[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] matthew olson, first of all, welcome. To all of you, all four of you. Matt olsen is cofounder of ironnet cybersecurity. Previously serving as a director of National Counterterrorism center where he briefed the National Security council and reported to president obama on counterterrorism activities. Mr. Olson also previously served as general counsel nsa focusing on surveillance law and cybersecurity. Under the bush administration, mr. Olsen served as acting assistant attorney general, National Security division, doj. Mr. Olsen also served as executive director of Guantanamo Task force special counsel director to the fbi and served as federal prosecutor for more than a decade. Hes a graduate of university of virginia and harvard law school. Adam kleine is robert m gates Senior Fellow Center for new american security, widely published in areas of National Security, surveillance, counterterrorism, law and policy. He was previously an attorney at International Law firm. He was also worked on National Security policy at Rand Corporation and the 9 11 Public Discourse project, the nonprofit successor to the 9 11 commission. Mr. Klein served as the law clerk for justice scalia, it is a graduate of Northwestern University and columbia law school. Elizabeth goiten codirects the Brennan Center for justice, liberty and National Security program, New York University school of law. Previously ms. Goitein served as counsel to the yes, senator russell feingold, chairman of the constitution subcommittee on Senate Judiciary of this Senate Judiciary committee. Ms. Goitein also served as a Trial Attorney in the federal Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the department of justice, and she graduated from yale law school. Elisabeth collins is serving her second term as board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. Previously she was an attorney in private sector at two International Law firms, and served as the republican chief counsel for Supreme Court nominations for Senate Judiciary committee. Ms. Collins was also an assistant attorney general legal policy, doj, where she provided advise and consult relating to National Security and other issues. Ms. Collins is a graduate of the university of chicago and harvard law school. We will proceed to my left to my right, so mr. Olsen, proceed please. Thank you very much chairman grassley bigots honor to be here. Let me but the bottom line upfront come as a former director of the National Counterterrorism center i can attest to the fact that section 702 has significantly contributed to our ability to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and around the world. This is consistent with the testimony that you heard from the panelists, the witnesses in the earlier panel. Similarly as a former general counsel at nsa and as a former Justice Department official i worked to ensure we have limited section seven at you in the that protected the privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. I will make a few brief remarks and i will focus those remarks on three points, all addressing how section 702 has worked in practice. First, the operational value of 702. As this committee is well aware we face a persistent at adaptive threat from al qaeda and isis and other groups. Just since september 2014 isis has claimed credit for 40 terrorist attacks outside of its calories in syria and iraq. The online environment for potential extremist Committee Case isis handlers and with recruiters plays a critical roe in providing the direction to these individuals and mobilizing extremist toward violence. So to combat this dynamic threat our ability to conduct surveillance under 702 has proven vital. The key point is this, our best opportunity to identify and stop these attacks before they occur is the good intelligence. Thats often derived from our surveillance authorities such as 702. As the director of nctc i relied on a daily basis on intelligence, collected under 702 and in our morning briefings the and us often reported a critical piece of information came from section 702. In his landmark report the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board identified approximate 30 specific case or section 702 was the initial Catalyst Enterprises unknown terrorist operatives and plots, and more than 100 cases where several to help to lead to the rest of individuals on terrorism related charges. This is a truly extraordinary record in just the past few years. My second point is oversight. When congress amended fisa in 2008 i was at the department of justice. Congress established an unprecedented and coffee its compliance oversight regime for 702. Under this regime as youve heard all three branches exercise authority to ensure the government is probably using its authority. This oversight has been strengthened over the past several years through both congressional and executive branch action. This rigorous oversight regime reflects the careful balance that congress struck in 2008 to ensure that both the effectiveness of its authority and the protection of privacy and Civil Liberties. In my experience the statute has been effective in doing both. The third point i would like to make is to suggest that calls for major reforms are not warranted. One issue that the committee has written about this morning is the socalled incidental collection issue. A person targeted for surveillance under 7 702 speaksn the phone or send an email, they often maybe communicate with somebody in the United States. This is whats been referred to as incidental collection. Some have raised concerns about such collection. I can tell you the ability to obtain and use these medications has proven vital to the disruption of plots and the rest of al qaeda operatives in the tray. The zazi case and other specific case are examples of the Public Congress should resist calls to restrict the governments ability to acquire and use this information concerning u. S. Persons. I second issue involves ability to search 70 702 information wih u. S. Person identifiers such as names and email addresses. I believe these queries are essential means for analyst identify critical intelligence that would otherwise be inaccessible. From an operational perspective when intelligence analysts and identify terrorist operatives and undercover plots, one of the very first steps is t a check an existing database for potential connections to suspected terrorist. So with the fbi suspects a person here is moving toward violence, the ability to query 702 information enables that guy to go to identify key medications that the government has already lawfully collected to find vital clues for i believe this approach reflects an enduring lesson from the 9 11 attacks. That is of the impairment for the government to effectively integrate and use the relevant information it holds in its databases in order to connect the dots. Some are now urging congress to impose probable cause requirements on intelligence agencies before they can even search section 702 dated with u. S. Person identifiers. In my view this is a monday billy of agents to move quickly to identify terrorist information. At the early stage of investigation it may be impossible to establish probable cause and, therefore, such data would be beyond their reach. And so, mr. Chairman, the authority of congress established under section 702 has played an indispensable role in my view and protecting the nation and canno and in offerins program under strict oversight regime the government has construed it can collect data in a manner that collects privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. Americans. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Klein. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member, thank you for inviting me to testify today. In a recent report to coauthors and offered more than 60 reputation for future sit ins policy including section 702. We concluded section 702 is a a valuable intelligence tool that should be reauthorize with existing statutory authorities intact. We also propose enhancements to oversight, transparency and privacy. The public should know that section 702 is already subject to rigorous multi layered oversight from all three branches of government. Few Government Programs receive such close scrutiny. That said it is worth considering what more we can do to protect privacy and strengthen public trust and intelligence programs. This isnt just a privacy issue. Its also important for National Security. Programs that lack public support will not be politically sustainable in the long term. The challenge is to do this without diminishing section 702 effectiveness as an intelligence tool. Broadly speaking there are three areas of opportunity. The first is to strengthen key institutions that oversee 702 including the fisa court and the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. The secondary is Greater Transparency so about how 702 affects americans, but how agencies query 702 information and about how the government uses 702 information in the criminal justice system. The third area is to strengthen accountability for those who received signal intelligence reporting, to ensure classified material is handled responsibly and never use for inappropriate purposes. Including political purposes. Id also like to mention one thing i hope this process will avoid. One of the 9 11 commissions key messages was Intelligence Agency did to people to connect the dots between various pieces of information been collected. I worked for tom kean and lee hamilton in 2004 during the process that led to the creation of the dni and nctc and i know congress and Intelligence Community have moved heaven and earth since that time to break down information of stovepipes in the ioc. With a great terrorist threats to confronting us at our allies, it would be unfortunate to reverse course on the progress now. We should not create new obstacles that could prevent agencies and connecting the dots and stopping terrorist attacks. Im happy to provide more details during the q a. Thank you and i look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Ms. Goitein. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member feinstein and members of the committee thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Brennan Center for justice. Congress goal when asked the fisa amendments act in 2008 was to give our government more powerful tools against foreign threats. The government has used this authority to monitor suspected terrorists overseas, to trace the networks at interrupt their plots. That is exactly as it should be. We are here today because of the other things that section 702 has been interpreted to allow. The government isnt simply monitoring Foreign Terrorists or powers. Instead its scanning the content of almost all of the International Communications that flow into and out of the United States and acquiring hundreds of millions of key medications each year, including a large although still unknown number of Americans Communications. In addition, despite being required to minimize the retention and use of americans data, the government keeps that data for years and routinely searches it for information to use against americans in ordinary criminal cases. Indeed current roles allow the fbi to read americans email femo listen to the phone calls without any factual predicate to suggest wrongdoing, let alone a want. I dont believe this is what congress had in mind when it passed section 702. Inviting the law congress entrusted the executive branch and the fisa court with significant discretion. For instance, Congress Allowed the targeting of any for a overseas trusting the government to focus its efforts on those who pose a threat to our interests. Congress also left it to the executive branch and the fisa court to fashion pacific minimization rules. I dont mean to imply that this trust was misplaced. In fact, weve seen essentially no evidence of intentional misuse. What weve seen is Mission Creep so that a law designed to protect against foreign threats has become a major source of warrantless access to americans of data and a tool for ordinary domestic law enforcement. This outcome is contrary to only terrifies his original intent but to americans expectations and their trust that congress will protect their privacy and the freedoms. There are several reforms that congress could enact that would show up protections for americans while preserving the core of section 702. The governments ability to collect the communications of suspected terrorists and others who wish us harm without a warrant, even when those key medications transit through or are stored inside the United States. Ill touch on three of the key reforms. First, congress should narrow the scope of surveillance by requiring the government to have a reasonable belief that the target is someone worth targeting such as a foreign power or a suspected terrorist. This would be an integral determination. It would be no probable caution, no fisa court approval. This reform would offer critical protection, not just a lawabiding foreigners, but to americans. When the government can target any for a overseas, that enables a massive amount of collection of innocent conversations between americans and their friends, relatives and associates abroad. Those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling and potentially abuse. This reform is also while for the United States tech industry. The governments ability to target any for a overseas is one reason that european courts have invalidated datasharing agreement between the u. S. And european companies. Thats why 30 major u. S. Tech companies, including google, microsoft and facebook, signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of its section 702 surveillance along with other reforms. Second, Congress Congress should require the government to obtain a warrant before searching section 702 data for Americans Communications. Cant care to what mr. Evan said, restrictions on searches of lawfully acquired Digital Information by the constitutional norms, even when the government has a warrant to seize in search of digital data in a criminal case, it cannot run a different search of that data for Different Reasons without obtaining another warrant. Its really should not have that freedom when it obtained the data without a word based on a promise that its only targets were foreigners. Third, congress should codify the end of the data collection. This practice has no basis in the statute. Its a small part of upstream collection which is itself a a small part of section 702 surveillance. The privacy concerns it raises are uniquely significant this is clearly a case where the risks outweigh the benefits. These basic changes were not only go far toward protecting americans privacy, and also better align the statute with the goals it is meant to serve. Ill stop there and i look forward to taking your questions. Ms. Collins. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member feinstein, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I provide this testimony in my capacity as an individual board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. An independent executive Branch Agency charged with providing advice and oversight with respect to federal counterterrorism actions. From 20132014 our five member bipartisan board conducted an extensive examination of the 702 program. In july 2014 we issued a unanimous report concluding that the section 702 program is valuable, statutorily authoriz authorized, and at its core constitutional. We set forth the legislative foundation for the program, the implement procedures that govern the operation of the program, and extensive oversight structure that accompanies the program. We also unanimously voted out ten policybased recommendations, each of which has been implemented or is in the process of being implemented, and none of which required legislation. My oral and written testimony draw heavily from the boards report which continues to be a valuable resource for understanding and assessing the program. The board conducted both a legal and policy analysis of section 702 p