A general advisory firm. He served as the director of from 2006 elligence to 2009 where he was responsible for overseeing all information oncerning the plans, intentions, and capabilities of adversaries, producing timely analysis for decision conducting covert operations to thwart terrorists and other enemies of the United States. Author, lecturer and teacher. She spent 17 years in the most editorial positions at the New York Times where she was the first woman to serve as bureau chief. Managing editor and executive editor. She e joining the times, was Deputy Washington Bureau chief and an investigative eporter covering money and politics at the wall street journal for nine years. Leon is a cofounder and chairman of the pineta institute for policy and a former secretary of defense. Secretary pinetas long and service shed public career has spanned the United States army, the United States ouse of representatives, the office of management and budget, president clintons chief of staff, director of Central Intelligence, and the 23rd defense. Y of steve, our moderator sa staff writer at the new yorker, the of seven books of nonfiction and a twotime prize. Of the pulitzer he has been a reporter, forn correspondent, senior editor, managing editor, and is the dean of Columbia University graduate school of journalism. Please join me, ladies and welcoming our panelists and our moderator. [applause] steve thank you. Thanks everyone for being here. To this oking forward discussion. No one up here is congenitally so im hoping to invite all of you to talk over your moderator, ignore your moderator, ask each other questions, weve got a lot of ground to cover and a lot of lively subjects. I think lets start with the basics and i think maybe toward the end of the conversation, i move into the world were in now, the digital age of creates a a which whole new set of questions looking ahead. Editorial decision making, our colleagues in the audience know, law. A lot like case you have certain principals behind you, certain standards, nd casebycase, you try to apply the complex facts and make good judgment. When a reporter comes to you that sensitive story reveals Sensitive National security information in one sort another, what are the principles you have in mind as you evaluate what to publish, night to publish . Well, certainly, in that steve, i would, you now, unless it was something extraordinarily sensitive, where i would know that lives were really at stake. I would encourage the journalist and the reporter with the story to find out more about it, to make very er difficult decisions about what stories to actually publish and to hold a story or in very unusual situations to something, publish you know, information really helps you. In the end, decisions, i should say explicitly were, you know, the most excruciating. Confronted both the washington because stories involving National Security and rooted in e were washington as managing editor of as times and certainly executive editor, and the i ancing test that applied, use me as one of the panelists this morning pointed out, you know, constitutionally hold power ndate to ccountable and keep the public informed. So that is our first responsibility, but in the test, that has to be with, is the story really going to cause harm to country, because as ournalists, were citizens, too, and we want to do verything we can to keep the country safe. Professional our duty is really to inform. I had these jobs the period immediately war on terror the and all through to the end of he bush administration, and through both obama , certainly ons, and fewer to 9 11, there were of these requests. You had to ask yourself the question that, actually, one of downeys kaiser, put ob brilliantly, which is if a war on terror is being waged in the of the people, shouldnt the people know about it . Shouldnt the people know about dimensions . New se with all of the programs that were launched during that period, they hadnt consent d a chance to to some of the, you know, dark programs that were being carried out. End, youre, in the responding to federal constituencies. Ne, to the public, because youre balancing the importance f keeping them informed and holding them accountable. You know, the country, you dont a precipitous decision that could actually arm the country, and then your own reporters, because you get you know, what adds to thesecruciating nature of decisions is the reporters usually worked really long on to get them and ironclad, you know, their sources have put themselves in harms way. They feel their credibility is n the line because their sources expect the story to be published. All of those balls are in the air. Least first thing, at hat i did, is when an raised serious National Security concerns and asked the New York Times to ither hold a story or not publish it entirely, you hit the pause button. I worry that a lot of impression as the that we get these leaks about programs, like we hone into the Washington Bureau them right publish away, but that could not be case. Er from the but, you know, i dont think just assume that president s ons and aretheir chief intelligence crying wolf and, you know, being cavalier and to publish i think, is ckly, not the right response. Because the ime, requests became more frequent to organizations to stories, ies or kill that there are new organizations, big ones in no longer call comment on use for some of these stories, which sometimes doesnt always have the administration finds a sensitive have story in the works. Steve so on one more beat, in principles, you could refer to one thats probably if you judge on, that publishing would directly to the death or survival of an individual, or the publishing gratuitous operational detail, or its messing up an Battlefield Movement thats of no Public Interest reason, of course, those are relatively easy principles to behind you. But when you get to this assertion of harm to the country to, national erred security damage may involve less effects, exposure of or ements between allies other sensitive matters. How do you think through that are there nd times ive worked with you, watched you make some of these judgments, but how did you define National Security you considered whether to withhold a certain detail . As jill said, we seek information about that and try to make the best decision after having as much of that possible, and including experts from our own staff. You were an expert in one part for example. I think its best to answer with one illustration, which is a Pulitzer Prize winner dana priest, regarding intelligence agencies, she is a reporter who had many, many sources from the top to the bottom of the agencies. Nce and there came a time some years after 9 11 when she realized sources were very concerned about something, very worried about something. Leak. As not a nobody dumped this on her. She just was picking up little pieces of information from a variety of sources and piecing it together, and it was turned out to be the cias secret prisons abroad, particularly in eastern europe, where highvalue terror suspects questioned. Eld and cases know also in some there are questions with the questioning techniques. Once you piece together a lot of this, she did what you should do. She went to her sources in the cia, including the person in for public information. She was sent to the senior person in charge of this entire to them and listened about what was going on. Im sorry, first of all, you want to know if its true. Know if this is right. So thats another reason it goes that news rnment, organizations may be publishing things without talking to the government at all is scary, it may notst of all, be true. So you want to establish the eracity of it and you want to establish National Security concerns and know what are they, what different kinds of decisions do we make . And she kept me informed all through the all whole matter. Finally, when it became clear to hem that we were going to publish some kind of story, when were still trying to figure out hat to include and not include in my quarter century of making these kind of decisions, we but often the story held specific details, obviously in code names of operations, of individuals, locations of where the earliest drones front. Hot up we didnt want to publish story warfare. Ne and kept the name of the country. Not because the government told us not to. But if we named someone, it would end. We didnt want it to end because they knew what was going on. In this case, we went to the and either the director of the cia or director of the Central Intelligence that was installed at the time and argued that we shouldnt air the story at all. Usual, i asked questions, what is involved here, whats so harm to human life and on. The various types of harm, we would just do that for the reputation. Well, you can strike that. [laughter] secondly, it means our allies trust us with secrets. Thats your problem, not ours. And then we got into serious things, they had to shut down the prisons most likely once located. Ore importantly, there was other kinds of operations going on with one or more of these countries in eastern europe, the counterterrorism organization, that yes, they were identified country hold iing the locations, that it could bring governments or certainly end the other security united ion with the states. And my ears perked up to that, because you can do this story naming the ssarily countries. Did, told them, as i always were going to consider them again, it was along with us. We were able to ask questions that were well informed. And then we were invited to the graham, who and don was the ceo, and bo jones, the myself, and the resident was there, you know, the chairs that you see here, hes sitting in the one and don graham is sitting in the other and im over and opposite me is cheney who didnt go out with me the whole time, and the National Security advisor was around and there were other folks there. Nd the president made the same presentation, the context of the war on terrorism, specifically about context of harm. Whichd a lot of questions were answered by steven hadley, the National Security advisor. Again, i e way out, asked specific questions, and said wed make a decision. That it was my decision whether to be made by him or the publisher, which is we always do things at the times. Of the he way out, one gentlemen in the room, id known off, and ime on and said, youre not going to name those countries, are you . I wasld tell thats where headed. I could tell thats where he was headed. Nobody else mattered. And thats what we did. A lot of t we took hell from people who thought it was terrible for us to breach this National Security secret on side, and we took a lot of hell from other people who said you didnt name those ountries, what are you, chicken . Secretary pineta, from the and side of the camera, having, im sure, run through these conversations from either cia or at the pentagon, what write . Ould you whats your reaction to what you leonard . Jill and do you think theyre on the right track in the way they balancing test . Frankly, my eta experience with leading newspapers like the times, post, wall street anetta frankly, my experience with leading newspapers like the times, Washington Post, wall street journal and others was that they tried to exercise good job here. Calls. Are tough its not easy. And the only times that i had we e discussions is where ad the potential if a story went out that a very sensitive probably be revealed. Meant jeopardizing the life of that source. Discussion ad the and, you know, look, reporters job, thats what they they go after those stories, and a lot of them have agency, rces within the whether you like it or not. He fact is, they do get their stories. And when immediately you pick up these stories, you know, you frankly, i and, would say 9 10 stories are, you they go, because report ser doing his job. Particularly like the stories getting out there, but thats the name of the game. But on that 10th story where you life you know, somebodys is in jeopardy if, in fact, this and you can make that case and i, frankly, most f the time, i talk to the reporter. Confirm he reporter, the reporters story, and the would be sensitive enough to take it to his bosses very ou know, i think the fact that a life was in jeopardy as enough to kind of balance turn the scales. Wherenever in a situation it involved, frankly, a broader youcy issue similar to what len, and thank god. I always felt that and there where it involved the post and i actually talked post e editor of the and i got a fair hearing. In the end, they delayed the story and then, said tely, you know, they well delay it for a while, and to wed like to come back you. And they did. So i have to tell you, my xperiences were that this was pretty straightforward, and that pleased that when youre making these decisions forget, they have a reporter, they have a story, its a hot story, you know, it a lot of news, and to be able to pull back from that orause the National SecurityNational Interest is involved, is not an easy call. My experience, the papers always made the right call. Steve general, welcome your comments on the principles that,ion, but to go beyond youve been speaking in a very striking way about the need for threeletter n agencies, in order to build the credibility with the voting ublic that a democracy requires. And i remember when you were in nsa being surprised as a call up and the phone number was answered, and sed to be called nosuch agency, and when i asked for some [laughter] for some help, the next thing i knew, i was having lunch or coffee with you garden. And i was struck that you seemed selfconscious strategy of trying to build some kind of balanced visibility for secret agency. What was on your mind in those days, and whats the broader we can t you think reach . General a lot of things you commented on. Make the call. The traditional answer when someone calls the nsa public with, howd you get this number . [laughter] hayden we made a more ous effort to put a human face on the agency. We he time for nsa, we knew were going into very unchartered territory. Debate s no national about the appropriateness of nsa intercepting soviet Strategic Forces communications fields, out to icbm looking for words of interest like launch or Something Like that. [laughter] we knew the n but 21st century equivalent of those networks would be out pursuing terrorist, proliferator communications, that were coexisting with your hack mail there in or gmail. Get the t we could not political sanctions or, frankly, 21stoney we need to pursue targets. If were still at the bunker in mede and hadnt built up a stronger sense of confidence hat we could be on those networks, we could bump your emails, but we wouldnt we would do , that only our duty. Conscious effort to raise our profile. Thats how it got more dramatic. Briefly, the last great nsa story is the snowden metadata stuff, fort mede ills up at and i think my administration was wholly flatfooted in responding to it. They needed to be out there more telling their story. The way it was rolled out took to a very dark corner of the room. It was very hard to explain what the agency was doing. One of the things the agency was faced with was they thought they were fine. After the great intelligence scandal of the 70s, pike and that, the compromise was to take intelligence, which frankly in most democracies, the province of the executive and actually share oversight of with the legislative branch. We have two select committees on now, and then a special Court Whenever it touched americans. Authorized bygram two president s, not one, two, overseend by congress, by the intel committee, which of it, and e fans checked back every 60 days by the court. Thinking, all right, thats going to be a bad one or twoday story but we checked. The macedonian check, executive, legislative, judicial. And we od to go, werent. Reaction from the gnl american operation, and not tin foilwing nuts with on their heads. [laughter] general hayden really americans. Serious and steve, what happens, reinforcing what were trying to now were nd 2000, doing it 11, 12, and 13, what had happened was a lot of good americans would point to that, congress, court, and now said that no longer constituted consent of the government. That may be consent of the governs, but its not consent of the governed. Them, but you old didnt tell me. Contract we cial had built on the church pike compromise, we had real nine ubsidence, and the social contract was gone and now, act can democracy wants to like it does with every aspect f government this was not unique, wants to have a more personal knowledge of what its do before e services they willingly validate the ctivities of the Intelligence Services. To be clear, if were moral, well shape the effectiveness. How this business works. But if were not more open, step away from us and we wont do anything. Now, the great challenge is, how the public to a degree we have never informed them before in order to have the legitimacy that the ublic used to concede to us simply by keeping a couple of committees informed . Leon may i Say Something . I want to follow up on that about the importance of the youre talking about between Intelligence Services and government on the ne hand and journalists on the other. The snowden case is a good example of that. Of that been in charge coverage at the post. Im not there anymore but im amiliar with how its being done. And the it has been very protection of he National Security for communication to go on between the journalists and the in a case at the post. Very good policy with working them. And its for the advantage of the journalism, for one thing o, make sure its accurate because you have a bunch of memos and complicated technical stuff you dont understand if help. Nt have in some cases, it turns out to be a proposal that actually went which you dont find out unless the government cooperates with you in going things that