Dont understand which is the disparate impact. In other words, is it the provision that causes more proposals to go to more proposals to go to the housing or is it the provision that causes more approval of more. Youve about got to know what youre shooting at. The disparity tied to the practice is just the first step in the appal sis. The second step is whats the justification justification. Ill ask it the last time and let you get on. Youre saying you need justification, but for what . Which is the bad thing to do . Not promote low Income Housing . You say whats causing the bat effect, but whats causing the bad effect . It may be neither because the government may say in the first case, well this is our justification and that may be a just fi indication that holds up. The government may say in the second case, well thats our justification and that may be a justification that hold up. Do you think that a private developer would ever be found guilty of disparate impact because he owns a piece of property in an affluent neighborhood . No, certainly not. Hes permitted to develop hiss property. Of course. The disparate impact would be if he fails to sell or make available to people of all races, lets say, the units in that property, correct . Theres got to be a specific practice. Practice, all right. A specific practice that has a business it would be unjustified. Exactly. I thought the question was though i mean its not a developer. Its the department of housing and Community Affairs and i thought the challenge was where they were supporting development, not the developer. This may not be a good disparate impact claim, mr. Chief justice, but the cases that are in the heartland are really pretty straightforward. But are you saying that in each case that the chief justice puts, there is initially a disparate impact at step one, that is to say, community a wants the development to be in the suburbs. The next statement, the Community Wants it to be in the core neighborhood. Its your position, it seems to me, or the position of the respondents, that in either case, step one has been satisfied. That may be right justice kennedy, but i think the point that seems very odd to me. But i think even if they are difficult cases there are cases in the heartland that have been adjudicated for 35, 40 years cases such as theres a zoning restriction that has a disparate impact that cannot be justified on a substantial basis. Theres an only oklahoma pansy restriction. Can i ask a question im sorry about chevron . Should we be concerned here about the use of chevron to manipulate decisions of this court . The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968. For 40 years plus, there were no hud regulations. Then we granted certificate in the gallagher case and it was only after that and within, i think, days after that that the hud regulations were issued and then the gallagher case sketettled. And the mount holly case settled. So should we be troubled by this chronology . I understand the import of your question, your honor. I guess i would say a couple of things in response. The first is that hud in formal adjudications reviewed by the secretary has found disparate impact liability available under these provisions in the fair housinging at since 1992 i believe and those would be entitle todashev ron deference and i do think respectfully thats a point that we made in our brief in the first case. And the second, i dont mean to be flip about it because i understand your honors point of the question but i do think it overestimates the efficiency of the government to think that the proposed rule making on an issue like this that was persuasive. Very persuasive. And so i think actually this has been the position of hud for a very long time and you would get chevron deaf frens. I think thats pretty clear wholy apart but we do have it and i think it gets chevron deference. And if i could turn to the question of avoidance constitutional avoidance that has come up i dont think this is a suitable case for constitutional avoidance, and let me try to explain why. Whatever one might think in the title seven context about the consequences of finding disparate impact liability, this is a very different context. And the title seven context the issue has been raced that the only way to avoid disparate impact liability is to engage in race based remedies. Not race based thinking about what neutral criterion to adopt but race based remedies. And here in the heartland cases under the Fair Housing Act you arent going to have that kind of an issue. The remedy is going to be the substitution of one race neutral rule for another race neutral rule. For example if a landlord cannot justify an occupancy restriction thats particularly tight, the remedy there is going to be either no occupancy restriction or a loser occupancy restriction, and the consequence in those case rs same thing with zoning, the consequence in those cases is no one gets classified by race, no one gets a burden imposed upon them because of race, and no one gets a benefit because of race. Who you select depends on what effect that will have on racial use of the facility. I this i the consequence no i think you select it on the basis of what effect it will have on race. But that that kind of consideration, so long as the rule that comes later is a race neutral rule seems to me is exactly the kind of thing that the plurality opinion of this court said in the contracting context that governments could do. They couldnt afford a preference to priority contractors but they could do things as the court suggested. It could be newer smaller businesses more eligible. To underscore that, i think everybodys getting confused with this. Disparate impact does not go to who they take unless they set up a practice. Thats correct. That has that in the heartland cases with respect to the fair housinging at, the kinds of remedies that are going to be imposed are like the kinds of remedies that the court said or the plurality said, excuse me, justice fein and justice kennedy, theyre like the kinds of race neutral situations that your parents what youre saying is suppose that the plaintiffs in this case on that side wins. Theyre trying to win. The defense on the other its not true that that means all section 8 housing is now going to be an even large amount but in rich neighborhoods. First they can defend on the ground that we dont have that practice to put it in poor english, second they could say yes, we do but dont you see that isnt going to hurt minorities because it puts those minorities in housing where many of them are unfortunately in poor neighborhoods and it doesnt have the great effect. They can say, anyway, its justified for a whole bunch of reasons. So the answer is case by case they have a specific set of forms that give answers. Hud can come in and decide and there is no need to throw the whole baby out i dont know if its the baby or bath water, whatever youre thoughing out, but you dont have to throw out the whole big thing in order to prevent. So im sorry. If i can understand, because, again, i dont know what youre shooting for. Two different communities okay . They have these tax credits, whatever, to give out. One place they give it to the housing in the afluntsd neighborhood, the other they given it to the housing in the low income neighborhood. Theyre both sued. The one they say, o, no this is good because were promoisturing it. The impact is not a problem. The other says, no this is good because were revitalizing low income neighborhoods. They both win . They might both win. If there are instances in which theres a concern that recognition impact liability could result in not just racebased thinking about neutral means but racebased remedies, it seems the answer is what the court gives, answer on an applied basis. But that isnt the justification for denying hud on the authority that hud has under the regulations under the statute as amejded in 1988 when congress specifically gave hud the authority to do sonld a did so against the backdrop of supposed the skpemexemptions. After nine courts of appeals found that it did impose it. The question here is whether under chevron the statutory text read fairly taking all the provision of the statute together unambiguously forecloses hud for finding impact liability here and we assume we submit the answer too that question must be no. It does not unambiguously forbid hud from reaching the conclusion it reached. Therefore the answer presented in this case is whether the Fair Housing Act recognizes disparate Impact Housing liability is yes. Could i just ask . I dont know a lot thb area, and i take it one of things youre warning us against is seeing the entire area through this quite unusual case and youve referred a few times to sort of the heartland cases but without really getting out what the heartland cases are. So for me, what sure. May i answer, mr. Chief justice . Sure. Thank you. Theyre the kinds of cases that have been litigated. Youve seen in the court of appeals opinions for 35 years. Restrictions say a town adopts a restriction saying it cant convert housing from ownership to rental unless youre renting to a blood relative. It has the effect of excluding minorities. The town adopts an occupancy restripgs for apartment buildings thats so tight that youre not going to be able to families with kids arent going to be able to live there. That disproportionately affects it. Those kinds of things. Zoning restrictions. Housing program restrictions. Those are the kinds of rules of the heartland cases. Thank you. General keller you have for minute reus remaining. To answer your question, boilkt would open up liability for disparate impact. Here the department could face impact liability if it was going to take tax credits and send them to lower areas or affluent neighborhoods. You keep saying that but thats not what happened here. The remedy was not to tell you to move your development from one area to another. The remedy did preclude developments next to land fills but it also included other tinkering with the qualifications. But youre still going to need people who want to do it. But in the remedy in this case the development they wanted to do. Kept it retained jurisdiction for five years. That has to go with your attacks on the remedy. That doesnt have anything to do with what disparate impact as an approach set out by hud. Each is going to have to examine snowno. What they have to do is what everyone should do. Before they set up any policies i think about what is the most race neutral policy. Thats a very different thing. That i think everyone is on gated to do. Its only if the other side proves that a qualification has a race effect thats not necessary can they win. Here the department engaged race neutral policies. Justice sew lito, to your point about smith and the adae factors other than age there are three things that distinguish that from this case. First, theres a textual distance. It refers to actions otherwise prohibited and corporate smikts interpreted that as recognizing that disparate liability could lie under that ada. In fair housing we dont have that. This is truly a safe harbor. Second, smith already noted that the ada already used adverse effect. And third no constitutional avoidance could have applied there. The reason were here is the texas didnt did not use racebased decisionmaking. Take a hypothetical from gruder. If the university of michigan said the incoming class must have 30 of its incoming classa certain race and we used to do that but if those arent available, racebased means must be used that would be suspect at the very least. All we need to do is show a doubt. Ricci said that there was one. What in the remedy ordered here was racebased . What remedy said you have to take in ten,10 , 20 , 15 . Its whether the disparity is going to close and whether the department is going to remain not in compliance with the Fair Housing Act is still race based. Thank you mr. Chief justice. Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted. With live coverage of the u. S. House on cspan and the senate on cspan two. Here on cspan3 we complement that coverage by showing you the most relevant events and on weekends its the home to americanAmerican History tv with programs that tell our nations stories including six unique seer. The civil wars 100th anniversary. American artifacts touring museums and historic sites. History book shelf with the best known American History writers. The prez denlcy. Looking at the policies and legacies of our legacys commanders in chief. Lectures in history with top college professoring delving into americas past and our new series real america featuring archival government and educational films from the 1930s through the 70s. Cspan 3 created by your cable tv. Watch us on hd like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. All this week cspan2 has been showing washington journals recent tour of historic historic black colleges and universities. Thats Tuskegee University at 6 30 and at 7 15, well show you Xavier University of louisiana. While congress is on break this week were showing American History tv in prime time. Tonight, japanese internment during world war 2. That starts at 8 00 p. M. Eastern with real america and Living Conditions in internment camps in arkansas and wyoming. And at 8 20 lectures and history with a course on how the japanese handle it. Et a 9 25, american artifacts thanks you through the Japanese American Museum and at 9 55 eastern, history with norman minet a who was assigned to japanese internment camp with his family. The cspan cities tour takes book tv and American History tv on the road traveling to u. S. Cities to learn about their history and literary life. This weekend weve partnered with Time Warner Cable for a visit to greensboro, north carolina. And after months and months of cleaning the house, charles halpern, who had been given that task, was making one more walkthrough, and in the attic he looked over and he saw an envelope with kind of a green seal on it and walked over and noticed the date was an 1832 document. He removed a single nail from a panel in an upstairs attic room and discovered a trunk and books and portraits stuck up under the eaves and this was a treasure your of Dolly Madisons things. Weve had this story displayed to the public, displaying different items from time to time but trying to include her birth to her death in 1849. Some of the items that we currently have on display, a carved ivory calling card case that has a card enclosed with dollys signature as well as that of her niece anna, some small cut glass perfume bottles and a pair of silk slippers that have tiny little ribbons that tie across the arch of her foot. And the two dresses are the reproductions of a silk peach silk gown that she wore earliest in life and a red velvet gown that has intrigued that both that it lasted and was part of this collection and theres also a legend that now accompanies this dress. Watch all of our events from greens beau, saturday at noon eastern on cspan2s book tv and sunday afternoon at 2 00 on American History tv on cspan3. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in rodriguez versus the United States, a case that is Supreme Court versus United States, a case testing how long a traffic stop can be extended to allow police time to conduct a dog sniff for dogs. The court will decide this case before the end of the term in june. The oral argument is about an hour. With your argument next this morning in case 139972 rodriguez versus the United States. Mr. Oconnor. Mr. Chief justice, may it please the court, the big issue that starts in this case that whether after completing the task related to a traffic stop whether an officer without individualized suspicion can hold the driver for a dog sniff. Specific question in this case is whether officer strubel was entitled to piggy back an already completed Traffic Offense with probable cause onto that Traffic Offense for an investigation of mr. Rodriguez involving nothing more than a hunch. That is the question of the case. But that remains that wasnt reached by the court of appeals. The District Court as you pointed out rejected the argument that there was probable cause saying its nothing more than a hunch but that was not reviewed by the court of appeals so that could still be open. The decision of the court of appeals, your honor, absolutely. That was a diminimus ruling. They did not reach the question as to whether there was e minimus ruling. They did not reach the question as to whether there was minimus ruling. They did not reach the question as to whether there was reasonable suspicion and left it just based on their ruling of whether in fact this was a diminus action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the eus action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the mus action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the ius action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the nus action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the ius action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the us action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the us action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the dog sniff took place during the mus action. Counsel, do you concede that this would be all right if the around the car prior to the completion of the traffic stop and the ticket then, of course, it would be all right. Mr. Oconnor, its frequent that a policeman when he stops somebody for broken taillight or whatever, will conduct some other inquiries. You know, where are you going . Ask a lot of questions. He will check whether the person is is driving a stolen car. Whether the person is properly all of that has nothing to do with a broken taillight and yet thats permitted, right . It would be permitted if he did it after he wrote the ticket . At that point in time, no. That is right. He can only do that before