The great tragedies of american kennan that cannon was not listened to by the policymakers in 1960 when we. Ecided to go to war jamesired army general gavin presents his views on the vietnam war. This was broadcast of your he 8,e, broadcast february 1966. He was the only general to parachute four times with his troops in combat. He was u. S. Ambassador to france for the first two years of the kennedy administration. This is the first 70 minutes of hearing. Day within of the the Eisenhower Administration over possible United States involvement. He served under general ridgeway then army chief of staff as the assistant chief of staff of plans and operations. Whos one of them leading military strategist in postwar. Although hes now in private industry hannahs remained a thoughtful observer and commentator on military strategy in the nuclear age. General gavin has served his country very well and has a right to enjoy his retirement. We need his advice where there are very few people with his experience. We are confronted with momentous decisions in the near future and i need not tell you what the subject matter of these decisions involves. This committee is trying to explore certain aspects of our policies upon which you can throw some light. Always seek his information and enlightenment so that our the judgmentgment, of our people and this committee may be as wise as possible. This is not a novel or new approach. The senate has delegated to this committee in the first instance. It will be reviewed by the senate as a whole and the country. We have many precedents for this inquiry. On may 6, 1954, just before the fall of you and been through of yin bin fu, express himself clearly. That we will express clear opinions and the policies which we have been asked to cooperate. We will insist that we and the American People be treated as adults and that we have the facts without sugarcoating. General, we are pleased to have you, will you proceed . Yes mr. Chairman. Men say its a great privilege for me to appear before this testing was committee. I look upon this theyre not working. Will someone fix these . Which way is on . May i say once again, what a great privilege it is to appear before this distinguished committee. Its a privilege for citizens to begin in the opportunity to perform first of all and second i particularly appreciate the opportunity to appear at an open hearing because i feel strongly that these issues are of the utmost importance to our people. They should hear the differing views and out of this discourse will come a coalesced and consolidated national will to get on with the work in hand. That say at the outset into the background of my point of view i have arrived at and wentssed in that magazine to true years of the service with the philippine scouts in the late 1930s and since that time considerable interest in the affairs of Southeast Asia at the time of the fall of the oo ian food of yin bin f talked to the end and general balance general daniels and others about the problems. Among other things thailand was a sensitive spot and might become a deeply involved part of Southeast Asia. Since that one of the most interesting experiences i had was with mr. Kennedy. He was confronted with a very difficult situation i speak from memory. The question confronting president entity was to what extent should we become involved in land warfare in laos. I dont know but i would suspect that he had saw that had he saw the advice of the pentagon wouldve committed forces and more divisions. This made little sense and the more we talked about it, the more i agreed with him that a landlocked country remote from the application of seapower and less airpower seemed to offer a hopeless situation to us. He asked me to go to paris upon my return and enter into discussions with savanna to see if we could not convince him that we were interested in an independent laos and this is what i understood to do. With some misgivings at the outset because he had a reputation for being very close to the communists and i was not sure how our negotiations would come out. Mr. Herman ably conducted negotiations parallel with my own. Meetings andeight fruitful and fascinating as they were for me, we did arrive at a treaty that hopefully guaranteed the freedom neutrality and independence of laos. I was aware then as i am now that what our president saw to achieve was a clinical settlement to what appeared to be a serious military problem. He was absolutely right. We did arrive at that solution. Since then, i have continued to devote a great deal of my time to matters of global strategy in our commitments. I was asked late last spring to do an article on the meeting of the atomic bomb 20 years later. This was for the early august edition of the New York Times magazine. I given a great deal of attention to the bomb in the 1940s and even then came to the conclusion that urban bombing lacked credibility. For a number of reasons not worth going into. And i further note i was denied publication at that time. I felt the problems of the bomb were quite different than simply escorting world war ii experience. As the summer came to an end, my thinking on this matter to get into the real meaning of the changes in global strategy. I did an article on this and in the midst of this i was exchanging bonds with mr. Fisher and talking about sky cavalry theh was a postulation in early 1950s considered far too reticle for acceptance at the time and is now an accepted battlefield application. So at that time, late in the summer i decided that in the view of our total spectrum of global commitments and the changing nature of global strategy we had better look hard at our vietnamese commitment. Itd become alarmingly out of balance and this was the basis for the letter that i wrote which i would be happy to come back to later. I might say that all i said in that letter was lets look where we are today, what our commitments are, what they cost and what we can do. B, what the alternatives are. What these costs might he and having done this lets make up our minds what we will do. I base this as much upon the statements of many officials that have been to that wartorn country and returned with optimistic statements only to find they have had to change them thereafter which suggested to me that in the beginning they didnt understand what the requirements were and could not estimate accurately what the needs might be to meet those requirements. Referencetter i made to hanoi and the futility of bombing and pointed out this would cause create more problems than it would cause. When was this general question mark still in 1962 . I want to place it in time. Quick this was late last year. Strength ut of my thinking about the strategy. At the moment im in passing touching upon the letter. The ammunition dumps tank columns or concentrations of trucks and military targets, two, power plants and such as that, it was slowly creeping. I wanted to lay this at rest once and for all in all time. Per se forg a city psychological for psychological reasons achieves little in the way of military effect. Today it could be extremely damaging in the court of World Opinion i want to be sure i had that. Just bombing would not solve anything. Theready talked a bit about matter of global strategy into which i would like to fit vietnam. Two of the most significant things that happened in our time have been the bomb and the space x duration what both of which have tremendous military significance. Its a very interesting case in point because the first question we asked ourselves was the meeting of the bomb. Was it the beginning of a new age . In which the adam would solve our military problems as we had been unable to solve them in the indeed the end . I suspected it first it would be the end. At first i thought it was a minority opinion but now i am absolutely satisfied. As man has saw to impose his will on his opponents he has saw to it do it in every way that he could get it. From metallic pellets inspired by charges to the fusion of the adam itself. Ins finally succeeded bringing down explosions that take place on the surface of the sun, fission. He has brought the energy of the cosmos itself to the earth. He can no longer use it because it could destroy a major segment of the human race. End of a search to impose his will on his fellow man. That search has terminated and now he must find more discreet means. Greater mobility and rapid Data Transmission will stop he must know what is going on everywhere as quickly as he can find out to keep it under control and thus avoid a major catastrophe that might occur if Nuclear Weapons were used. If this is so and it is truly a concept in which i do ask you to share agreement im grateful for the opportunity to express it if this is so then for the first time in Human History something very unusual is happening in warfare and i believe that it has. Has to do with those measures you take short of war that make absolute victory certain. If war occurs inadvertently your sure to win. It seems to me now on the best analysis i have been able to make i did not understand. If war occurs inadvertently if your strategy is right you will win out give you examples of that. I would say if i may that ive given a great deal of thought and done writing on the subject. Science at political the university of california four weeks in 1964 on a sabbatical. I have not come to these conclusions casually as they represent for me considerable effort and thought. That our strategy today should be based upon first of all a dynamic viable economy. An economy that can export much for new real skills managerial techniques dollars or acquisitions, ventures abroad to help other people. We have developed a way of life that provides an abundance of means for our people and we should continue to export this just as aggressively as we can to help other people. Im not talking about economic colonialism. For the enlightened fitness man trying to help other people help themselves. People are not born equal nor our nations born equal and they need help to achieve a place for their people. We have been doing extremely well in this respect. Im talking in this context of the strategy. But it seems to me, for example great booksof the on decisive battles the 15 decisive battles were it to be rewritten today waiting clued the donees of mr. Khrushchev who sought to coexist within his own to tell a terry and system based on planning and not market demand, who failed because he could not get the green grown and to that have the fertilizer and his economy could not produce. Characteristically this happens in a failing strategy and he saw attacked the gamut to recoup. With the cuba and a great adventure that thanks to our secretary of defense he was defeated in. I would say that his demise is one of the decisive setbacks in all of history and i think that now in my personal opinion that our efforts to work closely with the soviet people should be rewarded. And in the present state of the Union Message making changes to encourage trade is a good thing. Deal done a great exporting professors entertainers and scientists. I think we can go a long way together. It was a turning point. Further, thatay strategy today is in the realm of science and technology. Out of science we are producing an abundance of new knowledge that can energize our economy and keep it moving. And very briefly, in the court of World Opinion, World Opinion area thathave the will have a great deal to do with what we may do. I would draw the parallel of the use of energy and power through the many centuries of human existence when people were restrained by their fellow men and what they could do to do many things even city states restrained with their armed forces could do in this nation has shrunk to the point today where we simply cannot do all the things we would like to do. Ive always felt that one of our greatest captains of all time was General Macarthur and yet even he had to come to realize and learn the hard way that the use of a nuclear bomb because we had them in our arsenal could not be permitted under his mandate from the United Nations. It was sickly and intolerable thing. Ive touched upon three areas of strategy that i believe are of overriding importance. My concern therefore for vietnam first became aroused when i found us cutting back in our global commitments and the relevant economics. I began to suspect that the escalation in Southeast Asia was beginning to hurt our strategic position. If this has significance now, it may have tremendous significance in the long run. What weturned back and are doing in World Affairs through economic endeavors to support a tactical confrontation that appears to be escalating, we are in dangerous territory and for this reason what we are doing deserves looking at. There are several areas where confrontations occurred tactically. I mentioned cuba. Europe is one today. Our tactics in europe are far in excess of our needs. To get to asia, the korean commitment is one that we must maintain and we are maintaining. Of changt support kaishek likewise. Southeast asia is a very volatile and endemic area of operations. Vietnam was not alone. Thailand i look on as a very dangerous area and one that we should regard seriously at this time. In looking at it i raised some questions. What do we have today and what can they do. I stated they would have sufficient forces to hold areas along the coast. Dont butput a core it should still be open a bit at the ends. Ordon, but it should still he opened at the ends. This appears to me to be incredibly costly and manpower and national wealth. And i to the conclusion think this is important. Charges have been made about what i have said and i quote we must do the best we can with the forces we have deployed in vietnam now. I did not say withdraw or attack or do anything else. We must do the best we have with what we have in hand. Keep in mind the true meaning of global strategy and World Affairs today. Economic science, technology and World Opinion will serve Strategic Interests well if we handle our resources wisely. Tacticalher hand, mistakes could be disastrously costly. Since the advent of the space age there has been a revolution in the nature of global conflict. The confrontation in vietnam is our first test in the understanding of such change or our lack of it will stop the measures we now take must stem from sagacity, thoughtfulness, restraint and an awareness in the changing strategy in this rapidly shrinking world. Mr. Chairman perhaps at this point i might say nothing further and i would be very pleased to have an opportunity to answer any questions that may be addressed. Thank you very much general. I think that your review of the overall strategy is very useful and speaking for myself not being a military man and has great appeal. But i would not wish to pass judgment on it further than that will stop i believe general that you had something to do with the study of indochina. About 1954 when you are working with the general. Yes sir, i was the chief of plans developed in the beginning of early 54 and i stayed in that position for several years. In theyou participate study that general ridgway ordered relative to the feasibility of, at that time entering in to indochina . Yes mr. Chairman, we consider the advisability of entering the hanoi delta and as i recall, we talked about the need and many engineer battalions. We anticipated environmental losses would be very great and there was some talk about the significance of hanoi island if we would go into the delta. We give it quite thorough consideration. Book onneral ridgways page 276 he says i would read it to see if you would comment on it. General ridgways statement, i felt it was essential that all who had any influence in making the decision on this grave matter should be aware of all the factors involved. A lot of these facts i sent out to indochina, a team of experts in every field. Engineers, Communication Specialists medical officers and experience combat leaders who knew how to evaluate in terms of battle tactics. The area that they found was practically devoid of those facilities which modern forces such as ours find essential to the waging of war. Telecommunications, highways and railways all the things that make possible the operation of a modern combat force on land were almost nonexistent. The facilities and airfields were totally inadequate and to provide facilities we would need would require tremendous engineering and logistic efforts. On page 277 he writes, we could have fought in indochina and we could have one if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost and men and money that such intervention would have required, a cost in my opinion that wouldve eventually been as great as or greater than that we had in korea. In korea we learned that air and naval power alone would not win a war and inadequate Ground Forces cannot win when either. It was incredible to me that we had lost this bitter lesson so soon, that we were on the verge of making that same tragic error. That error was not repeated. As soon as the full report was in i lost no time in having it passed on up to full chain of command. It reached president eisenhower. It was clear. The idea of intervening was abandoned and it is my belief that the analysis which the army made played a considerable and perhaps decisive part in persuading our government not to embark on that tragic adventure. General, as far as you know, are the conditions in indochina different today than they were at that time . There is one basic difference sir. He was talking about going into the toy delta and write to the chinese frontier which certainly meant the Immediate Intervention of chinese opposition. Other than that i would say conditions are not essentially different although this was an important point, too. I should say that in the way of background there is more than a cold piece of paper in this type of planning. We spent a lot of time worrying about it certainly i did. Hits considerable combat experience of a new that i would be responsible for the planning, conduct of operations and i divulged a great deal of talk colleagues who had considerable experience in Southeast Asia and china. We finally decided that what we were talking about doing was going to war with china under the conditions that were appallingly disadvantageous. Murtagh not going to war with her thousands of miles f