Littleknown european expert, sir mick jagger athletic i think of him because interest organization, some think hes saying you cant always get what you want but if you try real hard, he might get what you need. Please join me in thanking the panel. Please join me in welcoming the panelist to the stage. [applause] its a pleasure to be here and having a chance to delve into the issues explored a little bit in the first panel now will get a bit more into defense. Elsa to stage and in short each of our panelists. The consensus on the appropriate size and strategy for equitable sharing and strategic risks has been an enduring talent and realization of nato deterrence of defense policy to be heard already. It became clear ambitions goals set at the 1952 meeting that was never going to be achieved so nato shifted to greater reliance on Nuclear Defense on u. S. Strategic forces and moving to retaliation in the 50s which envisioned or sustained conventional forces preserving ambiguity. We heard in the first panel strong opposition in many countries to the 1979 decision deploying Nuclear Weapons in europe for new capabilities and strengthened u. S. Strategic deterrence to improve capabilities nato launched Longterm Defense Program 1979 to mitigate negative shifts but the soviet union exporting emerging technology. While few allies but the goal to realize the program nato continued deterrence. After the cold war territory became last urgent and the focus of military effort shifted to peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operation. Nato undertook steps to ensure vulnerable allies and develop his presence. His 2022, nato has taken steps to strengthen the eastern part of the alliance and other elements strategy and military posture and added this today. Allies are seeking way to expand cooperation in both areas. Weve asked our panelists to discuss next steps to sustain what nato calls deterrence and defense. We are very fortunate to have three speakers to address these issues and i will turn to them sequence and in each of their expertise. Would you provide the audience an overview and military posture advancing nato summits tried to hug to the deterrence. Its a real pleasure to be here and i think youre right theres something quite profound happening and has been for a couple of years focused on building Regional Security now back to putting that at the heart. The overall approach on the primary goal is to make sure there isnt an attack and we have been pretty successful but there is a recognition that the scale of the challenge and brushing objectives, we cant take it for granted. The best way to achieve it, we would when importing that back at the heart of nato and what is happening at the moment. We are conscious that we have to think of this we have to manage deter but is stopped short in this and then we have to be ready and be able to win a conventional attack and we have to be ready to maintain Nuclear Weapons and a strategic effect and how they interact with its about convincing them that you can exploit. The professing thats happening, the alliance of National Defenses so we have war plans and teaching plans and approve the end open conflict and you will hear this afternoon to follow through the logic of the plan what they are doing and how and it is quite transformative. Theres a lot in terms of the headquarters and Norfolk Virginia and northern europe. This is the core of my job and allies are much more transparent and her pretty good idea over the next couple of years and a couple of areas will need target first at long range and let it move things around. We still need the ability to bring land forces together we have a pretty big area. There is no recognition ands are changing now. But i hope the numbers will keep rising and they were not spending that much and all that will take time and you need industrial capacity. I am quite optimistic moving in that direction. Sometimes people underestimate reset but the organizational structures and funny and getting people to understand and what it means. Not just frontline countries but also where areas so its really exciting time. Thank you very much for a good segue even where you work in both, would you share insights from your work and requirements of deterrence by then ill. Natos conventional defense that will go back in time and crimea that question defense is that it took quite a long time and poland a lot it is the only nato military and at the same time battle groups more than 1000 troops. Overall it still is polands 1000 outcome of the compromise in 2014 when the county got in the new Member States of the alliance but not only a Nato Response to his army nato was created quarters all of it is limited by poland and this was reversed after 2022 on ukraine for more battle groups and reinforcing these battle groups, a very important exchange but still not sufficient on the opinion of many but they were set up over the panel as well as training nato so very important changes adding to that. In exercising across the northeastern plank. I have done, not yet, maybe we are heading toward this goal allies are capable but it does not mean it does not work. It does. And that conventional very much on the elements in this plank and the potential conflict in the defense on the page of National European investments in the state of transatlantic relation. All in all having in mind politically within the alliance and in the coming years on the Baltic States and armed forces with nato weapons for the alliance, or them not to respond going to Nuclear Escalation conventional deterrence, more elements working and making progress and important defense is necessary. We would like to come back to the question about these capabilities if you let nicely and talking about deterrent posture backed up by the guaranty Nuclear Capability to other allies that helped so want to ask, how do you assess the direction of the dimension of the alliance including steps taken or should be taken to ensure Strategic Nuclear capabilities secure steps taken over the last couple of years . Thank you for the invitation, honor to be on the panel. Want to start off by pointing out fundamentals because i think they will that direction. As long as Nuclear Weapons exist, it will remain unbiased. Its worth pointing out Nuclear Capabilities, any sharing arrangements, those are getting a lot of attention, the Nuclear PostureUnited Kingdom and france and the other factor we will going is nato has consistently said they remain committed to arms control, nonproliferation and those are priorities that will have to Work Together to shape the direction the Alliance Goes on so theres a couple of indicators on these issues, clearly an effort by allies to strengthen allies. We learned deterrence issues and better understanding and extended care deterrence. The other direction we are seeing is the unity from my perspective, there are two big factors that will shape the direction which is obviously russia particularly the question is how much they will rely on it going forward. Russian forces have not performed particularly low but it isnt just about national performance, its about investments to rebuild original forces, that is not a turnaround profit. While they do that we anticipate the shift also anticipate russia continues it is underpinned the invasion. It has been insisted. This is a key part of that and im glad that came up so much in the previous panel. What is really important the impact of the thing that we are all obsessed with it and talking about. Are they allies thinking about future competition . It seems like it has started and evolving for the way allies engage will be Significant Impact on Nuclear Posture. For example the u. S. Conventional forces are divided, what is it mean for alex . I think the direction traveled really is actively and seems to be what mayor wants in this posture. Theres a couple of options that i think could contribute my just putting out there on the first would be supplemental new Nuclear Capabilities so the most obvious Cruise Missile or other regional capabilities. Another option would be another important nuclear actor, the uk. If the uk wanted to add a big boat pretty serious domestic financial constraints. Another one which im sure we will get to which is the nuclear sharing. Another option might be a change in Nuclear Posture and strategy to consider earlier decisive escalation pension weapons or Nuclear Weapons. The United States the longer signaling to one adversary so thats where ive been more decisive. What should be done to remain effective, natos Nuclear Posture underpinned you want a safe and security nuclear, shall continue on the current modernization from up there will be challenges on that inc. In the difficult growing. But proceeding the pace with rest modernization in a record at minimum i think is essential or Nuclear Security but in addition, other allies can participate exercising in the alliance continually multis of things theyve been doing anyway and i know this panel is about deterrence, a key component of the conversation is talking european allies, i hear them more and more express their concerns and domestic politics is a part of that. The other part is that allies are concerned with competing priorities for u. S. Attention. It goes expert once we are now number three on Foreign Policy verities coming after the war in gaza and china so i want to make another equitation he in addition to following through and have large one of our greatest assets means in the National Interest so i hope we can get to that. I like to come back to that and the impact it might have on this habitability. I did want to turn back to initial capabilities. We did mention in the earlier discussion, very ambitious and much larger goals and working on these plans and it can be discussed in any detail whether it might be additional elements or reinforce by the decisions of the Washington Summit and the development of generational abilities. Of posture we have now and whether it is robust. The answer is the only way we defense was through even one scaled up. Its not the only way to defend all territory and ukraine cap draw on that and power protected from see. When i arrived in the baltic, a lot of firepower would come from the north atlantic but also, we are very focused on this question of this into place two things. We need to know its happening and get back to 2022, we saw it, we had a debate of what it meant and even russians cant have this. You need to act early enough to move forward and now the Necessary Authority to make the move into place before we get to that situation and the logistics of the terry on how you move across europe so theres a lot in that. On the fourth level to clearly from a essentially what made european allies for the last 20 years is providing relatively small, sending them to the other side of the world and doing that on a rotational basis. A much larger force, you pretty much know where it is going and what its going to be so the way in which we organize this as really changed. Last year we confirmed this. The number of forces behind that is much larger. This most your interest lies said if we collectible you got it. Be made available we know there are capability gaps. But we have a much clearer idea no on how we can fight. That the good segue third discussion about learning lessons and when asked about lessons from russia for ukraine tornado strategy and how can be applied all and nato defense agreed to establishing on the nato ukraine. Definitely nato has a lot in this ability. How russia waking this but overall we had conflict between russia and nato and was on but that will change substantially the picture somehow special and fatal will be waged. Please capabilities, something ukraine does not have and currently limited access and need to look at Lessons Learned what russia takes in my observation with what nato should learn that we need more, we talked about that. The conflict for needs to grow to build reserve. We had discussion on going in the decision made already on the tract extending the voluntary from drafting women or introducing service for military for young people so this is a discussion have. You had public discussions but come decisions were made it i think if you look at s decision that shows land forces are marked in the war on ukraine could not be repeated and nato needs to reinvest these capabilities so another issue is we need to exercise information, training of ukrainian forces, time is missing it will have negative effects on the battlefield and ukraine. I think we are observing air defenses, they need to know ukraine has had huge amounts of equipment and supplemented we dont have it in nato. We have huge gaps to be dealt with. We have right now problems in poland and we have been flying, is taking a turn for the second time talking with the opinion of many polls testing our reaction we dont have capabilities nationally and limited capabilities within 80 and we dont have a strong base system on the order to deter russia for the air defense system. Let us how huge the gap is not quickly need to invest is doing that but it takes time. Its working on your defense on lower levels. The only way to capture such moves in the future. More longrange capabilities from germany, top military and being depleted. The need for delivery. A longrange capability and increase. But what is particularly interesting from the wharton ukraine is introducing innovation to the battleground quickly how to it is not accustomed to development in this lesson. And how to move come for example, major Public Services online come something ukraine has done under the war conditions. I think ukraine can compete, we can learn a lot. Also similar military cooperation, that would be another point. Great, thank you. I do want to come back to the nuclear question. Before we do sin should mitchard recited i know angus has been working on come his colleagues at nato headquarters had working on looking at ways to encourage Cooperation Among allies and strengthening their Defense Industrial capabilities. You might touch on that. Weekly before we go and then i come back to heather and will go to some questions from the audience. Sure. Just say no, that are too big aspects of this. The first is society and something governments are thinking about and do they have plans for how they would experience a war eventually. This is partly psychological shift and using some allies addressing that by collision very directly about this. Countries like sweden and denmark have stood up very boldly resort is said to the population you need to be ready for the prospect of war. Its also about are you planning, how you would keep going things like provision of energy, food, telecommunications, healthcare, transport, et cetera. What we do in nato is we set benchmarks for what does this look like in each of these areas and we have process of assessing allies against that come having them to learn from each other, do compare and contrast that the other aspects to this thise relationship between the military and the civilians in a war. So many civilian governments over the last 20 years have got quite used to the idea that if there is a civilian contingency you turn to the military for help. With the pandemic or Natural Disaster or a terrorist attack. In a fullscale article v situation, actually that they do have is likely to get reversed because the military would be flat out dealing with the military threat. What it will need from the civilian side is access to transport, access to much larger healthcare and dealing with mass casualties, for example. And Public Access to stocks the food energy and things like that that it wouldnt be able to generate organically. This is why one of the things were looking at for the Washington Summit is allies making a pledge that they will have nationally, each according to their own systems, a mechanism for doing that civilian military planning so that they know they are ready for that. There is a third aspect to civilians which is as well making sure that our infrastructure is not vulnerable to interference from hostile powers. Its a lot about china and when you look at how embedded china has become it a lot of infrastructure and Sensitive Services in an number of our allied countries, there is quite a big debate going on in it and in the European Union about how to reduce the risks of those dependencies in exploited in a time of crisis or war . Great, thank you. Before we do ship to audience questions i did want as come come back to you heather. He touched on some important issues on the boards of strength in the strategic, the is and other Nuclear Capabilities that at the strategic level the backup natos deterrent posture. You mentioned uk is an option. What about the question of perhaps europe filling both combined ukfrench effort and filling some of the pressure gets is going to feel if they continue to focus on deterring china unless i forget north korea as well . And interesting, is a part of what was behind the macron gambit of think if you put a nuclear arms power on the ground in ukraine is that going to get put in some second thoughts . I know you would think that some of these issues with regard to russia saber rattling at csis in the pony party on deterrent and divide. Its a bit of the murder of quest