Withdrawal from afghanistan in terms of the earlier question about our capacity to deploy in two separate theaters of war . Right. I think the lessons i slightly change the angle here and say i think there are lessons from the afghan experience which can be applied to iraq. As i said earlier the business of doing it properly, building up an army from the grass roots, building up the respect of the confidence, capability, is in a way which wasnt done frankly in the british experience in iraq is relevant to what might happen. On that point do you think the afghan army is likely to perform better than we have seen with the iraqi army . Im optimistic. Providing theres one major caveat, providing the International Community stays committed both in continuing to train and also, and very importantly, in providing the money. Because dont forget the afghanistan did not collapse after the soviets left, it collapsed when soviet union collapsed when the money dried up. I am optimistic that providing those two cayats im satisfied the forces will be able to contain what will be an ongoing insurgency in afghanistan. On the final point do you think that the drawdown from afghanistan will ease the pressures in terms of force structures and our capacity to deploy . It certainly should. Because youre not committed, anyway. And weve seen with the deployment with the drawdown of afghanistan u. K. Forces have committed on operations overseas is probably at an alltime low since about the low figure of since about 196. 1968. Would you comment on turkeys refusal to get involved on a major humanitarian disaster on its own door step all i think i would say is yes turkey of course is a member of nato and has been a loyal member of the Alliance Since its formation. But of course nato is not engaged in any operations in iraq at the moment. Nato nations are though. Well, that is a different thing from saying nato is involved. There has been no decision taken to engage nato. Nato nations may be engaged unilaterally but that is not saying the nato is engaged. Therefore its up to turkey what they should and should not do. I think standing on the sidelines for a very long way away from what is a tough neighborhood and telling other people what they should be doing is not a good way of doing business. I recognize that. But are you telling us that it turkeys domestic situation which is the dominating factor in its decision not to get involved . I suspect that its it is in probably Turkish National interest more than anything else. Nd it is our duties to protect. Do you think what little weve agreed to do so far will have a negative impact on our relationship with the u. S. . Yes, i do. I think there is a real danger given up by default a position which we were primed to have of Standing Shoulder to shoulder with our number one ally. And i think that could have longterm consequences. Well, i think there was a time when the americans could always rely on us as i say Standing Shoulder to shoulder. I think one of the consequences that this could well be a further distancing of america from engagement in europe. And instead of being able to say that we were alongside since we joined alonga long list of other allies who are not prepared to deliver when merica makes the call. So by that rationale, we ought to be joining the u. S. And those members of the coalition and do our extending operations over the iraqi border into syria . Well, if we want to continue to have influence with our premier ally, we need to be prepared to commit along side. And that willingness to commit significant military force into a coalition or an alliance with the americans i have i think giveen us significant influence. And if you dont commit, if youre not Standing Shoulder to shoulder you dont have influence. Its as simple as that. Can you try to communicate that, translate that into something which is tangible . I understand what youre saying in the general terms but in terms of the influence that it can give us, how can you say that is in the interest of the United Kingdom . Well, i think by commiting alongside the americans, we we a say in outcomes which would not otherwise have. And an influence on those outcomes which we would not otherwise have. You could say not taking this view. But you could say well what good did that do us in iraq reconstruction . Because we really messed that up. You could say that but i think in return i would say that if we had done it properly we would be in a different position. And did we not do it properly because we werent listened to or because we too got it wrong . I think we failed to do it properly for a number of reasons. And i look forward to the inquiry reporting on this. I think its time would preclude we could spend a whole lot of time discussing why we didnt do it properly. If i may. To rurp to boots on the ground you were very clear about the need to follow through and do things properly. But your response on turkey and er seeming to get oth countries who are much closer to the danger and the gravity in the region, im sure is a point well made. Does that mean that the hopes of persuading other nations, our neighbors, to commit those to commit Ground Forces is in your view probably few tile . Well, if the u. K. Is trying to persuade other nations to commit more than were prepared mmit ourselves, i mean for a number of clearly the threat is greater. And well help you in some way . It goes back to the same point. If you arent prepared to commit and stand shoulder to shoulder with people they may be prepared to commit but if youre going to stand in the back of the room and say go forward go forward but im not prepared to go with you, you dont stand on very firm ground. You talked about strategy. Is the mission to destroy icele . The mission is what what is the mission . The military mission will be determined by government policy. And i dont know what the mission is. We havent got the government policy that says it. The one hand i hear destroy isil. On the other hand i hear humanitarian relief. Like before. If you dont have a Clear Strategy you cant have a clear mission. Let us assume that the mission is to destroy isil. D as you say, we are picking at the edges with air power. At the very best were going to contain isil into hopefully the perimeter which it is currently occupying. And we are hoping big hope that the kurds will and the iraqis will get their act together and be able to deal militarily and destroy the enemy which is isil themselves, which is a pretty tall order i think we would agree. We also are hoping, as john just implied, that the arab world would actually put up the s to back iraq and kurds, which is clearly not evident. I ask that question of the defense secretary yesterday in defense questions what is the arab world actually going to put ut beyond something from air power . We have declared that again repeated yesterday, that there will be no infantry on the ground from the United Kingdom and apparently the United States too. And i just cant see where we are going to have an end game. Because in the end i fear that if as we started this conversation isil is such a threat to this country the Prime Minister said it, the foreign secretary said it, such a huge threat. In the end, we may have to commit Ground Forces into action in the middle east, and e may have to eat our words on whether we would actually put infantry, armor, artillery, object ground and in support of those people on the ground. In a way, im not asking a question. Im asking for you to comment. Have i got this wrong . Well, i was going to say, and your question is . Im not sure i have got a question, chairman. My point is, i just cant see how we can do anything else if all those things happen. The arab states cop out, the iraqis and the kurds arent good enough, and isil stays there terrorizing. Are we just hoping for a america that will the people isil will rorized by rise up, destroy them, eat them . I think you highlight the importance of a political process or political approach that achieves that political aim. Its going to be very difficult to get politics into that area anyway but it may well be that military would have to go in to get the politics in. Thats perhaps my question. Is military required is there a military requirement to go in there so that politics can operate there . Well, i think there may well be. If the scenario you post late came to pass or comes to pass, we are left with the basic fact that if you want to destroy or neutralize isil youve got to do it militarily or you take the time to build up local capacity to do so. And thats going to take time. You either contain, in which case it might not be enough, or you have to deploy force to destroy. Before i let you go, you talked a lot about training. If we were training sunni forces to take on isil, what exactly would we be training them to do . Are we trying to create the kind of force that we created in the 1980s against the sovietbacked Afghan Government . In other words, are we training our people in guerilla tactics and laying i. E. D. S . Or are we training up a Counter InsurgencyWarfare Force which is going to clear, hold, and build sunni territory . And if the latter, is that going to be in the form of tribal militias, a sort of nni awakening that we had in 20072008 . Or is this going to be a part of the iraqi army . I suppose it determines to the commander to determine the nature of the campaign in which he is involved. You need to understand the nature of the problem. You need to understand the nature of the threat posed by isil, the way isil operates, and then design a force which can counter that. It may be any of the above. It may even be a more joinedup, capable armed force that looks more like a conventional army. General, thank you very uch. The general has commanded at every level right the way through kosovo, iraq, but particularly relevant he was the commander of the Multinational Division in southeast in iraq. General, thank you very, very much indeed for coming to us. And im going to turn to my colleague to begin. General, were going to run around some of the same sort of issues obviously. But youve said that or youre reported to have said, anyway, whether thats true or not, that it may be few tile to do some of these things unless you have a clear political plan to go with it. Its in one sense an obvious remark to me but its got a lot within it. One of the objectives . What should we be seeking . What are your comments on whether the two fit together or whether they do fit together . Yes, i did say that. I did indeed say that military action without a political plan to pursue is few tile. What i meant by that is that it stands very limited chance of success. And that stands a pretty good chance of making things worse drks and worse in a wider context it provides us an excuse for the politicians not to get to the real issue which is sorting out the politics. Reaching for the military is what they do when they cant think of what to do because its a big mistake because it distracts the issue which are the political ones. So if the real political prosmmation, what is this political question that we should be dealing with first before we reach for the military then . How do we solve it . You need to address the question of what do you think the problem is with isil . And this has been characterized in many ways. It is one level a simple another manifestation of sunni extremism. Another it is significantly different than al qaeda and its orientation where al qaeda was the external influences, corrupt islam. And hence attacking the United States on 9 11. Isis focus, literally what theyre saying, its very much aimed at sort of purifying inside sunni islam. Indeed you could therefore characterize it even more so as not just a battle within sunni islam but a battle within with a has beeni islam who are the true representatives on earth of with a has beeniism, because as you well know is a very pure form of islam and it sees itself as the only atlanta form of islam. If you look at the behavior of ice sis in the taken over areas in the region, they have not just been against normal muslims, not even against the shia, but against any form of sunni islam which doesnt omply with their very strict wave has been ea interpretation. So this is a very internal theological causality behind ice sis which we need to understand which seems to me the real threat that isi sinch posed is not to us in the west is to ca that which have their official state religion as wahabi islam. And i think it is to them that we should be looking for a resolution of what i see as being fundamentally as a fundamental religious problem and go back to the response of my earlier question. My concern with the response is we seem to be mowing the grass as far as terrorism but doing very little talking about the real problem which is this particular ideology, this mentality. And if were talking about threats to the United Kingdom i think that is the major threat rather than any military force that may be rampaging around syria and Northern Iraq right now. Do you see the existing military response then to sort of containing this sort of extregs as thee guys roam around the place . My understanding is this cal fate is the whole world or muslim populations of the world including malaysia and everywhere else. No douth just starting with the middle east and the la vanity and cyprus. Indeed. And but youve got to do something or doing something in response. What youre saying is thats really just a containment strategy but in one sense its not addressing the real underlying problem. But youve now got the soviets commiting materiel forces and uae woman pilot flying about the place shooting them up. I mean, is there not some progress in terms of the neighbors understanding their own problem and accommodating themselves in a different way . There is some. But very little. I think the containment policy is a sensible policy as far as it goes, at least it tries to buy time. Buying time for the sunni region sunni nations in the region to work out their response. And we need to have some sympathy with them. Because although you site the case of them raising materiels to fight the battle, i think they send about as many fighters as we have, which is pretty inadequate. And i suspect that that female pilot in the uae her life is now being made hell by the religious extremists in the u. A. E. Because underneath the surface of those countries, whatever their formal states say, weve got to recognize that a recent poll had a sense of people inside saub thinking that ice sis was a an expression of islam. And also the blog about the saudi pilot who refused to go on a bombing raid against isis because he believed in isis. So we need to recognize that there are extreme internal divisions within the sunni world and we should not assume that just because the got says some nice words about joining the coalition, actually actions do speak louder than words. And i think the minimal efforts that the sunni states have made towards isis show how difficult theyre finding it to handle it. The internal power struggle is so extreme that theyve termed it the war of saudi secession. With and i think thats what were seeing. And looking what we should do, its right that we should see this as a threat but we should sort of we would be wise to take the hip cratic oath on this one and in trying to do something we do no harm. And one of the great problems is that although we in our western ways see evil and we believe were on the side of good, thats actually not the way its seen in the region. And if were going to do it military engagement in the middle east we should remember clauses words not war being continuation of the policy but the victories found in terms of political terms not in terms of a fleeting spass of arms. So what does that look like . Until you work that one out its very hard to know what military action is actually useful. As i say, we in the west if were leading on this, what is the effect of christian forces and what is not just an internal islam not even internal sunni but internal wahabi battle for legitimacy . How does that play . How does that make our what people i would identify as our allies in saudi arabia like the king and prince, how does it make them feel . How does it make their job easier or more difficult . I would have a lot more confidence if i felt that i fully understood our planners if you willy understand the mine fully understood the mindset of the saudis. Just bring about some of the practical things where we are. A couple things that come out of what you say. Theres been this criticism about the iraqi armed forces. We discussed, you heard some of the discussion we heard earlier with others about this who were not going to stand and fight as a coherent army. But maybe some of these elements youre describing why that was. What is your view of the training of the iraqi army, its ability to become a coheerpt force . What should we do . Is there some way we can assist in that . Before i answer that can i just go back to your comment about practical matters that sort of intellectual yes. And say thats those bits are absolutely fundamental to understanding the problem. If we dont get that right then we really are making a mistake. Back to the issue. The army. An army is always said to be a reflection of the society that its drawn from. The iraqi army like the afghan army will be as strong or as weak as the governments and the societal glue from which is is drawn. We can do all we want. When i was there in 2007 out there in basra trying to organize the withdrawal from basra, i had a police chief who just got sent in and he suffered about three Death Threats assassination attempts in as many weeks. I said what can we do to help . He said this isnt about training or equipment. Its about loyalty. And you cant touch that. I think thats a lesson we just need to learn very hard. We can give these people the best weapons in the world we can train them but fundamentally the moral component if the moral component is weak it isnt any good. Thats why 30,000 ran away against 3,000. Because isil believed in what theyre doing and these guys dont. When these same guys are fighting, theyve got a moral component then. Because theyre fighting for their own. Exactly. Thats the point youre trying to make. Isnt it . Are we sort of slightly deluded that we get the Sunni Awakening again, whether that was meant to be and some way magically all of these different a pings will cohere into formed army . The