Reasons i voted for the training and equiping measures that have been implemented but my frustration is that as you also have observed there is a huge gap between the goals and missions that weve outlined for the United States and the actual action that were undertaking the train and equip activities are way behind what we might have hoped by this point and theres no clear timetable for really achieving the level of capability that we expected or hoped. I hope this has been a very sobering morning. I thank you all for being here. Thank you. Senator mccain i also want to thank the witnesses. Its been, i think, helpful to all members and this is not an issue thats going oy way, so im sure that well be seeing you again. Thank you. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2015] mexico motivated next, the vice chair on global threats. M behringer word every Graduation Ceremony. Embed a panel on Veterans Health care issues. Tomorrow night, interviews with four of the newest members of congress. The freshman profiles features democrat mark takai of hawaii republicans might boast of illinois, Democrat Bonnie watson of new jersey, and republican leaves open of the First District in new lee zeldin talks about his schedule. You have a five meeting followed by a 10 minute meeting. I get up early, i try to exercise as close to every morning as i can. Evenings usually and the. End late. There are people that have vices. For me, i like to empty my email inbox. That is my vice, staying on top of stuff. For me, we would be out, there might be an event, local groups from the district for a good cause but i like to get back to work. I go to sleep around 12 01. Cspan interviews with four of the newest members of congress. Tomorrow at 9 00 p. M. Eastern. On tuesday the center for strategic and International Studies held a discussion with admiral james winfield. A provided an update on the Nuclear Threats posed by north korea, iran, and russia. This is about 45 minutes. It is good to have all of you here. I want to see a special thanks to the admiral. Before we begin, many of you have heard us say this before but when we have Public Events we always start with a little safety announcement. I am your responsible safety officer. Im going to take care of you. So you follow me, were going to go, if we have to, out through that exit and that exit, the stairwell is around the corner. We are going to go down and meet across the street. Its too early for the bar to be open, so well meet in the park right next door and ill see if i can bring refreshments. Or something. But please follow me if we have to do anything. Thank you all for joining us today. This is the third in a series that weve launched. Dr. Thomas karako is the new leader for our Missile Defense program at csis. I should also say special thanks to our friends at boeing that are letting us do this public event to present the issues associated with Missile Defense. Im old enough to remember the days when Missile Defense was theology, not programming. That was 30 years ago, and we had great controversy associated with Missile Defense issues. Fortunately thats past us. Were now into the details of whats appropriate, how much is appropriate, how is it positioned, when do we get it online, things like that. Admiral winnefeld has been more influential than anyone in reshaping this debate. Theres a significant increase in the budget this year for Missile Defense. I think it reflects a geopolitical reality. And its part of that geopolitical reality that were going to talk about today. Im very grateful that hes taken the time to join us. As i said, this is a series. He said, is this the end . I said, no, its a midcourse correction. So hes going to give us the midcourse correction today. So could i ask you with your applause to please welcome admiral sandy winnefeld. [applause] admiral winnefeld all right well, good morning, and thank you so much for that very kind introduction and for your friendship and for the invitation to speak today. Its great to be here at csis to provide an update on where our thinking is and where my thinking is, and where our progress is on Missile Defense including National BallisticMissile Defense, regional ballistic Missile Defense and going to add a little bit about cruise Missile Defense. I know for the most part its a technically savvy audience thats knowledgeable on the topic, especially the midshipmen sitting off to my right, which im happy to see here. I also suspect there are friends of mine here, keith, who has been extremely helpful to me in my journey of understanding this process, and richard fieldhouse, an old friend, former Senate Staffer who has been supportive of the program all along as well. So those of you mixed in, its good to see you here. Id like to start in a little bit of an abstract way by putting out two thoughts for my discussion today. The first abstract piece is we recognize two basic pillars of defense or deterrence, excuse me. Mainly, denying an adversarys objectives and imposing costs on an adversary for its aggressive acts. Missile defense is in the realm of the former, denying an adversarys objectives. We want potential adversaries to know that not only is there a price for attacking us or our friends, but also that the attack may not succeed in the first place, resulting in pain but no gain. The second baseline thought is that we believe any sensible nation has to prioritize its investments in defense along some kind of strategic framework. If we dont do this in a sensible way, well end up with a cacophony of demands and an era of declining means. And we all know where the means being dedicated to defense have been recently going inside our own country. This has implications for our Missile Defense investments. The operative word here is prioritize. Which is something this town hates to do, because it means there are winners and losers. Some would suggest that this framework should be around prioritizing regions. I say that serious threats come from nearly every region around the globe. So that doesnt work so well for us. Others would suggest that this sensible framework would be simply around prioritizing capabilities. But i would argue, yes, you do need to do that, but they dont arrange themselves. They dont prioritize themselves. Capabilities are ways, and we cant prioritize them before we prioritize our ends. So the chairman and i, and an increasing number of people inside the defense department, believe that our investments have to be prioritized along the lines of what it is were being asked to protect. Some of you have heard me speak of this before. Some things are more important than others. Call them whatever you want. The chairman and i call them National Security interests. And we try to look inside each one at the threats to that interest and whether or not we have those threats properly mitigated. It stands to reason that we need to ensure that we take care of the highest ranked interests first. Compromise in an era of decreasing means, which i mentioned a moment ago, will have to come in the area of lowerranked interest. And of course Missile Defense falls into various levels along that spectrum of interest. At the top of our list of National Security interests, as it is for any nation, is the survival of our nation and at the top of the list of threats to that interest is, of course a Massive Nuclear attack from russia or some other highend adversary, potential adversary like china. This is about existential attacks, attacks that are extremely hard to defend against. And because we prefer to use the deterrent of Missile Defense in situations with the highest probability of being most effective, weve stated that Missile Defense against these highend threats is too hard and too expensive and too strategically destabilizing to even try. So even though our russian interlocutors refuse to believe us on this, it has the very great virtue of actually being true. So well use the cost imposition piece to deter russia by keeping all three legs of our Nuclear Deterrence strong and our nuclear commandandcontrol system robust. But we do have other interests in the world. What we call limited Missile Defense falls squarely within the next security interest in line, the way the chairman and i look at it, namely, our determination to prevent catastrophic attacks on our nation. The number of nations trying to achieve that capability is growing, not shrinking, with our most immediate concern of course being north korea because theyre closest in terms of capability, followed by iran. A robust and capable national Missile Defense is our best bet to defend the United States from such an attack. And thats why the groundbased midcourse Defense Program is going to remain our First Priority in Missile Defense. In a shrinking defense budget, this system will be accorded the highest priority within the Missile Defense share of our pie. Further down the line, our other global National Security interests, including, very importantly, support for our allies and partners around the world, as well as protecting american citizens around the world, including our own troops, wherever they may be present. Thus, we also place a good bit of emphasis on regional Missile Defense, closely cooperating with a number of key partners in this area, and ill talk about them a little bit later. But in a world of declining budgets, its likely well come to rely more on those partners to resource their own Missile Defense systems. And i wanted to get that out because its important context for where we will and will not do Missile Defense and how we will prioritize our investments where we will do Missile Defense. Now let me spend a little bit more time talking about each of these two interestbased priorities. Defense of the homeland, and regional defense. Regarding the homeland, we have to take the iranian and north korean threats seriously, even though neither nation has a mature icbm capability. Regarding the homeland, we have and both nations know full well that they would face an overwhelming u. S. Response to any attack. While we would obviously prefer to take a threat missile out while its still on the ground, what we would call left of launch, we wont have the luxury of doing so. And because its our policy to stay ahead of the threat, we and both nations know full welldont want there to be any doubt about our commitment to having a solid right of launch capability. So it boils down to how many missiles we can knock down versus how many the threat can launch. And thats much more than just a function of how many interceptors we have in the ground. Its also a function of how the whole system works. We in the military often say quantity has a quality all of its own. Well, in the Missile Defense world, quality has a quantity all of its own and the leverage can be enormous. If, for example, because of system improvements, we only have to shoot half the number of interceptors per incoming warhead that we see, then we can handle twice the number of inbound warheads. That is why we are taking a lot of time and effort to improve the capability and reliability of our entire system. The Missile Defense agency, led by jim syring, has done a terrific job of this. Its not easy to hit to kill at the kind of closure speeds that we have been talking about, but weve done it. And its hard to make advancements in such a program when its so expensive to test the things you change in response to the things that you might find wrong. I give mda great credit for understanding that. And understanding that when you find a problem, you dont stop at the first thing you see, you wring out the entire system. You dont stop at the first possible fix to what you find wrong. And mda has done exactly that. Theyve taken their time and theyve done it right. Sometimes people like me get frustrated because we want to go faster, but mda has done a fantastic job of taking a rural and deliberate engineering and deliberate thourough and deliberate engineering approach to these kinds of problems and theyve done terrifically. In january of 2013, they launched an improved ce2 interceptor not against a target, but to run it through its paces to solve a problem and it performed magnificently. They send it up against a real target about a year ago and it performed magnificently. I was in the room watching it, and you can imagine what it felt like to see that thing have an extremely successful intercept. It was a very good shot in the arm for that program. And based on the success of that shot, we were able to resume production of eight planned gbis in the new and proven configuration. That success kept us on track to increase the gbi inventory by 14. Increasing the total from 30 to 44 with 40 in alaska and 4 in vandenburg. We currently have eight in place of which four have the improved design. And we have a lot of confidence in those missiles. Well keep improving those missiles and testing the improvements because we fly before we buy. The next flight of the gmd system will take place later this year. Its gonna be another nonintercept test of a ce2 gbi because we want to keep costs under control. We are going to demonstrate the performance of an alternate divert thruster in a flight environment and test endtoend discrimination of a complex target scene through the gmd fire control loop. At the end of calendar year 2016, we plan to conduct the first intercept test for the ce2 block 1 gbi, the real deal with a new avionics package. That will be our first intercept package of a true icbm target. The intercept should that intercept be successful, well deliver ten over the next year to achieve our goal of 44 gbis by the end of 2017. Were also making great progress with all three vendors on the redesigned kill vehicle, which we expect to flight test in 2018. But improving the whole system again, is not just about interceptors. We have to take a holistic view and invest our limited resources as wisely as we possibly can. In this light, theres been a lot of talk about installing an east coast missile field. Our Environmental Impact statement should be complete in the middle of next year. However, the only reason to make that investment would be to provide the capability to shoot assess, and then shoot again. We can only do that if we have the sensors we need to do so. So we need to put our ability to see targets at the head of the line. And therefore theres been no decision yet by the department to move forward with an additional conas interceptor site, though we could do that. Meanwhile, our current sites vandenburg and alaska, protect the u. S. Homeland from the projected and existing threat from north korea and iran should either of them really emerge. And even though an additional conas interceptor site would add battle space and capacity, a decision to construct the new site would come at significant Material Development and Service Sustainment costs. So we need to be careful. So while that site could eventually be necessary as i said, in the near term upgrading the kill vehicle on the gbi, improving our ability to discriminate and enhancing the homeland since our Network Sensor network are higher priorities for us in improving our protection against limited icbm attack. And we have a lot going on in this area. Working with our very close japanese partners, we completed the deployment of the tippy 2 radar in kyogamisaki in southern japan to complement the radar currently operating in northern japan. And were grateful to japan for their close cooperation. In this area. Its gone well. This radar and the new capability will enhance the overall performance of both radars when operating in a mutually supported mode. We made a Technical Capability declaration for the kyogamisaki radar this past december. That will relieve the need for us to put aegis ships underway for tracking purposes in the sea of japan and eastern japan, and thats important because it frees up those assets for other missions. Were also continuing to operate the spx in the pacific to provide discrimination capabilities for konas and hawaii defense. Were planning to deploy a new longrange discriminating radar for the pacific by the 2020 time frame. Finally, were continuing to pursue greater use of space. Uavbased technologies and increased integration of existing sensor capabilities across the c2mb system in order to significantly enhance our Missile Defense discrimination capabilities in the future. Now, i dont want to overlook cruise Missile Defense particularly as it regards the homeland. You might ask, if we choose to not invest the enormous resources that would be required to defend against a massive russian icbm attack over the north pole, then why would we care about Cruise Missile attack defense in the homeland . The element of surprise is nearly impossible with an