Frank church. It is thus known as the Church Committee. They met for 16 months, reviewing more than 10,000 documents and calling 800 witnesses in front of the committee. Legacyacy its a provided ongoing oversight of intelligence agencies and the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and the Church Committee hearings were heard in the oom. Us rim r next we meet kate scott who explained how and why the Church Committee came about and sets the stage for 1975 hearings with the cia director, William Colby. The Church Committee was created in january of 1975 by the senate. In response series of revelations and allegations about Domestic Intelligence abuses in the u. S. And the senate created the committee by an overwhelming 824, to, 82or establish a committee that would examine the abuses of intelligence agencies and maybe how they were violating constitutional protections. The Church Committee, to understand the context of the committee, you need to go back to 1970, really the first big revelation of Domestic Intelligence abuses. The whistleblower, if counter counterintelligence captain, provided details in a published account that was published by the washington monthly. Domestic a nationwide army program, and members of congress did not know about it. It was secret for a bout a decade and in the whole purpose was to monitor political dissent to the u. S. , those who voiced opposition to the u. S. Domestic and foreign policies. So senator sam ervin of North Carolina started a committee to look into those allegations in 1971. Two years after that, sam ervin again shared another committee, though Watergate Committee the Watergate Committee, to look into to the nations investigations into the watergate campaign. There were new allegations made about the political uses of the fbi and cia. During that campaign. And then finally, in december of 1974, Pulitzer Prize winning rschnalist first hi published a frontpage alleging that the cia had developed a domestic surveillance program, which would have been in violation of its charter. It was to know supposed to have none of these applications. That allegation came about a month after the midterm elections of 1970 or, when a large 1974, when a large group of watergate babies were elected to congress. Many of them had run on a Campaign Pledge to clean up the executive branch and to come into congress to provide better oversight of the executive branch. Thathing like the abuses happened during watergate, wouldnt happen again. They came in to say that we want to change the way that the government is operating. And a third revelation, saying that there were abuses out there and congress does not seem to know much about them area and so, in january of 1975, with the swearing in of this new class, the senate agrees to create a new special committee. Frank church is the chairman, that is why we call it the Church Committee. He was at that time an 18 year member who had served on the Foreign Relations committee. He was a senate veteran. He has been a prominent outspoken critic of the vietnam war. Involved in issues related to the u. S. , the use of intelligence abroad, he himself was a former Intelligence Officer. He had earned as an Intelligence Officer during world war ii. He had respect for the major Intelligence Community, but he was skeptical about it applications, particularly domestic application. John ofairman was texas, a member of the Republican Party who was a 10 year member of the Armed Services committee and he knew a lot about the Armed Services and Intelligence Community. He was concerned about how the senate could investigate these sensitive, National Security issues without revealing National Security secrets. Put onhe boasted he was the committee to make sure that this would not become a media extravaganza, that it would not be sensational. And in some ways, to protect the intelligence agencies. That really is the origins of the Church Committee. Could you tell us about some of the other members. Were they wellknown people at the time . They were. Love them more and some of them werent. The two senator leaders, one from montana was the majority leader. And a minority leader. And they wanted to create a community comprised of members with a good deal of experience, like frank church and john tower, but they also wanted to acknowledge that the watergate babies where particularly interested in approaching some of these topics in new ways. They tried to balance the Committee Membership with older members like frank church and barry goldwater, and baker, with newer members, like them representative from pennsylvania, gary hart of colorado with a newly elected member, and they had an interest in these issues and very much wanted to look into them. And they were new members, so it was a recognition that maybe we needed a new fresh approach to these issues that the country was confronted with. In a moment, we will see the testimony of William Colby from september 16, 1975. At that time, was it unusual for the cia director to testify in a public hearing . It was. It was unusual in part because for decades the house and senate had provided oversight of the intelligence committee, but primarily they had done it in closed hearing. That was for a number of reasons. The primary reason was they believed that they do not want to provide opportunities in a public hearing where information that was classified could be revealed, and therefore undermine the security of the intelligence methods or practices. But, there was increasingly a sense that the people who are supposed to provide oversight in congress of the Intelligence Community, had it not been doing it rigorously or effectively. , in the senate for example there were two subcommittees that were packed with oversight for the cia. One of them was the new Appropriations Committee and one was with the Armed Services committee and the of and the Armed Services committee was chaired by john stennis. He was a conservative democrat from mississippi, who very much supported the National Intelligence community and did not think that congress had a responsibility to look too closely at how it operated. He famously said, if you are going to have a National Intelligence community, you need to close your eyes sometimes and take what is coming. Another senator expressed, we do not know what is going on at the cia and frankly, we do not want to know. So that was the sense for the ears years of the cold war and it have been the prevailing sentiment. Because of the global threat of communism, the u. S. Needed to develop capabilities within the National Intelligence community, that could that, in the methods of the intelligence collection, it should not be secondguessed. So, for decades in the senate, the oversight had been provided and it had been done in closed session. The transcripts were not made public or released. Members inere a few the senate our increasingly unsettled by this lack of oversight and one of them was the majority leader. And he was actually the first senator to propose a permanent cia Intelligence Oversight Committee in 1950. And he continued every congress to resubmit the proposal to establish this permanent oversight committee. While he gained, at some point he had about 20 cosponsors to get this committee created, he never was able to get the kind of committee that he really wanted, and till the scandal of 1974. Allegations he was actually the one address drafted the resolution for the Church Committee. Colby unusual for william to be there for the reasons i just explained. He is an interesting character, it is interesting that he is the one to call it was called to testify. He had spent a majority of his career in the cia. He had worked during world war ii for the office of teaching strategic services. Then he went into private law practice for some years and in 1949, two years after the cia was a blessed, established, he joined. He had been deeply involved in cia operations, cold war related, for 30 years before he came back to washington and was nominated by Richard Nixon and approved by the senate and confirmed by the senate. To serve as the new cia director in 1973. So he comes to this position as director, while the cia is in turmoil. The former director had ordered a report, an internal report to be produced, and he had asked cia officers to come forward and report on programs they believed the agency had been involved in which may have been constitutionally questionable. Perhaps, if not illegal, at orst unethical or immoral, improper. This report, this internal report, became known as the cia family jewels. At the start of the Church Committee investigation, they did a lot of work behind the scenes, bitterly investigating these agencies in the Intelligence Community more broadly. They did not even know where to start. Colbyy, for them, william provided them with a copy of the internal report, the family jewels. It provided them basically with a roadmap. They could map out what the cia was doing and look deeply into these cases of improper behavior. Wasiam colby, of course, firmly committed to the cia and its intelligence operations. He was concerned about some of the act of the activity that the agency had conducted and he was concerned about political pressure coming from the white house during the watergate era. He wanted to ensure the strength of the cia moving forward and so, while he faced a good deal of criticism, both from within the cia and from outside the cia, even from former Intelligence Officers for cooperating with the Church Committee investigation, he thought it was the best way to strengthen the agency moving forward. Hisuld characterize cooperation as limited. He wanted to cooperate with them in the sense that he provided them with materials, but he also created a sort of liaison operation within the cia, to manage the relationship with the Church Committee. So the Church Committee would make requests for documents that were necessary to build their story and the cia would push back, we are not sure we have the material or why do you need the material . And by doing so, they further delayed the Church Committees ability to begin to get the big picture. So he did receive criticism and he received criticism for working with the committee, but he did manage to restrict the corporation in some important ways. And speaking with the former staff, you will recognize that they will speak about the frustration of the the experience trying to get information from the cia. Ofnow, here is called duke paul duke introducing the hearing. Then we will get thoughts from you. The senators seemed unimpressed. Perhaps, they already knew too much, each arriving with a notebook crammed with classified material about the cia, all marked topsecret. After five months, the closed door investigation, most of the senators now agree with frank church, that the cia has indeed been out of control. So the testimony of colby did not outweigh the suspicions. The hearings took place in the historic caucus room. There were no long lines and the seats reserved for the audience were at times, only two thirds full. After what has happened in this country, there is no more future shocks. Whether there are shocks or not, todays hearing did focus major attention on the way that the cia has gone about business in the United States. The subject concerned the cias development in warfare materials. The cias retention of an amount usehellfish toxin and their of the various chemicals and drugs. The relationship between the cia and biological laboratory has an activity requires further investigation this year. It resulted from information provided by cia officers, not directly associate with the project. Not all activities that might be required questionable poppycock brought to management. Two other officers aware of the project, indicated that the project involved the development of warfare agents, some very legal. And associated the Delivery System for use. The search produced information about the basic agreement between the army and the ira, relating to the project and records covering the activities from the beginning in 1952, to the termination in 1970. In the course of the investigation, the Laboratory Storage facilities were searched and about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and eight milligrams of cobra venom were discovered in a vaulted building. The major early requirement of the agency was designed for the standard of and hazardous situations during world war ii. This was the basis on which eventually we discovered the toxic shellfish toxin. The only application of this toxin was in the flight over the ussr in the 1960s, during which they carried the device concealed in a silver dollar. In this case, the drill was filled with shellfish toxin. They did not use it and was not instructed to do so. It was offered as an option. This was the only time we are aware that the toxin was provided for operational use, although it was made available for earlier flight. Was in the Agency Development of assimilation devices to use the standard chemicals themselves. Various devices in an agent designed to release available records do not indicate all specific items were developed exclusively for the cia and similar devices were also done for the army. At the time the toxin was found, the officer responded over the project in 1970 said he had no recollection on how it got there. Discussions were held with a retired officer who gave a lead. This man had been the branch chief in 1970, stating that the toxin had been moved and is stored in the laboratory. This was done on the basis of after conversations with a project officer. He further stated that he made the decision based on the fact that the difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin was so great, it made no sense to destroy it. Specifically, when there is no source at that time. Isy believe this explanation correct, but does not recall the actual act of receiving the material. Both of these middle grade officers agree that nobody, including their superior, was told of the retention of the shellfish toxin. If that amount of shellfish toxin were administered orally, which is one of the least efficient ways for administering , that quantity would be sufficient enough to kill at least 14,000 people. Administered in a sophisticated equipment found in the laboratory, that quantity would be sufficient to kill a great many more. Estimates go into the hundreds of thousands. My first question is, why did the agency prepare a which therexin for is no practical antidote, which attacks the nervous system and brings on death very quickly . Why did the agency prepare toxins of this character in quantities sufficient to kill many thousands of people . Int was the need for that the first place, long before the president ial order came down . Think the first part of the answer is the fact that the that was developed during world war ii, does take time to work and it is agonizing to the subject who uses it. Some of the people who would be natural requesters of such capability for their own protection and protection of their fellow agents, really would not want to face that kind of fate. If they could be given an instantaneous one, they could accept that. That was the thought process behind the capability. I cannot explain why that quantity was developed, except this was a collaboration we were engaged in with the army. We did develop this particular foras a possible possible use. When the cia retained the amount that it did, it obviously did it improperly. Quantity,hurch this and various devices for administering the toxin, were found in the laboratory. They make it clear that the peer really defensive purely defensive uses were not what the agency was definiteo, there were uses, like suicide, but i do not nk that suicide particularly places that are human targets in such a way that you would not even know that you are hit. Mr. Colby it was also for other reasons. No question. Chairman church have you brought with you some of those devices which would have enabled the cia to use this . Mr. Colby we have. Chairman church for killing people . [murmering] [indiscernible] if n church i wonder [chatter] this firehurch does the dart . Mr. Colby yes it does. The round thing at the top is the site. And it is practically a normal. 45. Works byit electricity, there is a battery in the handle and the fires a small dart. Chairman church does it fire silently . Mr. Colby almost. Chairman church what range does it have . Believe, 100 meters i about 100 yards. Chairman church 100 meter range. And the dart itself, when it does thehe target, target no he has been hit . Mr. Colby that depends on the dart used. There are different kinds we use and various weapons systems, and developed thatas could enter the target without them knowing. Chairman church and did you find such a darts in the laboratory . Mr. Colby we did. Effort