From the center for strategic and International Studies this is just under 45 minutes. Welcome to csis online event. Today were going to be talking about russian influence in the United Kingdom. This is part of a broader report that csis just produced that looks how to counter russian and chinese influence. So last thursday we held a conversation with former australian Prime MinisterMalcolm Turnbull that looked at chinese influence in australia. Part of the report examined japan and australia and how chinese influence works there. Todays conversation is to look at how russian influence works in the United Kingdom. As part of that broader work we also looked at germany. The reason Malcolm Turnbull was so important is because we use his framing of influence activities. We looked at covert, coercive and corrupting influence factors. Many reports have certainly examined the supply of influence activities, but very few look at the demand side. How democracies use and accept these influence activities. So our report focused much more on the demand how did democratic governors in societies internalize that influence activities . This report was made possible by the state Departments Global Engagement Center through the Information Access fund and administered by the vt institute, and were grateful of course for their support. But these views of course are the authors and not of the state departments. So if i may let me briefly go over some of the key findings from this report. Russia and china certainly have different objectives in how they use their influence activities but they share one commonality. They both try to divide the United States from its most important allies and certainly the United Kingdom is americas most essential or one of the most essential allies. Tay do this by using their influence activities to look at how democracies how they divide society societies. So we looked at stoocietal cohesion, we looked at the economic interconnectedness. That was a big key. How does money corrupt or capture elite . And then of course we looked at the media. How social media was interacting and regulating the types of influence activities that russia was perpetuating within the United Kingdom. The scope of this report fell outside the coronavirus pandemic, but of course near the end of our reporting we saw a more disturbing trend. That was china emulating russias tactics. Whereas russia tries to divide society and basically degrade democracy and faith in Democratic Institutions china attempts to coerce and try to suppress any criticism of china. But all of a sudden were starting to see china take on the appearances of more russian influence activities. So those are the overriding key findings of the report we invite you to take a look at that time report. So now lets dive deep into the u. K. We could not have put together a more fantastic group of colleagues to speak about russian influence activities in the United Kingdom. Let me first introduce the ambassador to the United Kingdom. Ambassador pierce arrived earlier in the spring and of course we went into lockdown, but we welcome you to washington ambassador pierce. Formerly British Ambassador to the United Nations and former u. K. Special representative to afghanistan. We also have with us luke harding, a Senior International correspondent for the guardian and author of a new book entitled shadow state, murderer, mayhem and russias remaking of the west. Its now out, and we thank luke for joining us from london. And then of course we our very own Deputy Director of the Europe Program at csis and senior fellow, the author of the u. K. Chapter for their support, and no one is better at helping moderate this conversation. They say timing is everything, and i believe this conversation couldnt be more welltimed because were told tomorrow the intelligence and security committee, the committee of the u. K. Parliament will be releasing its much anticipated report on russian interference in the u. K. And perhaps we can use this conversation as a good framing for when that report is released tomorrow. So with that thank you to our colleagues. Please read the report. Again, im Heather Conley from csis and were grateful youre here. Rachel, over to you. Thank you, heather. Ill just offer some brief remarks ability what we saw in the u. K. Case study and then turn it over to you, ambassador pierce, before we go into a discussion. But when we looked at the u. K. Case study we saw two russian objectives in particular. The first was to weaken the u. K. Internally. So this was magnified in things like accentuating existing divisions between leave and remain, rural and urban divides, even those in scotland who preferred to separate from the United Kingdom rather than remain. So the first objective was to weaken the u. K. Internally. The second was to diminish the u. K. s place in the world. So the activities that fell in this bucket were related to nato, the European Union and the relationship with the United States. So clearly russia recognized that the u. K. Is made Even Stronger by its membership in nato and recently the European Union and its uniquely close relationship with the United States. So those were targets of the influence activities as well. But what we found in looking at the study is that it wasnt so much the objective or tactics in either the russia or china case that made the real difference in terms of influence and impact. Rather it was what happened on the receiving end, how resilient was the society or the country that was on the receiving end of these tactics and objectives . And in many ways the u. K. Was very resilient. The government is accountable. Its highly trance parent. Theres a good balance among the different branches of government. The remedial landscape is very resilient. I was impressed to see 50 of u. K. Citizens are getting the majority of their news from the bbc and the community which can often be a vulnerability was very well integrated and welloff and did not present as a vul nnlt vulnerability in the case. We did find two of concern. The first was regulatory gaps. In particular the Campaign Finance law created some loopholes that possibly led to more foreign money coming into the campaign. Of course weve got no proof of that, but that is essentially where some of the trails led us. The u. K. Also has a very interesting structure with the crown dependencies and some of the overseas territories. So even when these regulatory gaps were fixed in the u. K. Proper they manifested themselves, and the legislation was implemented later in those two instances. The second vulnerability were societal vulnerabilities which i alluded to in the beginning. So a polarization whether its political or ideological that we see across the United States and europe. But certainly those were the two vulnerabilities that jumped out in the u. K. Case, and smartly i think in the u. K. Response they tried to address those vulnerabilities through changes in the Campaign Finance law, for example. Through efforts to increase Media Literacy or the ability to identify disinformation and misinformation. So while i think were on a very positive track certainly the tactics continue to change, and so the response has to evolve. And with that i think id like to turn the floor over to ambassador pierce to give us your impressions of, you know, essentially when did the u. K. Become a target of russia, why did they become a target of russia, and what are you generally seeing both with regard to influence activities in the u. K. As well as the u. K. s experience watching influence activities overseas. Thank you, ambassador pierce. Thank you very much, heather. Thank you, rachel, and thank you for inviting me to join this very interesting discussion. I think the first thing to say is that the u. K. And russia actually have a very long history, and at points in this history we have had very good relations. One goes back over 300 years, peter the great, and that was a stage of the relationship that for those times was very productive. We admire the russian people, and we recognize the enormous sacrifices that the russian people made in the Second World War. And we appreciate the fact that that Second World War was won with soviet assistance and the soviet union was an ally at that time. And weve always made it clear that we want a productive load bearing relationship with the russian government including the current russian government. And i went with Boris Johnson when he was foreign secretary to moskow to deliver that last message, which seemed at the time to be appreciated by our russian hosts. However, three months after that saw the giu poisonings in salsbury and eventually led to more than 150 Russian Diplomats being excelled across europe and the United States by the u. K. And its partners. And so i think the fundamental question has to be why does russia reject these overtures that countries like the u. K. But there are others make in terms of a load bearing relationship . Were never going to always agree with russia. But were often never going to agree on a huge number of subjects, but we are both members at the security council, and we do have certain interests in global stability. And that ought to be a Good Foundation for some productive even difficult conversations. But we dont see russia behaving as a permanent member. We see russia doing all the things you just described and more in georgia and other countries besides the u. K. And we also see that condoning if not abetting the use of chemical weapons in syria, chemical weapons are a universal universally prohibited weapon. So why does a permanent five member want to allow one of its client states to use such an awful weapon . And i think the russia of the cold war, if you like, the soviet union of the cold war would have seen that as crossing a line in terms of stability. So i think this comes to your question of how long has this been going gone, and im not a historian. I havent looked into it in detail, but i think antecdotally all these things are synonymous with the rise ofpute mchb theres something about this n mantra that the russians have of the end of the west. Theyre out to show that western values dont count anymore, the western approach to trade doesnt count anymore, the western approach to International Treaties and International Laws and standards doesnt count anymore. And theyre putting a lot of effort into undermining with that. And then as you say we come to the United Kingdom and all the things that youve described. We try in the United Kingdom to be resilient against those attacks. Weve set a number of programs like defending democracy and countering disinformation to make us more resilient and use all the parts of british institutions. But as you also say some of these arguments by the russians are pernicious. We all know how they affect opinion polls, and i come back to my first point why does russia want to behave like this . Why not just have a more productive relationship with the west . The west is no threat to russia, so why not take a different euroatlantic route as in the late 1990s it seemed possible that russia might do . So i think thats an important question which we should keep confronting russian representatives with. I think the second point of russia i think these are very interesting and intriguing. I doubt very much its a partnership of two equals, but at the same time i do wonder if the russians are more manipulative with the chinese than perhaps the chinese realize . And the whole disinformation thing where the chinese are copying russian disinformation including visa vi u. K. Policy i think thats an interesting area to explore. Ill stop there so you can ask questions or move onto luke, but very happy to elaborate on any of that. Thank you. I think thats very insightful about, you know, your analysis that russia feels it has more to gain from being disruptive than from engaging and trying to think about why that might be the case. Certainly there are certain rules and norms that are inviable, but beyond that i think their scope for thinking about how we change that calculus. And certainly russia is not alone in that. A number of other countries heather and i looked closely at turkey, and turkey is making its same calculation in its region it has more to gain from acting unilaterally and pushing its agenda rather than engaging with eu and nato partners for a collective end state. So i think thats a very sharp observation. Before i turn it over to luke maybe just one more question to keep the flow going. I mean, russia really has doubled down on these efforts that fall below the threshold of our conflict. We looked at the brexit referendum, the Scottish Independence referendum and possibly even the u. K. Elections. When you observe these in retrospect do you really think these efforts have had impact . We struggled with this in the study very much. We could see influence but we really couldnt necessarily say because there was this point of influence or involvement it led to this outcome. In your experience maybe even looking at the u. K. s engagement in Central Europe do you think that these efforts have impact . Oh, i think thats a really good question. As you say its quite hard to measure, and it may be were all too close to it to know if it would have had impact. So i think if one wanted to look at impact the east europeans have more experience of the russian government, if you like, than anyone else. And they certainly worry about the cumulative effect as well as individual decisions. So there may be something quite important in russian attempts to destabilize over time that we cant quite discern yet. I do think it was well said of the russian government that they put the saber in until they hit steel. And i always thought in the u. N. That the russians have as good chess players at least two strategies for any given ven venture. One is incremental and the other is much more dynamic, and they will pursue either of those depending on circumstance. So theyre very adept at jumping from circumstance to circumstance and advancing their agenda as fast as their circumstances allow. And i think the consequence of that or the implication of that is that to halt them we have to be very firm early on. They have to hit that steel with the saber early on, and i think thats where sometimes collectively the west is not always as forceful with russia as we might be. And i do think a bigger conversation about russian tactics in this regard would be helpful because i think if we arent alert to the russian strategy of riding two horses we end up with the risk that we inadvertently let something happen that then has consequence we werent expecting. So thats definitely worth conversation. And in many ways i like to have these conversations because thats where collective security resides, but on the whole i think the their news from more objective, independent, but well renowned outlets like the bbc and the national press. Theres a healthy skepticism, i think, in the british public, which is useful on these occasions. And i think the russian message is so obviously antidemocratic that it goes against a lot of traditions, so people, again, are skeptical. I think it interesting going back to the first point, the russians obviously cant get their message across by democratic means. That ought to tell them something, theyre irrational, clever people. But in terms of actual impact versus influence, i come back to the point i think were just a bit too close to it to know if that will be the case. Thank you. Well, luke, you have looked at a lot of these issues of impact and vulnerabilities and what makes an influence activity more or less successful, in quotes, if you will. What, in your experience, should we be studying . How can we reduce the likelihood that well see these influence activities occurring in the future, and if they do, how do we go about making sure the impact or influence is reduced . Yeah, well, thank you. Thank you, rachel. Congratulations on a terrific report. Its been a pleasure to read and very timely. Just listening to the ambassador, i was put in mind of a conversation i had with a british diplomat soon after i got kicked out of moscow, after four years there as a guidance correspondent in 2011. It was a pretty dispiriting experience, which followed breakinned at our apartment and harassment. The diplomat said the problem with the russians is they dont think the way we think they should think. And that really goes to the heart of it. To your question. Putin, in my view, ultimately, unfortunately, is not interested in mutually beneficial solutions. He is a classic zero sum guy who would rather have kind of lose lose than win win. And in addition to that, he really sees the world, he sees geopolitics, he sees International Alliances through a kind of kgb prism. And even though the soviet union is gone and communism is gone, his thinking almost genetically is very kgb, and in this kind of world view, which is paranoid, conspiratorial, sees russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by nato and other hostile enemies, the United States is the main adversary in russia, and the uk is kind of a lesser main adversary, and i think what putin has done with some success in recent years is to ta