Washington. The conversation, live at noon on cspan 2. The turkish referendum vote they give president erdogan expanded executive powers was the discussion of the institute at washington dc. Panelists offer their predictions for turkeys future. Good afternoon. Good afternoon. Welcome to the washington institute. I am the executive director. I am delighted to welcome all of you to this special event. Before i begin if i can please ask everyone to take your iphones or samsungs or whatever and turn them on silent, because we are broadcasting live on cspan one. So please watch your language and speak and clear tones so people around the world can hear us. Youre free to tweet as much as you like because we are eager to get todays discussion out far and wide. It is not often that one can time the publication of a new o will propitiously to an international event. Or arrange a referendum in a far away country to be timed perfectly with the publication of a new look. As it turns out, we have this confluence of events. We have the referendum in turkey that come although the results in the process were provocative and remain controversial and subject to great debate, and i am sure we will hear more about that, the result seems to be to elevate the existing president of turkey into an even higher or elevated position. Might be able to call the new sultan. Surprisingly enough, that is the title of this new book by the director of the washington institutes Turkish Research program, soner cagaptay, the and thean erdogan crisis of modern turkey. I know we know turkey is a country in crisis. As the subtitle of soner cagaptays Outstanding New work suggests. The subject of todays discussion is, what type of crisis . How lasting a crisis . A crisis at home . A crisis abroad . A crisis getting worse or a crisis Getting Better . Now, for all the provocation and controversy there might even be some clarity about the direction of turkish leadership. And to talk about these questions, first, imm going to be quite delighted to welcome to the podium the author of the new sultan soner cagaptay. And then, we have an outstanding array of turkish expertise here on the panel. And as a look around the audience, a remarkable array of turkish expertise within these four walls. Soner, iturned to am delighted to welcome to the podium the founder of the middle east Institutes Center for turkish studies and an adjunct professor at the George Washington university for middle east studies here in washington. Then we will turn to the Public Policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson centers italys program, veteran journalist, 15 years a turkish correspondent for the economist. Really delighted to have this panel, which brings such indepth knowledge of the current political situation and the likely direction of politics to turkey, and special interest to this audience of course, the direction of the u. S. Turkish relationship in this new era. We have already seen the first sign of the direction of the u. S. Turkish relationship of course, with President Trumps outreach to the newly reempowered president erdogan just yesterday. Now going to call to the podium my colleague soner. Soner has been with the institute now for many years. He is the author of several books on turkish domestic and Foreign Policy. Soners greatest claim to fame is there is a generation of American Foreign Service Officers who have gone on to serve america brought in turkey, who have passed through aners tender mercies as instructor of american diplomats abroad. I think we are all better served for that. That americas representatives in turkey have had the benefit of soners insight and wisdom. That is one of the things we try to do here at the institute, not and opine in books, op eds, television, but to improve the quality of American Foreignpolicy by such things as teaching american diplomats. I am delighted to have soner. Soner, the podium is yours. Soner thank you, rob. I in so pleased to see so many of my friends and colleagues from around town. It is a great day for me. I really appreciate you are here. I want to thank the rest of the panelists. They are two of the topnotch experts in town on turkish politics. There was an excellent oped in the New York Times this morning. She is a frequent commentator on various issues. I have been a follower of her work for nearly two decades. I am pleased to have her with me here today. I also wanted to start of course, by thanking president Tayyip Erdogan for will time in the referendum to overlap with the launch of my book. I could not have done it without him. [laughter] soner literally and figuratively. This is obviously a critical time in turkish history. I want to tell you first about my book, the new sultan. I decided to read this book last year in june. The original idea was that i would write it over a year, it would be edited sometime this spring and published next summer. Then the coup happened as i was writing the book. My editors asked me to bring up the deadline. I agreed. I wrote it between coming back from the beach in august and christmas in december, about four months. And then it was edited and copyedited and proofread and designed and printed in the last three months. And there you go. , very proud of the book of course. Thank a number of people to whom i owe gratitude for getting this right together. First of all, my boss rob sutcliffe. Of course because he is my boss and i am doing Salary Review with him right now. [laughter] soner thank you, rob. The institute and my colleagues. This is a great place to work. It is one of the best places to work and probably the best intellectual incubator. I have enjoyed my tenure here over the last 15 years. I feel lucky to be surrounded by so many smart people and my colleagues, as well as our research assistants. I have been blessed in the last decade and a half by a very Impressive Group of interns and research assistance, some of whom are in this room. I see meredith. Jim is here. You guys are both in the book , thank you. Of course, my biggest thanks goes to of course, sitting in the front. I think you deserve a round of applause. [applause] i did not drive her crazy. Thank you for bearing with me. We went through every sentence together. I would tell her a sentence and she would finish it. I would say, did you look at that typo . And she was say, yes, i fixed it. I cannot have done the book without you. I have dedicated this book to the loving memory of my mother. I was born into a workingclass family in turkey and went to yale for my phd. My parents have raised me and my siblings and deserve tremendous thanks. I want to turn to my book, why i wrote it and what it is about. And i will go to my colleagues and we will have hopefully, a good discussion on that. I followed turkish policy as a student for nearly two decades. I have written on it. In the last 15 years, i have been at the institute writing on turkey. For those of you who follow my work, you will find traces of our discussions in this book. In many ways, the new sultan follows my previous book, the rise of turkey. In this book, i looked at turkeys Economic Growth under president erdogan, and his justice and development party. I argue that turkey has witnessed meant us Economic Growth in the last decade. After having been transformed economically, erdogans task was to transform turkey politically. To this end and i believe this i believe erdogan wants to make turkey a great power. I said the path to that goes through becoming an advanced economy. Erdogan has made turkey a country which makes themselves strong. Turkey has to become a hub for google. And to pass for that it has to become an open society and a liberal democracy. Turkey, theof homework was therefore, to get to the advanced economy, to build a new liberal democratic order. One that would provide for freedom for the two halves of turkey, the freedom of religion for the religious half, and freedom of religion for the secular half, roughly defined. This new constitution would have to provide for broad liberties for all citizens, including the kurds. I concluded that relieved of his perennial, secular religious tensions in the border of the kurdish problem, inside and outside of the country, turkey avoidthen soar, the trap of a middle income economy and become a great power. I dont think erdogan read my book. [laughter] soner i wrote this one now, the crisis of turkey. Let me tell you what the crisis is and where it is heading. It is the story of erdogans power consolidation since 2003, Prime Minister. I argue in the conclusion that erdogan has become as unavailable as was ataturk was. He is the most powerful turk. The problem is, half of turkey loves them and the other half loaths him. That is the crisis in which turkey has found itself, as a result of erdogans political trajectory. What is more, i argue that erdogan wants to shape turkey in his own image. I suggest he is following what i model. Ataturk in the early 20th century, ataturk shaped turkey in his own image, including education policy, as a secular, western european society. Erdogan wants to use the ataturk model, but he is taking a cue from the countrys founder. He wants to emulate and replace ataturk. He does not share his values, just methods. That is topdown social engineering. And he wants to use state power once again, including educational policy to shape turkey in his own image, very different from ataturks image. A country that would become to the core, islamic, politically that is. Religious and middle eastern, and conservative. That is a topdown method that i think erdogan is borrowing from the ataturk model. But ataturk was a military general. Erdogan had a democratic mandate. Or i should say, he had one until the sunday. There is widespread consensus that the election process was not fair. And there is emerging consensus that there were irregularities the day of the voting. We dont know the scale of the irregularities, but that is the problem. Erdogan has decided to move forward. He has declared himself an executive style president. Best, a mandate in question for half of the country that does not support him and that only exacerbates turkeys deep societal polarization. It te did not olivier did not alleviate it. Turkey is split in the middle between pro and anti erdogan camps. Will belikely erdogan able to impose his vision on the erdogan society. I argue in the book that it is unlikely that he will be able to impose his vision on the entire Turkish Society. There are many experts on turkey in this room. I see many of my friends and former students from the state department. We have discussed this many times, it is a very complicated country with him a launch of political, at the, religious, and social groups. We saw this in sundays referendum. A near majority is not a majority. We have a map of turkey. If we can pull it up a second. There you go. As you can see on the map, overwhelming number of turkish provinces along the coast and northwest representing an overwhelming percentage of turkeys gp voted against them. He lost istanbul, where he started his political career, which i track in my book, in 1994 when he became mayor. That is where he provided good government, cleaned up the city. It is why the turks decided to make an Prime Minister later on and help his rise to power. He lost that. He lost support in some of the key cities of the country, but more importantly, as well as losing in the kurdish areas, he stanbul, i including his own area in istanbul. I argue in my book that turkey is simply too large demographically, too big economically, and too complicated politically for one person to control it in its entirety. Despite erdogans efforts to create a crowning class of capitalists, which would control the large part of turkeys economic wealth, it is still wedded to secular and european values. Let me know look at the trajectories, which i highlight in my book Going Forward. I see three trajectories moving forward. I will conclude a little bit looking at postreferendum Foreign Policy environments, which i think deserves some discussion as well. Trajectory is the current state of affairs. A deeply polarized society in which half of the country, the conservatives, islamists, nationalists, three groups that believe turkeys heaven. The other half is a loose coalition of opposition figures, socialists, leftists, democrats, or liberal muslims who believe turkey is hell. This is the best case, in my view forward, Going Forward, a permanent state of crisis turkey is stuck under. As long as turkey is generally democratic, erdogan cannot continue to govern the way he wants. There is a chance he might even end the democracy Going Forward. That is the second trajectory. The third is an extension of the second. Societal polarization, coupled right, fars from the right by isis, from the far lieft by pkk. Together with nefarious neighbors, who want erdogans fall, i argue in my book, could even catapult turkey into an unfortunate and unwanted civil conflict. Now and look at erdogans foreignpolicy challenges because we have not discussed that yet. I spent a lot of time in the how russia isbout the nemesis that keeps coming, despite the fact that russians are friendly towards erdogan. They are also deploying troops in setting up a base. U. S. Policy also works with ypg, but only where there is isis. Russia is operating where there is no isis. It is surrounded by the assad regime, turkey back rebels and turkey. Going forward, i think russia is going to be erdogans nemesis, as well as the most feared enemy. But does this thing erdogan but does this mean erdogans is coming to the bosom of the western world . He is not. We saw this in the runup to the referendum. The European Union became the punching bag in the runup to the referendum. This has a lot to do with erdogans next step. He has become an executive style present. There are elections coming up. He has to win those elections for the parliament in his party. Something interesting happened during the last election. Voters of the nationalist action party, which is a smaller fraction of the turkish parliament, which polled about 10 , voted for erdogan in the referendum and some voted against him. This party is splitting. The split is happening where voters in central and northeastern anatolia are flipping for erdogan. Nhp voters in the coastal provinces and large cities are flipping against erdogan. That is music to erdogans ears. That means he can solidify apks popularity. This is an ultranationalist party. It also suggests that mhps support for erdogan strengthens apk, but in case of new elections, mhp will fail turkeys high 10 electoral threshold. When that happens, apk has super majority in the parliament. Goalnk thats erdogans Going Forward. That means ultranationalists on foreignpolicy issues anticipate major problems in ties with europe. He has suggested he might bring back capital punishment. That would end of a turkey being kicked out of the council of europe. If they are kicked out, turkish courts will not be recognized at the highest court of the country. Turkish citizens will not have access to that, and that changes the political dynamics of the country. He controls the courts. I anticipate a hard nationalist foreignpolicy line towards u. S. Cooperation with ypg because that is in line with his hardline policy on the kurds in that mhpo make sure voters that have flipped for him becomethat is enough doom and g. I dont want to tell you all about the fourth trajectory. I will you to buy the book. He has made turkey wealthy. This is a middleclass society. That is where he deserves credit. Turkey has grown. It has better infrastructure. The citizens live better off they on they did before. From the previous book that i like most the rise of turkey when erdogan came to power, the infant mortality rate in turkey was comparable to prewar syria. To spain. Comparable they live like the spanish. That is why they are voting for erdogan. I also argued that this growth has built the middle class space. And now they are making middleclass demands. It is the wealthier provinces along the mediterranean that have voted against him in the referendum. So, that is a good sign going for. But i dont want it it carried away with the case for a liberal turkey because number one, the opposition that is against erdogan is extremely divided. It is not as large as the pro erdogan camp, but is divided. It includes turkish nationalists, seculars, and conservatives, central rights, and central lefts. There is a bigger challenge. Since go back to the leadership issues. The opposition lacks a charismatic leader. Turksvative islamic have their own ataturk. The real ataturk is dead. That is the challenge for the other half of turkey. Until the day that a man or woman emerges that could make the case for a liberal turkey that would have a constitution that would provide freedom of religion and freedom from religion simultaneously, that would provide broad liberties for all, individual liberties including cultural liberties, including the kurds, until that moment comes, i remain deeply worried about turkeys future. Liberal turkey remains a distant dream, it is plausible, given the economic information turkey has undergone under erdogan. I think it is thanks to him but i will write my next book. Thank you, everybody for coming. [applause] good afternoon, everyone. First, of course, soner, congratulations. I think he is one of the most productive turkey experts in town. He makes us look lazy. And my boss loves you aside from that, i really enjoyed reading your book. I picked upe, when the book, the first thing that came to my mind was, which sultan . So, i think at this point, after maybe we canm, live with the mcafee sent. With the magnificent. But what about sulaman the magnificent, who was a reformer. I think the book does a great job of opening a window into erdogans psyche. Enter telling his personal narrative, and this is a whichive of victimhood, resonates very well among his constituency and actually, beyond. It is showing us the interaction between the founding ideology and the reactions to it. So, that is why i particularly enjoyed reading the chapters on the kurdish nationalism and islamism, both reactions to the ideology. But i think turkey right now lives in a post islamist era. One would expect this era to end with liberal values. Both are radical oscillatory terrien ideology both are radical, authoritarian ideologies. This era is not really embracing liberal values. The opposite is happening. As soner mentions in the book, growing snow a middle class in turkey and they are demanding middleclass values. This is striking because at a time when there is a growing middle class in turkey, they are not really demanding middleclass values. Instead, there is a growing authoritarianism. I think it is because there is something inherently authoritarian in turkish political culture. Some might blame me for being an essentialist, but i believe that is really that lies at the heart of the issue here. I think the original sin of turkeys political culture is the statist ideology. The state occupies a particular place in the turkish psyche. Development, rebuilding society. Everything has been done through state. Even the bourgeois was created by the state itself. That is why we have a middleclass, a businessclass that is not really standing up against erdogans authoritarian policies in the 21st century. Many are aligning with the government. The most bourgeoisie from the 19th century, the rebuilding of bourgeoisie was by the state itself. I think that was problematic and i think that explains the state of turkish democracy at the moment. The people who are supporting erdogan. Going back to the islam versus secular debate, i think the people who voted on sunday in favor of the referendum, the 50 were not voting for it for islamism. Those opposed to it were not entirely camelist either. So there is Something Else going on here and the 50 that voted yes on sunday, they do not mind authoritarianism. Of course, this is a very dark picture. Where do we go from here . Im a bit optimistic about sundays results. Because i think the razorthin majority that he captured on sunday gives me hope. And at the end, electro policies will play a role but i think more than that, of course, we do not know what his strategy will be moving forward but i believe despite his victory, he has lost ground. He has lost ground within his own constituency. He lost all major cities including istanbul which is a very important place. He launched his political career in istanbul and he has not lost and since the 1990s. And, some of his base, especially the educated urban base, i do not think they are 100 percent happy with his authoritarian tendencies. And also, in the runup to the referendum, he played to the nationalists. His main strategy was galvanizing the nationalist vote. So he employed this very ultranationalistic strategy. I think that strategy did not pay off. He could not mobilize the nationalist space as much as he wanted to. Instead, he increased his votes in the kurdish region compared to november elections. Which is surprising. He increased. Of course, right now it is very fluid. It is very difficult to be sure about the numbers but what we are hearing from officials and journalist is that hundreds of thousands of people, the ruling party, increased their votes by around 400,000 which is almost 1 . And, i think erdogan took note of that. In his victory speech, the one on the day of the referendum, he said we increased our votes in the kurdish region. If he really wants to return to favor, i think that is good news. Instead of aligning with the nationalists, he may have to recalibrate his strategy and work with the kurds. That could mean, and i know my friends and colleagues here may disagree with me, he might go back to the negotiations, resume the peace talks with the kurds. Of course, if he chooses to play to the instead of aligning with the nationalists, letting with the kurds, that would be good news not only domestically but also for the turkish economy which has been hurt by terrorist attacks. So that would be good news for the economy as well because i think the economic downturn is going to impact his popularity as well. And also that would make some room to maneuver for on car and syria and that would also remove for ankhar and syria and that would also remove some of the tension of turkishu. S. Relations as well. So i would like to be optimistic but on the other hand, i think knowing he is a pragmatic leader gives me hope but yesterday there was a panel and one of my colleagues mentioned that he has always been a pragmatic leader. We have always known he has been a red medic leader but he has as a pragmatic leader but he has been in power for so long that he has become the state himself and that was the point to make, that statist ideologies captures him now. So now he is not the pragmatic leader that we always thought he was and instead he is going to be more ideological so he is going to have to have ideological reflexes and work with kurdish nationalists. So it is difficult to make predictions when it comes to turkey. It might be a little bit easier now that we officially have a president ial system but still want it comes to erdogan, it is very difficult to say what he will do and that 1 then margin gives me hope. And i would like to end it there. Thank you. [applause] i think i am too short for that podium. [laughter] trust me, you are not. Ok, if you say so. Thank you very much for posting me here and i would like to return the compliment. I have been following you for around 20 years, too. She was 10 years old. [laughter] so, here is what i would like to say about your book. If i was a journalist and my editor asked me to cover that referendum and i never set foot in turkey before, this is a great book. Helldidnt know what the was going on, this would be a godsend. It is tightly written, it hits a lengthy main points. It is a fantastic book. There he timely. Covers some of the most Critical Issues in turkey today and above all, the issue of polarization challenge fore Turkish Society. Everything that needs to be said has been said already but i would like to add a few of my thoughts. In terms of yesterdays results, in turkish a yes is one thing, a no another and i guess it was could havresult we leastme respects, at all assumede erdogan would win this referendum. The majority he has is not much of a majority. Which means in turn that he cannot really bask in the glory of this huge popular mandate he was handed by the adoring turkish people. On the other hand, he is settled with all of the responsibility of power because he did win this baby ins his lap. I am sure this is weighing mind. Y on his i think as soon as he gets invited to lead the party you again which is one of the provisions of the new system that kicks and immediately as soon as the results are made the official, he will set about i think doing a huge sort of his own party and in doing so will probably release a fresh batch of disgruntled adding to be pile that already exist. That is i do not think going to work that well for him necessarily depending upon where channeled,untled are whether they can coalesce around a leader. Some leap to mind like from the mhp. To wildlyarly to say, optimistic to expect all against him to unite. One who goes berserk when she sees the kurdish flag raised. So, very difficult. But here is the thing. For the First Time Since the 1980 coup, i think the legitimacy of turkish democracy globally has not been questioned in this way. That is a big change. Erdogan, theorry way the referendum is being framed in the International Press is all about fraud and irregularity. God knows i have followed a lot conferences when i was living in armenia, and those elections were really bad and what theyh said yesterday, ia wasr quite taken aback. I have never heard them this harsh before. I imagine president or the one oganeeling president erd is feeling grateful to President Trump. I am surprised President Trump would give that to him knowing how desperate he was for that stamp of legitimacy and you would think the United States would have leveraged that. So what happens next . Erdoganturn means that will continue to fundamental lies the policy. Means in order to deflect attention away to all of questions about the legitimacy of the questions, why he lost and etc. He may go on some crazy adventures. He may decide it is time to divek in Northern Syria or into kurdistan. We simply do not know. I think the good news is really that despite all of the adversity, with all my colleagues, the most articulate journalist who could have put forward the case most effectively against this referendum in jail thousands of kurdish politicians and jail, the fact that the government hogged the airwaves, despite adversity in short that we should have this result, is extraordinary and points to the strength of civil society. I think also, it shows that Turkish Society is maturing. In the old days people would sit back, fold their arms, and say, the army will come to the rescue. Thats not a given anymore. It falls upon individual turks to sort of fight the fight. I think that is very good news that he and i think this is by no means over. Turkish democracy remains very much a work in progress. To some extent, the arab spring was triggered by erdogan challenging the army. Then came full circle, now he is more like them. Then you have this results with people pushing back. I think people will continue to watch turkey. Im proud of my country and im soner, for this book. Thank you so much. [applause] excellent. Three fascinating and insightful presentations, which gives us a lot to talk about. If i can pick up really with an intriguing comment that you made in your remark and ask you all about the direction of u. S. Turkish relations. Now that we do have this outreach from President Trump to president erdogan, do you expect turkey to be a morcomplete partner with the United States, and what the white house is trying to do in syria and iraq . Or do you expect more maverick approach from erdogan as we go ahead . Amberin the maverick might be President Trump. Im under the impression that he might not have consulted the state department or an ambassador before he decided to make that phone call. I think the President Trump seems to act on impulse, perhaps that is what just happened. I do not know. The case remains, for as long as the United States top priority is to defeat isis in syria particularly, the tensions will remain. The premier partner of choice to do that remains the ypg. Yesterday we heard before the phone call president erdogan railing against countries that work with terrorists. That will remain a point of discussion. I think the whole case is something we all need to watch. I find it very interesting that former mayor giuliani is now in the mix. Lobbying i guess on turkeys behalf. He may dispute the word lobbying. Can you give two sentences about what this is . The case has to do with this turkish iranian gold trader who was basically busting u. S. Sanctions on iran by purchasing gold with iranian money, then selling the gold and money back. Roughly thats how it works. He sold to iran, got busted, and is sitting in a jail in new york somewhere. Most recently, the deputy general manager of one of turkeys largest stateowned banks was arrested in new york in connection with this case. President erdogan has raised this case several times. We heardident obama, president it with secretary tillerson. He would have to ask him why. But of course, member that this gentleman implicated in this huge Corruption Case that erupted in november the 23rd two december 2013 of december. The president and his family were linked to allegations of corruption. Turkishre quashed in was dropped,e case but then goted arrested in this country. Thank you. U. S. Turkish relations in the new era. I think much will to that contention, first one is pyd u. S. Connections. The second one of course is the extradition. When trump was elected, the turkish progovernment media was quite happy thinking that now this would be a reset to turkeyu. S. Relations. Under the obama administration, he wanted to work with it was obvious that they would not intervene in the legal process. Process. Dition but they were hopeful that things would be different. I think thats what lies at the heart of what turkeyu. S. Relations will look like Going Forward. The first question is what is oing to happen to the willration and how that effect relations. It depends on how turkey decides to deal with the kurdish question. If president erdogan moves forward with the kurdish Peace Process he might have a more pragmatic approach in syria. Itthe extradition, i think difficult. Y turkey has been trying to make this case. First is the legal process. The u. S. Court has to decide, and that will take years and so a problem will remain in turkeyu. S. Relations. Thank you. Im surrounded by two of the smartest people in town so i do not have much to add. Before i do, realize that dedicating my book to my mother overly emotional because sees scanning the room to gratitude for help with the book. Over the years of have the privilege of working with an Amazing Group of researchers. Many people and through help. Bring them fruits and yogurt in the morning. When i need a paper i going to ask them. Tyler, thank you so much. He helped me write my previous book. I am also grateful to two others in the room. One of the things i like more than writing is teaching. Thats not true, i like yoga more. [laughter] soner over the years of acquired several students, until my former students are in the room, they both review the books. Thank you all of you, i appreciate it. My thanks go to a whole bunch of other people. Im grateful to all of you. I want to turn to your question in u. S. Turkish relations. I think this is now a subset, politicalf erdogans agenda. I will go to the depths of why linked to Foreign Policy. Hes gone after various groups, demonizing, brutalizing them physically, cracking down on lot rallies, locking them up, shutting them up in the media. Starting in the last decade, i story i look in my book with secularists and the military, the kurds were added to the list. It went on and on. You have these groups demonized by erdogan, physically brutalized by the police, locked up in jail. Crackdown on the media. They makeup now half of turkey. Thats what we saw on sunday. So he cant continue to demonize further groups. Mores he wants to flip against him. So his policy of going after going up the internal enemies has run his first. Now he has external enemies. Fuel instrument allies Foreign Policy even further. Theres little to muster cost of bashing the netherlands for germany. There is some benefit of getting mic voters to support his party. I think we will see the face, regarding the kurdish issue, u. S. Cooperation with ypg and the kurdish Peace Process as well. He will be unfriendly on three counts. That will harm his relationship with the United States. At this stage it is almost a given that washington is going to move to take raqqa with ypg support mainly with ypg. Things might change. Turkey delivers to the table magically 12,000 welltrained reliable troops, i think washington would love to do raqqa with turkey. Its not happening. In the next year it will be increasing i think that puts u. S. And turkey on a collision course. I want to comment on the election outcome. Turkey has had this is not something i foresaw when i wrote the book, the idea that erdogan democratic mandate would one day be questioned he has one of election something that came out with the book is that the election that took place on sunday were not only not fair but increasingly the size of irregularities throw into doubt whether these elections for free and fair. If thats not the case of be ashamed. Turkey has had free and Fair Elections since 1950. Note that u. S. Policy with turkey on the mark for that Going Forward. Turkey is not a country that used to having unFair Elections. It would grudgingly gives our seal of approval to one more for unfair election. This is the first time it will be happening. Are unfairlections and unfree, theyre not free and fair, that doesnt happen. Historians, political scientists in the room, please help me. Its a crucial time in that sense. Very good. Thank you all very much. Let me turn to all of the turkish wisdom in the room. Questions from the audience. Yes, here. If you could wait and identify yourself to our microphone. Thank you very much. I have a small question. I notice on the map that the total number of votes was fewer million. The turkish population is 70 million. I suggest a low participation rate. Think it is an error. The turkish people has 80 million population, 58 million voters. Votes not validated. There are 48. 5 million voters wanted. Erdogan got about 1. 7 million votes more than the opposition. They have called into question. The opposition is going to question 37 of ballots to be recounted. President Erdogan Erdogan said i became president. On the far right. Speaking about Foreign Policy, how do you see the relationship. There seems to be competition. Theres always been competition for centuries between turkey and iran. They managed to compartmentalize their relationship, i think. They were on opposing fronts in syria and jet they kept working together. So they have been pursuing a pragmatic approach and i do not expect that to change. Iran is dependent on iranian energy. I do not think, no matter how i mean, in syria it would basically prevail but i do not think they will come to a breaking point in turkeyiranian relations. That said and i agree completely that turkey has been effective even before erdogan in compartmentalizing that relationship, a very complex one. Increasingly you do here at a much more sunni sectarian town in erdogans rhetoric which is causing quite a bit of annoyance in tehran which is has been expressed. A lot will be determined by positions of the Trump Administration taken on iran, whether it decides to be much more aggressive than the obama administration, and whether turkey sees that relationship with the United States as such and goes on by fighting with it. Relations with the Supreme Leader in tehran. Let me ask about jerusalem. There has been this pragmatic trade relationship that has been sustained even while the politics has been rather sour between them. How do you think this relationship will evolve in the new era . Soner happy to take on that. Its also another compartmentalize relationship for the economic part will grow. Thats driven by necessity. Turkey has a growing economy, with the exception of korea its the only one that has no natural gas, or oil. Its dependent on energy imports. And it gets its gas and oil from russia and iran. Thats a warning sign Going Forward. What that rivalry with iran means, he doesnt want to buy gas and oil for them Going Forward. He does not want to buy as much gas and oil from them Going Forward. He is going to buy kurdish oil from kurdistan and israeli gas. I think that is his ultimate goal. He has an interest in there theres a lot of gas turkey is the closest large market that can absorb it israeli gas and has the money to pay for it and the political will to do such a deal so i think there is a prospect of that Going Forward but politically of course, their relationship will be undermined by continuing turkish things with hamas. It depends on, to what extent israelis are able to tolerate a strong economic relationship with turkey, from which they also benefit. And turkish ties to hamas and whether or not this will be a breaking point Going Forward. Very good, thank you. Yes. You seem to be sitting in descending orders of optimism. [laughter] for all three of you but especially the first two, im curious what you see as the basis for optimism, given that you have consolidated power now in the presidency, a fractured and weak opposition, a significant crackdown on journalists and civil society. What are the remaining letters within the country will enable people to take . To allow them to fight back against this . Electoral politics. What we saw on sunday, the institutional changes will not take in until 2019. There are stipulations increasingly out there. Elections are increasingly unfair and election still do matter. I do not know if you are following twitter i remember seeing pictures of everyone and erdogan and his close advisers looking quite sad. I think they have taken note of how much ground they have lost in his stronghold. I think this will require a recalibration of strategy and also the status goal is not sustainable. Especially with the economy. The growth. I think the most important reason for the support he has been receiving. Looseoalition, that coalition that he has his fractured. So he has to make sure that he carries out structural reforms. He has to make sure that you do not have bombs exploding in major cities. Chaos will hurt him electorally. That is why he has to change course. Weve seen that before, he is very pragmatic. My short answer is that is why i am slightly more optimistic. I agree with electoral politics. I have decided not to give you any more snippets from my book because i what youd to buy it but i will give you one more. I argue in my books that one of the reasons we cannot shape societies anymore like we did in turkey we cannot do anymore. That is why president erdogan has to give up. It will not work. You cannot shape a society top down in your own image as a leader, especially if that society is 97 literate. Literacy is increasing at percent every year. We become the first large muslim Majority Society to attain universal literacy. In a society completely literate, 80 urban, largely middleclass, it will be so hard for this guy to shape the whole country in his own image. Not sustainable. He can try but it wont work. Hopefully it will be democratic. That they will oppose him that way, that will bounce it out. My sense of optimism despite the fact that erdogan controls a large part of the media people say 90 , it is probably more theres a media blackout on other options in the referendum. Resources devoted to the propresident Erdogan Campaign far outweigh resources to the other option. He only got 51 . Despite all that, if that maybe not even that. That tells me that you have to have faith in turkey, it is a great country. You have millions and millions of people despite the fact that information and their access to equal campaigning was limited, they still came out and voted in large numbers. I am betting on turkeys diversity. Economically it is too big, demographically to large, and politically too complicated for one person to shape in their own image. That time has passed. I would like to think that the president erdogan is emulating. Its not sustainable. I faith in electoral politics Going Forward. The question is whether we have a center right option. Turkey is mainly a rightwing country. In any election years, rightwing parties do about 60 of the votes. To one third of the vote so it is hard for me to see a single leftwing party. It will have to come from a challenge from the center right. The will have to happen is mhp, the nationalist faction we talked about earlier that we think is splitting, they are not their area. Said the mhp voter base is basically in two parts of turkey. One is coastal and urban turkey. And central turkey, the parties electric, completely or maybe for the most part voted but many places voted against him. Where will they go next . That is important. President erdogans is not an islamist party. The question is whether you have a center right option which can bring people together theres trajectory for turkey Going Forward. That is my fourth book, the case for liberal turkey which i will write next. Do want to come in on this . Very good. In the front. Thank you. To nsultant i will buy the book and read it definitely. He robbed me of my main question i was going to ask about israel. Ill ask my backup. Turkey is not negotiating with no negotiating with russia on buying the f400. I was wondering if this is a tactic to get a better nato system, what do you think . Thank you. You can put this in a more general context about where you think the future of turkishnato relations will go in this new era. Its hard to answer that question. Without knowing what the future of nato itself is. Setting that aside, these negotiations with russia on the f400, think theres posturing involved. Turkey is keeping its options open. The United States was aligning more fully with interests in syria in particular. We wouldnt be hearing so much about the as 400s anymore. Just looking at the situation on the ground in syria that russias behavior, despite this alleged love fest between president erdogan and put in after president erdogan apologized to him, what you are seeing on the ground is russia acting against turkish interests, when turkey tries to make a move, russia sent its forces with regime forces. Some people say they stopped just swapped uniforms. In any case russian moving to protect them cover during the sale of the western flick. Not allowing turkey to really act the way it would like to inside syria. They want to go after turkey the minute they show any sign of shifting back to regime change, especially when you saw the enthusiasm displayed by president erdogan, when the cruise missiles hit. The russian response to that as well. Then we have this business of what happens to israel, whatever you like to call it. Cant remember its latest game. The pressure on turkey to move against idlib is right there on the turkish border. Theres tension on trade. There were bands on vegetable exports. They have not been removed yet. Eagerly expecting russian tourists to go back to turkey. I think just a few weeks ago, the charter flights, russia decided to cancel them. There is tension on that front and that just indicates that is contrary to what we have been seeing in the progovernment media. Neither side trusts each other. Putin doesnt trust erdogan. About erdogan, because he was quite optimistic. He thought he could change calculations in syria which obviously couldnt. I dont think it is as smooth as projected by government circles in turkey. Quickly on russ, president erdogan thinks he is a friend in moscow. He is wrong. Big mistake. The way putin looks at the region in the middle east, his main concern of course with the syrian war and Everything Else going on is the political success of islam, of sunni political islam, which is one reason why i think he is friendly with egypt. Its not as clear about his stance in libya. President putin is picking secular politics, entities, does not matter what their nature is. Or the brotherhood political alternative. For him his success in turkey is the success of a political response in russia and abroad in the middle east. Unacceptable. He will do everything he can to undermine him. He will support his opposition which is why he is linked with both ypg and people say pkk and he will have stronger ties with them Going Forward because that is a chip for putin against erdogan and outside, which is also what there is no regression and they are surrounded by isis, assad version, and turkey. If you are there with the us regime you are fighting turkey. Thats a their position. I think he sees erdogans ultimate goal, which is why i think he will be mistaken to think that putin is a friend Going Forward. There is another reason why think he is adversarial to erdogans experiment in turkey. Russia is 20 muslim. The majority of russian muslims are closely linked to turks. They were expelled by the sars. And they have a large ds for a diaspora ina turkey. I dont see have it will work. Think russia will be the main adversary as the polarization continues and scenarios are looked at in my book. How russians are and how they have tried to undermine turkeys stability. Very good. Investor ginsburg on my right. Ginsberg on my right. Thank you and congratulations, i enjoy the panel. There is something you didnt mention, or i didnt pick up for many of you. Maybe its because you consider the issue not relevant to the outcome of the referendum. Ill give opportunity to help me get better educated. It is what happened in the coup, the thirdrtertwo, coup, whatever you might want to collect. Whatever happened, what has been the impact sent that was all we were reading about when turkey was the postcoup roundup. What has the consequences been on this referendum, and the situation with turkey Going Forward . It almost sounds like the two issues are separate, since none of you broke the coup into your discussions as to where things are going today. Well i think the failed coup almost handed him the victory that he captured on sunday. Im sorry forgot to mention that. It played a huge role because once again, that victimhood narrative that he talks about his book once again that was in play. Because of that failed coup he could be able to recreate the narrative. Now he is the victim of enemies not just up there but also within the state. I think it an important role. In terms of supporters, the runup to the referendum, listening to scholars in turkey who are talking about whether he alienated thousands of people after the failed coup, people were asking wither that would translate to loss of votes on sunday that is. Think i can answer a question, but clearly, the question comes down to how much how much electoral support the israelis had. Were they a real political block . What we hear is the whole debate going on critical of the government they are mostly within the grand movement. Many of them, those not in jail, managed to flee the country. The rest just will not see the difference. The share the same base, similar ideologies. Thats why they did not translate into loss of votes for erdogan on sunday. Anything else on the impact of the coup . I dont think any of us knows what happened. In fact, the night of the coup, who actually are dissipated, who actually planted. I still think that remains a big mystery. The narrative is that a wereant number of involved in this was a coalition between them and other antierdogan officers in the armory. We dont know because the government has said we dont know. The parliamentary inquiry that was supposed to be conducted on this has been very opaque. And of course, you know, the media has been muzzled and is unable to do its job. In so i think we really dont know what is going on inside the army itself as a result of this coup. I think that is the more important question, what impact has this had on the army, and what does this portend for its future, in terms of the ability to intervene again . And what its role will be overall in turkish political life, but perhaps most importantly, who the army is. What kind of people are joining the army . What is the new ideology in the army . There are suggestions out there that it is very different from army of your. It is much more conservative, religious, the new inductees are of more in the role erdogans vision. But this is just speculation. Ok, thank you. Yes, sir. I have a couple quick questions. We heard about resuming this process. After what happened, do you think its an opportunity for resuming the Peace Process with the htp . My other question, they were opposition akps article was shortened to get the article approved. It got support from mhp. Whats the difference between dish islamic rule, and the camelist to get to that deal, the draft of the constitution . For nonturkish aficionados, this was the Peace Process between the government and kurds in the south. Second question on the relationship between the islamists and nationalist secularists, what you was struck. I will take the second one. Since i am the contrarian here, first of all we need to be clear about which kurds to think president erdogan would be talking to if indeed he feels entity ac nam an gnanimity or is compelled because he is a little choice. The fact that he is already talking about the death penalty, the fact that he is lashing out against the ypg, just within hours practically of the result being announced, i dont think that suggests that he is ready to resume peace talks. Thats how i probably find it. I think its bad news, especially between now and the system kicks in and he has new parliamentary elections were he hopes to draw the htp and mhp. That some people have an 10 majority so he will have an absolute majority and the parliaments of the chp will end up looking pretty much i guess like the opposition does in russia. I do not think he is ready. On the contrary, i think he is creating his own kurdish momentum. This will be a mix of pious kurds. Him aw that resulted for win in the election. That might be part of the bond, though there are some irregularities and the fact that the kurds were prevented from campaigning effectively and monitoring effectively as well, all these cities and towns that would that were destroyed, that he went through patronage create some kind of a base for himself with the kurds but i do not think he will go back to talking to the pkk or the htp unless erdogan agrees to do everything he tells them to do which again is not very likely, because if he were to do so he would lose all credibility with the kurdish people. Or his own followers among the kurdish people. Unlikely to see a reconciliation there. I want to add one thing. When he talks about the death penalty, i think his referring to the gallant nests. Ulanists, because you cannot apply it retroactively. When hes talking about severing ties with europe, tells the osc to mind their own business . Thats not my point though. My point is you think that just because he talked about death penalty, he cannot possibly be talking about returning to the kurdish peace forces. What i am saying is that maybe thats not relevant because maybe he is not referring to the upper echelon. When he talks about the death penalty. Yes, i made my point. I am more optimistic and especially if you look at htp has lost ground, too. So i think the kurds, they do not have many options to turn to. A you look at places like border town, it is an htp stronghold, theyve been the only party there. Other places, the fact that in a context where erdogan has been referring to this ultranationalist rhetoric, if he could capture those votes in those terms at the expense of the htp, but tells me the kurds also think they are the only person who can broker a peace deal. I think he might end up going back and resuming that the election was free and fair and the southeast. That is what fair, im saying. Else the results of the referendum, a simple yes or no, said it would be voting for him. Its apples and oranges. I think we need to be careful and we need much more information of what actually happened before we draw firm conclusions about voting patterns among the kurds. I can also chime in, great discussion. Im enjoying it. [laughter] what happened is a mystery in the kurdish area. Overall, turks love to vote, we know that. 85 turnout, turnout was much higher in areas for the referendum failed, 90 . This pretty impressive for democracy. Turnout was lower in areas in the national average. So a lower turnout in kurdish areas but it is the only area where erdogan made significant gains. The votes were part of the bump that they do not explain the gains of 20 in some provinces. The vote compared to a keep a vote in the last election, if you compare whichever one you take, mainly stagnate and across the country and dropped in certain reverences. It dropped a little bit in on ankhara across the board. This is sort of my nonsophisticated way of looking at it as a secular observer of turkish politics. I would love to see if theres anything that would happen. The pkks decision to carry the war to the cities, you know, that caused a lot of unhappiness among ordinary kurds. They were very upset that the pkk did that to them. In that sense, if you had a free and fair election, i still think you would see the htp vote go down. I agree with that. At lets take a couple more questions and bring this to a close. Congratulations to the panel. I wanted to go back to a soners scenarios. Also his remark about erdogans strategy. I think you said, his strategy had the effect of creating half the country as enemies. Now that hes run on a domestic enemies, he has to turn towards foreign enemies. It also seems like he has nothing but foreign enemies. So im wondering how he handles the situation in which he has no external friends. And what that would mean for your three original or four original scenarios. Ok. Dave pollock up in front. Thank you very much and again, congratulations. I want to ask about, strangely enough, islam, which we have not heard all that much from any of you about the specifically religious islamic aspect of either erdogans program Going Forward, his appeal to voters, what effect that has on Foreign Policy. My conclusion from what you have been saying is, after 15 years, erdogan and the akp have not managed to further islamized Turkish Society and politics. Is that a correct conclusion . And what else can you say about what specific aspects of islamic issues might come up in the future . Implications of having no friends. Islam and turkey. Lastly just for the record, is this the last election erdogan wins . Or do you expect him to win again when he comes up for election in 2019 . We will market in the history theill just mark it in history books. [laughter] of that the last question on islam. I think he islamized society, but he hasnt even tried to islamize the state. Thats why especially if you look at ive always argued that turkish islam is different than the middle eastern islamism in other parts of the region. I think again it has something to do with that tradition that i talked about. I think when he came to power, he became part of democracy and culture. He didnt even try to islamize state institutions. Islamism in turkey for instance doesnt really make reference to causes that sharia. Thats really something about the turkishislamist psyche. Think theres no threat there. Thats why when we say the problem is not aired ones islamism, but its authoritarian is him. His whole project has revolved around raising Pious Society into a more religious society. He has managed that. But of course we need a political scientist to do more research on this phenomenon. The rise of religiosity. Maybe turkey is not an exception in that regard. If it was erdogan of course to a certain extent yes because changed, transforms the whole education system, transformed major dynamics in society. But when it comes to creating a sharia type state, i dont think he has done much. Before he came to power he was critical of institutions like the director of foreign religious affairs, because he always argued that deyonit has been a tool to not only suppress religion, and he promoted getting rid of that institution. He came to power and now its a bigger bureaucracy with a bigger budget. I think that points to his state instinct. He became a bureaucrat in that regard. Ithink he does instrument allies informed instrumentalize islam, and that can be dangerous especially where Police Cadets in training chant islamic slogans. Others do the same. When the coup was unfolding, he rallied people around religion. You had to the imams making the call for jihad essentially. A lot of instrumentalization of islam more than his predecessors. I would point to the fact that groups like to put a new shirt, isis, have established Networks Inside turkey and seem to have recruited it with great ease. Thats something that obviously needs to be watched. Final word just before we conclude. I agree, if turkeys neighbors for luxembourg, the netherlands, and belgium, i would not be worried about islamization. Turkey has strong middleclass educated people connected to the world. [laughter] how about canada and spain . Thats not the case. Isis is a neighbor. It has been for a while. Theres a jihadist next door that makes this dangerous for turkey and turks. That means turkey could become a recruiting pool for jihadist ideology. Theres a chapter in my book i wont tell you more about it. You have to buy it. [laughter] i want to take the other question just before finishing, on foreign enemies. I think that because polarization politics wont help him win another round of elections, he will have to win the next election. Otherwise you will have to do with the french he will be a president and his parliament will promote another party. The system is not setup to function like that. It is setup set up to have majority controlled by the president and parliament. Or it will collapse. To get there he has to win elections. Whatever the elections are,. Foreign enemies this is only we Going Forward. Its easy to unify. Thats for the question about mhp and akp agreements comes in. Theyre different parties but akps base and mhps base in certain areas overlaps significantly in turkey. If you look at the map the areas of central and north to locate where support for mhp,an was strong from that is why the deal work. He is going to consolidate a nationalist agenda with his strongman image. That means problems with europe and the United States, and in the short term significant problems on the kurdish account the u. S. I was delighted to see so many friends and colleagues here today. Thank you for coming. This is a great afternoon for me. Thank you, again. It has been a wonderful project. I am happy to launch this book with you. Before i conclude, i want to thank tony and vanessa for their work and generosity. Their generosity makes my work cap and. My work happened. Thank you. [applause] thank you all very much. Thank you for joining us today. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] today on the cspan networks, a look at u. S. British relations. We will be live from the Heritage Foundation at 10 00 a. M. On cspan3. Academiciaeaders in talk about health care. We will talk about that live on cspan. Admit in, the Heritage Foundation with the conversation on the politicizing of science. This comes a week before a protest called the march for science is scheduled to take place on the National Mall in washington. Yesterday, john kelly, Homeland Security secretary, talked about Homeland Security threats and outlined top issues at his agency. From George Washington university, this is an hour. [applause] washington journal mr. Knapp good morning. This will be the first public address of its kind that secretary kelly will have given since his swearingin
vimarsana.com © 2020. All Rights Reserved.