a couple of suggestions, but i am open to hearing more reactions. I think one way this is useful, it is helping us think about term. Gy over the long its how ideologies adapt their circumstances, but there is a thatnsual structure endures. I think this is true for civilizations, which from the beginning is complicated and full of tensions and dualities. Yo