Not a place for happiness. Overall, the requirements for invasion of japan was overwhelming air sea superiority and abundant amphibious which we and abundant amphibious which we had in 44, 45. That is among the reasons why the big pacific drive did not get started until 44, 45. We were building lots of ships. Roosevelts global strategy. Although talk building the pacific war, it is evidenced that it was a two front war. Roosevelt always thought about it as a global war. A lot of historians like to compartmentalize it. They anticipated post war relationship with the soviet union. Now, roosevelts strategy, there are different interpretations by it. A lot of people said he had no strategy. He just reacted to events. Others say he was a prisoner of public opinion. Post war critics would say you had virtue kwrous americans looking to win the war. I dont think thats true. And of course there is the cold war arguments that roosevelt should have tried to contain and limit soviet expansion while at the same time fighting germany and japan. Finally, a few authors and i agree with them, say definite vision for the post world war. Was a dupe, apeaser, realist . What spin would you put on it . Complicating matters, he died before he could fully execute th his strategy. When truman took over, he changed it. Roosevelt was secretive. He didnt like diaries. Didnt like notes in his meetings. Deceptive. After the war, you have the outbreak of the cold war, which made the relationship with the soviet union a hot potato. A lot of people had instead had to cover their tracks. The official strategy of allens strategy was Germany First, which they had thought about before the war started. And agreed to december 1941. At that conference they said we would go standard defensive and take the offensive in europe. Almost immediately the angloamerican deviated from that strategy. There has been historical debate why was that . Who is to blame at that . A lot of people like to lay it at the feet of the rich. Who deviated from Germany First and why . I would say the traditional criticisms of British Mediterranean strategy apply to the pacific. For example, in global terms, the Pacific Theater is peripheral. And the mediterranean strategy was a diversion from the second front. In fact, it was deployment to the Pacific Theater that made a second front impossible during 42 and 43. The Pacific Theater hindered the buildup of troops in the United Kingdom. As we shall see, it strengthened june to december 1942 after we had defeated the japanese. Increased another 60 in 44. So the question is, why was this . And i will make the argument that it was a product of roosevelts strategy for the post world war. What was that order . What did roosevelt want to achieve . His overriding drive was to fill the vacuum with a post world war. This would in future decades be known as datante. He sought to meet stalin to establish this relationship. He deferred the second front until he met stalin and secured an agreement on the post world war. Reached the agreement with stalin inial ta. And it is worthy to note this strategy is and his vision was die metric alley opposed. The post order was on u. S. Soviet longevity. He wanted to appease them, rather than contain them. Eliminate the colonial empires. Churchill was against that. Divide germany. Churchill preferred a integrated germany. Weak france versus strong france. And roosevelt wanted to build up china to be a force in the post world war. Whereas church hill simply accepted the reality that china was weak and would stay weak for a long time. Now, if you were going to fight an antisoviet world war ii, you would be fighting the war on the right. But that was not the war we fought. We were fighting the war on the left. Unconditional surrender. This was enunciated casa blanca. We will be discussing it today. Planning for invasion bombardment, blockade was predicated on the need to force the japanese to accept it. And it has created a post war controversy whether we should have modified it rather than dropping the atomic bombs. One purpose was when the germans were allowed to have a conditional surrender. In 1943 the goal was to keep the big three u. S. British soviet alliance together. Stalin had refused to meet roosevelt. And this exploring a separate piece with the germans. Roosevelt kept signaling we were not going to conclude a second piece with germany and japan. I see that yellow font is is probably not that good. The declaration there, china would receive an american guaranty against external aggression. And japan will return man cheer ya, taiwan. And in due course, korea would become free and independent. All of that is roosevelts vision for jerry main as a divide weak germany. And i mentioned this primarily because there is a pacific analog to this that was this itself was never fully realized after world war ii. And the japanese even less so. And at the conference that is when stalin promised to enter the pacific war after germany was defeated. Roosevelt promised to give a strong position in man customer ya. They already had a strong position within china. In mongolia. Korea would be placed under a 40year tutelage. And at the second conference, december of 43, churchill now said that soviet entry into the pacific was unnecessary and he wanted to cancel that and do further operations in the mediterranean. Churchill agreed to this but the chinese army would not now be build up. China would face them a alone without any position. Germany and japan would be divided. Soviet interests in that manchuria would be effective. No american troops would be there. The idea was japan would be divided and both the soviets would have a role in the occupation of japan. Two ideas they had or sketched out in the War Department soviet occupation of tahoku. It was still in play in august 1945. And it is worth mentioning that the soviets would not get there via invasion, which they lacked the capability to do for the most part. But they would be invited to occupy this. This would be similar in effect to our withdrawal from the territories west of the alps in germany. And overall, soviet gains in asia were actually looking pretty awesome. This is ironic. One of the reasons we went to war in the first place. Now, from the Pacific Theater perspective, there is a consistent thread from 43 to 45 that we wanted the soviets to come in. This was not we were not trying to let the soviets or stop them from coming in. We wanted them to come in. We believed that russia would attack gentleman is pan after the war in europe was over. And we knew russia wanted a weak japan and control, dominant influence in china. None of this was a surprise. It was completely predictable what the russians wanted. And the War Department recommended planning to prepare for that. And by 44 we as we were approaching japan, we wanted the soviets to attack and destroy the japanese army. But we knew that the soviets needed a lot of Logistical Support to do that. We kept asking the soviets for air bases in siberia we could use against japan. And we also suggested that the soviets would supply Occupation Forces for japan. The soviet attitude was give us stuff and we are going to go do what were going to do. Operation mile post. We expedited soviet intervention, actively promoted it. From late 44 they requested this low gist cal aid. This was largely by july 45. They would use to eliminate threats. Germany and japan. Soviet intervention in the pacific was not desired but actively promoted and paid for. We wish the soviets would participate. But as we shall see later today, truman decided that it was kind of a little too much and he should rule it back a little bit. Balancing the war in europe and pacific. Throughout the war we had to decide where to send our forces. How much to send to europe and how much to send to the pacific. The admiral king said 15 effort in the pacific. Most is going to europe. We made a 50 effort against the pacific. And the pacific effort never fell below 45 depending how you want to count it. King never explained how he arrived at his 15 . But the obvious question is is this is a little inconsistent with Germany First. So whats going on with that. If you look at the manpower strength in europe and the combat divisions deployed it is is roughly even until mid 1944, which will surprise you if youre aware of the preparations to launch forward in june of 44. It was actually quite favorable to the pacific in 42. Balanced out in 44. But even by june to december 44 when we were fighting the germans in france and belgium, 50 of our aircraft are in the pacific. Thpt shipping transportshiping is evenly divided. As we prepare for amphibious assaults in france, we are preparing in the pacific. The marshall islands. Now, i think this great deployment of manpower is and aircraft to the pacific from june of 42 after middayway to december 43 there wasnt that much payoff. We recovered the aleutians, solomons. Not that we should have expected a big payoff because we didnt have naval superiority yet. But the fact that we sent so much stuff there that it didnt achieve as much as you might half. Naval attrition roughly equal in this period. Which of course favors the country, the United States, which is massively outbuilding its opponent. Big gains in 44. But as i will subsequently argue, i think we were from the standpoint of Germany First, we were overinvested. It is arguable the southwest pacific drive was not militarily necessary. On the plus side, 44 was the year that the Japanese Navy was crushed, the prerequisite for blockade and invasion of japan. What was the cost of these specific commitments . Clearly it is a weaker effort in europe. No invasion to france in 43, 44. Weaker Italian Campaign from 44 to 45. It happened exactly the same month as the invasion of the marshalls. Whatever you think about this is inconsistent with the first strategy. Not saying these are all good ideas but certainly consistent with Germany First. Overall, world war ii was a global broad front. And the approach is is supported two drives. It was understood by military officers. That was part of their professional education in the 20s and 30s. And, yes, at the time they did know where the ideal main effort to be. And i think its in arguable that a failure to concentrate on the global main effort that had been agreed to december of 41 and the theater main efforts slowed down in theater and the war as a whole. It is difficult to find a nonpolitical reason for this. Okay. Pacific plan. Strategic planning in 42, the goal was to defeat the japanese offense, secure the sea lanes. 43 planning, emphasized china. And as we talked about earlier, that went by the wayside. Early plans for invasion of japan said we wouldnt do that until 47, 48. Thats a heck of a long war. Blockade bombardment. Invasion considered in 43. We assumed for planning purposes that bombardment and blockade might cause japan to quit but it might not. So we had to prepare for invasion. Principal went through to 44. In 44, we studied various options for direct results. We studied bypassing the philippines and going straight through to kyushu. We decided on an in decremental approach. Southwest pacific drive. As you can see in early 44 we agreed to attack in the philippines and marianas later in the year. At that time we observed the japanese building up where we planned to invade. So the question was, should we bypass some of the objectives down south and go straight for japan . The ultimate decision was no, we will continue with our planned program. And why that is of interest is that that predictability continued after we took the marianas, they reinforced oujima. They had us figured way before the summer of 45. They had us figured even in 44. Blockade bombardment in 44 and 45 based on the big factor with with is bringing over the necessary troops for the invasion of japan. And bringing the soviets in. What intermediate objectives to take between okinawa and kyushi. Intelligence studies were looking at how long will it take to make japan surrender by blockade and bombardment . We dont know. The assumption behind the air a attack was that we would destroy their internal Transportation System which would of course include food distribution. Overall conclusion was that probably japan would not surrender through blockade and bombing until mid to late 46. And mcarthur and marshall examined this. Ultimately they concluded that we should invade kyushu. Joints chiefs of staff agreed. But throughout those april discussions, the atomic bomb was not yet a factor. Not a lot of them were ready to that. Worth noting from the assistant of subsequent controversy, every single option were looking at has a lot of negative implications for japan. Blockade, going to start bombardment. Going to kill people. Starve them. Going to kill lots of civilians. Theres just no way around it. Battle experience through april 1945, you can see the japanese dont quit. They always take 90 casualties. Most of the guys who surrender are because they were too injured to die in the process. The real numbers down there, they quit after the war ended in september 45. If the work continued, we might have to go kill them all too. Our casualties varied depending upon the operation. You can see iwo jima, 36 casualty. Voted ill for the invasion of gentleman is pan. Summery, we always assumed it might precipitate a surrender. We could not count on it. We did not know how long it would take for them to quit by bombardment. We still dont know that. How do you coerce a country to surrender . There was eufr rpbg to expect it. So the haikido option. I hadnt given a great deal of thaufplt before i was looking at this issue. But in fact, this was started at a very early stage. Mid 43 they were saying the best waive to defeat japan is to go the high hoo kudo. High kudo. Why do you want to do that . They were looking at a division invasion. It was the moment promising step for bombing japan. They noted it would surprise the japanese. Easy to isolate. Hard to reinforce. Fewer enemy air bases in range of the invasion. Minus side, very Long Distance invasion. We would have to build up our area in the aleutians. Weather, terrain, not great. Not good. And we would have to build air bases. So locking down here, fighters from hokkaido. Coverage over the main Industrial Area of japan. Again, this distance is equal to london to berlin or further. So very advantageous base. And so okay. Logistical studies, this is a feasible operation logistically. The beaches and ports and we can build air fields. Its doable. They are in late 1944, we started looking at two operations. I found it actually interesting. An operation in 45. They said an operation against kyushu, we decided not to do that. But one worthwhile point was that if we take southern cue shoe we would not take the northern because it is mountainous. There would be continued engagement with the enemy. So over time there would be incessant casualties on that front. And moreover, hakkaido is a better air base. In october 44 planners recommended invading hakkaido in may of 45. Further studies of that they thought the weather was bad but not bad enough to preclude the invasion and air forces from how kied hokkeido. And, again, recommended the invasion in may of 45. But the ultimate decision was that as we had made as much progress in the south and southwest pacific and by october 44 we were about to invade the philippines. We had the mariana. We built up the southern route from. That point of view it was regarded as more advantageous to be into kyushu after invading the philippines in early 45. So, however, they kept it on the table. They said if the japanese reinforce kyushu we might have to invade hokkaido instead. This issue would occur again in the summer of 45. So the decision in october 44 was to retain hokkaido the possibility that we might have to execute in the future. The leader of the air force at the time was if we are going to invade we need a lot of air support. The best place to do that from is hokkaido. Because we can invade hokkaido in may and build our air bases for three months in time to support an invasion of hanshu in late 45. Whereas we cant invade kyushu until november of 45 and that means we wouldnt have the bases in time to conduct effective air attacks on honshu for the invasion. The commanding general in the Pacific Theater noted that they see us coming. Again, this is late 44. He already says they see us coming. Lets attack hokkaido instead. Not go straight into the face of the japanese defenses. In kyushu. However, that was rejected and the decision was to plan for kyushu. And in early 45, they were thinking about what would we do if we had to post pain the invasion until 46 for various reasons. They recommended going into china. This is like a terrible place to invade. And you sort of get the impression like we are doing this just to do it. All the reasons they had previously dinner still played as far as i can tell, which is the big japanese marching a at you. It doesnt really add much to your bomber capability that you already got. From the philippines and okinawa. But nevertheless, they said planning shall continue for operations against hokkaido. So the summary is it was hokkaido was perceived as a critical objective and a military viable objective. Nonetheless, the decision for kyushu was heavily influenced by prior choices and logistical commitments. The disadvantages of kyushu were wellknown even a year before the japanese started reinforcing kyushu. And the window of opportunity was mid to late 44 in order to attack hokkaido is the spring of 45. In retrospect, they should have done that maybe instead of okinawa. Would it have participated an early surrender and avoid the atomic bombings and soviet intervention. We thought as soon as we land that would make the jab surrender. Maybe, maybe not. But that same argument would apply to hokkaido. The planning continues. Hokkaido remained under consideration in summer of 45. My overall conclusion for today is this had major implications for the end of the pacific war. And for the future of asia. Roosevelt had proposed immense role to the soviets in post war asia. Of course, stalin said, yeah, thats good. And even though the soviets were off the stage to the last few days of the war, they loomed large in roosevelts thinking. He did not get to execute his strategy, but he had laid the groundwork and in particular by providing the supplies that the soviets needed to take the offense, it was that we could not stop the soviets fro