Chapman, lor lorenzo goco, trecd genif, michael neblet, michael pezner, Caroline Tess and james wolf. And finally david granite, who has been a neverfaltering staff director throughout this review. Madam president , this study is bigger than the actions of the c. I. A. Its really about American Values and more or less. Its about the constitution, the bill of rights, our rule of law. These values exist regardless of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. They exist in peacetime and in wartime, and if we cast aside these values when convenient, we have failed to live by the very preseptembers that precepts that make our nation a great jaun. There is a r twhee carry the banner after great nation. So we submit this stud on behalf of the committee to the public in the belief that it will stand the test of time and with it the report will carry the message never again. I very much appreciate your attention and i yield to senator mccain. You can see the report. Up next, well would hear from the vice chair, senator chambliss was critical of the report. Mr. Chambliss thank you. Madam president , i rise today as the vice chairman of the Senate Select committee on intelligence to respond to the public release of the declassified version of the executive summary and findings and conclusions from the committees study of the c. I. A. s detention and Interrogation Program. This is not pleasant duty for me. During my four years as the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, i have enjoyed an excellent relationship with our chairman, senator diane feinstein. We have worked closely to conduct strong bipartisan oversight of the u. S. Intelligence community, including the passage and enactment of Significant National security legislation. However, this particular study has been one of the very, very few areas where we have never been able to see eye to eye. Putting this report out today is going to have significant consequences. In addition to reopening a number of old wounds both domestically and internationally, it could be used to incite unrest and even attacks against our service members, other personnel overseas, and our international partners. This report could also stoke additional mistreatment or death of american or other western captives overseas. It will endanger c. I. A. Personnel, sources and future intelligence operations. This report will damage our relationship with several Significant International counterterrorism partners at a time when we can least afford it. Even worse, despite the fact that the administration and many in the majority are aware of these consequences, they have chosen to release the report today. The United States today is faced with a wide array of security challenges across the globe, including in afghanistan, pakistan, syria, iraq, yemen, north africa, somalia, ukraine, and the list goes on. Instead of focusing on the problems right in front of us, the majority side of the Intelligence Committee has spent the last five years and over 40 million focused on a program that effectively ended over eight years ago while the world around us burns. In march, 2009, when the Committee First undertook the study, i was the only member of the Intelligence Committee that voted against moving forward with it. I believed then as i still do today that Vital Committee and Intelligence Community resources would be squandered over a debate that congress, the executive branch, and the Supreme Court had already settled. This issue has been investigated or reviewed extensively by the executive branch, including criminal investigations by the department of justice, the Senate Armed Services committee, the International Committee on the red cross, as well as other entities. Congress has passed two separate acts directly related to detention and interrogation issues. Specifically, the detainee treatment act of 2005 and the military commissions act of 2006. The executive branch terminated the c. I. A. Program and directed that future interrogations be conducted in accordance with the u. S. Army field manual on interrogation. Also, the Supreme Court decided roughly v bush in 2004, Hamdi V Rumsfeld in four, Hamdan V Rumsfeld in 2006 as well as boumadinev bush in 2008. All of which established that detainees were entitled to habeas corpus review and identified dish sis in the detainee treatment act and the military commissions act. By the time i had became vice chairman the, attorney generals holders decision to reopen the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in the c. I. A. s Interrogation Program. This unfortunate decision deprived the committee of the ability to interview key witnesses who participated in the kaye program and essentially limited the study to the review of a cold documentary record. Now, how can any credible investigation take place without interviewing witnesses . This is a 6,000page report and not one single witness was ever interviewed in this study being done. This is a poor excuse for the time of oversight that the congress should be conducting. There is no doubt that the c. I. A. s detention and Celebration Program which was hastily executed in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in our nations history, had flaws. The c. I. A. Has admitted as much in its june 27, 2013 response to the study. There is also no doubt that there were instances in which c. I. A. Interrogators exceeded their authorities and certain detainees may have suffered as a result. However, the executive Summary Findings and conclusions released today contain a disturbing number of factual and analytical errors. These factual and analytical shortfalls ultimately led to an unacceptable number of incorrect claims and invalid conclusions i cannot endorse. The study essentially refuses to admit that c. I. A. Detainees, especially c. I. A. Detainees subjected to enhanceed interrogation techniques provide ed intelligence information which helped the United States government and its allies to neutralize numerous terrorist threats. On its face, this refusal doesnt make sense, given the vast amount of information gained from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that were generated as a result of them, the capture of additional terrorists and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning. Instead of acknowledging these realities, the study adopts an analytical approach designed to obscure the value of the intelligence obtained from the program. For example, the study falsely claims that the use of enhanceed interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of jose padilla because abu glued iowa hea who has direct dies to Osama Bin Laden provided to information about padilla during an interrogation by f. B. I. Agents who were exclusively using whats called rapportbuilding techniques against him more than three months prior to the c. I. A. s use of d. O. J. Approved enhanced interrogation techniques. What the study ignores, however, is the fact that abu gluedas earlier zubaydahs interrogation did involve use of techniques that were later included in the list of enhance ed interrogation techniques. Specifically, the facts demonstrate that abu zubaydah was subjected to around the clock interrogation that included more than four days of dietary manipulation, nudity and more than 126 hours, which is about five days, of sleep deprivation during a 136hour period by the time the f. B. I. Finished up the 8 1 2 hour interrogation shift in which abu zubaydah finally yielded the identification of jose padilla. So during a fiveday time period, abu zubaydah got less than 10 hours of sleep yet the majority does not acknowledge this was an enhanceed interrogation. In light of these facts, the studys claims that the f. B. I. Was exclusively using rapportbuilding techniques is nothing short of being dishonest. More important, the actionable intelligence gleaned from the enhanced interrogation of abu zubaydah that started in april of 2002 served as the foundation for the capture of additional terrorists and the disruption of the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists were planning. His information was also used to gather additional actionable intelligence from these newly captured terrorists which in turn led to a series of successful capture operations and plot disruptions. By the studys own count, the numerous interrogations of abu zubaydah resulted in 766 solesource disseminated intelligence reports. Thats an awful lot of actionable intelligence collected under the c. I. A. Program that this study tries to quietly sweep under the carpet in order to support its false headline that the c. I. A. s use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective. The study also overlooked several crucial intelligence successes that prevented terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies around the world. Al qaeda affiliateed extremists subjected to the programs enhanceed interrogation techniques made admissions that led to the identification of the man responsible for plotting the september 11 attacks, khalid sheik Khalid Sheikh mohammed or k. S. M. It stopped attacks on the u. S. Homeland and against our military forces overseas. Al qaeda affiliate Abu Zubaydahs statements to interest raters led to the identification of jose padilla, tasked with conducting a terrorist attack inside the United States. The intergays disrupted al qaeda s plotting against camp lemeyia in djibouti, and at that time home to some 1,600 u. S. Military personnel. There is no telling how many lives this Program Saved in those particular interrogations alone. Intelligence gathered under the detention and Interrogation Program also prevented terrorist attacks on our allies in the united kingdom. Terrorist plots against Londons Heathrow airport and canary wha wharf were disrupted because key conspirators were apprehended and questioned on the basis of intelligence gathered using several interrogation techniques, including enhanceed interrogation techniques. And finally, information from detainees held in the program was critical to ascertaining the true significance of abu ahmad alkuwaiti, the facilitator who served as Osama Bin Ladens personal courier and the man who led c. I. A. Intelligence analysts and the navy seals to bin laden himself. For anyone interested in a nice chronological survey of the significant intelligence gained from the program and how it was used to capture additional terrorists and drupt terrorist plots disrupt terrorist plots; i would invite you to read pages 9d 6 and 97, which delineate exactly a chrono milliochronologyof intelligencee that allowed for take joan of individuals. It seems the study takes every opportunity to unfairly portray the c. I. A. In the worst light possible. Presupposing improper motivati motivations and the most detestable behavior at every turn. Now the very enemies who the program helped keep at bay for all those years as well as adversarial nations will be able to sploi exploit what is essentially a dangerously inciteful and dangerous treasuretrove of information about our intelligence operations. Now im all for pointing out and correcting problems with the Intelligence Community, and i have been very outspoken sonl on some of them, but i prefer that our oversight be conducted quietly and in a manner that does not yep dice the National Security of the United States. Ultimately, our nart views examined eight of the studys most problematic conclusions, many of which attacked the c. I. A. s integrity and credibility in developing and implementing the program. These problematic claims and conclusions created the false impression that the c. I. A. Was actively misleading policymakers and impeding the counterterrorism efforts of other federal Government Agencies during the programs operation. We found that these claims and conclusions were largely not supported by the documentary record and were based upon flawed reasoning. Specifically, we found that, one, the c. I. A. s detention around Interrogation Program was effective and produced valuable and actionable intelligence; two, most of the c. I. A. s claims of effectiveness with respect to the use of e. I. T. s were accurate, three, the quia attempted to keep the congress informed of its activities and did so on a regular basis. And as a member of the committee, i can attest to that. Four, the c. I. A. Did not impede white house oversight. The white house was very involved in doing oversight of the program. Five, the c. I. A. Was not responsible nor did it have control over sharing or dissemination of information to other executive Branch Agencies or to members of the principles committee. Six, many of the studys claims about the c. I. A. Providing inAccurate Information to the department of justice or themselves totally inaccurate. Seven, the c. I. A. Did not significantly impede oversight by the c. I. A. Office of the inspector general. And, eight, the white house determined that the c. I. A. Would have the lead on dealing with the media regarding detainees. These findings are not matters of defense of the c. I. A. The c. I. A. Is fully capable of defending its own actions and i know will do so. Rather, these findings are a critique of certain aspects of this particular study. As a general rule, i want our committee findings, conclusions, and recommendations to be unasalablunasalable in every investigation that we conduct. Unfortunately, that didnt happen here and im very concerned about the unintended consequences that will result from the studys erroneous and inflammatory conclusions. I imagine that some members of the media may choose to repeat the studys false headlines contained in the report without checking the underlying facts. By doing so, they will only be damaging their own credibility. I invite anyone who reads the studys executive summary and findings and conclusions to pay particular attention to how often the text uses lieutenantst absolutes such as played no role, no connection, or no indication. Please then read our minority views to find the clear counterexamples that disapprove most of these absolute claims. I suspect that the readers who make this effort will be disappointed, as i was that this study makes so many inaccurate claims and conclusions. Our minority views also explain how thissitude was crippled by this study was crippled by irregularities that hampered the committees ability to conduct a fair review of the program. These procedural defects resulted in a brie mature Committee Vote in december of 2012 to approve the study before the text was adequately reviewed by the Committee Membership or subjected to a routine fact check by the Intelligence Community. Typically once a Senate Committee report has been approved, staff are only authorized to make technical and conforming changes. The executive summary and findings and conclusions released this week have undergone such extensive and unprecedented revision since the study was approved back in december of 2012 that the traditional concept of technical and conforming changes has now been rendered meaningless. Amazingly, the majority made significant changes in the substance of the study for months after it was voted on by the committee. In addition, after we mitted our minority views, the majority staff then went back and made a few changes to specifically correct some of the more blatant errors that we identified in the views and that c. I. A. Identified in their review. While i am pleased that our views led to some minor improvements in the study, those ultimate those untimely changes required us to add text explaining the validity of our initial conclusions and criticisms. Simply put, the documents released today are very different from the documents that were approved almost exactly two years ago by the committee at the ent end of thet congress on a partisan basis. Another significant weakness of this study is its disregard of the context under which the c. I. A. s detention and Interrogation Program was developed. It is critical to remember that the Intelligence Community was inundated by a surge of terrorist threat reporting after the september 11 attacks. The fear of a followon attack was pervasive and it was genuine. The nation was traumatized by the horrific murders of nearly 3,000 americans and at the c. I. A. There was no greater imperative than stopping another attack from happening. This Congress Text is entirely absent from the study. In addition, everyone must remember that the c. I. A. Was directed to conduct this program by the president. I have spoken with a number of c. I. A. Officers over the years who remember the contentious debates about the program at the time it was being considered, but at the end of the day, the agency did what the president directed them to do under color of law and based upon opinions issued and updated by the department of justice. Many of my colleagues continue to discuss the brutality of many of the enhanced interrogation techniques. While i agree with waterboarding which only occurred against three detainees is particularly severe, many of the other techniques were n