Transcripts For CSPAN3 1916 Election Foreign Policy 2024071

Globalization and my work that most pertains to our panel today is a book called promise and peril america at the dawn of a global age. Just out in paperback. You can buy it downstairs. I have the distinct pleasure of being the chair and coorganizer of this really exciting panel i think and i hope youll agree once were done. Its a fascinating topic with tremendous contemporary relevance as well as historygraphical significance. U. S. Foreign relations before and after that kept us out of war election. This is really not just about u. S. Foreign relations but also world relations, international relations. Now, the spark for this panel is the centennial of the 1916 election in which Woodrow Wilson ran on a he kept us out of war platform despite the military interventions ongoing in mexico and the caribbean. Marking the centennial of this election this round table brings together superb historians with a wide array of focuses to address whether or not 1916 should be seen as the end of an era or the beginning of an era or in short was 1916 a turning point . Many of us will have firm stances on this. Some of us will probably equivocate a little bit. At the outset, i wanted to give special thanks to university of illinois Urbana Champaign historian kristen hoganson who helped to organize this. She helped come up with the idea, coorganized with me, even though she couldnt participate on the panel at all. So thanks to kristen hoganson. Id also like to thank the American Historical Association and the panel cosponsors. The society for historians of the guilded age and progressive era and the society for historians of American Foreign relations. Our aim today in this panel is to consider and to reconsider how recent transnational, international, imperial, political and world historical scholarship has affected our assessments of u. S. Foreign relations in the years leading up to and following 1916. Although a fundamental issue of our panel is periodization the panel will also share their insights on recent trends and future opportunities in u. S. History, in World History, and in Foreign Relations scholarship pertaining to the guilded age and progressive era and Foreign Relations. Each of us will make some fairly brief remarks i hope, five to eight minutes. Ill keep us on the clock. And these are designed to be thought provoking rather than comprehensive. Well touch on a variety of themes here including humanitarian relief, on the environment, human mobility, great power politics, military interventions, interim pimm imperial, rivals, anticolonial struggles for sovereignty and the animated and central concerns as such heated terms as isolationism and internationalism. In addition to offering a variety of thematic expertises, panelists contribute a range of geographic perspectives and i think this is what maybe makes our panel unique. It stretches us to think more about areas outside the United States. To think about europe, to think about mexico, haiti, the caribbean, east asia, and beyond. And were hopeful of generating a dynamic discussion not just across the panel but also with you all and in that vein, i wanted to say at the outset that wed like you to queue up at the mics when it comes time for q a. Now right as we begin, its incumbent on me to talk about the election itself in 1916 and then we can dispense with that and move on to maybe some of the most fascinating details we have coming. So having served one term with europe and the world embroiled in the great war, alongside significant u. S. Disillusionment with progressive reform, Woodrow Wilsons path to reelection in 1916 was far from certain. Ultimately, he became the first democratic president since Andrew Jackson in 1832 to be elected to two consecutive terms in office. When he defeated Supreme Court justice republican Charles Evans hughes in the 1916 president ial election. Foreign policy figured prominently in the Election Campaign and while its true that ultimately entry into the war in april 1917 produced a form of party truce in the interest of national unity, this did not shield the Woodrow Wilson administration from fierce congressional criticism, culminating in a breakdown of that truce with the Senate Rejection of the league of nations. Of course the election took place while world war i was being fought in europe and while mexico was going through the mexican revolution and well hear more about that soon and with u. S. Troops on the ground in roughly a dozen locations throughout the world. Republican candidate hughes primarily and harshly criticized wilson not so much for his hemispheric stance as for not taking, quote, necessary preparations to face the conflict in europe. Given this, and given hughess lack of attention to the socalled mexican problem, most scholars argue that wilsons image as an antiwar candidate was reinforced by this campaign and not just by his facile slogan, he kept us out of war. Diplomatically, u. S. Public sentiment leaned toward the british and french, the allied powers. But the country remained neutral, at least formally, toward the conflict in europe. And well hear more about the ways in which that formal neutrality was actually undermined by actual trade and loan practices and other policies. The democrats reelection slogan, this famous he kept us out of war, painted wilson as a peacemaker and highlighted such recent efforts in 1916 as a january initiative to bring together all the powers of europe for a mediation conference. However, during the course of 1915 and 1916, leading up to this perhaps turning point, germanys aggressive wartime naval tactics brought the u. S. Ever closer to entering the conflict. For instance, in april 1916, wilson defended neutral rights as he had after the sinking of the lusitania in 1915 and threatened to sever diplomatic ties with germany. Following the sinking of the passenger ferry sussex by a uboat in the english channel. The attack marked the beginning of a new uboat campaign or one that had been planned. But the bluster by the Wilson Administration led to the germans backing down this uboat campaign. So there was a divide in the response in the american electorate. Prowilson americans saw this as a triumph of u. S. Assertive neutral rights diplomacy while critics perceived this as what today we might term leading from behind, or diplomacy from behind. Now, the war in terms of the war in 1916, there were a number of major events and we dont have enough time to go through them all. There was a major battle, series of battles, jutland, which wound up being a truce that resulted in the british blockade continuing. There were many monthslong battles in the somme and at v d verdun which resulted in a million total casualties. So 1916 can be seen as at least a watershed in terms of the fighting of the war itself. Politically in 1916 wilson had the advantage of incumbency but feared the potential of a reunited Republican Party. Now much had happened of course in the four years since the last election when wilson faced off against William Howard taft of the republicans, Teddy Roosevelt of the bull moose progressive party, and socialist eugene debs. In the intervening years, wilson has emerged as an even more powerful champion of the Progressive Agenda on the domestic scene and as a strong spokesman for american neutrality in the devastating war that was being that was raging across western europe. But as historian Lloyd Ambrosius has shown, wilson recognized as Many Democrats in fact had not in the west and in the south that the u. S. Could be drawn into the war at any moment by an act of some obscure german sub commander. Therefore, while wilson advocated continued neutrality, he also called for military preparedness and the apparent tensions between those two policies troubled Many Democrats, particularly irishamericans and germanamericans. Leading to some intense political vulnerability for wilson in the election cycle. At the Democratic Convention in st. Louis in summer 1916, wilson won on the first ballot. As did his running mate, Vice President Thomas Marshall of indiana. The platform called for the following military preparedness, a World Association of nations to maintain peace after the war in europe had ended, panamerican unity, a ban on child labor, womens suffrage, though wilson hadnt yet endorsed that, and prison reform. During the convention, the delegates cheered most vigorously for the now Famous Campaign slogan he kept us out of war, which world conditions really made far more of a hope than a promise. As wilsons private notes make clear, he understood this all too well. He made the core of his campaign, therefore, three ps. Peace, preparedness, and progressivism. And he sort of added a fourth p, which was prosperity. And this is important to think of in terms of International Dynamics because it was allied stimulus via war orders and loans that led to a shift back from a recession that had begun to occur early in the war, particularly for southern agrarians. On the republican side Teddy Roosevelt believed the war would bring him back into the white house. As many of you no doubt know, he championed intervention, he accused wilson of cowardice for his mediation efforts. But the outspoken roosevelt failed to really understand the depth of the divide he had generated in the party one election cycle before. So the republicans nominated Charles Evans hughes, a really fascinating character. We may get into him a little bit more. And who roosevelt famously termed a bearded iceberg. But hughes won the nomination on the third ballot and former Vice President under Teddy Roosevelt, charles fairbanks, also of indiana, importance of swing states here were not getting too deeply into the politics but indiana, ohio, states like that were really important in this election. Became the republican Vice President ial nominee. All right, so wrapping up the course of this. Perceptive observers were confident that hughes would win in november. Even wilson seems to have had doubts about his path to reelection. According to historian john milton cooper, ever the fighter, he relished the struggle but was not necessarily optimistic about the outcome. As scholars tend to note, the Republican Party stood united behind a single candidate and the democrats had won only three president ial elections since 1860. Voters seemed apathetic, maybe even weary of progressive reforms, and the key accomplishments of the Democratic Administration over the last four years seemed scant, at least at the time. Hughess Foreign Policy, moreover, emphasized a straightforward preparedness program, which seemed far less muddled than wilsons simultaneous calls for neutrality and preparedness in the same breath. Critics charge wilson with wanting the nation both in the war and aloof from it. A utopian stance that we still hear from many historians and political scientists today. This seemed remarkably unrealistic, at least to his critics in 1916. Famously hughes and his staff went to sleep on november 6th, certain that they would win the election. It was not clear until at least two days later when the returns from california and ohio came in, that wilson was the likely winner and it took another two weeks for hughes to actually concede. So what happened . In short, wilson won, he secured 30 states to hughess 18, he won 49. 4 of the popular vote. Though his share of the Electoral College vote in 1916 was much smaller than in 1912, his share of the popular vote was over 7 higher. More to the point, wilson loomed so large over his party that he could take credit for the narrow Democratic Victory in congress, and as historian John Thompson has observed aptly, not the least part of wilsons accomplishment in 1916 had been the widespread approval he gained as a mandate coming out of the election for his shaping of americas response to the cataclysmic war that had engulfed europe 2 1 2 years earlier. Now, the degree to which this electoral and Public Opinion achievement therefore marked a turning point for wilson is something i hope well talk about but the degree to which this heralded a change or a real sea change in American Foreign relations and world relations is our main topic for today. So having dispensed with what happened in the election and some of the causes and consequences, well now get into the core animating concepts and debates about what the consequences and stakes were. So, ill first introduce our initial speaker. Im very pleased to introduce professor julia irwin, an associate professor of history at the university of south florida. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarianism in 20th century u. S. Foreign relations. Shes the author of a great book, making the world safe the American Red Cross and a nations humanitarian awakening. Shes now working on a booklength study entitled catastrophic diplomacy a history of u. S. Responses to Global Natural disaster. Please help me in welcoming professor julia irwin. [ applause ] thank you very much for the introduction and for giving an introduction to the whole round table. And i promise i will keep within my five to eight minutes as allotted. So my research is, as chris mentioned, focuses on the role of u. S. Humanitarian aid in u. S. Foreign affairs, so thinking about both war relief and Disaster Relief and the role that they have played in u. S. Foreign relations. Both International War and disaster assistance, as i show in my work, have long been important elements of u. S. Diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural relations with the world. Both before world war i, before 1916, and indeed well after. So from my perspective as a historian of u. S. Foreign aid, should 1916 be seen as the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the wider world as a turning point in u. S. Foreign relations . My short answer to this question is the everunsatisfying yet oh so typical historians answer, yes and no at the same time. I promise ill come back at the end with a little more specific. But seen through the lens of u. S. International humanitarianism, 1916 does mark the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the world in certain respects. But at the same time, i think we can identify many more points of continuity in u. S. Humanitarian efforts, trends which really link the decades prior to 1916 with those that followed. So in my brief remarks today id like to touch on both of these points. Both these points of continuity and change. Lets begin with the former, points of continuity. Why should 1916 not represent a turning point in u. S. International humanitarianism tu more so during the first 15 years of the 20th century. During these decades, the United States provided millions of dollars in cash, material supplies, and other forms of assistance to foreign victims of war and natural catastrophes in many parts of the world. Much of this work was carried out by the private sector, by missionaries, by charities, by american corporations, by American Financial houses, and by private citizens. Often, though, with the support, active support and assistance of the federal government. Significantly, though, the u. S. Government itself was also starting to play a greater direct role in humanitarian assistance in these years, providing increasing levels of state Department Support and involvement, congressional funding, and military assistance for humanitarian crises. One of the most memorable examples of this comes in late 1908, early 1909, when theres a major tsunami in southern italy, the u. S. Congress allocates 800,000 in Disaster Relief to this event, which is a pretty substantial amount for this time. This humanitarian assistance, i argue, serves key strategic, diplomatic, and moral objectives of the United States as it was expanding its role on the global stage. This is something we cant get into in these five to eight minutes but if you read my book, im sure youll learn more. Building on these foundations, though, the years 1914 to 1916 would see further developments in u. S. Foreign aid. During this era of u. S. Neutrality in world war i, americans provided significant levels of food, medical assistance, and other forms of relief to european soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict. Many americans, moreover, delivered humanitarian aid on the ground in europe. Herbert hoover and the commission for relief in belgium are of course the most famous but not the only providers of u. S. Assistance in these years. Wilson, in other words, may have campaigned on the he kept us out of war slogan in 1916 but the United States was hardly uninvolved or out of the war or for that matter outside of the world when we take its global humanitarian activities into account. Through the channels of humanitarian assistance, the u. S. Government and its citizens had been deeply involved in Woodrow Wilson<\/a> ran on a he kept us out of war platform despite the military interventions ongoing in mexico and the caribbean. Marking the centennial of this election this round table brings together superb historians with a wide array of focuses to address whether or not 1916 should be seen as the end of an era or the beginning of an era or in short was 1916 a turning point . Many of us will have firm stances on this. Some of us will probably equivocate a little bit. At the outset, i wanted to give special thanks to university of illinois Urbana Champaign<\/a> historian kristen hoganson who helped to organize this. She helped come up with the idea, coorganized with me, even though she couldnt participate on the panel at all. So thanks to kristen hoganson. Id also like to thank the American Historical Association<\/a> and the panel cosponsors. The society for historians of the guilded age and progressive era and the society for historians of American Foreign<\/a> relations. Our aim today in this panel is to consider and to reconsider how recent transnational, international, imperial, political and world historical scholarship has affected our assessments of u. S. Foreign relations in the years leading up to and following 1916. Although a fundamental issue of our panel is periodization the panel will also share their insights on recent trends and future opportunities in u. S. History, in World History<\/a>, and in Foreign Relations<\/a> scholarship pertaining to the guilded age and progressive era and Foreign Relations<\/a>. Each of us will make some fairly brief remarks i hope, five to eight minutes. Ill keep us on the clock. And these are designed to be thought provoking rather than comprehensive. Well touch on a variety of themes here including humanitarian relief, on the environment, human mobility, great power politics, military interventions, interim pimm imperial, rivals, anticolonial struggles for sovereignty and the animated and central concerns as such heated terms as isolationism and internationalism. In addition to offering a variety of thematic expertises, panelists contribute a range of geographic perspectives and i think this is what maybe makes our panel unique. It stretches us to think more about areas outside the United States<\/a>. To think about europe, to think about mexico, haiti, the caribbean, east asia, and beyond. And were hopeful of generating a dynamic discussion not just across the panel but also with you all and in that vein, i wanted to say at the outset that wed like you to queue up at the mics when it comes time for q a. Now right as we begin, its incumbent on me to talk about the election itself in 1916 and then we can dispense with that and move on to maybe some of the most fascinating details we have coming. So having served one term with europe and the world embroiled in the great war, alongside significant u. S. Disillusionment with progressive reform, Woodrow Wilson<\/a>s path to reelection in 1916 was far from certain. Ultimately, he became the first democratic president since Andrew Jackson<\/a> in 1832 to be elected to two consecutive terms in office. When he defeated Supreme Court<\/a> justice republican Charles Evans<\/a> hughes in the 1916 president ial election. Foreign policy figured prominently in the Election Campaign<\/a> and while its true that ultimately entry into the war in april 1917 produced a form of party truce in the interest of national unity, this did not shield the Woodrow Wilson<\/a> administration from fierce congressional criticism, culminating in a breakdown of that truce with the Senate Rejection<\/a> of the league of nations. Of course the election took place while world war i was being fought in europe and while mexico was going through the mexican revolution and well hear more about that soon and with u. S. Troops on the ground in roughly a dozen locations throughout the world. Republican candidate hughes primarily and harshly criticized wilson not so much for his hemispheric stance as for not taking, quote, necessary preparations to face the conflict in europe. Given this, and given hughess lack of attention to the socalled mexican problem, most scholars argue that wilsons image as an antiwar candidate was reinforced by this campaign and not just by his facile slogan, he kept us out of war. Diplomatically, u. S. Public sentiment leaned toward the british and french, the allied powers. But the country remained neutral, at least formally, toward the conflict in europe. And well hear more about the ways in which that formal neutrality was actually undermined by actual trade and loan practices and other policies. The democrats reelection slogan, this famous he kept us out of war, painted wilson as a peacemaker and highlighted such recent efforts in 1916 as a january initiative to bring together all the powers of europe for a mediation conference. However, during the course of 1915 and 1916, leading up to this perhaps turning point, germanys aggressive wartime naval tactics brought the u. S. Ever closer to entering the conflict. For instance, in april 1916, wilson defended neutral rights as he had after the sinking of the lusitania in 1915 and threatened to sever diplomatic ties with germany. Following the sinking of the passenger ferry sussex by a uboat in the english channel. The attack marked the beginning of a new uboat campaign or one that had been planned. But the bluster by the Wilson Administration<\/a> led to the germans backing down this uboat campaign. So there was a divide in the response in the american electorate. Prowilson americans saw this as a triumph of u. S. Assertive neutral rights diplomacy while critics perceived this as what today we might term leading from behind, or diplomacy from behind. Now, the war in terms of the war in 1916, there were a number of major events and we dont have enough time to go through them all. There was a major battle, series of battles, jutland, which wound up being a truce that resulted in the british blockade continuing. There were many monthslong battles in the somme and at v d verdun which resulted in a million total casualties. So 1916 can be seen as at least a watershed in terms of the fighting of the war itself. Politically in 1916 wilson had the advantage of incumbency but feared the potential of a reunited Republican Party<\/a>. Now much had happened of course in the four years since the last election when wilson faced off against William Howard<\/a> taft of the republicans, Teddy Roosevelt<\/a> of the bull moose progressive party, and socialist eugene debs. In the intervening years, wilson has emerged as an even more powerful champion of the Progressive Agenda<\/a> on the domestic scene and as a strong spokesman for american neutrality in the devastating war that was being that was raging across western europe. But as historian Lloyd Ambrosius<\/a> has shown, wilson recognized as Many Democrats<\/a> in fact had not in the west and in the south that the u. S. Could be drawn into the war at any moment by an act of some obscure german sub commander. Therefore, while wilson advocated continued neutrality, he also called for military preparedness and the apparent tensions between those two policies troubled Many Democrats<\/a>, particularly irishamericans and germanamericans. Leading to some intense political vulnerability for wilson in the election cycle. At the Democratic Convention<\/a> in st. Louis in summer 1916, wilson won on the first ballot. As did his running mate, Vice President<\/a> Thomas Marshall<\/a> of indiana. The platform called for the following military preparedness, a World Association<\/a> of nations to maintain peace after the war in europe had ended, panamerican unity, a ban on child labor, womens suffrage, though wilson hadnt yet endorsed that, and prison reform. During the convention, the delegates cheered most vigorously for the now Famous Campaign<\/a> slogan he kept us out of war, which world conditions really made far more of a hope than a promise. As wilsons private notes make clear, he understood this all too well. He made the core of his campaign, therefore, three ps. Peace, preparedness, and progressivism. And he sort of added a fourth p, which was prosperity. And this is important to think of in terms of International Dynamics<\/a> because it was allied stimulus via war orders and loans that led to a shift back from a recession that had begun to occur early in the war, particularly for southern agrarians. On the republican side Teddy Roosevelt<\/a> believed the war would bring him back into the white house. As many of you no doubt know, he championed intervention, he accused wilson of cowardice for his mediation efforts. But the outspoken roosevelt failed to really understand the depth of the divide he had generated in the party one election cycle before. So the republicans nominated Charles Evans<\/a> hughes, a really fascinating character. We may get into him a little bit more. And who roosevelt famously termed a bearded iceberg. But hughes won the nomination on the third ballot and former Vice President<\/a> under Teddy Roosevelt<\/a>, charles fairbanks, also of indiana, importance of swing states here were not getting too deeply into the politics but indiana, ohio, states like that were really important in this election. Became the republican Vice President<\/a> ial nominee. All right, so wrapping up the course of this. Perceptive observers were confident that hughes would win in november. Even wilson seems to have had doubts about his path to reelection. According to historian john milton cooper, ever the fighter, he relished the struggle but was not necessarily optimistic about the outcome. As scholars tend to note, the Republican Party<\/a> stood united behind a single candidate and the democrats had won only three president ial elections since 1860. Voters seemed apathetic, maybe even weary of progressive reforms, and the key accomplishments of the Democratic Administration<\/a> over the last four years seemed scant, at least at the time. Hughess Foreign Policy<\/a>, moreover, emphasized a straightforward preparedness program, which seemed far less muddled than wilsons simultaneous calls for neutrality and preparedness in the same breath. Critics charge wilson with wanting the nation both in the war and aloof from it. A utopian stance that we still hear from many historians and political scientists today. This seemed remarkably unrealistic, at least to his critics in 1916. Famously hughes and his staff went to sleep on november 6th, certain that they would win the election. It was not clear until at least two days later when the returns from california and ohio came in, that wilson was the likely winner and it took another two weeks for hughes to actually concede. So what happened . In short, wilson won, he secured 30 states to hughess 18, he won 49. 4 of the popular vote. Though his share of the Electoral College<\/a> vote in 1916 was much smaller than in 1912, his share of the popular vote was over 7 higher. More to the point, wilson loomed so large over his party that he could take credit for the narrow Democratic Victory<\/a> in congress, and as historian John Thompson<\/a> has observed aptly, not the least part of wilsons accomplishment in 1916 had been the widespread approval he gained as a mandate coming out of the election for his shaping of americas response to the cataclysmic war that had engulfed europe 2 1 2 years earlier. Now, the degree to which this electoral and Public Opinion<\/a> achievement therefore marked a turning point for wilson is something i hope well talk about but the degree to which this heralded a change or a real sea change in American Foreign<\/a> relations and world relations is our main topic for today. So having dispensed with what happened in the election and some of the causes and consequences, well now get into the core animating concepts and debates about what the consequences and stakes were. So, ill first introduce our initial speaker. Im very pleased to introduce professor julia irwin, an associate professor of history at the university of south florida. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarianism in 20th century u. S. Foreign relations. Shes the author of a great book, making the world safe the American Red Cross<\/a> and a nations humanitarian awakening. Shes now working on a booklength study entitled catastrophic diplomacy a history of u. S. Responses to Global Natural<\/a> disaster. Please help me in welcoming professor julia irwin. [ applause ] thank you very much for the introduction and for giving an introduction to the whole round table. And i promise i will keep within my five to eight minutes as allotted. So my research is, as chris mentioned, focuses on the role of u. S. Humanitarian aid in u. S. Foreign affairs, so thinking about both war relief and Disaster Relief<\/a> and the role that they have played in u. S. Foreign relations. Both International War<\/a> and disaster assistance, as i show in my work, have long been important elements of u. S. Diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural relations with the world. Both before world war i, before 1916, and indeed well after. So from my perspective as a historian of u. S. Foreign aid, should 1916 be seen as the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the wider world as a turning point in u. S. Foreign relations . My short answer to this question is the everunsatisfying yet oh so typical historians answer, yes and no at the same time. I promise ill come back at the end with a little more specific. But seen through the lens of u. S. International humanitarianism, 1916 does mark the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the world in certain respects. But at the same time, i think we can identify many more points of continuity in u. S. Humanitarian efforts, trends which really link the decades prior to 1916 with those that followed. So in my brief remarks today id like to touch on both of these points. Both these points of continuity and change. Lets begin with the former, points of continuity. Why should 1916 not represent a turning point in u. S. International humanitarianism tu more so during the first 15 years of the 20th century. During these decades, the United States<\/a> provided millions of dollars in cash, material supplies, and other forms of assistance to foreign victims of war and natural catastrophes in many parts of the world. Much of this work was carried out by the private sector, by missionaries, by charities, by american corporations, by American Financial<\/a> houses, and by private citizens. Often, though, with the support, active support and assistance of the federal government. Significantly, though, the u. S. Government itself was also starting to play a greater direct role in humanitarian assistance in these years, providing increasing levels of state Department Support<\/a> and involvement, congressional funding, and military assistance for humanitarian crises. One of the most memorable examples of this comes in late 1908, early 1909, when theres a major tsunami in southern italy, the u. S. Congress allocates 800,000 in Disaster Relief<\/a> to this event, which is a pretty substantial amount for this time. This humanitarian assistance, i argue, serves key strategic, diplomatic, and moral objectives of the United States<\/a> as it was expanding its role on the global stage. This is something we cant get into in these five to eight minutes but if you read my book, im sure youll learn more. Building on these foundations, though, the years 1914 to 1916 would see further developments in u. S. Foreign aid. During this era of u. S. Neutrality in world war i, americans provided significant levels of food, medical assistance, and other forms of relief to european soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict. Many americans, moreover, delivered humanitarian aid on the ground in europe. Herbert hoover and the commission for relief in belgium are of course the most famous but not the only providers of u. S. Assistance in these years. Wilson, in other words, may have campaigned on the he kept us out of war slogan in 1916 but the United States<\/a> was hardly uninvolved or out of the war or for that matter outside of the world when we take its global humanitarian activities into account. Through the channels of humanitarian assistance, the u. S. Government and its citizens had been deeply involved in World Affairs<\/a> for decades prior to 1916. But heres the but, right . The nonetheless. Nonetheless, the election of 1916 and u. S. The subsequent u. S. Entry into the war, and i think this is really the more important turning point here, can be seen as a turning point in u. S. Humanitarian aid in at least two respects and first was the nations really incredible willingness to mobilize for humanitarian assistance after 1916. Statistics on the American Red Cross<\/a>, which was the nations preeminent wartime aid agency, make this trend starkly visible. Counting just 286,000 members in 1916, the American Red Cross<\/a> would see its numbers explode to 22 million adults and 11 million children by 1918. Thats about a third of the u. S. Population at the time. During these same years in 1917 and 18, u. S. Citizens would give 400 million to the American Red Cross<\/a> to fund its relief operations. Again, 400 million is not pocket change. In 1917 and 18. U. S. Entry into the war as these statistics suggest really generated an unprecedented level of support for u. S. Humanitarian aid. At rates really never seen before in the nations past. A second clear shift was the u. S. Governments increasingly formal involvement in u. S. Foreign aid after 1916. And this is a trend that would intensify even more so as the 20th century progressed. During 1917 to 1918, admittedly, the u. S. Did not create its own state agency for humanitarian aid. However, the Wilson Administration<\/a> and the u. S. Armed forces did provide enormous amounts of support, logistical assistance, and subsidies to the American Red Cross<\/a> and to other american voluntary organizations to help support their operations. Through the wartime u. S. Food administration, moreover, the u. S. Government would declare bold new powers to conserve and produce food for the wartime cause, including most notably for foreign relief. And finally, after the armistice in 1919, the u. S. Government would formalize its role in International Humanitarian<\/a> aid further still when congress established and funded the American Relief<\/a> administration, the u. S. Governments First Official<\/a> overseas humanitarian agency. After 1916, then, the government was playing a much more formal role in foreign aid than it ever had in the past. And foreign aid was transformed, really, for the first time into an official instrument of u. S. Foreign policy, something that it would increasingly become in the century that followed. So in conclusion, seen through the lens of u. S. Humanitarian aid, i suppose i would argue that 1916 was less of a turning point and more accurately, i think, a new chapter in the history of u. S. Foreign assistance. A moment in which trends that had really emerged in the late 19th and 20th centuries began to coalesce, solidify, and intensify, and i think thats how i would leave it. So i look forward to discussing all of these issues in greater depth and to hearing from the rest of you. [ applause ] all right. So next up is professor rebecca mckenna. Professor mckenna is assistant professor at the university of notre dame. Her book manuscript, which sounds really exciting, i cant wait to read it is american imperial pastoral United States<\/a> designs on the philippines. And its under contract with the university of chicago press. Its a project that examines u. S. Colonial hill stations in the philippines designed by Daniel Burnham<\/a> as a way to explore the literal and more figurative architecture of the u. S. s new empire. So please help me welcome rebecca mckenna. [ applause ] so thanks to chris and to kristen hoganson for organizing this round table, which im very independence in the years ahead and this was a position that was contrary to the view of many ordinary filipinos so we find something new in the relationship americans were forging with filipinos in 1916 or newish. Because its important to notes that despite wilsons stated desire to rid the americans of their philippine frontier and most filipinos eagerness for independence, filipinos did not gain a clear timeline for independence in 1916 or for that matter under wilsons tenure. One would not come until the 1930s. The jones act was in fact a far less radical bill than versions proposed in 1912 and supported by filipinos. One had actually called for independence within two years. And i think the law speaks in these ways to wilsons gradualist approach to the philippines. He had rejected those more radical versions. The approach that americans ultimately took arguably was premised on longstanding assumptions about racial difference and civilizational hierarchies as indicators of fitness for selfgovernment that still had traction as a Republican Opposition<\/a> to independence reminds us. These assumptions were conveyed in the laws preamble, which implied that filipinos were still unprepared for selfgovernment, still needed american tutoring. Filipino resident commissioner manuel quezon, who drafted the first and later versions of the bill, addressed these characterizations in 1914. He delivered a speech before the u. S. Congress, laboring to disabuse americans of their inaccurate and antiquated ideas of filipinos, a set of ideas that we might attribute in part to the campaigns of retentionists, those who wanted to promote the continued occupation u. S. Occupation of the philippines. Kezon emphasized that no matter the celebrated benefits of u. S. Rule, education, material improvement, material prosperity, he said these alone will not make the filipinos happy and contented under your rule, nor induce them to concede the necessity of that rule. Filipinos would not forget their rights as men and as a nation. So, the point is that this measure in not granting a timetable for independence ultimately tended to prolong the u. S. Occupation as paul kramer has argued even as it accorded a greater measure of political autonomy to filipinos so in practice what came to pass with a democrat in the white house wasnt altogether different from the policy under republicans since the turn of the century even if the democrats had introduced this language of stable government as a requirement of a forthcoming independent status. And in this respect, i think we might say that 1916 was no turning point when assessed by the effect of the jones act or by the logic of continuing to deny independence based on assumptions of filipinos limited fitness for selfgovernment. Thanks. [ applause ] all right. So hopefully youre all keeping a tally. Maybe, no. Not quite that simplistic, but well keep moving forward. So next up, we have professor nancy mitchell. Shes professor of history at North Carolina<\/a> state university. Her book, the danger of dreams german and american imperialism in latin america 1895 to 1914 examined the u. S. Perception of a german threat to latin america, which obviously loomed large in this moment, 1916. As she contributed a chapter to the u. S. And europe 1914, along sirm lines. And her most recent book is jimmy carter in africa, race and the cold war, which will be published by Stanford University<\/a> press this spring. So please help me in welcoming nancy mitchell. [ applause ] thank you very much. Thank you and kristen for organizing this panel. I just have two brief comments to make. And the first, ill begin with a comment, which is imagine yourself trying to convince a haitian or a dominican or a nicaraguan that 1916 was a turning point. I think that would be a very difficult thing to do. I have no ambiguity in my answer to the panel question, which is, absolutely, in terms of the caribbean and Central America<\/a>, 1916 was not in the least a turning point. It wasnt, as julia irwin says in her paper, it wasnt even a new chapter. It was pure continuity from the 1890s, particularly from the spanishamerican war right on through i think you really could make a strong argument, right on through with total continuity to the present day. With a few little blips along the way, possibly, with sandino and castro. If there were to be a break, a turning point, i think we might have expected it in 1913 when wilson came into office. And the fact that there wasnt any turning point in 1913, i think, explains why there wasnt a turning point in 1916. Wilson and particularly William Jennings<\/a> bryant, who became his first secretary of state, campaigned rhetorically in a way that might have led some very optimistic or naive latins to have expected a change. And yet, when wilson comes into office in 1913, he absolutely continues tafts dollar diplomacy, in fact only intensifying it. Intensifying it both in terms of economic and military penetration of what was called americas backyard. The reason i think is very simple. By 1913, the United States<\/a> had significant vested interests already in the region, and secondly, in a cost benefit analysis, the costs of applying and asserting and tightening american hegemony in the caribbean and Central America<\/a> were negligible compared to the benefits. The benefits werent great, but the costs were so low, both in terms of military well, in terms of military expenses for the United States<\/a>, blood and treasure, economic expenses, but also in terms of Public Opinion<\/a>. Public opinion in the United States<\/a>, in the United States<\/a> congress, in the United States<\/a> press, and also in europe by 1913 and certainly by 1916, europe had ceded any rejection of american hegemony in this at least north of the amazon. The war in europe expanded the opportunity for the United States<\/a> to tighten its hegemony, and also made the United States<\/a> even more the u. S. Government even more eager to assert to establish stability in the region. When there was so much turmoil in europe, it became even more desirable to try to impose state what americans considered stable governments in the countries of Central America<\/a> and the caribbean. When the election of 1916 occurred, and wilson said that he wanted to keep the united he wanted to keep the United States<\/a> out of war of course the words u. S. Troops and haiti in the Dominican Republic<\/a>. And in nicaragua. He didnt need the United States<\/a> to intervene and every country. In the caribbean, and Central America<\/a>. And away its a little bit like lynching. You dont need to lynch everybody. You lynch some people, and that is the lesson that people learn. It is very possible to intimidate. In 1918 1919 intensifying american control over the region, wilson despite his rhetoric that he was saying at that moment in versailles, crushed revolts in the Dominican Republic<\/a> and in haiti, mercilessly. So i would say awe salute lee no turning point if you look at it from the Vantage Point<\/a> of the caribbean, and Central America<\/a>. The second point that i want to make, this matters. It isnt just oh well haiti, Dominican Republic<\/a>, lets look at france, like look at england what do they say. I would make the strong argument that it is where the United States<\/a> had latitude, where the u. S. Government could do what it wanted where the United States<\/a> government didnt operate under strong constraints. You really get a sense of that government and you get a sense of Woodrow Wilson<\/a>. If historians had reprioritized and looked more at his policies in the caribbean and in Central America<\/a> it wouldnt be a surprise as it seems to have been to some readers of the New York Times<\/a> recently. That wilson was a racist. Its in this region, that these very important aspects of will sonyism could become very clear. [applause] excellent, next we turn to professor Benjamin Montoya<\/a> for his insights he recently earned his ph. D. From the university of colorado, bolder. This dissertation risking a measurable harm, the diplomacy of immigration restriction and u. S. Mexican relations. Considers american efforts to place a quota affected paul his coeditor beyond 1917 American Legacies<\/a> of the great war forthcoming from Oxford University<\/a> press. He recently began teaching for the History Department<\/a> and the International Affairs<\/a> department at colorado, bolder. Please welcome professor montoya. [applause] good afternoon i think my comments will tally a yes vote in a few minutes here. Columbus new mexico in march of 1916 would mark a permanent shift and u. S. Mexican relations. After that year, the United States<\/a> would never again directly or interact we try to steer the course of mexicos revolutionary politics. After its beginning in 1910, the United States<\/a> was keenly interested in what was going on in mexico and tried to put a lot of effort into basically shaping the direction of that revolution, largely through regime change, largely through the denial of arms and so on. I will give a few examples. In late 1912, wilson the u. S. Ambassador to mexico under taft, he played a key role in orchestrating the demise of the president he was viewed as an effectual at protecting u. S. Interests in mexico, whether business or property. The following Woodrow Wilson<\/a> denied arms to the regime in mexico city by occupying by authorizing the occupation of veracruz. This action was pretty much done to aid to a few that following year 1915, Woodrow Wilson<\/a> would commit a similar act, this time aimed at punch ovia. He would deny the importation of arms and sale of arms. This was a way to help the government which the u. S. Had recently given the a recognition in 1915. By 1916 by the year the columbus raid the punitive expedition that would follow this raid. Wilson and the u. S. Government had diplomatic repertoire, this idea of using intervention to steer the course of the mexican revolution. Whats different about 1916 is that, columbus expedition it brought risks and dangers for the u. S. Government that they did not anticipate, probably didnt face and other parts of Central America<\/a>. Probably makes it speaks to the distinct nature of u. S. Mexican relations. Im not sure. Maybe speaks to the mexican revolution. In short, what happens a 1916 is that wilson almost goes to war with mexico. Despite his effort to avoid war, the punitive expedition is a way to find a balance between public animosity, or public anger, about the columbus raid in the United States<\/a>. At the same time he is trying to apprehend and ate the carranza government. The paradox, only one of those goals is accomplished. Its hard to describe the expedition, long short of it is, for the better part of a year six to 12,000 u. S. Troops basically in the Northern State<\/a> of chihuahua and mexico, they werent able to find him. They fought ice faced hostile locals, terrain, especially from the carranza government in mexico city. Throughout that year, carranza well get repeated warnings to the u. S. Government, the longer the u. S. Troops are in this country, the more likely war will occur. These are not empty warnings. There are several skirmishes between mexican troops and u. S. Troops. When i say mexican, i mean carranza forces not poncho via forces. By june 1965 probably during these events that were talking about already, war is almost brought between the two countries. Tensions are diffused, prisoner exchange, by the end of the year both countries negotiate a withdrawal of u. S. Troops. Final contingents leaves and early february 1917. There are consequences to this turning point, while after 1916 we never again will see in mexico, this wont be the case for the rest of the region. In mexico, we will never see such a direct kind of pointed efforts to steer politics in that revolution. There are consequences, a lot of them are negative, most of them affect mexico. First one, consequences have to do with the fact that the mexican the qurans a government is destabilize. His effort to bring peace and order back to mexico is seriously hampered by the ten month presence of u. S. Troops in northern mexico. A lot of the legitimacy he tries to build when entering power in made 1915, to this point, is discredited. The popularity that he is trying to gain is usually, in most cases, it is lost to poncho via. This is another consequence of the punitive expedition, by the end of 1915, poncho via much Fame Division<\/a> of the north has lost a key series of battles and has pretty much a shell of itself. Poncho via its forced to hide in the mountains of northern mexico. By 1960, at the end, a few weeks before the troops leave mexico. His movement is revitalize, not to the extent of power that it had in 1914 and 1915. For the rest of the decorate carranza will always have to consider poncho via movement in northern mexico. It really hampers his efforts to Bring National<\/a> piece to mexico. Finally, this probably many more consequences, but just the ones im highlighting. The punitive expedition poisons relations between carranza and wilson for the rest of the decade. Really kinds of makes u. S. Mexican relations tenuous, not only until 1920 when carranza these power and assassinated. Especially through 1920s as both countries discuss issues of foreign property and oil. I will end with the paradox, speaking to wilsons overall ideas of intervention and his idea of keeping the u. S. Out of war. While he can claim in november 1916, that he legitimately kept the u. S. Out of war with mexico. A lot of this decisionmaking on his part was because he increased the anticipated war with germany. After the summer of 1914, after the beginning of world war one, wilsons view of the conflict in mexico of the mexican revolution was views through the prism of world war i. This is why he was intervening so much, bringing law and order back to a country so close to the United States<\/a>. By the end of 1916, this decision to not involve itself in mexico any deeper than it already had. Was largely based in the belief, that i would argue, was because with more with germany seemed an avid double by 1916 and 1917. Thank you very much. [applause] so now last but not least, is professor Nicole Phillips<\/a> phelps. Hes an associate professor at the university of vermont. Shes the author of u. S. Have spurred relations from 1815 to the paris peace conference. Sovereignty transformed. Which is now on paper back, you can get it downstairs from Cambridge University<\/a> press. Her Current Research<\/a> sounds fascinating to me. Somewhat involved in this top. Is a project that explores the history of the u. S. Consular service in the long 19th century. Please help me in welcoming professor phelps. [applause] thanks very much and also mr. Hogan thing and work in organizing the panel, thanks for all of you to taking the time to be here this afternoon. Part of the reason the slogan he kept us out of war was so popular with so Many Americans<\/a> in 1916, was because it resonated with the long standing tradition of rhetoric about american isolation from the west of the world. That dates back to George Washington<\/a> 1796, farewell address and hardly a Foreign Policy<\/a> decision, treating negotiation or certainly an electoral speech. Went by without Many American<\/a> politicians referring to washington and stressing that not only should the United States<\/a> continue to be on involved in World Affairs<\/a>, it actually it had been an involved in World Affairs<\/a>. Certainly the debate over the league of nations brings that rhetoric to the floor prominently. The discussions continue on into the 19 forties. One of the things that this rhetoric of isolation did for americans in 1916. And has also done for many many historians, is to blind them, or make it more difficult to see the many ways and which americans and u. S. Governments were actively engaged in International Affairs<\/a>. And what i shorthand in the long 19th century. One of the ways for historians to more effectively see that american involvement in the world, is to shift their attention away from great men and political speeches, to look at the activities of private citizens in World Affairs<\/a>. Certainly professor irwins comments about humanitarian involvement, speak to the benefits of that kind of approach. Today, i would like to talk a little bit about actually official u. S. Involvement in the world. Specifically, thinking about the ways the u. S. Officials were involved in legal and normative structures, also the administrative structures that they set up to facilitate their involvement with the rest of the world. In terms of law, its important for us to think about all of the numerous treaties, most of which were bilateral, some are multilateral. In which the United States<\/a> government was the party, beginning with the 1783 treaty with sweden. A lot of these treaties, that kind of setup basic relations, they tend to recycle the same language. We might actually think about those bilateral treaties as perhaps, constructing more of a Multi Lateral<\/a> web. Theyre typically created as bilateral. What those treaties do they set up the rules and procedures for normal relations. Particularly, how individual people and goods across international borders, they set up opportunities for the u. S. Government to protect the lives of american citizens, and their property abroad. We should also keep in mind, they also introduce obligations for the u. S. Government in protecting the lives and property of foreigners in the United States<\/a>. The United States<\/a> was also signatory to treaties, both bilateral and by the end of the century multilateral. That detail the rights and obligations of neutrality, which is certainly something that the u. S. Government was passionately interested in. Shaping the contours of that. One of the things thats important and when thinking about these treaties, daytoday relations, or the rights and obligations of neutrals and war. The people who were most responsible for making sure that the United States<\/a> adhered to those treaties, make them function, were not secretaries of state or president s. Or even diplomats. That daily responsibility fell to consular officials, many more consular officials and there were diplomats. Theyre and many more places in the world. I think we should also think about councils as being the other side of the coin to the u. S. Customs service. Which even though the state department didnt have a lot of support in congress, had difficulty providing salaries for diplomats and councils. The United States<\/a> government spent a lot more money on maintaining a vigorous custom service, because of the importance of terrorists to the federal budget. We should keep in mind, all of the paperwork that you need to get through customs, whether invoices, bills of health, passports, in certain circumstances. Those are things that are issued by consulates abroad. We should think about those two institutions as complementing one another. Id also like to suggest that the United States<\/a> government was deeply involved in participating, also in shaping a variety of normative structures. In particular, the diplomatic culture of the 19th century we get the evolution of all sorts of, signals and language in that diplomatic culture. Things like, the recall of ambassadors, or ministers. Credential ceremonies, all sorts of things that arent officially codified, but are essential to the operations of international relations. This is something that is more of the realm of secretaries of state, president , and diplomats, rather than councils. Together, with these the treaty obligations and these normative structures, together they create a lot of everyday interaction between americans and u. S. Officials, and the officials in and private citizens of other countries. A lot of that normal interaction is things that americans, even president s, didnt actually see all that often. When they did see it, in the long 19th century, many of them criticized it as an american. As i mentioned before, there were difficulties and getting appropriations for the diplomatic consular service. They might even go so far as were drawn wilson did, which was to label all of that and more old diplomacy and blamed the outbreak of the war on those practices. Ultimately to get to this question of whether 1916 is a turning point for the election or also the well whether the election or u. S. Entry into the war as a belligerent in the spring of 1917, i would say when were thinking about these legal normative and administrative structures. Its not really a turning point. Thats too radical of a break for me. I think we might think about the war from august of 1914, through the end of u. S. Involvement in 1921, when it regular rises the regulations with governments of european countries. We might think of those four years, more of a prism that refracts those normative and legal structures. Theyre somewhat different during the war, and a little bit different after the war. On the whole, they persist. They keep the United States<\/a> just as involved in the world after world war i, as they had done for more than a century previous. Thank you. There was a lot there in all of those talks. Now is our opportunity to begin a bit of discussion, please queue up at the mic, and ask away. One other thing to note, i would love at the end to maybe problem a ties the concept of the turning point itself. Its a concern for all of us i would say. Please take it away. Excellent, wow what a fantastic round table, outstanding presentations im so excited. Id really love it if i guess its the most obvious question. In connection with the philippines perhaps. If any of you could help me reflect on im reading a lot about the mandates regime known. And u. S. Disinterested in the mandates regime, which is obviously a little bit later the 1916. Susan peterson is saying, the mandate regime is hard part of this old diplomacy. They are just more chess pieces to move around, its not really about advancing groups to a moment of self determination. Its just about making what she calls and brighter natives. One of the reasons that she says the u. S. , is not interested is because they are anticipating what ultimately becomes trustee ship. Which however paternalistic and awful it is in various ways, its so premised on this idea that eventually, at the end of the line, there is going to be independents and self determination. I wonder if you are seeing language, in your era about that kind of is it like a civilization checklist for when its okay to have selfdetermination . Which your remarks animated. Or is it really just about free trade and capitalism. If thats going to affect the transformations that are needed for this next step . A couple of things, one, the language of the jones act, and its preamble, does talk about this attempt the goal is to move the philippines to a point where it enjoys it stable government. For me, its something that is a rationalization for prolonged, potentially indefinite rule of some kind. I think that that is something that the democrats come up with, emmanuel casten uses in part to serve carrie fay be favor with them to pass some kind of law. Measure, that would say that independence is ultimately the goal. So theres that. As far as your question is, is free trade is that ultimately is that the ultimate goal . Can you [inaudible] im talking about civilization, and a short of checklist. A stable government for me as a euphemism in some ways for fitness for Self Government<\/a>. Which was the language used at the turn of the century. Nancy might also be able to speak to that. [inaudible] largely about race, before Woodrow Wilson<\/a> is an office, the americans under republican leadership, we are eager to see what they talked about the material improvement, and material prosperity in the philippines. At that point, that was supposed to be this sign of civilization. That way okay maybe now, filipinos are ready for independence. That had been a piece of the story, clearly embedded in that even that i think was not necessarily a goal material improvement was not a deep ruble that was another way of holding back independence and creating as you said a checklist. Once we have this, maybe you will be fit for Self Government<\/a>. I think that and the language of stability, stable government, were both i think kind of ways to continue retaining the philippines. Finding some way of rationalizing americans ideals with the fact that they still had an interest in the philippines. Hello first of all i would like to thank the presenters and the chair for their excellent thoughtprovoking comment so far. One thing i found with the exception of julias paper, missing from this topic, which is interesting considering its about an election. The role of the American Public<\/a>, and the American People<\/a> in your presentations. Since after all, Woodrow Wilson<\/a> slogan is trying to find a middle ground to appeal to the public who was war wary. But scared of war, but feels the war isnt evident will. The combination of the kept us out of war. With the idea of a turning point, when youre talking about the first half of the 20th century, to my opinion, you really just talking about the American People<\/a>. Getting the American People<\/a> ready for a greater role in the world. This continues up to 1941, and the late thirties. The isolationist movement and president Franklin Roosevelts<\/a> fears of whether hes trying to get too far ahead of the American People<\/a> and getting involved in this situation in europe. Also in china and indonesia. What im wondering is, is 1916 how much of a turning point is it or isnt it for the American People<\/a> . For their view of the place they see the nation, the United States<\/a> having in the world at large . I can comment on that, at least initially. When it came to the columbus raid, probably fairly obvious, the American Public<\/a> response was quite strong. The interesting part, by the latter half of the year, there was a desire to respond to the columbus rate and march. Just a few months later, there was a desire to not be drawn into war with mexico. Its an interesting balance of if this is something about mexico itself. There was this feeling among americans that there should be some sort of retaliation for columbus. I think the challenge for wilson was balancing that, his whole cabinet advocated for some tort of intervention. His challenge was balancing the need for retaliation, without getting into war with mexico. So i think at least in my situation, its hard to gauge exactly how much of a direct voice the public hard in these president ial politics. On certain subjects. At least when it came to the columbus raid and the expedition that followed, i think the public had a big role in determining how the administration would the policy options he had available to them and how he would implement them. I would say, in terms of latin america in terms of Central America<\/a> and the caribbean. In this period, Public Opinion<\/a> was supported to the extent that it paid any attention at all. Of the idea of stability, pro americanism, and uplift. I would agree that uplift, or making the world safer for democracy. In terms of haiti, the Dominican Republic<\/a>, nicaragua, is really just packaging. I think you see that most clearly in the lack of follow through. Im not saying it was packaging for the American People<\/a> who thought thats what the government was doing, and who supported the. In terms of government policy, theres such a striking lack of followthrough in haiti, the Dominican Republic<\/a>, and nicaragua. Where the United States<\/a> had the Strongest Military<\/a> presence, to really seriously try to construct a democratic structure. Thinking about 1916, november 1916 is the turning point, is whats getting to be problematic for me. If were thinking about the American People<\/a>s perception of europe, from 1914 to 1916 are the pivotal moment. A lot of that has to do with the press, the fact that sort of the average ordinary american citizen is reading a lot more about european politics. Not only whats going on in western europe, but also the eastern front. Theyre seeing images of debt, suffering, and newspapers also things like fundraising publicity for charities. I think there is, with regard to u. S. European relations among the American People<\/a>, perception of europe that maybe some things you are that we havent seen in the past. I dont know that 1916 is the moment, its the era of u. S. Neutrality that we see these changes happening. I have one thing to add at least. Within the Party Coalitions<\/a> of that moment in 1916, some fracturing related to the european war, one thing wilson has to grapple with is his particularly southern marshall, not interested in fighting in this european war of interest. Southern firebrands from pitchfork, to claude, to james a lot of them are not interested in whats looming on the horizon. In the region of the country often thought of as particularly marshall, and solid democratic bloc, is a group thats pushing against the preparedness programs that interventionism. Its important its 1914 1916, its made important because of the election cycle. He has to gather that in, he couldnt go much for their until november 1916. Its not a shock after november 1916, a lot of the programs that lead up into the war, really begin in earnest. You see that, in the west some interesting configurations that have a lot to do with mexico. The western labor interest dont want to fight a war with mexico, i think republicans were oddly unaware of that. They didnt seem to discern the nuances of the fact that the west, which becomes democratic for a moment, and 11 of the 12 states where women vote in this electoral cycle, are more passive is leaning and not interested in a war. Thats a group also that supports the sort of wilson he kept us out of war moment. This question is primarily for professor montoya, doesnt necessarily concern so much the 1916 election. It concerns the infamouss immerman telegram, and the background there to. Obviously, some people have disputed whether it was legitimate or not. It didnt arise obviously, it didnt fall out of the sky, there was a Historical Context<\/a> to it. It was perfectly understandable that the germans will not be happy about the United States<\/a> continuing to supply the allies, providing munitions perhaps they might be inclined for that reason to make problems for the United States<\/a>, which would divert the United States<\/a> away from europe. Problem in their own backyard, does your Research Reveal<\/a> any indication that the germans were in fact active in mexico . For that purpose . I think friedrich cats probably really made that clear, that the germans were its interesting. The germans were active in active in mexico. Their efforts were largely helpless, largely came to nothing. They lacked funding, essential purpose,s immerman telegram itself is pegged as a fool hearty effort by the German Foreign<\/a> minister of the time. There was real german hope among intelligence services, there was disagreement within the german reich itself with how much to push this. There were some german officials who really wanted to push the United States<\/a> into a war with mexico. There was obvious Strategic Benefits<\/a> to that. I mentioned how wilson authorized the occupation of veracruz, in 1914. The arms that were going to the regime in mexico city were coming from germany. Different factions of the mexican revolution all the receipt different support from the great powers in germany. Definitely one of those powers who are really trying to just like the u. S. , playing a rival factions off each other. Supplying them with arms. Mexico doesnt have its own arms industry, throughout the mexican revolution, access to arms or denial of arms was key in determining the pace of the revolution. The duration of battles and things like this. The great powers, the french, the germans, the americans. This is one of the big strings they pull in the revolution, was access to arms. And the germans having one of the best arms factories munitions industries in the world, was key in steering that. Can i add to that . I agree, completely with ben. Particularly that the german efforts were hapless, in my book danger of dreams, its basically analysis of was there a german threat to the hemisphere. Tracing it from the 1890s all the way up to this immerman telegram. Based on german i crimes, what i concluded, and i think definitively, while the germans talked a lot, particularly the pan germans and well him talked a lot about the idea of a german empire in latin america. While there were reasons to be worried, for example, there were a lot of germans living in brazil. There was a whole German Colony<\/a> in brazil. There is no evidence of any serious German Government<\/a> plan at any point. To take advantage of the. This immerman telegram you can say is some evidence, i really think has been size, it was helpless, and it was in a very particular context of wanting to divert American Forces<\/a> before they got involved and europe. I think the whole idea of any concerted, serious german threat to the hemisphere doesnt hold a quarter. Like you said, accompaniment to these big power politics, is factoring in the Mexican Government<\/a> itself. One of the reasons these german and trees didnt go very far, is because carranza the president of mexico, it wasnt in his interest to get to cozy with germany. He basically towed this very tenuous line of neutrality. I think its key to remember, that the Mexican Government<\/a> played a role in courting some of these alliances, in the end, rejecting them. In a way, it was two carranza interests to not align with germany. Even though germany made some pretty strong overtures. Thank you all for this amazing panel and also thank you for your collective work upon which we are all relying and placing amazon orders from the audience. Just a thought, related to the quick question before last. And then a small question. With a question about the American People<\/a>, and the responses about Public Opinion<\/a>, really highlight what to me not having worked in this area before, but attempting to now. There is really a terrible mythological problem. That there is not an easy way around, the usual ways of measuring Public Opinion<\/a> in the literature are dependent upon the media. With the other approach, what chris was essentially bringing in, Election Results<\/a>. Do you have any other ways of measuring in some reliable away, what we might call Public Opinion<\/a> . So that sort of one plea for help. The question that got me up here, was to say, thinking about 1916 as an election year. Woodrow wilson is not the only one who got elected. So, do you think it was no consequence from the rest of the elections in 1916. I think initially congress, of course the 65th congress didnt come into second and till the beginning of april. Still, it was a congress that had Jeanette Rankin<\/a> in it, there were important new directions, at least in some areas. I was especially thinking about nicole, if you hide thoughts about american politics more broadly. Benjamin, what about state politics in the southwest . Did it not matter at all, who was governor of texas . And who the sort of local political leaders war, in the american southwest. Thank you both for excellent questions. To think about other Election Results<\/a> in 1916. At least in terms of Foreign Policy<\/a>, i think the only thing i would go out on a limb to say, to think about is congress. Theyre wilson is very good at maintaining his executive authority in the realm of Foreign Policy<\/a>. I think that there is whereas domestic legislation, about the eight hour day and all those kinds of things. There is a lot of democratic members of congress, who i think are ultimately responsible for getting that legislation passed. In terms of getting the United States<\/a> into the war, whatever. I think we need to be looking outside of congress, and in the white house for that. Perhaps we should keep in mind, another person who was not elected, colonel whos doing a lot of behind the scenes diplomacy. To encourage u. S. Entry into the war. But this also segue into this question of how do we measure Public Opinion<\/a> . Which is a great question and one that drives me nuts. I spend a lot of time with my thesis students thinking about this very issue. I think i dont think there is a good way to really know what Public Opinion<\/a> is. Because i definitely think that the newspapers, and magazines like the century or whatever. That they dont actually reflect Public Opinion<\/a>. I think they helped shape Public Opinion<\/a>. I think at least four Foreign Policy<\/a>, one important tool is to think about who actually is involved and making a Foreign Policy<\/a> decision. And whose opinions matter there. So you can have, somebody like Robert Lansing<\/a> who says the American Public<\/a> wants to enter the war. And hes basing that on an editorial that he read in harvard. Because thats what he wants to hear. In some ways im not sure how much Public Opinion<\/a> actually matters. The people who do make decisions, what theyre claims about Public Opinion<\/a> is, is what matters. Thank you very much for this question, i think its complicated because a lot of southwestern officials were very concerned with mexico. The other rub to it, a lot of them had business interests, or property and mexico. Not just southwestern officials, people like william hearst, a lot of people had a lot of land and minsk sicko. Colonel house led a lot of texas politicians were very keenly concerned about their property and business interest in mexico. I think this is why, they try to strike this balance between intervention to protect their property, but intervention to bring law in order back. Intervening to find the right person. At one point, poncho via seems to be the right person. They denied arms to hand, carranza seem like the right person his main advantage was that he brought stability. For some of these politicians, he was even too radical. In the south was not even a consideration, he was not a communist he was pegged as a communist. Its complicated, you can say that all the time. This is where the balance this is where they tried to strike the balance. Theyre trying to steer the course of mexican politics, really to protect their interest, and to bring stability back to mexico. Not just for their interest but for these larger concerns. A stable mexico can allow the United States<\/a> to look to europe without any concern. The columbus raid, the punitive expedition, carranza himself represents constant trouble that the u. S. Cant figure out for most of that decade. The answer to this question, thinking about Public Opinion<\/a>. A good place to look is voluntary agencies, and their membership numbers and money. Our hour americans putting their money where their mouth are. As pointed out, the progressive ever of the United States<\/a> is the nation of jordan or. They join associations everywhere. Comparing Something Like<\/a> membership numbers and the Preparedness Movement<\/a> at militia, versus memberships and the womens peace party, the union against militarism, might be a good way to measure where people are choosing to direct their money and their voluntary attention. Thats really useful, i want to add. I like triangulating between different pieces of media. Its not so much in terms of seeing that theyre writing an article or an op ed for preparedness. Rather than go to the socialist press, what are they responding to . What arguments are they picking out to fight back against, if its pro preparedness off argument. You get a sense of the kinds of issues that leads to shaping Public Opinion<\/a>. I think will be persuasive. Thats a it exists in that historical moment. If you find enough of those, you can create a pretty good correlation. Obviously your thinking, letters from constituents, you get a bulk of those at least you get a good sense of a given place and who those people in congress are likely to be taking seriously. And terms of the policies they are promoting, thats one of the place i would look. Also, its incumbent on all of us to recognize even after the era of polling, polls are inherently problematic. Even when the 1930s, when you get its not like you have a definitive sense of Public Opinion<\/a>. Public opinion is shaped much by the questions that are asked, when youre looking at letters to the editor in world war i era. You ask questions, and they send in lenders. Some of those questions are about their german aggression and threat. What kind of response are you likely to get in that scenario . Most likely are purse people are perceiving the threat rather than peacemaking or mediation that you would see from w. Ppe or other kinds of organizations. I want to point out about the west, if this is a pivotal election, and it pivoted on just a few steaks, on california. That johnson, republican progressive, flirted with, and then pushed back from thats largely i would argue, based on Foreign Policy<\/a> stance. Johnson was reluctant to intervene in the world war. You can look to regional figures, who are also Major Players<\/a> in the senate. Then johnson goes on to be a reconcilable against the league, treaty of versailles are, and consistent on the side of interventionist for the rest of his career. First, thanks for a terrific and thoughtful panel. I want to ask a little bit about wilson and race. The character caricatured version i had of this going into the panel with Something Like<\/a> this. Wilson is it nationalists and believes in self determination, or believes he can be prodded into saying those things. Not when it comes to the colonize world, because hes also a racist. Thats kind of the story that you get from mandalas book, i got the sense rebecca, that that was the story you are giving us. It strikes me that Something Different<\/a> is going on between what wilson is doing in the caribbean, parts of the caribbean that the United States<\/a> does not formally control, and in the u. S. Empire. Rebecca, at the end you said, its pretty much more of the same because stable government. The philippine cant be impended with the stable government and no one to find stability fines but, wilson actually would have supported wilson supported he was ready to get Philippines Free<\/a> open on a four time scheduled independents. Filipinos asian you said it. Theyre turning over of government to filipinos. Theres this other act passed next year in 1917. Which makes puerto rican citizens. I have a hard time reconciling, this is genuine befuddlement. I dont know how to reconcile that, which really does seem to me to be a new leaf. With what hes doing in the caribbean. Does he believe that non whites are capable of Self Government<\/a> or not . Certainly if you look at his haitian policy that certainly not. Whats going on in the colonies, hes dark seemed to be interesting and divesting the United States<\/a> of its empire. He talks that way and he seems like he puts his money where his mouth is to some degree. Some extent, that is part of what im saying here it is under wilson. Once you have democrats in congress, you have to keep in mind whats happening in the philippines to. The consolidation of nationalistic politics. You get the articulation, yes independence will happen. This is no longer this is not the goal of the u. S. To sort of withdraw sovereignty at some point . Yes clearly that is the goal. I think youre right in that way. But i question might be why is it that timetable for independence why is that not manifest . Why does that not pass . That is something that some filipinos were eager to see. I think that would be the distinction that i would make. Almost, my measure maybe its a tall order. And so i think maybe the night the way nancy was putting it before, does the action follow the rhetoric . In this case, thats what im saying, theres maybe a newish kind of thing thats happening here. There is a commitment to a vision thats being laid out of a post colonial world. One that we know from the book that that you know people like the filipinos are seizing on to be sure. I think what wilson is saying in the philippines, yes we want to deny ourselves of this frontier. It will be gradually, not going to be necessarily on the timeline that filipinos want. Its going to be maybe this is somewhat semantic for you. Thats what id suggest there. I would also suggest that we should be thinking about scientific racism, ideas at the time, and how they intersect with political theory. Certainly, wilson is willing to draw a color line both in the United States<\/a>, and globally. But also, i think part of if we can put the best possibles been on why he thinks a color line is a good idea in the United States<\/a>. Its because, democracy only functions when everyone agrees. If people are biologically incapable of a green, like because there are african and not anglosaxon. Then they shouldnt get to vote because american politics wont work properly with them and it. I think that that argument also applies in the support that he gives for creating National States<\/a> in europe. So yes, polling because poland means in his mind nationally homogenous poland, not some polls living in germany and some living in russia. He wants those clear lines so that everybody who is capable of having a democracy, can have a functioning democracy and their own country. And theyre going to have it because they are all of biologically the same. In the electoral pool. To amplify that question slightly, i want to ask nancy, to what extent does this kind for all of sedition ship rates, problematic as it was, actually represent a shift from the continuity you are arguing of u. S. Foreign policy in the region . To what extent maybe is it more emblematic of imperial politics rather than the sort of politics of International Exchange<\/a> . The divide between haiti and puerto rico. I dont want to be reductionist, i do think it comes down to cost benefit analysis to a certain extent. Haiti represented a challenge, whereas, that the United States<\/a> felt that the Wilson Administration<\/a> needed to establish stability in haiti. In a way that it didnt feel that need in puerto rico. Theres a possibility of being more quote on quote, generous, in puerto rico than in haiti. ,. Its interesting to compare policy towards haiti and policy towards the Dominican Republic<\/a>. To think about the differences of race there and i think that you can make an argument that policy towards haiti was more paternalistic. Then towards the Dominican Republic<\/a>. To a certain extent, puerto rico would fall in that spectrum. On the other hand, the ignorance of the administration is even the racial makeup of these countries that they were dominating. Makes it difficult to come to any hard and fast conclusions on that. I dont think that puerto rico indicates a shift, or a turning point. I think the overwhelming evidence is that there was a continuity in the american tightening of hijab many in the backyard. And that the problematic granting of citizenship and puerto rico is this just one more tactic along that way. Were ready for more comments and questions from you all if youre up to the task. I have one more broad question that may be bringing us all together. Its sort of where we started when we were organizing the panel just one for now. The extent to which world war i really shapes all world relations in this era. I think very often weve been given talks about world war i. Many of us has been thinking about because of the anniversary, trying to add a global perspective on the war. Obviously famine relief is contingent in part on all of the devastations of the war, on the other hand, you are citing examples of tsunamis and things that happened before the conflict. How did the fighting of the world change, amplify, and hands, alter the other patterns that were talking about here . Geographically, or at other levels . One of the ways we organize this panel, is to think about transnational actors, ideas, flows of currency, goods. What does the war do to inject the kind of set of changes, or Something Else<\/a> . Should we think of this, in other words as a wartime moment. If 1916 is a turning point, and world war i, admittedly not as global as world war ii. What should we think of this as world war i framing out all of our analysis of this era. Sort of a problematic piece of hindsight that we have professional historian should avoid. I think for mexico, as i alluded to at the end of my comments. I think world war i is huge in shaping americas response to mexico as i made the points i think after 1914 wilson is looking increasingly east hes noticing deteriorating relations with germany. This really gives him even more desire to try and bring law and order back to mexico, which brings his puts his finger on the button morph intervention. At the same time, it raises this concern of actually getting drawn into a war with mexico. So, and i think because of the war, wilson probably concedes more to the Mexican Government<\/a> that he would have before world war i. An example, negotiations that brought the end to the punitive expedition during the later half of 1916 as it was clear that the expedition itself was not going to work, the u. S. Tried to get guarantees from tehran said that his government would protect american. They tried to get concessions basically saying, you protect american property or respect this. Eventually, wilson gave it up. It is an interesting episode where he concedes to withdraw the expedition, he got nothing in return from it. When he got out of it was not going to war with mexico. Mexico conceded nothing by protecting its sovereignty. In that case it shaped how wilson really pulled back, in 1916. Overbearing intervention mindset, because of what was taking place between the u. S. And germany. What has been useful to me about this panel is the extent that we do you Center Europe<\/a> from our discussions of u. S. Border relations in the further half of the 1900. From the perspective of an ordinary person living in occupied 80, Dominican Republic<\/a>, in 1915 or 16, things have not changed in a lot of ways, suddenly, but not suddenly changed in world word one. We need to think of the prospective people are talking about. The u. S. Was involved with the world diplomatically and economically, prior to its entry in european war. We need to remember that when we teaches period, when we think about this period. Its not just the u. S. And the relations with europe, with the entire world. Throughout the western hemisphere in other parts of the world. I do think u. S. Entry into the war does change a lot of things. We can point to a number of ways the size of the expansion and u. S. Military. The involvement in european affairs. Nothing happened after the u. S. Nothing changes at all. Its important to think about the fact that u. S. European relations are not their only Foreign Relations<\/a> are. We need to look at other areas. Continuing on. That you can predict certainly from the standpoint of the caribbean and such as america. I dont see world war i has the key moment. The spanish american war is a much more important turning point in looking at relations as julia said, from that perspective. Depending on the kind of story you want to tell if we will tell a story about domestic change in the United States<\/a>. World war i is important, because it change changes and creates impotence for the American Government<\/a> to adjust its citizenship laws. Pretty much for every population. If we want to think about the expansion of the federal government, world war i is crucial for that story especially if we are thinking about things like the, or what becomes the fbi and the ability of the federal government to play a role in law enforcement. If were thinking about a story about World History<\/a> where u. S. Foreign policy. Is world war i the story we should be telling about the teens . The story we should be telling is to leave out the war, as long as you get the tree, paris peace treaties. It is actually important in shaping the norms and International Law<\/a> creating the league of nations. We should keep in mind that given who wilson invited to help participate in planning the peace, we get a lot of geographers are interested in latin america. The u. S. Goes out of its way to get latin American Government<\/a>s to participate at the paris peace conference, which we should keep in mind. Everybody but latin america in the standard way of thinking about it. The piece is latin america, too. That harbor or 9 11 was an obvious turning point in u. S. Relations with the world in a lot of ways. What weve been talking about here is the slower, longer president from 1913 to 1917. U. S. Relations with the caribbean, we need to be able to do both. That we can identify, our job is also to teach the public to look for these long term trends in continuitys. I would agree with julia. Rather than turning point, moment of opportunity is what we are more comfortable with in some ways. Particular moments and events that we can largely agree on that are turning points. Largely working as a cultural historian, i tend to see the palace moving they are upon layer that yo the set of circumstances. Or events for that matter. As far as the public, i wonder that maybe they or we, would welcome other sorts of stories. It doesnt have to be the turning point. And that is what captivates us the most. I wonder if we diminish our audience in some way, if we think that is a history that has to grab audiences. I like julie categorization there. I think that there are turning points, but i have to provisos. One is that i think we need to be careful to contextualize them. I think one of the things that this panel has shown is, what story we are telling. When we talk about turning point, we should try to make it as clear as we can. Turning points in what context . What story are we telling where this is a turning point. Clearly the election of 1916 was a turning point, in some context. In some stories. It isnt in other stories. I think that is something we need to be careful, and not assume that the eurocentric stories are the important ones. Secondly, i think its also important to nuance the turning point because the government is so big and bureaucratic that it might look like a turning point. When you dig deeper, its like one of the people i interviewed for my book on carter, they were talking about you nita. He said when carter came in, the order came out that the United States<\/a> could no longer give covert aid to angola. He said it its like a computer screen. The computer screen goes dark, and you think i lost everything, and then you just touch it and everything comes back again. Even when it looks like there is this dramatic turning point, the same bureaucratic structure and inertia of government is there. It might not be asked significant a turning point as it might appear on the surface. I may be the only one on the panel that said yes to the turning point. I think nancys points are key. There can be turning points, but you need to remember the context. As i highlighted in my comments, the consequences. What im looking at, there was the shift in diplomacy between the u. S. And mexico. The u. S. Medalist in mexican affairs. That doesnt mean that good things follow. If you know anything about 1920 diplomacy between u. S. And mexico, it got heated. There were mormons where, war might have been close. From 1920 to 1923, the u. S. Did not even recognize mexico. It was based on tenuous relations over things like oil and property. The u. S. Continue to have problems with mexican leaders all the way up to the 1930s. If you wouldve been president in the revolution, instead of in the mid twenties, there might have been a war. The short answer is there can be turning points, but as nancy said, we have to remember the context and what follows from those turning points could make those situations worth those diplomatic situations worse and more complicated. I definitely think that turning point are useful as we try to tell stories and make the pass the turning point and more useful today. We should not overemphasize them. Two of the things that i stressed with my students a lot i am always troubled with the accounts that and with the heroic struggle, and at the end of the story a laws passed and we all live happily ever after. In some sense, the passage of the law is a turning point, because the legal system was one way before the law and its another way after the law. Two things happened. One, part of the story that the law is in, its really important. When there is an election or a law is passed, all the people who contributed to make it, it did not just drop dead when it was passed. There is a continuity of agents involved in the story. Memory that continues, and those things that happened before the turning point continued to be relevant after the turning point. They can be useful in giving us some sort of cohesion, but we should not overemphasize them. We will conclude with that and know that there are multiple nuances in context for turning point. In 1916, and u. S. Foreign relations and world relation, its a great moment to see some of the shading of that. Thank you to the panel, and lets continue the conversation. Weeknights assessment on American History<\/a> tv. The contenders, our series that looks at 14 president ial candidates that lost the election. It had a lasting effect on u. S. Politics. We feature 1920 democratic president ial nominee, alfred a junior. The happy warrior. Smith never went to high school or college. He was speaker of the new York State Assembly<\/a> and term governor. He was the first catholic ever nominated by a major party. Watch tonight, fleeing gaining at eight eastern. Enjoy American History<\/a> tv this weekend and every weekend on cspan 3. At 8 pm eastern on American History<\/a> tv, hear about topics ranging from the american revolution, civil rights, and u. S. President s, to 9 11. Thanks for your patience, and logging into class. With most College Campuses<\/a> closed due to coronavirus, watch professors transfer teaching to a virtual setting to engage with their students. Reagan met him halfway, reagan encouraged him, reagan supported him. I should just mention, madison originally called it freedom of the use of the press. It is indeed freedom to print and publish things. It is not a freedom for what we referred to as institutionally as the press. American history tv, on cspan 3. Every saturday, at 8 pm eastern. Lectures in history is also available as a podcast. Find it where you listen to podcasts. The competition is. On the apart of the cspan student cam competition. Middle and high school students, see the start of a national conversation. Make a five to six minute documentary, exploring the issue you on the president in congress to address in 2021. Be bold with your documentary. Show supporting and opposing points of view, include cspan video. Be a winner. There is 100,000 dollars in total cash prizes. Including a grand prize of 5000 dollars. The deadline to submit videos is january 20th 2021. Be informed, you will find competition rules, tips, and more information on how to get started at our website. Student cam. Org. Tonight on the communicator, charlie mitchell. Cybersecurity, talks about the administrations approach to cybersecurity and how its efforts compared to previous administrations. The message that the u. S. Government has been really pressing on industry and business leaders. The top person in an organization have to personally take responsibility for cybersecurity and show that they are interested. That this is a cultural value within their organization. The government is telling that two companies, and i would think the same thing should apply to the government. Tonight, at 9 pm eastern on cspan two. The president , available in paperback, hardcover, and ebola. From public affairs, prevent biographies of every president. Inspired by conversations with noted historians about the leadership skills that make first accessible presidency. As americans go to the polls next month, to decide who should lead our country. This collection offers perspectives into the lives and events that forged teach president s leadership style. Probably more about all our president s, and the books we showed historians, visit cspan. Org slash the president s. Order your copy today, wherever books are sold. Harvard professor erez manela talks about how Woodrow Wilson<\/a>s upbringing mr. Manila discusses how wilson champion determination and reform as bulwark against both concentration and power disorder. The video of courtesy of the National World<\/a> War One Museum<\/a> and memorial in kansas city missouri. Doctor erasmus ella is a teacher at Harvard University<\/a> and served as a director of graduate programs at Harvard Center<\/a> for International Affairs<\/a> and as cochair of the harvard international","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"archive.org","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","width":"800","height":"600","url":"\/\/ia601905.us.archive.org\/7\/items\/CSPAN3_20201012_211500_1916_Election__Foreign_Policy\/CSPAN3_20201012_211500_1916_Election__Foreign_Policy.thumbs\/CSPAN3_20201012_211500_1916_Election__Foreign_Policy_000001.jpg"}},"autauthor":{"@type":"Organization"},"author":{"sameAs":"archive.org","name":"archive.org"}}],"coverageEndTime":"20240716T12:35:10+00:00"}