Put those three things together tog and then eventually im going to to defer to max to talk about sign the composite. That became a significant part of the message. And chicago, salt lake and the San Francisco bay area and the composite. Jim by 1995, we got the manifesto. Rea when all those pieces came together, we went back out to the public through jim with the of message. We really, i think, got what we were looking for. Is i will go back to that composite. Its a fascinating story of the sw investigation as well. I will jump in before you address that. The composite is the iconic picture of the man in the hooded sweatshirt, the aviator sunglasses. Early on in the investigation, you do a lot of monotonous tasks. Reviewing the file, we didnt have a lot of leads. Reviewing file and trying to determine if there were things that hadnt been done in the past. I was reviewing the file with regard to utah related bombings. There was a bombing in 1987 at a Computer Company in salt lake city. It was the only time the individual known as the e omny in unabomber was ever seen. Alt l he was seen by an employee very y time close. She was within three feet of him, looking at him out the window as he placed a bomb ou beside her left front tire of her car. Her she was interviewed afterwards intervi by a police artist, an artist wards they brought in to do a composite. N to she did the composite. D the when i reviewed the file, it washe something unusual. There were five different composites by that same artist in that same witness on five different days. Ame it was just unusual for me to see that. Why . So i found this particular witness, tammy and asked her why. Tammy said, he wasnt capturing what i was trying to tell him. Her he kept getting the shape of the tryin face wrong and some other things. She was very adamant. I said, tammy, how can you be so be s adamant about that . She said, well, i just reviewed my notes. And i said, what notes . Id theres no notes in the file t from you. Ite she said, well, i wondered why they never came back and got notes from me. They instructed me to write down everything and nobody every came back. N c just she brought me her notes. She was very consistent with what she said. Jim had just finished a case supervising as the sac a n san kidnapping case in San Francisco, the kidnapping of a young woman. She was snatched out of her bedroom at a slumber party, taken, raped and killed. They used a forensic artist to do the artist concept of the person who killed kidnap and k killed her. It eventually led to the identification of a guy named richard alan davis. Richard alan davis, if you took you his mugshot and you put the drawing side by side, they were exact. Im not being negative. But most police artists concepts have been, you talk to a a witness and you give them a book full of noses and a book full of types of faces and ears and they plug all the things to s re mr. The. I refer to those as mr. Potato head drawings. They captured the features of a a person but not really the person. Ot jeanie was an artist first. She was a tremendous artist. Ng. She could interview a person and draw a real life like picture of who the person was describing. So jim said, find her. Get jeanie and see if we can do this. We did. Age we took her to utah. Tammy interviewed with jeanie and they for Something Like four hours to get a composite. Everyone thinks the life of an fbi agent is very interesting and they do exciting things. During that fourhour period of the time, i got the privilege of playing with tammys 3yearold on the living room floor and watching lion king on tv. The artist concept that resulted was a great artist concept. If you have the opportunity to look at the two different concepts, its just remarkable after seven years what tammy s could describe and what jeanie could draw and if you take Ted Kaczynskis university of california official photograph that w and put it beside it, you see it exactly the jaw line and the jutting chin that she described. That was a unique thing. Aring we did it in black and white. We didnt want people focusing he was on yellow hair. Because we were afraid he might be wearing a wig and so forth. Ing what we found out later he was. He was wearing a yellow wig and he was supporting that yellow hair. Wig by planting yellow hairs in bombing to throw us off track when he didnt have blonde hair. There were all kinds of interesting things throughout the case like that. T hary terry, you mentioned the manifesto. I want to get to that. Give us a sense in the final years of the pressure you felt klahoma to catch this guy. I was reminded reading the book, 1993 was the Oklahoma City bombing. Pre first question perhaps to the whitehouse or the high levels was that the unabomber. Talk about just the pressures that you felt. One of the saddest things that happens is when you were assembled and you think you have a great plan and someone else gets killed. As that happened in 1995. Re m it happened to us in 1994. Di while all of this was coming l together and while we thought we were making a difference. You can see the moral of people from t just kind of start to dip. You go home every night, max andncisco i commuted. We commuted from the east bay each over to San Francisco. While everybody else chose their partner, we kind of became partners. Cause we kept each others moral up. On those moments and those days, victi of course, people back here, th because its their job, the phones are ringing off the hook,d media has its own spin. The families and the victims of the the families are on the phone or they want to talk to you. You do. A we went and sat down with people. To what do you say . I remember the epsteins. Doin dr. Charles epstein was a unabomb victim in 1993. I remember john conway, the first case agent for unabomb, t expected took me out to meet the epsteins. We sat in the living room. Om the apprehension of going in there. They were one of the first families i met when i started doing this. We sat down and it was not at c,ft s all what i expected. I think from that point on, this is what really got us through the days. They sat there and they were more worried about me and whether i or not i was getting er the enough sleep than they were about what had happened to him. As max and i and jim dealt with hen the families and the victims will over the years, they were all itting that way. U in the darkest days when you would expect that they will be upset, they would be sitting down with you and saying, you got to make sure you stay focused and stay rested and know that we have confidence in you. Ou i its hard to convey how you ay feel. But i will tell you, i know how be i think everybody feels today in thats looking at the world and is responsible for being on the s diffi front lines of counterterrorism. You worry and work long hours and its difficult to put it st down. Ila we used to say i know they you still say that if you are a baseball player and you bat. 500, you are about the greatest in the world. The fbi and the cia, we cannot afford to bat. 500 and we cant afford to bat. 900. Because one out of 100 getting through can be not just a tera tragedy but perhaps Going Forward could literally affect the sovereignty of our country. Thats how serious the problem of terrorism became. Atbeca thats how we took this when we spent the days together. June of 1995, the unabomber sent out his manifesto. It did not just go out to the New York Times and washingtoni did post but also Scientific American and penthouse. I did not know that. Tell us your reactions when you learned about the manifesto. Did you realize this was going to be a major break, or was this going to lead to more complications . For me it was a major break. Back up a little bit. Co i was concerned about the mmunica unabomber, the difficulty to materi catch any criminal thats not communicating, it makes it very difficult. Once they start communicating, you have opportunity for lead contin material to develop. , that the unabomber had been quiet fors almost seven years up until he th. Started bombing again in 1993. L and then in 94 it continued. He started writing letters. I felt, thats good. He wrote a letter to the New York Times, an editor to begin with. D and then leading up to suddenly he comes forward, gushing 35,000 word manifesto. U i thought, alleluia, this is the right direction. He also attached to that an didnt extortion demand, a threat to u the newspapers. He preceded followed that, actually, very closely with im going to blow up he was claiming to have a terrorist group behind him which we didnt believe. Were going to blow up an airliner if you dont public the manifesto. Then a few days later he came with another letter, i was just kidding about that. Which we didnt think was funny. When that manifesto came, of course, we read it intensely and looking for any clues. E wabou we had experts that we sent course copies to, people that were lynn quiz tick experts. I would like you to address how we brought that a conclusion to where we made use of the manifesto to bring the public ught tha attention to it. Sure. Ma when we got the manifesto in alle who th 35,000 words, there were a number of people on the task force who thought it would be a great project to go back to and wrot try to source what time did this person what time frame was this person educated in who wrote this . What could we tell about ber phrasing . What could we tell about the ge take four books that were referenced in the manifesto . 19 all of these things. Pr that took us on this journey to a number of college campuses. I will take you back to 1985. Mc one of the things that happened thre in 1985 in november was that a tter w professor in michigan, university of michigan got a bomb in the mail. Mayb his name was mcconnell professor mcconnell. It was a bomb that was actually connel built into a threering binder. L there was a letter with it. A this is my thesis statement on we were the history of science. I would like you to take a look at this and maybe tell me what you think. A sponsor my thesis. Of course, when professor mcconnell and his assistant opened up the binder, it was actually a bomb that went off. We were really fascinated in an this 1994 a couple of postal does inspectors were fascinated by it work and proposed a project to focus a in on this history of science, unive what does it mean. We had done a lot of work on that. Ifesto gone to a lot of university a lot of campuses and talked to a lot of professors. Prof by the time the manifesto came, go a lot of the information that try came from knowing all the professors enabled us to go back to them and drill down and try to bring more details together about the books that were our fi referenced in the manifesto, the language and how it might relate to the history of science, which was our first clue from this guyonths when he wrote that letter. We spent months really trying to un get to know and understanding manif and reading the manifesto. Had by the time we had someone step forward that could help us bring, we it together, we had kind of beentr on trails. Lot of p we were able to go back and pull a lot of pieces together. There was debate about whether or not to publish the sh manifesto. The Washington Post did. S a tell us about how i believe th there was a meeting that you can maybe describe where at first you said, no, dont publish it. But then changed your mind quickly. The tell us about how about that re meeting. An there was a meeting at the task force in San Francisco. Po the knee jerk reaction was, the National Policy against doing business with a terrorist. We have an extortion demand. We h we sxf3;iat. We will recommend to the director of the fbi that they they should not public. It took an hour to turn that should decision around. The Task Force Members to say we should look at this from a Law Enforcement perspective and let t washington deal with National Issue policies. If it will move the d an investigation forward and give nati us the opportunity to make an arrest in this case, doesnt that outweigh a National Policy broad National Policy . W so we changed the Task Force Members changed the recommendation to me and terry at and i went back to came back here to washington and we went the across the street to janet reno, the attorney general at the time, and she agreed. The next day when i was amazed but busy people made themselves available and we had the publishers of the New York Times and Washington Post at cos a meeting along with the editorial staff, which was very d interesting. Terry, do you want to comment . He it was funny. Is were sitting on opposite sides of the table. Ngs we thought the tension would vei have to do with talking about unabomb and publication. It really came down to the i perha mentioned that we have this psup at scenario where we think if you published it, one of the things ling t we would do is sur veil newsstands in San Francisco and other cities because our obuja the profilers tell us that perhaps the unabomber will try to show up at a newsstand and get a we think trophy copy of the paper. Im telling the story. Spdhe they are listening. Po finally i said, we really on tho think that if the post or the s. Times published this, we would set up on newsstands. Was fro we found in San Francisco, theres only a couple of places where the same day washington oughts post is actually published i mean sold. Wa we think that would be the perfect way, because the New York Times is everywhere, the perfect way to publish it in the post and we can kind of stand up on those two places. There was quiet. And then someone i dont remember actually if it was from the post or the times, but i have my thoughts, said, by the way, who sells more papers in San Francisco, the post or the t ad iould times . I had no answer. I didnt know what i should do. Go ahead, tell them. I said, actually, we all kind of laugh because the Washington Post sells nothing in San Francisco. He then said, well, i wouldnt have been surprised at that. Ouldn who reads the post washington . Eads so we had a good moment there. Ultimately, they shared the costthere. Of publication. On september 19, the Washington Post published in a special ins aj,rq nabomb manifesto. Sert t we then implemented our plan. Again, max and i were going home one night, had it all ready, we w had people coming in early thee al next morning to set up on the newsstands. Ds. We figured that we needed so to many agents to watch about four or five locations, because we really didnt figure we would sho have over 100 maybe 150 e people show up. At 3 00 in the morning, we got athey t call before we ever started the the blo commute. They told us, we have got lines around the block at these places. Ha we have hundreds of people waiting to buy the post. We needed more agents. Thats what we had to do. It turned out to be we got the help of the media by publishing it and then i did numerous press conferences the talking about, remember what we know about the unabomber. We know the geographical areas he he worked in. Urging the public to come forward. There was a Million Dollar reward that existed for a few years. And a 1800 telephone line that year people were calling in their potential suspects, people exwives reporting their husbands. Ex 52 or 54 brothers reported third brothers were the unabomber. Of course, we were just looking for the one tip that would be look the one that made good. One that is what happened. Thats exactly where i was ly w going to lead to. Tell us about the tip. That . Max, you want to talk about zeroi that . ÷qcz i want to talk about zeroing in on him, too. We got a call from an attorney who was brokering t trying to broker a deal with us about a client that he had. He was a washington, d. C. Attorney. Good it just things dont happen like they appear to have happened. Ted h this attorney had a good workingim relationship with an fbi agent gi here in washington, d. C. He was no longer here. C he was in south carolina. He contacted him in south carolina. He in turn said, im not there, i will give you an agent in d. C. An to contact. He did. This young lady met with him and got a 20page or 21page document to read. It was typed on an antique 1925 typewriter. Ter. We had one forensic piece of . y evidence that we were always searching for. It was an antique smith corona 1925 to 30 typewriterco. Togeth thats the one thing that connected all of the cases together over the years. Molly got it, took it to the our laboratory. Motory. They examined it and said, its not that typewriter. Th they sent it back to molly. Molly was a good agent. She knew how massive this case was. This case was not the normal case. Vewas n you ask about the unabomb file, it was 59,000 volumes of information. ,000 that translates over to 11,800,000 pages of documents. She knew that. She called out to another ages o supervisor and told him she had this document. She was sending it but she didnt want it to get lost in ding the stuff coming in. It she said, Pay Attention to it. Even though the typewriter isnt the same, the ideas here are the exact to the ideas in the ideas manifesto. So joel got it and read it and got excited. He took it to terry and to our psychologist on the task force and they got excited. Terry and jim were going to lunch. They took it to terry. Terry said, oh, my god, we need to talk about this. He canceled his meeting with canc jim. H gave him some lame excuse and we went to lunch together with that document. As we were having lunch and reading the document, who walks e in but jim . He looked at terry and said so anyway, everyone got excited about it. Our task force, you have to our understand, relates to a to question you asked before, we tes to had come off of a very ct tha compelling suspect that jim had determined could not possibly be the unabomber. Could the members a lot believed that ber. It was. They had worked hard, long, ey had exhausting hours. We said, man, we need to give them a break before we start on this again. Them so we do a little reconnaissance, jerry does and talks to jims sett