Frank church. It is thus known as the Church Committee. They met for 16 months, reviewing more than 10,000 documents and calling 800 witnesses in front of the committee. Legacyacy its a provided ongoing oversight of intelligence agencies and the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and the Church Committee hearings were heard in the oom. Us rim r next we meet kate scott who explained how and why the Church Committee came about and sets the stage for 1975 hearings with the cia director, William Colby. The Church Committee was created in january of 1975 by the senate. In response series of revelations and allegations about Domestic Intelligence abuses in the u. S. And the senate created the committee by an overwhelming 824, to, 82or establish a committee that would examine the abuses of intelligence agencies and maybe how they were violating constitutional protections. The Church Committee, to understand the context of the committee, you need to go back to 1970, really the first big revelation of Domestic Intelligence abuses. The whistleblower, if counter counterintelligence captain, provided details in a published account that was published by the washington monthly. Domestic a nationwide army program, and members of congress did not know about it. It was secret for a bout a decade and in the whole purpose was to monitor political dissent to the u. S. , those who voiced opposition to the u. S. Domestic and foreign policies. So senator sam ervin of North Carolina started a committee to look into those allegations in 1971. Two years after that, sam ervin again shared another committee, though Watergate Committee the Watergate Committee, to look into to the nations investigations into the watergate campaign. There were new allegations made about the political uses of the fbi and cia. During that campaign. And then finally, in december of 1974, Pulitzer Prize winning rschnalist first hi published a frontpage alleging that the cia had developed a domestic surveillance program, which would have been in violation of its charter. It was to know supposed to have none of these applications. That allegation came about a month after the midterm elections of 1970 or, when a large 1974, when a large group of watergate babies were elected to congress. Many of them had run on a Campaign Pledge to clean up the executive branch and to come into congress to provide better oversight of the executive branch. Thathing like the abuses happened during watergate, wouldnt happen again. They came in to say that we want to change the way that the government is operating. And a third revelation, saying that there were abuses out there and congress does not seem to know much about them area and so, in january of 1975, with the swearing in of this new class, the senate agrees to create a new special committee. Frank church is the chairman, that is why we call it the Church Committee. He was at that time an 18 year member who had served on the Foreign Relations committee. He was a senate veteran. He has been a prominent outspoken critic of the vietnam war. Involved in issues related to the u. S. , the use of intelligence abroad, he himself was a former Intelligence Officer. He had earned as an Intelligence Officer during world war ii. He had respect for the major Intelligence Community, but he was skeptical about it applications, particularly domestic application. John ofairman was texas, a member of the Republican Party who was a 10 year member of the Armed Services committee and he knew a lot about the Armed Services and Intelligence Community. He was concerned about how the senate could investigate these sensitive, National Security issues without revealing National Security secrets. Put onhe boasted he was the committee to make sure that this would not become a media extravaganza, that it would not be sensational. And in some ways, to protect the intelligence agencies. That really is the origins of the Church Committee. Could you tell us about some of the other members. Were they wellknown people at the time . They were. Love them more and some of them werent. The two senator leaders, one from montana was the majority leader. And a minority leader. And they wanted to create a community comprised of members with a good deal of experience, like frank church and john tower, but they also wanted to acknowledge that the watergate babies where particularly interested in approaching some of these topics in new ways. They tried to balance the Committee Membership with older members like frank church and barry goldwater, and baker, with newer members, like them representative from pennsylvania, gary hart of colorado with a newly elected member, and they had an interest in these issues and very much wanted to look into them. And they were new members, so it was a recognition that maybe we needed a new fresh approach to these issues that the country was confronted with. In a moment, we will see the testimony of William Colby from september 16, 1975. At that time, was it unusual for the cia director to testify in a public hearing . It was. It was unusual in part because for decades the house and senate had provided oversight of the intelligence committee, but primarily they had done it in closed hearing. That was for a number of reasons. The primary reason was they believed that they do not want to provide opportunities in a public hearing where information that was classified could be revealed, and therefore undermine the security of the intelligence methods or practices. But, there was increasingly a sense that the people who are supposed to provide oversight in congress of the Intelligence Community, had it not been doing it rigorously or effectively. , in the senate for example there were two subcommittees that were packed with oversight for the cia. One of them was the new Appropriations Committee and one was with the Armed Services committee and the of and the Armed Services committee was chaired by john stennis. He was a conservative democrat from mississippi, who very much supported the National Intelligence community and did not think that congress had a responsibility to look too closely at how it operated. He famously said, if you are going to have a National Intelligence community, you need to close your eyes sometimes and take what is coming. Another senator expressed, we do not know what is going on at the cia and frankly, we do not want to know. So that was the sense for the ears years of the cold war and it have been the prevailing sentiment. Because of the global threat of communism, the u. S. Needed to develop capabilities within the National Intelligence community, that could that, in the methods of the intelligence collection, it should not be secondguessed. So, for decades in the senate, the oversight had been provided and it had been done in closed session. The transcripts were not made public or released. Members inere a few the senate our increasingly unsettled by this lack of oversight and one of them was the majority leader. And he was actually the first senator to propose a permanent cia Intelligence Oversight Committee in 1950. And he continued every congress to resubmit the proposal to establish this permanent oversight committee. While he gained, at some point he had about 20 cosponsors to get this committee created, he never was able to get the kind of committee that he really wanted, and till the scandal of 1974. Allegations he was actually the one address drafted the resolution for the Church Committee. Colby unusual for william to be there for the reasons i just explained. He is an interesting character, it is interesting that he is the one to call it was called to testify. He had spent a majority of his career in the cia. He had worked during world war ii for the office of teaching strategic services. Then he went into private law practice for some years and in 1949, two years after the cia was a blessed, established, he joined. He had been deeply involved in cia operations, cold war related, for 30 years before he came back to washington and was nominated by Richard Nixon and approved by the senate and confirmed by the senate. To serve as the new cia director in 1973. So he comes to this position as director, while the cia is in turmoil. The former director had ordered a report, an internal report to be produced, and he had asked cia officers to come forward and report on programs they believed the agency had been involved in which may have been constitutionally questionable. Perhaps, if not illegal, at orst unethical or immoral, improper. This report, this internal report, became known as the cia family jewels. At the start of the Church Committee investigation, they did a lot of work behind the scenes, bitterly investigating these agencies in the Intelligence Community more broadly. They did not even know where to start. Colbyy, for them, william provided them with a copy of the internal report, the family jewels. It provided them basically with a roadmap. They could map out what the cia was doing and look deeply into these cases of improper behavior. Wasiam colby, of course, firmly committed to the cia and its intelligence operations. He was concerned about some of the act of the activity that the agency had conducted and he was concerned about political pressure coming from the white house during the watergate era. He wanted to ensure the strength of the cia moving forward and so, while he faced a good deal of criticism, both from within the cia and from outside the cia, even from former Intelligence Officers for cooperating with the Church Committee investigation, he thought it was the best way to strengthen the agency moving forward. Hisuld characterize cooperation as limited. He wanted to cooperate with them in the sense that he provided them with materials, but he also created a sort of liaison operation within the cia, to manage the relationship with the Church Committee. So the Church Committee would make requests for documents that were necessary to build their story and the cia would push back, we are not sure we have the material or why do you need the material . And by doing so, they further delayed the Church Committees ability to begin to get the big picture. So he did receive criticism and he received criticism for working with the committee, but he did manage to restrict the corporation in some important ways. And speaking with the former staff, you will recognize that they will speak about the frustration of the the experience trying to get information from the cia. Ofnow, here is called duke paul duke introducing the hearing. Then we will get thoughts from you. The senators seemed unimpressed. Perhaps, they already knew too much, each arriving with a notebook crammed with classified material about the cia, all marked topsecret. After five months, the closed door investigation, most of the senators now agree with frank church, that the cia has indeed been out of control. So the testimony of colby did not outweigh the suspicions. The hearings took place in the historic caucus room. There were no long lines and the seats reserved for the audience were at times, only two thirds full. After what has happened in this country, there is no more future shocks. Whether there are shocks or not, todays hearing did focus major attention on the way that the cia has gone about business in the United States. The subject concerned the cias development in warfare materials. The cias retention of an amount usehellfish toxin and their of the various chemicals and drugs. The relationship between the cia and biological laboratory has an activity requires further investigation this year. It resulted from information provided by cia officers, not directly associate with the project. Not all activities that might be required questionable poppycock brought to management. Two other officers aware of the project, indicated that the project involved the development of warfare agents, some very legal. And associated the Delivery System for use. The search produced information about the basic agreement between the army and the ira, relating to the project and records covering the activities from the beginning in 1952, to the termination in 1970. In the course of the investigation, the Laboratory Storage facilities were searched and about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and eight milligrams of cobra venom were discovered in a vaulted building. The major early requirement of the agency was designed for the standard of and hazardous situations during world war ii. This was the basis on which eventually we discovered the toxic shellfish toxin. The only application of this toxin was in the flight over the ussr in the 1960s, during which they carried the device concealed in a silver dollar. In this case, the drill was filled with shellfish toxin. They did not use it and was not instructed to do so. It was offered as an option. This was the only time we are aware that the toxin was provided for operational use, although it was made available for earlier flight. Was in the Agency Development of assimilation devices to use the standard chemicals themselves. Various devices in an agent designed to release available records do not indicate all specific items were developed exclusively for the cia and similar devices were also done for the army. At the time the toxin was found, the officer responded over the project in 1970 said he had no recollection on how it got there. Discussions were held with a retired officer who gave a lead. This man had been the branch chief in 1970, stating that the toxin had been moved and is stored in the laboratory. This was done on the basis of after conversations with a project officer. He further stated that he made the decision based on the fact that the difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin was so great, it made no sense to destroy it. Specifically, when there is no source at that time. Isy believe this explanation correct, but does not recall the actual act of receiving the material. Both of these middle grade officers agree that nobody, including their superior, was told of the retention of the shellfish toxin. If that amount of shellfish toxin were administered orally, which is one of the least efficient ways for administering , that quantity would be sufficient enough to kill at least 14,000 people. Administered in a sophisticated equipment found in the laboratory, that quantity would be sufficient to kill a great many more. Estimates go into the hundreds of thousands. My first question is, why did the agency prepare a which therexin for is no practical antidote, which attacks the nervous system and brings on death very quickly . Why did the agency prepare toxins of this character in quantities sufficient to kill many thousands of people . Int was the need for that the first place, long before the president ial order came down . Think the first part of the answer is the fact that the that was developed during world war ii, does take time to work and it is agonizing to the subject who uses it. Some of the people who would be natural requesters of such capability for their own protection and protection of their fellow agents, really would not want to face that kind of fate. If they could be given an instantaneous one, they could accept that. That was the thought process behind the capability. I cannot explain why that quantity was developed, except this was a collaboration we were engaged in with the army. We did develop this particular foras a possible possible use. When the cia retained the amount that it did, it obviously did it improperly. Quantity,hurch this and various devices for administering the toxin, were found in the laboratory. They make it clear that the peer really defensive purely defensive uses were not what the agency was definiteo, there were uses, like suicide, but i do not nk that suicide particularly places that are human targets in such a way that you would not even know that you are hit. Mr. Colby it was also for other reasons. No question. Chairman church have you brought with you some of those devices which would have enabled the cia to use this . Mr. Colby we have. Chairman church for killing people . [murmering] [indiscernible] if n church i wonder [chatter] this firehurch does the dart . Mr. Colby yes it does. The round thing at the top is the site. And it is practically a normal. 45. Works byit electricity, there is a battery in the handle and the fires a small dart. Chairman church does it fire silently . Mr. Colby almost. Chairman church what range does it have . Believe, 100 meters i about 100 yards. Chairman church 100 meter range. And the dart itself, when it does thehe target, target no he has been hit . Mr. Colby that depends on the dart used. There are different kinds we use and various weapons systems, and developed thatas could enter the target without them knowing. Chairman church and did you find such a darts in the laboratory . Mr. Colby we did. Effort noturch the only involved designing a gun that could strike a human target but also theng, target itself the dart or toxin itself would not appear in the autopsy . Mr. Colby there would be no way of perceiving the toxin. Chairman church that is about as efficient as you could get . Mr. Colby it is a weapon. Chairman church there is an additional concession, namely the lack of accountability, so that we now not only have a secretive agency, we have an agency about which there is question on it accountability to the authority of the president , or the authority of the National Security council. The record seems to disclose that there is no president ial order in the first place, directing the cia to establish this program at all. Secondly, there appears to be no ciart by this eia by the on these toxins and weapons. There seems to be no evidence that those in charge of the cia inquired of the subordinate into the toxins and weapons. Or that following the president ial order decreeing the these things, that any order when within the c h went north within fort within the cia further destruction. It was only by chance that the leadership of the cia became aware years later of the existence of these lethal toxins, which were in violation of a direct president ial order. In short, the record is a must. Mess. We may never know exactly what happened. Colby you have not interviewed them on the record . Do you know what documents they destroyed . Mr. Colby we do not have an inventory. As for the formulation, any reason to think that documents contain that information . Mr. Colby i doubt it would have very much, this case, from the evidence we have any reason to think it might say however that all this was used in an aggressive way to kill someone . There may well be some of that. When was documentation destroyed . Mr. Colby 1973. The same time as mr. Colby 1972. 1972. When . Mr. Colby november. Any idea of what volume of the records destroyed . Mr. Colby i do not know. As i said, it was a memorandum from the director at that time. The destruction, if anyone. As i said, there was a between m of agreement the director and mr. Gotliebat the time. And the director was. Helm. Mr. Helm is in the room, mr. An rman and youll have opportunity to hear him. Hell be our leadoff witness tomorrow morning. I wont prolong my opportunity to examine the witness must have longer, mr. Chairman. Understand well try to operate under the 10 minute rule. May i ask you this question in general, mr. Goby. You have the doctrine of plausible liability yes, and ive rejected it now, senator. I say we cannot defend upon that anymore. The question i was going to put to you, is that a phrase of art in the Intelligence Community. Second have a significance that you understand. Used in a rational earlier years, if the United States could deny something and not be clearly demonstrated as having said something falsely, then the United States could do so. In the case of assassinations and the case of any other domestic surveillance, in the ion of the formulat poisons, under that previous doctrine ofould the plausibility deniability have led the agency to destroy evidence, orconceal to compartmentalize to the point here it would be a committee such as this later would have been unable to establish what really happened. Plausible denial concept was used in the sense of International Domestic relationships. Are you saying it would not have applied to the formulation of toxic materials . I would not say it didnt with it at g to do all, but i would think that the basic rationale for the doctrine of plausible denial was so that our nation could deny something tagged with it. You be olby, can absolutely sure there arent other vaults containing poison in this town or this country or in some possession in some other parts of the world . I cant be absolutely sure, no, senator. C ive conducted such be stigations, but i cannot sure some officer somewhere has g. Sequestered somethin can you as concisely as your le state understanding of the practice of confrontation. The confrontation practice is merely the strict application of the needtoknow principle. If an employee in the intelligence Business Needs to know something in order to do job, then he has a right to the information. If he does not need to know the information, he does not have a right to the information, and its the information is one which is required for large numbers of employees, such that large numbers of employees would be allowed to know it. A the particular activity is very sensitive matter and only a very few employees need to know t, then it will be known to only a very few employees. We make a particular effort to keep the identities of our ources and some of our more complicated technical systems restricted very sharply in the to the people who actually need to work on them, and many of the rest of the people in the agency know nothing about them. That needtoknow principle, does it apply to cases of sensitivity to the director of Central Intelligence . Certainly not, with one exception. To know believe i need the name of an agent in some foreign country whos serving us life. E risk of his i know hes there, i know what kind of a person he is, but i do know his actual name, and i have kept that out of my knowledge, because i i dont want to know that kind of a thing. But thats the only area that i to. Ld apply it i am responsible for everything that happens in the agency. Ing that know everyth happens in the agency. Rather spoken the sively here about apparent lack of clear lines and controls and authorities running and clear lines of responsibility and accountability running upward. To the best of your knowledge, pervasive been any in the matter of orders from directives from the resident or orders from the d. C. I. On the part of subordinants . In other words, has this reached a greater proportion than might even have been revealed here as of a lt of our discovery very, i think, significant instance of insubordination. If, indeed, it has been pervasive, isnt there a need at theh tighter controls top . Senator, i believe that we a we have in the c. I. A. Very tight discipline. Im not saying its total. Obviously, it did not work in i think with people scattered around the world doing very sensitive work, work,highly compartmented there has been, indeed, a very high sense of discipline in the ofanization and a high sense compliance to the regulations and the rules and the directives of the organization, and i think that the leadership of the always felt has very much a subject to direct president ial control and responsive to it. So you would say actually that this instance is an exception to the rule, that ordinarily, the discipline has control has at the worked and the accountability as worked in the way that it should according to the administration . In the business in which we are in, the intelligence and covert operations, i think there cases in very few which the agency has or its mployees have done something that they should not have. And in many of the cases in hich we now question, we find that those activities were pproved by the appropriate authorities at that time. That the sense of discipline within the organization seems to be quite tight. Tovar. Ator thank you, mr. Chairman. I only have one question, mr. Colby, but i have a short statement id like to make to you. Criticism and analysis are important ingredients in making our democracy work. However, we are now approaching the point where both are being self to the point of destruction. Get out of thest doubt and pessimism in which we have sunk. We must not let the quarrels of the past interfere with building for the future. Tidal way of criticism has swept over the Intelligence Community, mistaken or is unwarranted. The damage is severe. Is ontinued, its survival uncertain. Before this committee appeared c. I. A. In active duty and retired. All have been impressive because loyalty. Dedication and nothing we have heard detracts from the reputation of the highly competent organization. The men and women of the c. I. A. Are doing a great job under very trying conditions. And i say to them, as our nation on course, i believe there will be change for the hold onand i ask you to until that happens. You were never more needed by this country than right now, and as one american, im proud of you. To those young people who may be looking for careers and who have a desire for public service, i of no better way to serve your nation than as an Intelligence Officer. Many skills are required to keep productive organization. Continuity is vital to america. Mr. Colby. Senator, if i may, on behalf eamployees, thank you for that statement. They are under a lot of pressure these days and they will appreciate that. Ask e question i have to you, have other countries developed bacterial warfare ability . Certainly, senator. Aspect of beeshthio logical that the president of tells the c. I. A. To continue, that is to follow the that ty of other nations, we will see the capabilities and activities of other nations in some ield and we have officers that do follow these activities abroad, and they are quite general. There are some very dubious sure where were just not of what the actual capabilities are in some respects, but we do indeed, and there is extensive effort done by other nations in this line. Now presented from no, we can follow the foreign ones. No problem with that. Can you do anything to offset them . I think defense against those possible things is a matter for defense, tment of senator. Do you feel youre safe in that field . Collaboration with the department of defense and advising the department of ments e in foreign develop in this area, we are giving them the basis for developing such need. Ive efforts as we thank you. Thats all i had, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator. Morgan. Gentlemen, mr. Colby. Since this is the first public committee, i is think we should note that we feel, and i certainly feel, that the role played by the Central Intelligence agency is a very vital one and a very important one. And i think the fact that youve quoted from president kennedy ho said that, quite often, our failures are trumpeted and our unheralded, as appropriate here. Has been told by itnesses that had the Central Intelligence agency existed prior to world war ii, pearl harbor might never have happened, or if it had happened, deaths, and the property might have been much less. We doant you to know that recognize the role of the Central Intelligence agency. We recognize the fact that we in this country must be able to our in advance what potential adversaries and potential enemies may be lanning so that we can cope with it. So i believe it is important. Mr. Colby, i believe most of the questions have been asked, except fairly early, the reference was made to the and we tial order, alluded to what was, in fact, i hink the press release concerning the president ial order. But as a read the president ial this find that the statement, the United States bacteriological and biological programs will be confined to research and development for efensive purposes, immunization, safety measures, et cetera. Not preclude research into those offensive aspects of biological cal agents necessary to determine are defensive measures required. Earlier, you stated you thought it might have been the mentality of those who made the decision to keep these toxins, that they in order to ed develop defensive weapons. O you think if that was their thinking, that it would be in keeping with the president ial to you . I just read it well, we looked at that. I think you might be able to center, ife for that, you were actively involved and had responsibilities for these i ensive measures, but as think the chairman pointed out, the quantities maintained by c. I. A. Are difficult to defend under that directive. What was your position with the c. I. A. At the time, mr. Colby . In 1970, i was on detached service. I was ark signed to the vietnam. Of state in then you had nothing to do thoughts. I knew nothing. And you knew nothing until. Until we discovered it in may. I would commend you, mr. Colby, again, for taking these steps to determine what has happened. I think most men in the c. I. A. As well as those in the Internal Revenue service and the federal ureau of investigation are dedicated Public Officials and want to do what is right. And i think your method of sking for any known violations has been helpful to this committee and i would commend t, mr. Chairman, to the Internal Revenue service, to the they at they might ask if know of known violations in this it , and i would recommend also to the federal bureau of investigation. Senator goldwater mentioned, and i believe the president ial order irected the c. I. A. To continue to maintain surveillance of the and biological warfare and capability of other states. You say you have done that. Yes, sir, senator. Are you in a position to tell this committee whether or not other state and especially potential adversaries or enemies now have stock piles of such toxins . I dont think i can say much about stock piles but i do know that there are installations which appear to us to be experimental stations of some sort. Thank you, mr. Colby. In the chemical field, certainly, there are stom piles. That also. E of thank you, senator. Mathai. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, some of americas greatest victories and some of greatest defeats have represented failures of intelligence. Antetum, and pearl vital all illustrate the necessity of intelligence. Exactly o, just almost a year ago, senator mansfield and i introduced the legislation, which has resulted in this investigation, we had that very much in mind. We wanted to be sure that we had the best intelligence system, available. But i think we also had in mind adams warning this a frequent recurrence to the principles of the constitution is absolutely necessary to advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government. I think the discovery of this toxin raises some interesting questions, which are within the purview of this investigation, to be ch i think have answered before this committee completes its work and makes its recommendations to congress. I accept your statement that this toxin was one used, except in the instance as youve described. But i then have to ask you this. Toxin, what sed the provision of the constitution have afforded authority to do so . So i think c. I. A. s operations are certainly overseas operations. They fall under the National Security act of 1947. And they fall consequently under the provisions of the for the ion that Call National defense and the foreign of the United States. Of ut the use of a toxin weapon thats a use of force, wouldnt you say . Normally, for weapons to be deployed against another nation, congressional approval. In the midst now of the war powers act, and this activity preceded that. Yes, it did precede it. But what occurs to me here is that we have an illustration. The use of force and the states ns of the united with other powers in the world, or at least the potential use of forc force,as you say, its never been used in this instance. Which differs only a degree and othert operations examples we can think of. So it seems to be that the discovery of this toxin raises very fundamental questions about covert tionships of the activities of any intelligence agenci, be it the c. I. A. Or the f. B. I. Or others. Constitutional process by which this government is think, ed, and i would mr. Chairman, that there is no upon us ility greater that relationship as accurately as possible before the close of these hearings. Thank you. Course, contained within the amendment to the oreign assistant act past december, which now requires that any activity of c. I. A. Other than intelligence gathering abroad, shall be found to be important to the National Security by the president and shall be reported to the appropriate committees, and that includes six committees of the congress at this time. This is a statutory provision, with. We are in compliance and let me say, mr. Colby, i agree with you. Me say this imposes responsibilities on the congress that i dont think weve always well. Rged very of Congress Members who recold from responsibility of knowing whats happening. Who said congress dont tell me. I dont want to know. Ofhink that is an indictment the congress. Just as severe as any indictment which is labeled against any of the Intelligence Community. Mr. Colby i wouldnt call it an indictment of the congress, senator. Reflected the her general atmosphere, political intelligence ards that was the traditional approach and i think we americans are changing that, and this act is an example of that change as is this committee. Senator i think youre more generous than im inclined to be. Permissive. That i dont think that climate will excuse what is really a dereliction of duty and if there had not been that dereliction of we would not be here tonight. I must say, senator, that i we have been at victimized by excessive secrecy, not only with respect to the failure of congress in the past over se of surveillance intelligence activity, but also accepting secrecy has created this kind of mischief within the executive branch. Here we have a case where the ery methods of secrecy concealed for five years, an act insubordination within the only that came to light by the happenstance that mr. Director, present asked the agency if they please wouldnt tell him. Thats een going on wrong . And as a result, somebody, about this, hing gave him the tips. S a result of which he then onducted an investigation regarding this disclosure. So i believe that the internal Agency Within the at lf are a matter to lack very closely to be sure that this kind of thing doesnt appen again, if it can be prevented. Excessive secrecy may have victimized this agency as well the congress. The Senate Hearing weve just been watching took place inside 1975. Room on september 16, at one point, there was a oisoned dart gun passed from William Colby to the senators. Criticism as a bit of that the committee used that used, peopleit was argued, as a kind of prop, and sensationalized a very serious subject. Always think about ongressional hearings as, they present a real challenge for members of congress because members of congress use congressional hearings typically as a way to educate the american particular set of issues that they think are important. Sometimes to shape public opinion. Sometimes to shape the opinion congress, and typically, because they have a legislative recommendation if road, and they want to use that situation with involved, to let the American Public know whats. Oing on so there was some internal usefulness of e that dart gun. Ofernal debate among members the committee as well as the staff, should senator church wield that weapon in front of the cameras. Of course, there were hundreds of photos taken. Splashed os were across front pages of newspapers across the country and, of very well on the televised hearings. And i think that ultimately, because it was the first public ee ring of the church committ and the Church Committee had been investigating for months at months nt, five or six had been devoted to just uncovering some of these anxious, and they were and they were getting some pressure from the media and from members of the senate to talk finding, t they were and so they put together this hearing and, indeed, they wanted to make a splash. They wanted to get peoples intention. And you can see from the hearing, the caucus room is filled with press, photo journalists, tv cameras. Members of the press are in the back. Members of the public were here. Although it wasnt as attended as the watergate hearings in 973 but you do have an opportunity to sort of shock the nation. This is the kind of stuff that in. C. I. A. Has been involved does this enhance National Security. Is this the kind of program that the Intelligence Community should be developing . And finally, whos overseeing this program . If it was, indeed if his if these toxins were meant to be disposed of, why do they still exist . In other words, whos watching the watchers . Sort of the perennial question. Senator church received a good deal of criticism for using brandishing that weapon, if you will, because people thought it was sensationalizing a very serious topic, but there were others who said, look, we needed to get press attention to this issue and more broadly, to get the American Public to take notice of what we were finding. In order to help us achieve our legislative goals, which we saw and im wn the pike, sure well talk about those a a tle later, but congressional hearing is a moment that provides an pportunity for members of congress to really focus National Attention and, indeed, using that weapon did just that, focused National Attention on these types of programs. So to wrap up this whole ssue of the colby hearing, the first public hearing, what was the legislative result. Did they get what they wanted . Yes. Limited. Was it was a limited success. Stages of ry early the committee investigation, there were staff who were we ted to developing what call charter legislation. And charter legislation was an effort to legally efine exactly what these agencies should be doing, so there was the c. I. A. Already charter. Under a charterad violated that by developing these domestic surveillance programs. And so members of the committee were focused on, how can we revise that charter to make the c. I. A. More effective and these it from doing types of things in the future and at the same time, there was establish affort to charter for the f. B. I. The federal bureau of investigation, those were always seen as goals thategislative could come out of the church investigation. The second thing, though, is and oftentimes, this is what happens with congressional hearings is that by shining often n an issue, it forces the agencies under perform their o own sort of internal review, and so, they often will institute their own internal reform. Thats certainly what happened with the fbi, the attorney general, edward levy came out with a series of attorney general guidelines to help guide he f. B. I. And prevent it from engaging in abuses in the future. C. I. A. Was already engaging in this process before the family ommittee as the jewels report suggests, they reviewing their activity. I think that the c. I. A. Did tive charter gisla for the c. I. A. Was never approved, for a variety of legislative so the ortion of those of the review of the c. I. A. Never quite reached fruition. There were, from what i understand, a number of internal changes nd internal that took place as a result of the Church Committee inquiry, and then later, the congress establishes the c. I. A. Inspector to ral position in order provide consistent internal oversight of the agency, and that person, of course, the i. G. Has to report to congress about the he or she finds to be problems internally. Kate scott, thank you very much. Thank you very much. Announcer each saturday and unday for the next five weeks will air extended portions of the Church Committee hearings. You can watch them here on tv only on tory cspan 3. Independent media is the oxygen of democracy. Its essential. Holding those in power accountab accountable. Ou know, were not there to serve some kind of corporate agenda. When we cover warranties brought to you by the weapons manufacturers. Q a, ndayinate on journalist amy goodman, host and executive producer of the Daily News Program democracy now, talks about the books shes coauthored, democracy now, 20 ears covering the movements changing america, which looks back at some of the stories and covered. E shows the idea of democracy now starting 20 years ago, it really hasnt changed. Ringing out the voices of people at the grass roots in the United States and around the world, and they very much represent, i think, the majority people. I mean, i think people who are concerned deeply about war and peace, about the growing inequality in this country, about climate change, the fate of the planet, are not a fringe minority. Not even a silent majority. But the
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