Good afternoon everybody. My name is thomas mahnken, Senior Research professor and ceo of the center for repeated and its my pleasure to welcome you here for a discussion of this book. The big stick, the big stick the limits of soft power and the neccessity of military force. What were going to do is let the authors always should have the last word even if he doesnt, we will give him the last word. What im going todo his first turn to my colleague , ambassador eric edelman, a practitioner here at skype and counselor to the center for strategic and budgetary assessment for comments. Ill turn to my other friend and colleague, how branch, Henry A Kissinger distinguished professor of Global Affairs for his comments. And we will turn to the office, to elliott and then opened the floor to you for your questions, and go from there. So with no further do, eric. Thank you, great to be here. I think its important that every book event remember the important part of a book event is to sell books for the authors so i think all of you need to get a copy of the big stick, particularly our television audience, you need to get a copy available on amazon. Is a very important book, particularly important at this point in time. We are meeting today on groundhog day. And i think thats very apropos. By the way, those of youdont know , Punxsutawney Phil saw his shadow so were in for another six weeks of winter. But the movie groundhog day is one of my favorite movies and for those of you seen it, bill murray wakes up every day in a groundhog state. And in some sense i think that the metaphor is for what professor cohen is writing about because it seems every so often, the United States needs to relearn the lesson of military power is important and weve had to relearn the lesson after world war ii, korea and vietnam. And i think we are now going to have to relearn it again after the lessons of the last 15 years and in some sense that is the subject of professor cohens book. And that has now last diplomats, ive been a practitioner for 30 years. I certainly associate myself with comments that George Brennan made although hes not my favorite Foreign Service officer but hes sort of the archetype of the diplomat and in 1946 in addressing the national war college, he said you have no idea how much it contributes to the general pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a quiet armed forces background. The mere existence of those forces he said is probably the most important single instrumentality in the conduct of us foreign policy. And i thoroughly agree. With ken and thats not to say that one would use those forces promiscuously and sometimes people think the Foreign Service wants to do. But it does mean that of the sinequan out of effective diplomacy is the availability of usable military power. And if you need any better example of that, i would argue that the its rather feckless and the point was diplomacy that former secretary carry engaged in over syria over the last year and a half of the Obama Administration would be exhibit a. Professor cohen began his book, his book is really by the way, about war. More than the use of military power and an important part power. Is really a book about the role of the United States in the International System and why hard power and the alliances which it sustains are a crucial part of that role. And i think he makes an excellent case of both for the importance of that role. In the first instance. He makes a excellent case about why the United States can still afford to play that role. And it does play that role and the challenges that we face, a multiplicity of challenges in the form of a rising china, in the form of a revisionist russia, the continuing challenge of jihad is him and the danger of fragile and failing states. To the International Order. And how only the us military power along with other instruments of massive power can address those challenges. And he concludes the book, just to give you a sense of what you will read if you taken my advice and go and buy it is also some very good propositions about how one ought to think about the use of force because as i said, i dont think i40 would argue that promiscuous use of military power is called upon. The challenges that he describes an eye out and bought this before i go over to my colleague how branch. , the challenges he describes in europe and the middle east to me are very reminiscent and i think he agrees with this, and the book supports this. Of the kind of challenges that states face in the interwar period. And i wanted to conclude my remarks with a consultation from winstonchurchill. A book on the governing storm which i think speaks to most of what professor cohen is addressing in his book and also the current moment. And he says that its his purpose, turtle that is. As someone who live and did during that period, to show how easily the tragedy of the second worldwar could have been prevented. How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous , how the structure and inhabitants of democratic states unless they are welded into larger organisms lacked those elements of persistence and conviction. Which can alone give security to humble masses. How even in matters of selfpreservation no policy is pursued for even 10 or 15 years at a time. We shall see how the councils of prudence and restraint may become the prime agents of mortal danger and how the middle course adopted by safety in a quiet life could be found to lead directly to the bullseye disaster. We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of International Action pursued by many states in common across the years irrespective of the evan flow of national policy. Thanks tom. Its a great pleasure to be here to have the chance to offer comments on what is a terrific book by somebody i consider a colleague and friend and i suppose i could go on at some length about the virtues of the book but frankly all you have to do to get a sense of that is to read the glowing reviews that have been written everywhere from the New York Times to the wall street journal to the Weekly Standard to get a sense of how good it is. That wouldbe much fun anyway so in the interest of perhaps providing some fodder , im going to briefly mention five thoughts that elliotts book provoked in me. One where i violently disagree with it. And four, which all you have to do is the state of us military power today where i suspect we violently agree. And so the first one and this is truly in the best interests of the best tradition of academic hairsplitting imgoing to take issue with the three paragraphs i didnt like. As opposed to the 225 pages that i did. And elliott knows where im going with this. So eliot lays the dragon of strategy in this book i pointing out that any sort of grand intellectual design or theory or blueprint or plan isnt going to survive very long in the real world. And as someone who actually came from teaching a class with the words grand strategy in the title, let me push back because i think that your critique of grand schemes, i think you may actually be critiquing a strawman version of grand strategy so we believe that grand strategy is indeed a stepbystep plan or something that can lend a seamless coherence to foreign policy, youre right. It is truly hopeless in any interest but i would say i think most people who argue in favor of grand strategy think its something a little bit different and perhaps more modest. Its just a very basic set of principles, ideas, of priorities that guide how you react to a chaotic world and even how you adapt in the face of unforeseen event. Its a sense of what is most important as a country . What are the things that most threatened that . And in general, how can i apply what resources i have to fix it . If you take that as the definition, you can find a lot of historical examples of grand strategy from fdr to truman. And furthermore i would point out that i think the grand strategy, as i can see is absolutely essential to good Defense Strategy and decisionmaking as you call for and you outline. I think you have to have a grandstrategy , some conception of how your foreignpolicy fits together to know what interests are worth fighting for and which ones arent. Its difficult to apportion resources across the years without some Global Integrated conception of what youre trying to achieve and how your objectives relate to one another. The grand strategy is not the enemy of good military policy and strategy, its actually the allied thereof. The second point, and this its to the area where we probably agree, it had to do with what you described succinctly as the american hand. I love this chapter, it does a great job of laying out the numerous strains the United States has, how rumors of our demise have been exaggerated in the past and they may be so today. The counterpoint to that and i imagine you would agreehere that is that although at a global level , the us has great advantages over any challenge here. As a regional picture, the picture is getting quite dreary. The key challenges and competitions today are not primarily global. China is not challenging us on a global basis yet. The real challenge is east asia. And here and elsewhere the regional balance has become problematic. I think its quite doubtful whether the United States today could extend the baltics and even parts of Eastern Europe for resources. There are real questions about whether we can defend taiwan today are other parts of asia. So theres a crucial global regional distinction that all of us have to keep in mind and thinking about the question of how strong is the american hand . We outstrip all challenges when it comes to global Power Production capability but in the key regions which is where the rubber hits the road, i think we are actually headed differently if we are out there already. That brings me to a third point which the book addresses nicely which is that when you look at these regional balances, not just the adversaries that make up the equation, us allies are a big part of it to us allies at immensely to the strength of the United States wields. Host of them are in decline. You point out how the relatives and absolute military capabilities of most of our european allies are based off the past 20 years and that the client is adding tremendously to the difficulties we face in our Defense Strategies and is making for hearty vice, we have to defend taiwan and japan or the baltic because its increasingly overmatched by russia or china. Its undercutting the ability of the allies to contribute meaningfully to expeditionary interventions in places like the middle east at a time when the instability is traditionally evoked those interventions. What we seen over the past 20 years is that the allies have led in fact in all of our conflicts in afghanistan to libya to counter i so they brought lester the table in each of those and because our strategy is always a coalition strategy, thats a significant problem. And it brings me to i think a fourth point in your book that it fleshes out nicely which is the issue of strategic solvency where if you put these last few issues together, i think what emerges is that we are rapidly approaching the point of strategic insolvency. The point where our allies cannot do things we have traditionally done that we have pledged to do that we think we want to be able to do. The United States is not an authentic regional more capacity anymore. We now face a threetiered problem, theres the ability and all of the eurasians fears that we carry and if one believes this as i do and if you are right the military backbone, military power, the background of International Order is raises troubling questions. So i think were approaching a stark choice and this is something derek and i are working on right now. Where you are going to have to pay significantly more to maintain a Defense Strategy and the primacy of the International Order that weve enjoyed or were going have to be accustomed to doing less in the world. We should take the first choice and i think youve actually do that with breaking the bank if you were willing to make some difficult but fairly common adjustments with respect to entitlement spending and revenue but the gap in our capabilities becomes too big to afford and thats a fundamental question going forward. And then this brings me to a final point that the book flagged for me and its one i know you would agree with. Which is that military power is utterly crucial to american policy and International Order but it isnt enough. And were reminded of this every day right now. You can imagine a scenario in which the United States opens the floodgateson military spending. In which we reinvest the basic but in which we still come out on the other side geopolitically weaker. Because in this scenario we have also, we pursue trade policies that work against the international and National Prosperity weve enjoyed for the last seven years. We stop reassuring countries around the worldwhen we started employing , we decimated our reputation for steadfastness and reliability. Thats not such a crazy scenario these days. So by all means, yes the importance of doing this but also yes to all the other aspects of american statecraft and policy that have traditionally made this nation so great. Elliott, what say you . Know, first i want to thank my friends and colleagues here and i want to thank all of you are being here. This is a book which i think i could only have written with the colleagues i have read with the people i have and with the environment that of this remarkable institution which brings together this i think quite unique mix of history and policy and practice, im looking at my three colleagues up here, all distinguished scholars. All this government experience. And i hope thats made the book distinctive. Furthermore i think ive always found part of this the right way, its to do it in a way that is out in the public square. I wrote this book with the intention that it would be read by people you are not students of military affairs and dont normally think about it but it ended up being pleased with the New York Times review. Which was by somebody who i think is an expert on family kinds of issues, she paid me the nicest complement ive ever. Which is its organized like a bento box. [laughter] ill take that. And finally, part of this tradition is a tradition of civil and spirited disagreement so we will do that too. Before i address some of these previous remarks, ill say one or two things about the writing of the book. For me, one of the most challenging parts of it was a chapter called 15 years of war. And thats in part because i felt obliged to tackle the question of iraq and the question of policies in which i felt had been engaged and advocating and in some cases implementing once i went into the government and i have to say that was very tough to. Im not entirely sure how well i did it. Because it meant it was really looking hard at the things i thought or some which i no longer think. Thats never easy. On the other hand, i would also say and this certainly also having been in the thick of it, it does make it harder to be a dispassionate observer and critic. Once again i think one of the great things about size is that it enables you to do that. President daniels, were going to see a 40 right over here. Sorry. Let me move from that to talk a bit about what how race because in a way it does get more of the book. I think somebody said our distributors may be semantic and what you call friend strategy i call policy. And i think my general editorial principle is one word is always better than two. Particularly if youre going to use words like brand oh i prefer just problematic. But i just prefer the word policy. There is some disagreement about how effective policymaking gets done. It is partly because i think at any time there is enormous uncertainty and youre reacting to events and a particular mixture of people and so forth. But i think thats goes to an even bigger problem now so although i quite agree with you that you have to have some general principles, general ideas, those will only give you limited diagnosis. Very limited guidance. The more important thing is how you go about once you are actually in the midst of the fog and the merc and struggling with it. I very much agree with you and i think the three of us would agree that one of the difficulties that we have is although the american hand is basically very strong, we can really screw it up. As some of you probably know weve already gotten off to a good start. In a couple weeks doing that. Particularly in the way that you describe, that is blowing up relationships. I would have been more optimistic about it because you say as i point out in the book, the european sample of falling off the cliff but i think its coming up differently with japan coming up, smaller, partners like vietnam but allthat , eric edelman is my master of destructive diplomacy, i learned from him, im not joking about that. And one of the things i learned from him is the wisdom of what george said, this is like gardening. The constantly have to be tending your allies. Its not natural. This is not something that is imminent in the world and i agree that we are, each of those regional balances is more difficult. I argue in the book that the big strategic challenges that we face are very disparate, very different, they require different kinds of ways of thinking so i think i would have thought anyway this was a much more precarious situation. Then in the past. , if you nasty a year ago, i would say the reason why im writing the book is is going to be precarious but i think we think about it the right way. With care we will be able to make the world we are in. But we have been joined by president ron angle and i like to give him the opportunity to make any remarks. Either from the audience or from the others. [inaudible] wonderful to have you. You dont usually get the president of