I think we will go in and get started. I know we got a lot of ground to cover, a lot of questions that people will want to ask. Some of you have contacted me before hand to launch your request. It afternoon everybody and welcome to this council on Foreign Relations meeting on the u. S. China relations. Im evan osnos from the new yorker and the Brookings Institution or im thrilled to be joined by three of my favorite scholar practitioners and theyll introduce them in a second buffer zone what you commended them for agreeing to wait into one of the most complex and pressing questions, foreignpolicy questions before us, and that of course is a question of whether beijing and washington can avert the pressure towards confrontation, the pressure of history, the patterns of history that drive a ruling power and a rising power into confrontation. And then even the harder question which will also do with, and that is what do we do about it . A couple of housekeeping notes at the very beginning. Please completely turn off your Electronic Devices are dont just put it on vibrate because that can interfere with the sound system. And if you have a reason to use your phone, you are welcome outside the repair our meeting today is on the record. We will talk for about 30 minutes appear and then opened it up to questions. Our distinguished panel begins writer to my right with my friend anne stevensonyang, cofounder and Research Director at J Capital Research which keeps an eye on the macroeconomy, on domestic policies, a range of a suspected and she has as much experience on the gratis anybody i know. To her right is ely ratner, dallas at china study of the conspicuous deputy that security advisor to Vice President biden and h get a special focus on cha policy in the midst of a vast portfolio. And, of course, our distinguished visitor from cambridge is Graham Allison who has been a friend, advisor, teacher think too many people in this room. Hes director of the Belfer Center for science and international affairs. He is most relevant for today i suppose, author of the new book destined for war, can america and china escape the trap. By my informal reckoning the only people of yet heard about the book is an uncontacted tribe in the amazon consider 12 people. By the end of this event they, too, will be apprised. Want to know why it is trending on twitter you have to credit graham for that. We will start there. The concept of the trap has provoked intense interest and discussion on both sides of the pacific ever since Graham AllisonStart Talking about it. Even before the book was out. What were going to do today is will ask our pals he gets a few words at the beginning to speak for a few minutes on how they conceptualize u. S. China relations from your relative vantage point. What are the structural tension, was the opportunities and where is this had a . A . Grandpa will start with you. The floor is yours. Thank you very much and thanks for the opportunity. I think if we try, if theres a concept that helps us understand whats happening in relations between china and the u. S. Today i think there is anything that concept is thucydidess trap. It were trying to look to the news and noise but they whether its about trump going from a climate pact for whether its about missile testing north korea or potential confrontation in the South China Sea or germany becoming or china becoming germanys number one trading partner, if you look through that to the structural and even sub structural reality, that principal dynamic is a rising power thats threatening to disrupt the ruling power. I think that picture helps us put the rest of the things in place. This concept, its called not grams trap or allison trap but thucydidess trap pics of this is not my idea. This fellow thucydides if you dont know about them, help in this audience, i dont mean to tell you about it but you should at least google it and actually you can download his book for free, after the for free, and you can read the first 100 pages and in a whole month youll learn more than anything else in the month. Its a spectacular book. In any case he wrote famously it was the rise of athens and the fear that its instilled in sparta that made more inevitable. As i explained in the book use choosing inevitable as a hyperbole or exaggeration. He just means likely, very likely. In the book i look at the last 500 years. I find 16 cases when a rising power threatened to disrupt a ruling power, displays, not disrupt but displays. In 12 of the cases the outcome was war. In four the cases the outcome was war with the verdict. As argued in the book, business as usual. In this case i believe sadly what produces his usual and history is usual in this case if it ends with the war between u. S. And china would be catastrophic. So the case helps remind us in instances in which states dont work, nobody wants war, that does not mean war is not figure in cases where war would be catastrophic, that does that mean war cannot occur. And the case of irish people to think about most is the case of 1914. I dont think you can study world war i too much. Its still dazzling to imagine. And, indeed, one of the principal actors in it was asked after the war, how did this happen . He said famously, if we only knew. [laughing] so how in the world could assassination of an archduke in sarajevo by a serbian terrorist cant make this up become a match to produces a fire that burns down the whole of europe. End of the war, world war i forever leader of the principal actors have lost what they care about most. The emperor is trying to hold together simpler. His empire is dissolved, hes gone. The russians are is trying to backup the serbs. The regime has been overthrown by the bolsheviks neckties in germany is trying to backup his buddy in vienna. Hes gone. The french are trying to support the russians and the treaty relationship, a whole generation, never recovered as a society. And britain turns into terminal decline. At the end of the war if theres a chance or do over nobody wouldve chosen war, but working. The lesson i draw from this, one of the lessons from each of the cases come interesting lesson. Each of the want of interesting and important nuances. The proposition that people dont want war and no one would be catastrophic as relevant, helpful but not decisive. And particularly in instances which like today is this inherent, not inherit, this deep, deep structural stress thats reflected in what the book calls the rising powers, which im bigger, stronger, my interest deserves more weight, i deserve more say, more sway. The current arrangement seen a little confined because they were set in place before i became bigger and stronger. And the ruling power becomes anxious, even becomes fearful, maybe even a little paranoid. This, therefore, enhances and magnifies misunderstandings so everything anybody else does looks rather menacing. It also exaggerates the impact of external events that would otherwise be inconsequential. The world war i case is a great reminder of this. Even they could otherwise by third parties be inconsequential or easily manageable, and thats the cases of athens and sparta as well. Conflict between them was a reason for us to have a great were at the end of which were both destroyed. No. Its terrible idea. A thirdparty action produces an action to which there is a reaction to which there is a reaction, at the end of which youre somewhere where nobody wanted to go. Thats the fear i have in the current situation. So eli, you been an agent of the ruling power probably so pick what you make of the patterns of history and how much does it in for the way you think about it today . Thank you. Because great is his only friend today. Looking forward to the conversation. I thought i would stop by making a point which is having spent years debating the rice in china in academia, think tanks, in the white house situation room, i have come to the from belief that almost every argument over u. S. Policy as wood relates to n is what i would call a proxy war over our underlying assumptions about the rise of china. Let me point out, where you land on these assumptions in many ways determines where he will come out in policy issues. Ill highlight to which are really important and up to be lifted up at the front of this conversation because otherwise they will look behind. The first is about inevitability of chinas rise. We have two different perspectives. I was reading grandes comments are one of his oped in the New York Times describing chinas unstoppable rise and anne who describedescribe chinas econome Worlds Largest pyramid scheme predicting that the chinese economy wont be that important to the Global Economy in a relatively short amount of time. What your prediction is other trajectory of chinese power is absolutely fundamental. The other question is is chinas rise could for the United States and good for the world . There are people who believe its benign, the effects will be that much different, they will want what we want or they will want what they want but it wont affect us all that much. Theres a Different School that i described to others that would suggest not that chinas rise in and of itself is a bad thing but there are elements that do pose quite severe challenges to the vital interests of the United States. Where you come down on the question, the nature, the character of chinas rise is fundamental. Its worth bringing those out in the discussion i think at the top. As a relates to the thucydidess trap itself having been with, or to spend your strategy, i would say the following. First, i couldnt agree more that were between the United States and china would be devastating. The capabilities are extraordinary. It would be like nothing the world has ever seen. You talk to world war i. Now were talking about cyberspace. Nuclear weapons, the effects could be absolutely incredible and we shouldnt be complacent about that bu but i dont thinke are complacent. We have a deeply engage relationship with china. Having military to military relationship. We have confidence building measures. In fact, we havent had a Major Military crisis between the United States and china over the last soviet is a testament to the fact this engagement is helping us understand each others interest in keeping us away from the precipice of conflict. Where i have concern and where my critique is is not an grahams argument but how it has been applied. I think this concern about avoiding confrontation with china, lowering tensions has been taken too far in your strategy. The u. S. China relationship, keeping it happy, healthy, keeping it good, lowering tensions avoiding conflict, confrontation has become an end in and of itself in your strategy. This result, it is result of what i would consider to be endemic risk aversion in the u. S. China relationship that has created a permissive environment for chinese assertiveness, for chinese liberalism, and that the biggest threat to date in asia is not in fact, we are on the brink of great power war but we are on the brink of chinese hegemony, chinese sphere of influence, whatever you want to call it. But a china lead order in asia which china will win by not fighting, to steal a chinese phrase. This risk aversion when we sent our strategy about avoiding war is leading us down another very dangerous path and we ought not to ignore that potential outcome. The lasting policy as relates to tethering our strategic lens around this issue or avoidance is that there are other very important very consequential competitive aspects to the u. S. China relationship theres an economic competition that is getting fierce. Theres an ideological competition that is only getting more pfister theres institutional competition thats only getting more fierce. Its my sense that is what the future of u. S. China competition lies. If we think of the central feature of the competition as a military competition, and thats what we center our strategy around, we will miss this other part of the competition. I was reading an article by a leading chinese academic just yesterday who said, talking about the relationship between the nested and china, the rifle he said will become less hot but more profound and widespread. I think thats exactly right. As we think about how to manage this absolutely critical issue, the challenge of avoiding war with the United States we ought not let the result in either risk aversion or a distraction from the other element of competition. Even if its endemic it may not be a cute at all . Thats an interesting point that were not sleepwalking towards his arrangement. History or dates in a sense. I think the question is why i am i here . I focus on economics and finance adding theres a good reason im here, which is chinas ambitions are economic, not just strategic. Im a big fan of looking at the evidence in front of your eyes instead of the evidence you imagine the evidence in front of our eyes is that china has note geostrategic plans or designs on becoming the great world power strategically. What does have designs on his economic, extend its economic strength throughout the world, collecting tribute, building states along its borders that have relationships with economic dependence on it, and building its own private channels of economic and financial communication. As for doctor allison, this is really above my pay grade but i would say although thats an interesting useful, theres others that could be just as useful. I tend to become on the fan of carls work, what was his book called . [inaudible] exactly. So i think that perhaps interesting paradigm to use is the great multiethnic empires that of all perished except for china, egypt and mayan and persians, and even the romans, which to some extent were expensive mistake but expansionist the most in economic terms because of their need to find, to extend, to find new sources of income. I think thats what we need to be focused on with china. The effort to build dedicated and less transparent channels such as the Money Transfer system that china has tried to build, the Asian Infrastructure bank, the belt and road system to sort of bypass the world bank and the multilateral institutions, all of the trade arrangements with Southeast Asia. Yes, there extending military power in Southeast Asia but i would say thats more but having military power than being interested in sort of invasion or anything like that. I think that the issue of taiwan and hong kong and the relationships to the mainland are being perhaps underestimated for the risk, but that the strategy for china is not, i think china is quite determined to recapture taiwan in one way or another, not militarily. That would not benefit china in any possible way. John is very dependent on the technological strength of taiwan, on its ip industry, almost as dependent as it is on the Financial Industries in hong kong. I think one should think more about the special zone concept that is been used in the past, perhaps extending the one nation, the one country to system toward taiwan and perhaps trying to get provincial representation in the mainland onto taiwan as happened under they k mp. Something along those lines, a coop strategy rather than a military strategy. I think thats what we should be focused. Anyway, more to say another example of war without bullets, as Chinese Military strategist which in the context. I suspect you want to respond to a couple of these things. I went a few take us this next question, which is about what we do about it . Innocence one of the policy implications . You have staked out effectively the stakes com can you give us a sense of what the risks are, of what history suggests. Within our question is what do we do . How much does a United States, how much candy, how much should a comment chinas rise . How much is a more assertive use policy a check against eventual war or in fact, does it hasten war . Big topic. Let me make three points, partly respond because i think the differences among us may be more clarifying what im go to the point. Start with a point and i will tell you, ill come back to very basic i say in the conclusion of the book this book will be very unsatisfactory for washingtonians. Because in washington you have to describe the solution in the same sentence as the problem. The doctor says dont just stand there, do something. Im supposed in the last chapter unfold a new strategy thats got a snappy title, taken aspirin and everything will be fine. I say this was not the case. This is not a problem that is subject to a washington fix. It give you the opportunity for volume two which your publisher will be very pleased about. My hope is volume two will be written by somebody in your generation who are likely more imaginative than old cold warriors like me and whose minds are not as encumbered or even by the constraints. Because i think that our current discussion about strategy towards china has been basically mosh. In the book i participated, wires in the Clinton Administration for the Obama Administration, engaged but hedge is a great moniker that excludes nothing and permits everything. It essentially goes with the flow. So whatever happens i can explain why i meet are hedging or engaging and the Defense Department can pursue continued. The treasury can pursue engagement or even concessions. So i would think this is been the absence of a strategy. It allows us to go with the flow in whatever happens. If i go back to the first point, this is now for both i think for ely and anne. Thucydidess trap is not about only a military competition. Thucydides in writing about athens versus sparta, most of these by athens drove sparta craze is a economy, their culture, their invention of everything. Read what the corinthian ambassador tries to explain to the spartans in telling him why you cant live with these. He says of these people are out of their minds. They invent something new every morning and if it doesnt work they invent something to the next day. They never as he says there never happy to let anybod