Israelhamas war. Your video will remain off, but your microphone will be unneeded. Justin, over to you. Hi, everyone. I am the executive editor of Foreign Affairs. We are joined by three first rate experts in this field. These are the kind of people that we turn to when we have questions to ask, that we can get smart answers on. And even sort of smaller, narrower issues of detail. These are the kind of people that we turn to. Im really looking forward to learning something here. This is a conflict that has raised a lot of questions and calls a lot of our assumptions into question. Im hoping they can shed some light. You have the bios. I will not read them to you and bore you with those details. Its just get started. Im going to start with you, dan. Have an article on the Foreign Affairs today which is called israels mobile strategy in gaza. I suggest everyone on this call might want to take a look at it. It is a long and detailed and interesting piece based on some research and reporting you did in israel recently. Im going to pose this question to you and also audrey and stephen. We have talked a lot in the past 18 months in a different context about a theory of victory. This is the question often posed to ukraine. What is ukraines theory of victory . When i look at what is happening in gaza the question i have is, what is israels era of the victory in this conflict . Dan so, i would say that israel has multiple theories of victory. And at times they either are not thought through or contradict each other. At the most basic level israel would want to say they want to destroy hamas. That is something most people could not their heads about, but in practice that could mean a lot of different things. Israel is trying to target hamas leadership. It is trying to crush its infrastructure and fighters in gaza. But that is an exceptionally difficult way to destroy this organization. Unless there is some way to replace its rule in gaza. As part of israels thinking they think of the shortterm question and much less on the longer term, if hamas is diminished, what is going to take its place . I will add for conversation, israel has a bunch of other goals that are outside gaza. That includes making sure that hezbollah is not able to spread. That the u. S. Relationship is in tact. That people renew their faith in the government. So, it is trying to juggle competing objectives, and at times these do not work together. Justin ok. Lets go to audrey. Same question. You can either pivot off of what dan said, or tell us something different. What do you think israels theory of a is . Audrey i think israel has a military objective, not a theory of victory. Its military objective is to end hamas, but that strategy incorporates political plans to reach an outcome. And i think those are missing. Justin so, if you had to gauge the success of what they are doing, you would look at tactical rather than strategic, and surely from a tactical point of view are they getting closer to the in the state they seek . Audrey no, i think they are not getting closer, unfortunately. He gives me Great Sadness to say that. I think they are undermining some of their broader Strategic Interests in focusing heavily on a military objective. I think that the political and end state is fuzzy and in many respects in at odds with the greater Strategic Interests of israel. By pursuing kinetic use of are undermining the longerterm interests of israel, both at home and in the region, and potentially in the world. Because i do not think that israel has a realistic pathway to ending hamas. Particularly using the kind of tactics it is using right now. Even if israel destroys this version of hamas, as dan has said, even if it is successful in destroying its military rowing military wing, these can be replaced. Less israel stops killing Palestinian Civilians another group is going to take its place and there will be a renewed cycle of violence. The political situation will not be improved. Israel could have a viable strategy to end hamas, but that is not what they are seeing right now. I would be happy to talk about what i think that strategy is. Justin you will get to it. Steven, is your theory of victory different . Steven wanted to say i am at a disadvantage here because i am not a guns and the trucks military analyst, but having looked at the situation and listening carefully to what the israelis are saying, it strikes me at that they are three of victory is to render hamas incapable. This is a twist on what dan and audrey are saying. To render hamas incapable of threatening israel in the same way a did on october 7. This includes destroying the hamas leadership. In terms of a broader political goal, i think the israelis are being coy about what it is they actually want. Either that is because they dont really know, or that they know but they dont really want to tell everybody what it is. I think the logical outcome and some of the things Senior Leadership are saying would lead one to believe that there will be an occupation of the gaza strip for some period of time in order to make sure that they are theory of victory is actually achieved, which is rendering hamas incapable of threatening israel in a variety of ways. That may undermine israels international standing. It may cause tension in the u. S. Israel relationship. But like every other state, israels primary responsibility is to ensure the security of the country. That seems to me the way in which they are going in order to do that. Justin lets talk about hamas. I have the same question when it comes to hamas. What is hamas theory of victory here . I guess you could talk about, in a sense the motivations behind the october 7 attack, but i want to focus more on, they did that, and we can talk about why they did that and whether it was whether it went the way they thought it was going to go and whether it was the outcome they intended. I am more interested now, given that now hamas has phased 10 weeks of this israeli assault. Given the reality they face now, dan, you can travel to israel and talk to generals and idf personnel. You cannot go to gaza and talk to the leaders there. As best we can tell based on their statements and what they are doing, what is hamas theory of victory at this point, if they have one . Dan part of their goal is survival, but if they survive, they will probably emerge stronger politically. And they launched a devastating attack on israel. That attack has tremendous support among many in the arab world. Especially in the palestinian community. There is a real sense that israel needs to feel the pain that palestinians feel, that their community has experienced. And that israel has simply ignored them, and hamas has put this back on the map. Have point showing increases in support for hamas, especially in the west bank. If it survives it will be politically stronger. To a degree it satisfies the goals of one of its most important patrons, in iran. So there is benefit there as well. But it has to have some recognition of the overwhelming material superiority of israel. And that is something that hamas is always trying to reconcile. The reality of israels power with hamas efforts to undermine it and weaken it. To me it has not squared that final circle. In the end hamas may emerge stronger from all of this, but it is still vulnerable to counterterrorism, if not in a hamas bulb be destroyed sense, much more on a daytoday basis hamas will be off balance, leaders will being killed, it will have to hide. That is something that to me is probably it is probably going to fail at, at least in the short term. Dan justin audrey, you wrote this book called how terrorism inns. One of the statistics i always remember from that book, and correct me if im wrong, but it is Something Like, 8 of terrorist groups, what we define as terrorist groups, actually achieve their goals. I look at hamas today and im wondering, what are the chances theyre going to wind up in that 8 . Or are they going to meet some other fate . What is your understanding of whether they are trying to survive or do Something Else . Audrey yes, so i think the figure is even a little less than that. The figure is about achieving their strategic goals, which is for hamas, presumably it is about having a homeland for the Palestinian People, broadly and strategically. But i think its theory of victory right now in this particular part of their struggle is all about mobilizing Popular Support for itself and destroying israel, as it is stated in their charter. It has done so in a way that terrorist groups always do, and that is by provoking israel to overreact and undermine itself. I agree with you, dan that they are fazed by a much more militarily strong foe. But they are doing is using israels own strength against israel. They have also taken another classic terrorist tactic, which is to polarize populations both in israel, there were already pretty polarized, now it is worse, but also regionally and globally. Mobley is the most worrisome aspect of the polarization that has in some respects in successful with respect to hamas tactics. Anyway, it is definitely provoked israel to use overwhelming force, military force, in ways that are hurting it. And camino, hamas has maneuvered in some respects, israel into lashing out with brutal force in a way that undermines its legitimacy in terms of the perceptions of many members of the audience watching. This is really quite alarming. If you think about the constituencies that hamas was trying to reach, initially iran, hezbollah, its own members, and now an International Community appalled by the violence against the Palestinian People. It is very worrisome, and i hope that israel can engage in a much broader Strategic Perspective that includes a more clear understanding of what the political and should be with respect to hamas. Celeste undermine that strategy. Justin steven, does hamas have a theory of victory . Steven i think staying alive is part of their theory of victory. You know, it is important to record recognized that a critical component of palestinian identity. It is steadfastness and resistance. In particular for hamas and its cadres it is resistance. As long as there is hamas and they are resisting and they have the capability to fire at israel or engage israeli troops, against the mighty idf, they are resisting, and they remain and therefore it is a victory. It does also have the important effect and this is something that audrey spoke to which is to suck the israelis into an openended conflict within the gaza strip. Hamas, gall islamist groups, have a much longer timeline than many of us have for many about suspect they do. This is from their perspective an opening shot, or another round in a longterm struggle that is aimed at undermining israel by sucking it in, polarizing israeli society. Israeli society is not polarized at the moment. There has been a rally around the flag. They may hate Prime Minister netanyahu, but there is a rally around the flag. Ultimately over time an openended conflict is likely to polarize israeli society. Weaken its economy, demoralize its leadership, and undermine the trust of its people and leadership. Those are longerterm strategic goals toward the ultimate goal, which is the liberation of all of palestine, not gaza and west bank, but gaza, the west bank, and sovereign israel. I think it would be a victory. Look, what hamas did on october 7 is something no arab force has been able to do since 1948. So, they have gone a long way toward securing that victory. As much firepower as the israelis can bring to bear, as long as there is one hamas terrorist left firing back at them it constitutes some semblance of a victory. Justin im interested in this question of polarization. Dan, you were in israel recently. What was your sense of that . Im curious, my impression, as steven has said that, you know, there has been a kind of unity of a polity that had been previously very polarized around judicial reforms, and if anything it seems to me there has been unity around the repudiation of netanyahu. That everybody seems to dislike netanyahu or distrust netanyahu at this point. What was your sense of that . The followup question, how, if we can assume at some point that will end, what would be likely at this point to erode that sense of solidarity . Is it reservists returning from service . What are the factors . What are the things we should be looking for to start saying, maybe this is going to crack . Dan my impression was that there is tremendous unity. An outpouring of patriotism. You had huge adherence to reservist call ups, lots of volunteers, lots of Society Action that had been directed at the government now directed at supporting troops and the displaced. But it is a country that really has raw wounds. In these wounds are painful, and there is an expectation that senior military and intelligence officials will resign as soon as the first round is done. They have announced a bowl, military and intelligence leaders. Weber, political leaders have not. And if netanyahu and perhaps some others do not resign there will be mass demonstrations. The polarization you mentioned that had occurred before october 7, that will return with a sense of anger at netanyahu. An important caveat is the divisions that cause that polarization about the direction israel should go in. Differences between jews and arabs and the secular have not gone away. And now you have this horrible failure, and there will be, i think, one thing that could set this off is distance that the government is playing politics with the response rather than doing what is best for israel. That latter concept sounds good, but is subject to interpretation, but we are seeing this already with netanyahu. Trying to embrace biden, but also criticizing the Biden Administration variety of ways. We are seeing it with regard to how israel has described palestinians, where biden is trying to say, im the one who is netanyahu is the one saying, im the one who saved you from oslo. I think that could further polarize israel and make things even worse six months from now. But this is an opportunity of country to come together. Maybe that will happen. Justin im struck when i read commentary, even commentary on Foreign Affairs and the American Media more broadly, that there is these two ideas that kind of crop up constantly when we talk about the day after. That everybody understands that there is this need to figure out, well, what is going to come next in gaza . Steven, you had said maybe the israelis have some idea about this and they are just not saying what it is. Maybe they dont know. But there seems to be this constant suggestion of two things, that is, one of the reformed Palestinian Authority somehow ruling or playing a role in ruling gaza wants hamas has been eliminated or camino, destroyed. And the other is that there needs to be some kind of revitalization of the two state solution as a longterm goal, partially because that might actually solve the problem, but also see this argument that without that you will not get any buyin from arab states who will have to play some role in gaza. So you have to Pay Lip Service to that goal. Im struck by this, because it seems to me that in israel, and even amongst palestinians there just seems to be absolutely no interest in either of these things. I really would love to hear you are champing at the bit, so im going to go to you. Im just, i have rarely seen such a wide delta in all of the decades of this conflict and american involvement in it. What is going on and why is there this disconnect . Maybe you can tell me what you think. Out of me to be laughing. It is because there is this extraordinary disconnect i have touched on. Any number of times in my recent writings at Foreign Policy. Sorry, justin. You know, it is extraordinary, because it seems that american officials and others are seizing on the revitalization of the Palestinian Authority because they are bereft of any other ideas. I dont blame them, but certainly reviving the Palestinian Authority and the two state solution have got to be two Foreign Policy unicorns for the United States. In particular when it comes to reviving the Palestinian Authority when were talking about the timeframe the Biden Administration or its successor would be working with it seems to me an important it is important to understand that this is a quasistate that is compromised by extraordinary corruption, dysfunction, and a total lack of legitimacy. It was an extraordinary piece in the New York Times today by a palestinian political activist which underlined each one of these things. So, it would take a long, long time in order to revitalize the Palestinian Authority. I can tell you having just traveled in the gulf, the gulf countries are willing to play ball, but they are very, very wary of pouring money into the Palestinian Authority, knowing that it is not going to go to good use. So, what it would take, i think, is mixed mismatched the amount of time anybody is working with. And the idea that Mahmoud Abbas and the people around him are willing to give up our is also something that is quite open to question. I know the palestinians are missing in this discussion, who are essentially saying what we need if we are going to rescue the Palestinian Authority is to bring hamas into it. Ring hamas into the plo. In that way we can have a Broad Coalition of palestinians confronting this problem. Of course, this is a nonstarter for the israelis, and there have been any number of attempts at reconciliation between fatah and hamas over many years that has never worked. As far as the two state solution goes, dan was just in israel. I think it should be clear to everybody and dan can attest because he was on the ground that netanyahu has rejected it. Benny gantz has been coy