After the Un Security Council signed off on it. Form to begin on iran, talking with the policymakers divided between whether or not iran should act more forcefully to stabilize neighbors and those who advocate a more minimalist approach. You are watching it live here on cspan. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. May i request that you take your seat so that we can get started . Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am the associate director of the south asia center here at the Atlantic Council. On behalf of my colleagues i would like to welcome you all here today for a timely discussion on the Iranian Nuclear role after the deal. , criticala crucial juncture for iran, the United States, its allies, and the community. Rnational after 30 years of relative isolation and intensifying sanctions, iran may be entering a new level of engagement. We view this historic moment as one that holds immense opportunity. The task force serves as a comprehensive source of analysis on iran. By bringing together key regional stakeholders, the task force has made Great Strides in investigating geopolitical effects. Until now we have primarily hurt perspectives from outside iran, but we will here today more iranian perspectives. These reports will be presented by nasser hadian, who will be joined by our senior fellow at the middle east peace senior , who is going to take a broader view of the intentions in the middle east. This event is part of the south asia center iranian task force, led by our senior fellow. I would like to thank the fund for their generous and continuous support of the task force. I will now turn the floor over to our moderator. Thank you all for coming on this beautiful day. Once again, i think our timing is really excellent. With apparently the congress about to hold its nose and allow the iran agreement to go forward , one of the key questions is how will iran behave in the region . Will it take additional funds in terms of sanctions release and in the words of opponents, a march into a fifth capital . Will it doubled down on more interventionist policies or not will it doubled down double down on more interventionist policies or not . We have a guest here from tehran, nasser hadian. A professor of Political Science at the faculty of law and medical science at the university of toronto. He has served there as director of graduate studies. He has been a visiting professor and Research Scholar at the middle east institute and asian languages and Cultures Department at columbia university. Role at aprominent think tank in a run that is close to president rouhani. His areas of interest include the Nuclear Program,. Ontemporary politics he got his phd from the university of tennessee. Ownthen we have our [indiscernible] who has more than 13 years of experience working as an analyst, advisor, and corporate manager of the middle east, a security expert with a focus on the arab states of the persian gulf. Lebanon, syria, hezbollah, irans role in influence on them. Degrees fromsters the university of st. Andrews and university of maryland. I would recommend to you paper that he had a few months ago the dealt with the issue of containing iran. I would like to invest invite our guests to take a seat. ,. Why dont you, p or . Or whyt you, p dont you come up here . Has written a new paper that you can read yourself on our website, but i will begin by asking him to discuss the contents of the paper. A few years ago i interviewed a very astute journalist in iran. He told me, when i asked him about iranian influence in the region, he said that we are not going to stretch our legs beyond the capacity of our purpose. My question to you now, sir, is how big is that carpet . How big should it be . How big should it the . What is the nature of the debate taking place in a run regarding Regional Policy in particular . Professor hadian thank you very much. I appreciate you for inviting me to share my ideas with you. On the Nuclear Program and regional issues. About the anecdote that you say thatould like to there was a time in iran when the carpet was much bigger. We used to carpet every space. Now the fashion is that the carpets are in the middle and much smaller. [laughter] but of course, finer, if i can say that. Say basicallycan that there is not one wheel in iran regarding the region. As i mentioned in the reports that you have read, there were two views there. , the poor stabilization view, the one that calls for be aally a run to stabilizing force in the region. To produce security in the region. In other words, fitting into hand what you have. Afghanistan is not secure. We have another problem. Withve a lot of problems refugees, drugs, and narcotics in afghanistan. Some are worried about pakistan as well. With the laws of extremism there. And are worried about iraq what is happening there. Also syria and lebanon, to a lesser extent. So, they argue that within the next 10 to 15 years the primary objective of Foreign Policy should be stabilizing the regime. Iran should be a country that basically produces security. The argument is that we cannot andn island of security dismissive of the insecurity around us. That is the official view of iran and the dominant in iran. But there is an alternative view that is recently gaining more in the think tanks. You find this of course at the university and among the pundit. Pundits. They would argue that iran is already overstretched. We dont have any more resources to allocate. Basically we are the primary and that this is not our fight. They would argue that this would make the make us the target of a large attack. We have not yet been attacked, not because they are not capable but because they have not made the decision to do so. They can easily penetrate into our territory and explode bombs. So, why do we have to do that . The argument is that our engagement should be minimal. Minimal towards those who are vital and necessary. In iraq, damascus, and the coastal area. And, basically, in syria. Sunnis are really interested in having a representative in the government , if they want it, let them have it. But there is not that much concern for us. I mean, if they consolidated the power that would basically be a threat, not for us, but for the saudis, jordanians, lebanons. That ifment also is they want to come, they have to fight in the fight will be severe. Normally if you assume that they are not totally crazy, just partially crazy, the natural trajectory of expansion would be towards saudi arabia, jordan, and yemen. The argument of this second group would basically be that ande better off withdraw make our engagements on the minimal level. Arguments would be that this is somehow naive. That if you think that in the longer term we will not face problems, there will be a major threat if not in the short term but rather the longterm they will be a major threat for us. Of khorasan issue is very important to us. If the south announces independence, they will surely go for independence and what will be the position . Iran is the most important country that is called for preservation of territorial integrity of iraq in syria and is supporting that idea. Thatan withdraws from decision, the disintegration of these countries are easy to imagine. Say minant view with what would be the positions if there is an announcement of a claim of independence . The second groups argument would be that we have populations within our own groups, within iraq, of course. We have intelligence, security, and commercial infrastructures and we can benefit from the situation and they are not going to pose a measured threat for us. But as i said, members of this group think that these are naive status isand that the an important part of the region. We would face an entirely , with manyiddle east areas making claim for independence. Appropriate to basically support any kind of movement that accepts the independence of any one of these independent territories. We must maintain the territorial integritys of these countries. Thank you, thats very helpful. Most people in washington are not even aware of a foreignpolicy debate going on in iran. As you wrote in your paper, the dominant view in a run is that force for what they call stabilization. You know very well that what iran calls stabilization, arab countries call meddling or worse in the affairs of arab countries. So, i am going to ask you to give your analysis of the paper and how you think the iranian debate can be factored into the debate going on in the arab world, if there is a debate, how they can be influenced to see the iranian activities in a less negative light. Sure. Thank you, barbara. Mywife tells me that speaking to spit speaking skills have progressed so im going to go back to basics with a few slides. Is what iran wants to do and regardless of what it wants to do, what its capabilities are. Or both, because i think that is important. The issue of iranian intentions is still a big . For me. Wasstened carefully to what said, but i listened closely to evidence of the debate, statements from leaders, and even the reporting about it, with a clear description of what the players and views are. I did not hear that today. I understand that there are certain limitations with which you have to deal with, but i think it would be extremely useful and important, and i cannot overstate this, for the Public Policy community in inhington and key players the region to know who is advocating. This is hardly an academic exercise. Let me turn to the usual capabilities. Let me see if i can work this. I think i have that printed out in case. Just i am very quick with my slides. The issue of capability is very important because in the american policy debate about iran and its regional role, those capabilities are either completely misdiagnosed or worse, neglected. I would like to offer a little bit of nuance into that, because it is important. Never underestimate what iran can do in the region to advance its own interests. The ieds in iraq, that killed soldiers. American 196, according to a declassified document. The iraniraq war that at the other end of it, the iraqis were heavily financed by arab states and armed to the teeth by the west, that side was the side on life support until the end of its life. Bala, the most successful, most lethal, most disciplined nonstate actor in the world. Thats all because of iran. Hamas, not as effective, but probably the most important Security Threat to the israeli state. The me say it only. Bluntly. Lebanon will not have a president unless iran says so. Hezbollah has no meaningful future without the decisions of iran. Future is af syrian function of israeli design. It is a function, among others, of iranian designs. All security overall is a function of iranian design. Entanglingcceeded in its main adversary, saudi arabia, in a very vicious fight. While it has a dominant influence in iraq, the only actor they can credibly threaten it today is isis. Finally, the knot can there cannot be any major wars in that area of the World Without iran having a say in it. Because of these accomplishments, iran has considerable political Bargaining Power in the region. If you are sitting in tehran today, you are feeling good about your regional position. Capabilitiesian are a very mixed bag and this is where the bad new starts. The proxy wars in which iran is involved today have stabilized not a single space and have failed to build peace. Iran may have succeeded in bleeding its saudi adversary, but that comes at a heavy price. It comes with the price of telling the world that it is supporting an illegitimate revoltedhat has against an elected in legitimate president. Today the who sees today they will neither reconstruct the country or help to achieve a political solution. The iranians have been successful in syria, but that comes with heavy casualties for hezbollah, at alienating the sunni world, perhaps causing some military overstretch for the ir gc. Terrificomist had a piece on that. Perhaps an exaggerated claim, but there is some truth some truth to it. Some of the most important and influential people today in iraq , rumor has it they fired a very anglian angry letter complaining about the handling politicians. Sunni perhaps alienating them and not handling them with care. Former irit that the gc commanders back in action to be held in check or just watch over his shoulders. There is also a price for awakening golf and arab nationalism. Antiiranian,t, if i can world does use a word like that, is at a high point today. Because of yemen some of these countries are learning how to wage combat with some of the most important and powerful weapons on earth. With all the talk about irans warfare,n asymmetric we have to remember that this is a country with very modest conventional capabilities also. The Iranian Air Force is a relevant in any military scenario or any dogfight with arab gulf fighter jets. Iran has considerable skills in land warfare due primarily to the iraniraq war. Last thing you should be worried about is their land capabilities. Territorial conquests should not really be occupying the top of our list of concerns. The Iranian Missile arsenal is quite impressive. Its not reliable, though. Lethal asrecise or as we think it is. Feelver, its adversaries that there have been progress there hasnt progress made in integrating those regionally. Short, iran is very good at asymmetric warfare. But whether it is at land or at sea, the most you can do is problems, like closing the straight of hormuz anytime it wants. But it simply cant. In closing i know i have taken up too much of your time. It matters less what irans conventions are. When we try to assess their regional role at the nuclear deal, actions speak much louder. Capabilities that i described are clearly not inadequate or inferior. The also do not match rhetoric coming out of washington or the arab gulf states that will be facing a rhizome rising regional hegemony. There may be debate inside iran today. Important debate today is between iran and the arab golf states. How it happens, i dont know. Is not making it happen as quickly as possible. Thanks barbara thanks, bilal saa. I think one thing we have to keep in mind is that the policies are based on their threat perceptions and they feel the major threats come from the United States and israel and those asymmetric policies are supporting hezbollah. I think that hezbollah would continue even if there was not in a run, but i will let you tackle some of his other points. Professor hadian for the first part of your talk here, im sure that there are many in iran they would love to hear what you said. They not just only wish, but they really think they have such a capability. But the second part of your talk is far closer to reality. Address a number of the issues you raised. First of all, regarding saudi arabia, yemen, and the gcc, they are all different. Our relationships with them are very different to. Of the demands on iraqi Iranian Security are minimum. Their manly in favor of gcc policies. Im sure that they would love to get a credit iran. Is, we haveity spent a few millions of dollars in thats all. Anyone that goes there will remain here there. , no group of tendencies. Is there any illusion that we. An do anything in yemen possibly iran gets far, far away with this, also. Something they would not be able to do. Dropping it all together to say that iran is meddling in the affairs of others, i expected to hear this from politicians, but not from you. Distant always a between perception and reality, but this is too far. They have reported repeatedly on influencing yemen. Very limited. Very limited. You know, to me saudis have basically adopted the policies regarding iran before and since the revolution where they try to contain iran. They are building important infrastructure inside iran. In a number of our provinces. Training students, spending money, giving money, building mosques, so forth and so on. As they have been trying to all alongastructure irans border. In other words, if saudis are it is basically because they feel they need a base to contain iran. There is the reason for them to be in these places. They are in the arab countries. Whatever it be, privilege or special, entitlement to intervene in these countries. But you know how much money theyre spending their. If they are in iraq, syria, lebanon, it is basically on the basis of threat perception. It is a threat coming from israel and the u. S. On the basis of that threat perception, they have defined our forces. The strategic steps within be lebanon, syria, and a rack. They have tried to have an infrastructure there to do the most important thing. First, israelis taking military action against us. Number two, retaliation in case of an attack. We are not there because we are challenging the saudis. We are not in lebanon, syria, or a rack because or i rock or iraq. We dont see saudi arabia as a threat. They are very much at the bottom. After three years ago even you could not find anything. We dont consider them. We dont consider them to be a threat. We have not developed infrastructure to deal with the challenge. That is exactly what it is in saudi arabia. If they are in lebanon, they are not there because they want to challenge the israelis or us. They are there because they want to challenge of us. In all of these areas, the saudis are challenging us. Because we consider them as a threat. Iran, itng and blaming is really strange. But even a stranger can easily balance us, as i mentioned. The combined population is bigger. It could balance us relatively easily. They have a superpower behind it. They can easily balance it. Why they cannot balance this . It is an inherently political system. No matter how many times president obama tells them that we are behind you, we will give you this and that, we are going to support you, no matter how much we tell them leave us, you are no threat, we dont want to do anything other than inherently they are sourcing the , anyone who outsources it to someone else will seem insecure. So, thats natural and has been the case throughout history. Always we are worried that possibly the other guy is going to be sold or bought by the other side. Do they think that we will pay a higher price to the americans and they will side with us and be left . Unless they rely on their own resources to provide security , they are going to feel threatened in a matter what we tell them or what americans tell them. Its not going to resolve. To me we are a convenient and it convenient enemy for them. For the pundits, for the policymakers, for some of the , attacking americans , even attacking israel has a cost. But attacking iran is real