May 3, 2018 We are pleased to release an online course on the technical underpinnings of nuclear nonproliferation with a special focus on Iran, North Korea, and trafficking in nuclear commodities. The presenters are David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, and Houston Wood, Institute Board member and Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. They are longstanding nuclear experts with experience in many of the most pressing nuclear nonproliferation cases of the last four decades. The course lectures provide an introduction to the key facets of developing the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment, plutonium production and separation, and nuclear weaponization. Gas centrifuges are discussed extensively since they are today the dominant method to produce enriched uranium and have been favored by proliferant states, such as Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, among others, as part of efforts to seek nuclear weapons or at least a nuclear weapons capability. Part of the appeal of gas centrifuges stems from the amount of classified information that has leaked about them worldwide and the ability to put together a centrifuge program piecemeal by buying dual-use goods from abroad. As a result, the course also discusses the illicit procurement of key goods for nuclear programs by several states, such as Iran and Pakistan. The course is richly illustrated with case studies and extensively uses satellite imagery of nuclear sites. Because of the importance of satellite imagery in characterizing nuclear programs, one lecture covers the use of commercial satellite imagery in nonproliferation analysis and is presented by Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, a former Institute staff member.