Matthew olson first of all, welcome, to all four of you. Matthew olson is cofounder of cyber security. Previously serving as the director of National Counterterrorism center where he briefed the National Security council and reported to president obama on counterterrorism actibeing aaci. Mr. Olsen also served general counsel, nsa, focusing on surveillance, law and cyber security. Under the bush administration, mr. Olsen served as acting assistant attorney general, National Security division, doj, mr. Olsen also served as executive director of Guantanamo Task force, special counsel director of the fbi, and served as federal prosecutor for more than a decade. Hes a graduate of the university of virginia and harvard law school. Adam klein is robert m. Gates Senior Fellow Center for new american security, widely published in areas of National Security, surveillance, counterterrorism law and policy. He was previously an attorney at International Law firm and also worked on National Security policy at Rand Corporation in the 9 11 Public Discourse project, the nonprofit successor to the 9 11 commission. Mr. Klein served as the law clerk for Justice Scalia and is and graduate of Northwestern University and columbus columbia law school. Elizabeth goiteen is of the liberty and National Security program, the New York School of law, previously miss goitein served as council to russell finecoal, chairwoman of the Senate Judiciary committee. Miss goitein also served as a Trial Attorney in the federal programs range as a Civil Division of the department of justice and she graduated from yale law school. Elisabeth collins is serving her second term as board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board. Previously, she was an attorney in private sector at two International Law firms and served as the republican chief counsel for Supreme Court nominations for senator judiciary committee. Miss collins was also an assistant attorney general and legal policy, the doj, where she provided advice and counsel relating to National Security and other issues. Miss collins is a graduate of the university of chicago and harvard law school. Well proceed to my left and my right. So mr. Olsen, proceed, please. Thank you very much, chairman grassley. Its an honor to be here this morning. Let me put the bottom line up front. As the former National Security adviser, i can attest to the fact that section 702 has significantly contributed to our ability to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and around the world. This is consistent with the testimony that you have heard from the panelists, the witnesses in the other panel. Similarly, the former general counsel of the nsa and a former department of justice official, i worked to ensure that we implemented 702 in a manner that protected the privacy and Civil Liberties of americans. I will make a few brief remarks and i will focus those remarks on three points all addressing how section 702 has worked in practice. First, the operational value of 702. As this committee is well aware, we face a persistent and adaptive threat from al qaeda and isis and other groups. Just since september 14, isis claimed credit for 40 terrorist attacks outside the caliphate in syria and iraq. The online environment where potential extremists communicate with isis handlers and recruiters plays a Critical Role in providing the direction to the individuals and mobilizing extremists toward violence. So to combat this dynamic threat, our ability to conduct surveillance under 702 has proven vital. The key point is this, our best opportunity to identify and stop these attacks before they occur is through good intelligence. Thats often derived from the surveillance authorities such as 702. As the director of nct, i rely on a daily basis to information collected under 702. In the morning briefings, the analysts often reported critical information came from section 702. In its landmark report, the privacy of the Oversight Board identified approximately 30 cases where 702 was the initial catalyst that uncovered previously unknown terrorist operatives and plots and more than 100 cases where 702 helped to lead to the arrest of individuals on terrorismrelated charges. This is a truly extraordinary record in just the past few years. My second point is oversight. When congress amended fisa in 2008, i was at the department of justice. Congress established the unprecedented oversight regime for 702. And under this regime, as you have heard now, all three branches of government exercise authority to ensure that the deposit is properly using this authority. The oversight has been strengthened over the past several years to both congressional and executive branch action. This rigorous oversight regime reflects the careful balance that congress struck in 2008. To ensure the effectiveness of this authority. In my experience, the statute has been effective in doing both. The third point i would like to make is to suggest that calls from major reforms are not warranted. One issue that the committee has heard about this morning is the socalled incidental collection issue. A person targeted for surveillance under 702 who speaks on the phone or sends an email. And will communicate with someone in the United States. This is incidental collection. Some raised concerns about the such collection. I can tell you from my experience from the ability to obtain and use the communications is provening vital to disruption of plots to those in the United States. The azazi case is an example of this. I believe congress should estrict the governments ability to acquire and use such information concerning u. S. Persons. A second issue involves the ability to search 702 with the u. S. Person identifiers such as names and email addresses. I believe these queries are oo essential means to identify critical intelligence that would otherwise be inaccessible. From an operational perspective, when intelligence analysts seek to identify operatives in connection to suspected terrorists, would be one of their very first steps. So if the fbi suspects a person here is moving toward violence, the ability to query 702 information enables the fbi to move quickly to identify communications that the government has already lawfully collected to find vital clues. I believe this approach reflects an enduring lesson from the 9 11 attacks. That is the impairment for the government to effectively and use relevant information it holds in its databases in order to connect the dots. Some are now urging congress to impose probable cause requirements on the intelligence abiliticies before they can search section 702 data with the u. S. Person identifiers. In my view, this would i understand mine the ability of the agents to move quickly to identify terrorist information. At the early stage of the investigation, it may be impossible to establish probable cause and therefore such data would be beyond their reach. And so, mr. Chairman, the authority of congress established under section 702, has played an indispensable role in protecting this nation and allows them to collect private information and protects the Civil Liberties of americans. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Klein. Senator feinstein and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify today. In a recent report, two coawe tho coauthors and i. We concluded that section 702 is a valuable intelligence tool that should be reauthorized with existing statutory authorities and impact. But we also proposed enhancements to oversight, transparency and privacy. The public should know that section 702 is already subject for rigorous multilateral oversight from all three branches of government. Few Government Programs receive such close scrutiny. That said, its always worth considering what more to do to protect privacy and strengthen public trust and programs. This is not just a privacy issue, it is important for National Security. Programs that lack public support will not be politically sustainable in the longterm. The challenge is to do this without diminishing section 702s effectiveness as an intelligence tool. Broadly speaking, there are three areas of opportunity. The first is institutions that oversee 702, including the fisa court and the Oversight Board. The second is greater transparency, so about how 702 affects americans, how agencies query the 702 information and how the government uses the 702 information in the criminal justice system. The third area is to strengthen accountability for those who receive signals intelligence reporting to ensure that classified material is handled responsibly and never used for inappropriate purposes. Including political purposes. I would also like to mention one thing i hope this process will avoid. One of the 9 11 commissions key messages was the intelligence agencies need to be able to connect the dots between various pieces of information they have collected. I worked for tom cane and lee hamilton in 2004 during the process that led to the creation of the dni and the nct. I know that congress and the Intelligence Community has moved heaven and earth to break down information of the stove pipes in the ioc. With the grave terrorist threat still confronting us and the allies, it would be hard to reverse course on that progress now. We should not create these agencies from stopping the terrorist attacks. Im happy to provide more detail on any of these points during the q a. Thank you and i look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Chairman grassley, chairman feinstein and thank you for this opportunity to testify. On behalf of the Brennan Center for justice. Congress goal when it passed the fisa Amendment Act in 2008 was to give our government more powerful tools against government threats. The government used this authority to monitor suspected terrorists overseas, to trace their network and interrupt their plots. Thats exactly as it should be. We are here today because of the other things that section 702 has been interpreted to allow. The government is not simply monitoring Foreign Terrorists or powers. Instead, it is scanning the content of almost all of the International Communications that flow into and out of the United States and acquiring hundreds of communications each year, including a large, though still unknown, number of Americans Communications. In addition, despite being required to minimize the retention and use of americans data, the government keeps the data for years and routinely searches it for information to use against americans in ordinary criminal cases. Indeed, current rules allow the fbi to read americans emails and listen to their phone calls without any factual predicate to suggest wrongdoing, let alone a warrant. I dont believe this is what congress had in mind when it passed section 702. But in writing the law, congress entrusted the executive branch and the fisa court with significant discretion. For instance, Congress Allowed the targeting of any foreigner overseas, trusting the government to focus its efforts on those who pose a threat to our interests. Congress also left it to the executive branch and the fisa court to fashion specific minimization rules. I dont mean to imply that this trust was misplaced. In fact, weve seen essentially no evidence of intentional misuse. But what we have seen is mission creep. So allow designed to protect against foreign threats has become a major source of warrantless access to americans data and a tool for ordinary domestic law enforcement. This outcome is contrary not only to fisas original intent, but to americans expectations and their trust congress will protect their privacy and freedoms. There are several Reforms Congress could enact that would shore up proexits for americans while preserving the core of section 702, the governments ability to collect the communications of suspected terrorists and others who wish us harm without a warrant. Event when the communication transit through or are stored inside the United States. Ill touch on three of the key reforms here. First, congress should narrow the scope of surveillance by requiring the government to have a reasonable belief that the target is someone worth targeting, such as a foreign power or suspected terrorist. This would be an internal determination that would show no probable cause with fisa court approval. This reform would offer critical protection, not just to lawabized foreigners but to americans. When the government can target any foreigner overseas, that enables a massive amount of collection of innocent conversations between americans and their friends, relatives and associates abroad. Those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling and potentially abuse. This reform is also vital for the United Statess tech industry. The governments ability to target any foreigner overseas is one reason courts have validated agreements between u. S. And european companies. Thats why 30 major u. S. Tech Companies Including google, microsoft and facebook, signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of section 702 surveillance along with other reforms. Second, congress should require the government to obtain a warrant before searching section 702 data for Americans Communications. Contrary to what mr. Evans said earlier, restrictions on searches of lawfully acquired Digital Information are the constitutional norm. Even when the government has a warrant to seize and search digital data in a criminal case, it cannot run a different search of that data for other reasons without obtaining a warrant. It certainly should not have that freedom when it obtained a warrant based on a premise that its only target is foreigners. Third, congress should end the data collection. This practice has no basis in the statute or legislative history. Its a small part of upstream collection which is itself a smart part of 702 surveillance. The privacy concerns it raises are significant. This is clearly a case where the risks outweigh the benefits. These basic changes would better align the statute with the goals it is meant to serve. Ill stop there and look forward to taking your questions. Miss collins. Chairman grassley, Ranking Member feinstein and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I provide this testimony in my capacity as an individual board member of the privacy and Civil LibertiesOversight Board, an independent executive Branch Agency commd with providing advice and oversight with respect to federal counterterrorism actions. From 2013 to 2014, our fivemember bipartisan board conducted an extensive examination of the 702 program. In july 14 we concluded a report to show the 702 program is valuable, statutorily authorized and at its core constitutional. We set forth the legislative foundation for the program. The implementing procedures that govern the operation of the program, and the extensive oversight structure that accompanies the program. We also unanimously voted out ten policybased recommendations. Each of which has been implemented or is in the process of being implemented and none of which required legislation. My oral and written testimony draw heavily from the boards report, which continues to be a valuable resource for understanding and assessing the program. The board conducted both a legal and policy analysis of the section 702 program. We unanimously concluded that the program has a limited scope. It does not authorize or result in bulk collection. Instead, it authorizes the government only to engage in targeted collection of telephone and Internet Communications of nonu. S. Persons located abroad who are likely to communicate information about courtapproved foreign intelligence topics with the compelled assistance of providers. Although u. S. Persons may not be and are not targeted, u. S. Person information may be incidentally collected. In that aspect of the program was a core focus of our attention leading to key recommendations on minimization procedures. We also weighed the privacy implications of using u. S. Person identifiers to query 702 data. The queries are consistent with years of direction to the Intelligence Community to connect the dots but also through raising significant privacy implications. We made recommendations designed to address those implications. The board also focused on the judicially approved minimization procedures governing the program. We noted the special protections afforded to u. S. Persons and made recommendations designed to tighten certain aspects of the procedures. Finally, we considered the labored oversight that accompanies the 702 program. Oversight occurs in all three branches of government and can only be described as rigorous.