Transcripts For CSPAN2 Steven Levitsky And Daniel Ziblatt How Democracies Die 20180218

Good evening, everyone. My name is betsy atkins. On behalf of harvard bookstore, id like to welcome you to cambridge public library. Im extremely pleased to have Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt with us. Please check out more Upcoming Library programming and be sure to join our email list to learn about the event series, and please visit us online at harvard. Com events. Id also like to thank tonights cosponsor, mass humanities supporting programs that use history, literature, philosophy and the other disciplines to enhance and improve civic life for the people of massachusetts. Learn more at masscommunities. Org. Tonights talk will conclude with time for your questions. Please note that this talk is being recorded by cspan, and during q a your questions will be recorded. To ask a question, please come to the mic at the front of this aisle to my left. Following q a, there will be a book signing here on stage. The signing line will form down the aisle to my right, the end of which may extend out into the hallway, and the line will come onto the stage and exit out the door to my right. Books can be purchased outside the lecture hall, and how democracies die is 20 off tonight. Thank you for making purchases from harvard bookstore, an independent bookstore, and youre insuring the future of this series. Please turn off or silence your cell phones. Now im very pleased to introduce tonights speakers. Steven levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt are professors of government at harvard university. Professor levitskys research focuses on latin america and the developing world. Professor ziblatt are studies europe from the 19th century to the present, and hes the author most recently of conservative parties and the birth of democracy. In her recent New York Times review of their book how democracies die, its noted that levitsky and ziblatt show how democracies have collapsed elsewhere not just through violent coups, but more commonly through a gradual slide into authoritarianism and praises how democracies die is a lucid and essential guide to what can happen here. Please join me in welcoming Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. [applause] hello, everyone. Its really wonderful to be here. To see such a big crowd. Thank you to the harvard bookstore, mass humanities and also the cambridge public library. I cant think of a more appropriate place to discuss the current state of our democracy than in a free public library, so its really great to be here. [applause] so steve and i are going to kind of tag team tonight. Im going to start off and then hand things over to steve. And what were going to do tonight is talk about the motivation behind our book and some of the things weve learned while working on this book. So i want to begin really first just by talking about the motivations that led to the, to this project. So we both teach in the harvard government department. Were colleagues. Weve taught together and researched together for 15 years. We study democracy and crisis, authoritarianism in other parts of the world. This is what weve spent our careers doing. We were motivated to write this book because steve and i, like many of you perhaps, watched the 20152016 president ial election first with a kind of sense of uneasiness, growing disbelief and eventually shock at the tenor of political debate. But since we have spent our careers studying democracies in crisis this other countries, me in europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, steve in latin america the 1960s to the present, there was another layer of trepidation. At first it was really just small echoes. You know, we saw during the president ial election the republican nominee rail against the media. , threaten to not accept the results of elections, accuse his political rival of being a criminal, threatening to lock up his former rival, if elected. And finally, condoning violence at political rallies. So many people thought these were just words, you know . In some sense, they were. But steve and i were both increasingly nervous because we recognized that these are really hallmarks, these four things that happened during the president ial election going after the media, talking about elections in this way, criticizing a rival in this way, condoning violence these were hallmarks of authoritarians in other countries. And moreover, no major president ial Party Candidate in the United States in at least the 20th century but even longer, had ever done any of these things, had ever behaved this way. But many candidates we recognize for Political Office in other countries who eventually became authoritarian leaders had behaved this way. So both of us had this uncanny feeling that we had seen this movie before elsewhere, and out rarely ends well. It rarely ends well. So we decided we had to write this book. We wanted to draw upon the knowledge we have to look at democracies that have confronted and overcome these crises in other places where countries have overcome and succumbed, to draw lessons from these experiences to try to understand our own countrys predicament. So while working on the book, we came to some conclusions that differ, i think, from how many today think about the trump presidency. We came to realize the problem facing our political system today is not just donald trump alone. Its not just his outrageous comments, his confusing or unusual psychology, attempting to focus on, you know, the most outrageous latest tweet or political gossip, but at some level we realize this is a distraction. Its important to keep your eye on the ball. At the end of the day, we came to realize as we worked on this book that donald trump was not just the cause of our political systems problems, he was in many ways a symptom. He was a symptom of deeper, underlying problems in our political system. We realized, in short, that the problem runs deeper than trump. So is tonight what were going to do is talk about three discoveries we made in the process of writing our book that led us to this conclusion that the problem runs deeper than trump. Im going to first start off by talking about the first discovery, steve will talk about the second and third. Okay. So discover number one discovery number one, the best way the stop authoritarians is to prevent them from coming to power in the first place. Okay, what does this mean . Well, in the context of the United States this means that we have to Pay Attention to not just why donald trump was elected, but also how he ever came to be the nominee of a Major Political party in the first place. So let me elaborate. In the cold war, threequarters of democratic breakdowns around the world happened at the hands of men with guns in the form of military coups. Since the collapse of communism, the world has changed, and most democratic breakdowns arrive at the ballot box through elections. Demagogues come to power i through elections, and once in power, they inflict serious damage on Democratic Political institutions. So really a grave paradox facing democracies today is how does a democracy prevent an autocraticminded demagogue from coming into power and then dismantling those Democratic Institutions that brought him into power in the first place . Throughout most of American History, weve happily avoided this. But it was not because there were no demagogues, and its not because there werent voters who might support demagogues. In fact, we really have a tendency, i think, to whitewash our own history and forget theres really a continuous strand in American History of authoritarians who gain around 30 approval in opinion surveys. So this strand runs from henry ford in the 1920s, the founder of Ford Motor Company who was a famous antisemite, who considered running for president in the 1920s, huey long in the 1930s, joe mccarthy in the 1950s, George Wallace in the 1960s. Gallup poll data really going back to the 1930s shows each of these figures consistently garnered around 30 approval ratings, and this is a number that really runs to todays support, 35 approval for our president. So i dont think its actually too much to say that theres really a continuous perhaps latent strand of authoritarianism running as a subcurrent in american political culture. In some ways, the United States is not unique. This probably applies to most countries. But heres really the point none of these figures i just cited ford, long, wallace none of these figures ever made it close to the presidency. Though they were popular, they were kept far from power. So how and what changed in 2016 . So in the book we emphasize two contributing factors, and im just going to lay them out more schematically. We lay a this out in more detail, of course, in the book. The way we pick our president s has changed. Until 1972 and for the first threequarters of the 20th century president ial candidates were selected by Party Leaders. In a kind of system of gatekeeping or what political scientists have sometimes called peer review, Political Parties who worked up close with the candidates, got together and selected the candidates. These were politicians who would get together, and this is criticize ised, of course, as the kind of smokefilled back room, but these politicians had a big say in picking candidates what this meant was voters, essentially, were you are relevant at the stage of picking candidates. It was Party Leaders who picked candidates. Voters, of course, mattered in a general election, but it was Party Leaders who picked candidates. Now, the system, the smokefilled back room, certainly had downsides. It was exclusive, it wasnt very democratic, sometimes generated mediocre candidates. If you know anything about warren g. Harding, hes a type of prototype of somebody who emerged out of the smokefilled room who was mediocre. All systems have advantages and disadvantage ises. An advantage of this system was that it worked well, in fact, perfectly, in keeping extremists from ever becoming viable candidates for president. It was a screening system, a filtration system, a gatekeeping system that effectively kept demagogues out. Now, we all know that the american political system and American Society changed dramatically in 1968, the tragic year of 1968. The way we select our candidates also changed in 1968. Ing the president ial system was opened up. The smokefilled rooms were opened up. Primaries were made binding. Voters could now select the candidates for office. The general election was now preceded by the nearly continuous primary season that we all know that goes on for, you know, months and months and months where the voters had a say in picking the candidates. Now, this certainly was a more open system, but its interesting. There were two political scientists who wrote in the early 70s who warned that the fall of this filtration system is could also open the door to demagogues. Now, to be clear, we dont advocate going back to that old system. But at the same time, we have to recognize the Current System is doubleedged. It is more open, and so what this means is that if a demagogue ever runs for office, the road to nomination is much clearer. Now, its also true that in the 1980s the Democratic Party introduced a system of superdelegates where elected officials hold, held extra sway in the selection of candidates. This kind of contained some elements of the old system, creating a more complicated Obstacle Course on the way to the nomination. But republicans never adopted this system. They never adopted superdelegates. So the door was much more open. So this meant that if a demagogue ever decided to run for president , especially in the Republican Party, this was a much more open road to gain the nomination. And this is exactly what happened in 2016. Donald trump, modernday demagogue, became the nominee of the Republican Party. So theres a second factor though that we also emphasize in the book. It prevents someone, that shapes someone with authoritarian tendencies can reach this position of power and come into office. Inin many ways, its more cruci. Because, after all, donald trump won the nomination, but this didnt mean he was necessarily going to become president. First of all, Hillary Clinton could have beat him, but the second point that we emphasize in the book just as importantly was that it was absolutely imperative for the Republican Party to play a role here. There was an imperative role for Republican Party allies of donald trump to play. Heres really the central pivot of the story. Authoritarians come to power not just electoral authoritarians come to power not just via elections, but also with the enabling aid of Establishment Party allies. So throughout history this repeats itself. Italy in the 1920s, germany in the 1930s, venezuela in the 1990s. This is really a crucial test. When a demagogue comes along who clearly violates democratic norms and gets close to power, one of the last offramps that determines whether or not establishment politicians, party allies finally break with the demagogue, with the autocrat in the making, do they draw a line in the sand and say beyond this we will not go, or do they abdicate. Do they overlook the violations. Do they let party trump their commitment to democratic norms. In effect, do they form a Faustian Bargain allowing their ideological ally into power . Do they enable the authoritarian . Because when elected authoritarians get to power in this last stage, its nearly always because mainstream politicians out of miscalculation or opportunism let them in the door. The enabling role of the Republican Party is actually not unique. This happens remarkably often. In venezuela in the 1990s hugo chavez got his political start by being given a big boost from a longtime, mainstream fixture of venezuelan politics who freed chavez from jail, gave chavez a boost in legitimacy, and he was hoping to kind of tap into some of the Energy Around chavez. He was an older politician. His time had passed, and within several years chavez was president. And even better examples, italy in the early 1920s. Benito mussolini was a complete outcast of the mainstream, but a longstanding, prominent politician saw mussolini on the horizon and decided to include him on his party list in the early 20s to tap into some of the energy on the far right. Within a year, mussolini was prime minister. In germany, a similar story unfolds. The leader of the german conservative party, the head of a kind of very elitist, aristocratic party allied himself with hitler in the late 20s, held rallies together, tried to draw on hitlers grass roots appeal to try to shore up this relatively elitist party. But this backfired. The conservatives disintegrated, hitler grew in prominence. By january 1933 he was in power, and this fateful moment in january 1933 when hitler was named chancellor, von poppen, a leading statesman at the time, assured his conservative allies, dont worry, this is a quote within two months well have him into a corner, and hell squeal. And every instance the mainstream or the establishment politicses opened the door, abdicate, fail in their gatekeeping function and let the extremist in the door. In every instance, the mainstream politicians make the same mistake. They form this Faustian Bargain thinking they can contain the outsider. In every instance, the Faustian Bargain backfires. The same thing happened in 2016; republicans enabled donald trump. Many leading republicans, even after candidate trump won the nomination, openly despised and were offended by trump could have crossed party lines. They could have but didnt, for example, endorse Hillary Clinton. They could have put democracy ahead of country ahead of party. This could have made a difference. Now, im sure some of you are thinking, well, how realistic is that . Could that really happen . Would politicians really have done this . Turns out we dont have to look very far to find evidence this is possible. If you look to the 2017 french president ial election, the conservative republican Party Candidate in that country didnt make it to the second round. Its a tworound election system. Didnt make it to the second is round. In the second round, the question is would he endorse marine le pen, the populist demagogue, or would he support macron who had been a minister in the former socialist government. He, although he was idealogically closer to le pen, he endorsed marrone. In the macron. In the United States, the republicans did not do this. They let our le pen in the door. Donald trump was elected president , and once an authoritarians in the door, its a changed game. Steves going to tell us [applause] so will our constitution save us . Thank you, by the way, for coming. I have to calm down. I got feedback from my wife after we gave a talk in brookline last week, and she said stop pounding repeatedly on the lectern. [laughter] youre not nikita khrushchev. So im going to try i get a little worked up. [laughter] will our constitution save us. Our second discovery is not necessarily. Americans have a lot of faith in our constitutional system of checks and balances, and for good reason. We have the oldest, we have the most successful constitution in the history of the world. Our system of checks and balances contained andrew jackson, fdr, it contained nixon, why shouldnt it contain trump. But constitutions dont just work automatically. If they did, argentina which adopted a constitution which was basically an exact replica of ours in the 19th century would have been a stable democracy in the 20th century. Instead, it had six military coups. Constitutions work best, constitutions work well when theyre reinforced by robust democratic norms or unwritten rules. And our book focuses on two norms in particular. One is what we call mutual toleration or accepting the legitimacy of our partisan opponents. That means that no matter how much we disagree with our opponents, no matter how much we may dislike our opponents, we recognize both privately and publicly that they are loyal citizens who love their country, who respect the constitution, and importantly, who have an equal and legitimate right to compete more power and to govern. In other words, we do not treat our rivals as enemies. The second norm is what we call institutional forbearance. It means refraining from exercising ones legal right. It is an act of selfrestraint. It is the underutilization of power. We dont think about forbearance a lot in politics, but it is absolutely essential. Think about what the president is constitutionally able to do in this country. The president can pardon whoever he or she wants whenever she wants. Any president with a congressional majority can impact the Supreme Court. If you dont like the way the Supreme Court is ruling, you can expand it. If you have a majority in congress, pass a law, expand it to 11, expand it to 13 and fill the new seats with partisan allies. Perfect9ly legal. Perfectly legal. Or if a president s agenda is stallinged in congress, the president can circumvent the process and make policy through executive proclamations or executive orders. The constitution does not explicitly prohibit such behavior. Or think about what congress can do. The senate can use its right of advise and consent to block all the president s cabinet picks, all of his or her court picks, can prevent the president from filling Supreme Court vacancies. Congress can refuse to fund the government. It can effectively shut down the government. And, of course, congress can impeach the president on virtually whatever grounds it chooses. My point is that the president can exploit the letter of the constitution, our constitution, in ways that seriously undermine the spirit of the constitution. And, therefore, can throw our democracy into crisis. Legal scholar mark [inaudible] calls this sort of behavior constitutional hardball. Using the letter of the law in a way that eviscerates the spirit of the law. Look at any failing deming crass across history, and you will find constitutional hardball in abundance; around argentina, spd germany in the 30s, contemporary venezuela, ecuador, turkey, hungary, poland. What historically has prevent our system of checks and balances from devolving into ted lock, into d deadlock, into dysfunction and maybe even into authoritarianism are norms of forbearance. Its a shared understanding among politicians that neither side will deploy its institutional prerogatives to the hilt, that the spirit of the law will prevail over the letter of the law. We argue in the book that norms of mutual toleration and forbearance act as the soft forward rails of democracy. They help to prevent healthy political competition from spiraling into the kind of partisan fight to the death that wrecked democracies in europe in the 1930s and in latin america in the 1960s and 70s. Now, american democracy hasnt always had soft guardrails. It wasnt born with soft is guardrails, certainly didnt have them in the 1790s when extreme partisan intolerance and pretty heavy duty constitutional hardball nearly destroyed the new republic. And, of course, we lost our norms of mutual toleration and forbearance in the runup to the civil war. And we lost them really for about a generation afterwards. But beginning in the late 19th century, democrats and republicans largely accept one another as legitimate and largely avoided destabilizing acts of constitutional hardball. So there were no impeachments, no successful Court Packings, senators were judicious in their use of filibusters, were judicious in their use in their exercise of their right to advice and constraint. Consent, excuse me. They basically deferred to the president. And outside of wartime, president s refrained from acting unilaterally to circumvent congress. So for more than a century starting in the late 19th century, our system of checks and balances worked. But again, they worked because they were reinforced by norms of mutual toleration and forbeach,. What we argue and i think we show in the book is that our countrys democratic norms have been unraveling for the last quarter century. We saw early signs of this in the 1990s with the gingrich era government shutdowns and the partisan impeachment of bill clinton, but the process really took off in the 2000s when barack obama ran for president in 2008. Republicans called him a marxist, a proterrorist and antiamerican. Republican leaders during obamas presidency from giuliani to huckabee to gingrich to palin said that president obama did not love america, that obama the democrat was not a real american. Of course, the Birther Movement went a step further, questioning obamas very right to be president. Now, as dan pointed out, america has always, always had an extremist fringe. That is nothing new. Whats new is that this was not fringe politics. These were National Republican leaders. This was a Vice President ial candidate. Republicans nominated a prominent birther as their president ial candidate in 2016, and they depicted their rival Party Candidates as a criminal who belonged in jail. So by the 2000s, republicans had begun to deny the legitimacy of their democratic rivals. They had begun to cast democrats as the enemy. The decline of mutual toleration encourages politicians to abandon forbearance. When we view our partisan rivals not as opposition, but as enemy, as beyond the pale, when we view them as antiamerican, when we view them as a threat to our way of life, we become tempted to use any means necessary to beat them. And that is exactly whats beginning to happen. Politicians are throwing forbearance to the wind. Filibusters are now routine. Politicians shut down the government, refuse to raise the debt limit, nearly throwing country into default a few years ago. We see extraordinary acts of constitutional hardball like North Carolinas legislative coup of 2016, and perhaps most dramatically of all, the senates refuseal to allow president obama to fill a Supreme Court vacancy in 2016. Thats an act that was unprecedented since 1866. And all this is before donald trump was elected. So the problem is not just that americans elected a demagogue. Its that we elected a demagogue at a time when the soft guardrails that once protected our system are coming unmoored. So why the hell is this happening . Sorry, i promised that i wouldnt swear and broke it. [laughter] wont do it again. We argue that whats primarily driving norm erosion is extreme polarization. Republicans and democrats have grown so far apart that they now literally fear and is loathe one another. In 1960 5 of republicans said they would be unhappy if their child married a democrat. Same thing, basically same number for democrats. Today that number is 50 . Last year a pew survey found that 49 of republicans and 55 of democrats said the other party makes them afraid. We have not seen this level of partisan hatred since the end of reconstruction. And this is not just traditional liberal conservative polarization. People do not fear and loathe one another over taxes and health care. They dont. Todays partisan differences run much deeper. Theyre about race, religion and way of life. Our parties have changed traumatically during our lifetimes, over the last 50 years. If you go back to the 1960s, 1970s when many of us were growing up. The two parties were demographically and culturally very similar to one another, almost unmistakeable from one another. Both parties were overwhelmingly white and protestant. The parties differed on taxes, on government spending, on foreign policy, but on fundamental issues of god and race they were very similar. They were overlapping. Three changes occurred over the last half century. First of all, the Civil Rights Movement led to a massive migration of southern whites from the democrats to the republicans and, of course, with the enfranchisement of africanamericans in the south, africanamericans became overwhelmingly democrat. Second, the United States experienced a massive wave of immigration. Most of those immigrants and their kids ended up in the Democratic Party. And third, since reagan in the early 1980s, evangelical christians which were once evenly distributed even though a little bit more democrat than republican became overwhelmingly republican. So by the 2000s in stark contrast to the 1960s, democrats and republicans were demographically and culturally very, very different. The democrats, of course, are a Rainbow Coalition of urban secular whites and a diversity of ethnic minorities. The republicans, by contrast, remain overwhelmingly white and christian. Thats important. Because White Christians are not just any group. They were once the majority, goodsized majority in this country, and even more importantly they used to sit unchallenged atop this countrys socioeconomic, cultural and political hierarchies. They filled the presidency, congress, Supreme Court, governors mansions. They were pillars of local communities. They were the ceos, they were the newscasters, the movie stars, they were the college professors. And crucially, they were the face of both the democratic and republican parties. Those days, of course, are long gone. But losing ones majority and losing ones dominant social status can be deeply, deeply threatening. Many Republican Voters not all of them many Republican Voters feel like the country they grew up in is being taken away from them. And that, we think, is what ultimately drives polarization in this country. Problem is that extreme polarization can kill democracies. This is a major lesson from the failure of democracy in europe in the 1930s, in south america in the 1970s. When politics is so deeply polarized that each side views a victory by the other side as intolerable, as beyond the pale, democracys in real trouble. When an opposition victory is viewed as intolerable, you start to justify using extraordinary means to prevent it. Violence, repression, election fraud, coups. Now, americans have not reached that point, obviously. But we have reached a point where according to exit polls in 2016 one out of four trump voters believed that he was unfit for the presidency of the United States. He was unfit for office. And yet he was still preferable to a democrat. Weve reached a point where according to gallup republicans have a much more favorable view of Vladimir Putin than they do Hillary Clinton. Those are Dangerous Levels of polarization. So donald trump is a challenge, but the most fundamental challenge we face today is extreme polarization driven by a radicalized Republican Party that represents a declining White Christian majority, many of whose members perceive themselves to face an existential threat. Trump is a symptom of that polarization, not a cause of it. And his departure from the presidency is very unlikely to end it. So what can we do, in two minutes or less . [laughter] for one, its absolutely clear that the Republican Party has to change, that it has to become a more diverse party. As long as the gop represents a white, is a White Christian party in a society as diverse as ours, it will always be prone to White Nationalist appeals. It will always be prone to White Nationalist extremism. What can democrats do . Theres been a lot of talk, increasing amounts of talk in recent weeks and months in progressive circles about learning how to fight like republicans. Seriously. If republicans are going to play constitutional hardball, then democrats have to play tit for tat. If they dont, they will be victims of an endless series of sucker punches, stolen Supreme Court seats and the like. And democrats, in fact, are learning how to fight like republicans. They just used a filibuster last week to trigger their own, their first major government shutdown. That is a move straight out of the Newt Gingrich playbook. Many democrats will run this year on a platform of impeachment. That will be the central thing they campaign on. And is if democrats can control the senate, theres talk of denying President Trump the ability to fill any Supreme Court vacancy just like the republicans did to obama. We worry a lot about this response. Fighting like republicans, as legitimate as that is and seems, will inevitably reinforce and even accelerate the process of norm erosion. It will further weaken our countrys democratic guardrails. And in our experience studying democracies in crisis in europe and is latin america and elsewhere, that sort of escalation never ends well. Never ends well. So in our view, opposition to trump should be loud, it should be vigorous, it should be muscular, but it should be normdefending rather than normbreaking. These days forbearance is often seen particularly among democrats as a sign of weakness, as a sign of sort of backing down or giving in to the other sides bullying. But i want to suggest that in reality it takes great political courage and strength. Sometimes it means standing up to an angry base and saying youre not going to do what they want, youre going to do whats best for the country and for our countrys institutions. Republicans have utterly failed to show that leadership over the last decade or so. Democrats should not follow in their footsteps. Now, i was told i should close with a note of hope [laughter] but im out of time. [laughter] [applause] what happens now . [inaudible] okay. Questions, come ask at this mic down this aisle. Hi. I have a reaction to two points. In terms of the election, 2016, the listen why trump the reason why trump was nominated was none of the other candidates was good enough to oppose him. And the thing that bothers me the most that gets very little press as far as the election goes, and you know this statistic, 43 of the electorate stayed home. And this is the most scary thing for me to realize, because this is not democracy if people are going to stay home. Bernie sanders should have been the candidate. Hillary clinton, the queen of, you know, the Democratic Party, sort of boxed him out. And the bernie people stayed home. So this is that point. I just have one comment as far as packing the courts. My hero and many of my parents friends and familys hero, fdc, tried to pack the courts fdr, tried to pack the courts too, as you probably know. For some reason, it didnt work. Maybe you could comment on why. But he tried. Okay. Yeah, thank you. Yeah, good question. So, i mean, i sort of take the first point to be about voter turnout at some level, why is vote iser turnout low, and what can be done about this. Its a very complicated question. Theres lots of things that work, and social its in some is easy to blame citizens for not turning out, but one way i think about this is that many ways the parties mobilize voters to turn out. And parties mobilize voters to turn out, the way historically this has happened is voters are members of groups and organizations, Civil Society institutions, labor unions for the left, for instance. And the Civil Society institutions have transformed and as labor unions have weakened, its harder for parties to reach and mobilize voters. And so one kind of transformation that and actually theres recent, i just read a recent paper, research that shows in states that have laws that restrict the ability of unions to organize, theres lower voter turnout, and this has negative consequences. So i think in a way the kind of transformation of our economy im getting into the complex part of the answer the weakening of labor unions that parties need to find new parties to mobilize. And parties need to come up with new techniques of organization, you know, as well as dealing with the rise of new types of media. In some ways i think the problem with turnout is a it can logical challenge. And so parties technological challenge. On the second point about Court Packing, yeah, so, thats a story that we tell in the book. Its a fascinating and revealing story of roosevelt, after winning reelection in 36, decided, you know, his new deal agenda was stalling out and, you know, all the members of the Supreme Court had received their legal educations in the 19th century. These were these oldfashioned guys, and he wanted to get his and they were block his agenda, so he wanted to expand the size of the court, and he pushed for this. It was interesting doing research on this because i really had the feeling had i been alive at that time, i may have been cheering him on. But the other part of me realized also this is dangerous. This is exactly the kind of thing were talking about where institutions are turned, are politicized. And had he been successful, who knows what you know, the Supreme Court would be constantly changing its number. So he was defeated. How though . This is the interesting point. Not only by republicans, but by members of the Democratic Party. There were conservative democrats as well as new deal allies who thought this was too far, and there was one incredible story of a senator from wyoming who was such a close partner and friend of the roosevelts that at the inauguration dinner, he sat next to Eleanor Roosevelt and four weeks later came out publicly against this and viewed this as an attack on Democratic Institutions and came out against this. So this was a case of party allies saying the institutions are more important than our agenda. And so another case of that is nixon. It took a while, but nixon is ultimately defeated by defection of key members of his own party, not just democrats at the end of the day. It was democrats and republicans. The question is today if theres a similar, an abuse comparable to fdcs Court Packing fdrs Court Packing, to nixons many criminal acts, would republicans cross the aisle and stand up to trump . And i think so far the evidence is probably not. Sir. Excuse me. In your, i was impressed by your analysis, all of it, and is yet it focused on polarization and forbearance, it seem ised to me. I was really surprised that you didnt mention what i see as sort of the 800pound gorilla which is roger ailes, fox news and disinformation on the internet in a time with polarization so much what is going to kill us, we cant get people to agree that water is wet. They live in alternate universes, and i dont see again, im out of time, but lack of hope . I mean, i dont see whats going to change that dynamic. So if you could yeah. So there is clear evidence that the rise, one, of social media and also of hyperpartisan media is pushing Public Opinion to the extreme. So there is evidence that that is at work. Our view is that thats a secondary cause, that the underlying cause of our polarization, underlying source of our polarization is the partisan racial and cultural sorting that i described. This is, that fox news is exacerbating this problem, but take it away and we would still have a deeply polarized society. I also was very impressed with all the analyses and especially the parties as gatekeepers. And having this kind of for the Country Exchange is getting harder and harder due to polarization. I was also, my ears perked up when, dan, you talked about we need a reorganization internally to both parties, but especially i think to the Democratic Party. Because of Hillary Clinton locked in, the democrats locked her in right away, and there was some sort of what you call invisible primary there that dominated throughout that goal for the presidency. And when i was so shocked at two a. M. When, you know, wisconsin was won, i was shocked like everybody else, but then i said did Hillary Clinton give us trump . And that, you know, id like some comments on that. Thats too much of a reduction. But it keys in, i think, to what youre talking about regarding a real need for a deep reorganization, both steven and dan, please. Yeah. I mean, i guess, i mean, i understand the point, and theres, you know, some people maybe didnt like hillary, and theres, you know, maybe reasons to think she wasnt the best candidate. But theres a difference between having a mediocre candidate and a candidate whos a threat to democracy. And so i think the most we can hope i mean, the most we can hope for from parties is that they deliver at the very least mediocre candidates. [laughter] okay . And, or you know, so at some level had so i think, you know, maybe there was the process of selecting hillary, or you know, was not the process thats not the outcome that people wanted. But it was, had she become president , wed be in a different situation than we are now. So i think from my view the real core of the problem is to think about how did a demagogue figure get through this Obstacle Course. And thats, at the end of the day, the biggest threat to our democracy. We can debate about, you know, policy differences between, you know, the left side of the Democratic Party, the right side of the Democratic Party or even between somebody like mitt romney and the Democratic Party. But these are policy debates. These are the kinds of debates we should be having. We shouldnt be having debates about is this person a threat to democracy. So this is why if i have to choose, you know, its a balancing act. You want gatekeeping but this may also, you know, generate candidates that people dont like. In some ways, thats part of the democratic game. Hi. Thanks, that was great. Sounds like weve got lots of good examples of democracies that died that map well on to what were experiencing. Have you also found examples of democracies that were terminally ill but, like, turned it around and serve as a playbook from here on out . Is. [laughter] yeah, thats a great question. I would not call u. S. Democracy terminally ill. We looked again, getting back to the les question about gatekeeping, there have been, i mean, its been a long time and most of us have seen very little of this in our lifetime. Its been a long time since there were numerous extremist antidemocratic candidates and parties floating around. But go back to the 1920s and 30s. Maybe daniel should be answering this question because this is what he works on. And there were a lot of them. And many, many, several important european democracies were destroyed by, as daniel described in his talk, by the rise of extremist candidates and parties almost invariably in alliance with mainstream politicians. But there were democracies that avoided that fate. There were democracies where conservative parties said no and refused to strike up even if it was electorally beneficial or they complainted that it might be electorally beneficial. Conservative parties kept extremists at a distance. One of them is belgium, another one is finland. Those are two cases in which extremists were kept at bay in an extremely polarizing period in the 20s and 1930s, but democracy survived at least until the nazis arrived in belgium. Yeah. So if you want to hear more about the stories, buy the book. We tell Great Stories about belgium and finland. This is maybe less hopeful, but theres cases of democracies being rebuilt after trauma. So we also tell stories about the rebuilding of chilean democracy after pinochet. And, you know, its not automatic that these processes of redemocrattization would take place. Certainly, these are cases and experiences where people only overcame their differences in the face of trauma, you know, major trauma. And so the question is, you know, can we learn from those cases . I think we can. But can we learn from those cases without having to undergo that trauma ourselves. Im going to make one more comment about the terminally ill thing. I mean, that was a good question x i didnt mean to make light of the issue. We, again, i dont think that american democracy is termally ill, but terminally ill, but all of us, including me, have throughout our lives made the mistake, i think, of taking the stability of american democracy for granted. We are an old democracy, were a successful democracy, were a stable democracy, so most of us havent worried about it. And our politicians, our pundits, our media dont think much about the consequences of really reckless, irresponsible behavior. And thats a mistake. Because democracy can die. So even if were not terminal right now, its clear that there are warning signs, its clear that our democracys not functioning the way it should, its clear that there are threats on the horizon. And so thats why its really important that we take lessons, one, from democratic failures but also as the question implied, from cases that managed to turn things around. I always think that theres, like, two forms of capitalism here. We have capitalism in the cambridge and new york city and l. A. , but its a whole different form of capitalism in the rust belt. And as somebody whos had to drive around the country a lot and have driven to ohio back and forth, i dont know, maybe 15, 20 times in the last ten years, and i would go to these country areas and the back roads, and i would see all of this poverty. And its disconnected poverty. And i would see all the, you know, problems with addiction and, you know, opiate, and id say, wow. And id come back to cambridge and id say is do you know whats going on . Im from new york state, do you know whats going on in ohio . They would say, no, we have no idea. And id say you will at some point. So is i wasnt surprised at all by Donald Trumps election because of the anger that i saw in the rust belt. And its something youre not even mentioning, the money. And, you know, i always think its the money, stupid, you know . Theyre not making as much money, the economy isnt doing well, and theyre completely ignored by the powers that be. So is thats [applause] why arent you bringing up the money . Yeah. No, that youre right, we didnt mention this in our talk. In the book we do have a description. I think youre absolutely right. Another way to put the point that youve made is a driving force of this is rising levels of inequality, and were currently living, as you all know, in a period of inequality unmatched since anytime the late 19th century, early 20th century. So this is something that has certainly made our politics much more vulnerable to these kinds of upsurge, and this is a global phenomenon. Its happening everywhere in advanced chem crasses. So democracies. So one extra point i would add to this and how this ties into the argument weve been making so far is that its the combination in many ways of this Rising Economic inequality and increasingly Diverse Society that makes the politics of backlash so dangerous and so tempting for politicians to take advantage of. And so when groups, particular groups are targeted because of this rising disaffection with the economy because, you know, theres good reasons to be disaffected from the economy, but it takes the form of antiimmigrant sentiment and so on. And one of the, you know, kind of experiments, mental experiments i sometimes imagine is, you know, had the Voting Rights act and the Civil Rights Act which passed in the 1960s as well as Immigration Reform which passed in the 1960s, had this all happened in the late 40s, say, and 50 years of robust Economic Growth followed from this, we might not have we wouldnt have experienced the same kind of antagonisms that were experiencing today. So what, in fact, happened our real history is these reforms passed, helped democratize america, and within several years the Global Economy shifted and it was a slow todown in the Global Economy. So its a combination of these dynamics, i think, that have left us in a vulnerable position. And this is something the democrats can do, right . The democrats have really dropped the ball over the last quarter century on inequality. Democrats, like centerleft parties elsewhere, are supposed to be the party of the little guy, theyre supposed to be the party of redistribution. And since the early 1990s this has been basically off the agenda of the Democratic Party. And so is one thing that the democrats can do is actually push seriously for policies to recontribute wealth. Which really redistribute wealth. Weve had 16 years of democratic administrations in the last quarter century that have done almost nothing to combat a steady rise in income inequality. Well [applause] i think you may have just answered my question. St just you start, you describe what were undergoing now as polarization which kind of implies, you know, in the logic of it that both poles are equally at fault, equally extreme. And, you know, and yet as you just mentioned we have one of the poles which, you know, whose leadership, you know, is now described as too extreme for them. Policies that are very popular with their base and which were mainstream democratic policies, politics in the 70s like just a living wage, a minimum wage thats a living wage or expanding access to medicare. So i was going to ask you to comment on that, but maybe you just did. [laughter] we argue very clearly in the book that this is an asymmetric polarization. This is a polarization thats being driven by an extremist Republican Party. I think the evidence behind that is pretty clear. You know, and something that people have asked us about this on the republican side and say, well, the democrats, you know, have some blame to share, you know . We emphasize in the book and we think the historical record suggests it began with the republicans, but at some level its important to debate the history to understand whats going on. Were in now a situation where theres the threat that both sides, theres the threat of a spiral. In terms of abiding by the procedures and norms of democracy, thats what we worry about looking forward. Yeah. One of the things you guys mention towards the end of the book is how if you look around the world throughout history, there havent been too many cases of a democracy with a nonhomogeneous population being successful, you know, with moral and racial equality. And, you know, that kind of shocked me, you know, at first. And then i started thinking about it. Do you think maybe with the u. S. , is the u. S. Too big, is it too diverse, is there too much going on to really tap into that, have a functioning democracy in that way . [laughter] so heres my ray of hope. [laughter] one of the reasons why we, i mean, we actually think that the democracy that we built in this country really beginning in 1965 is pretty unique and pretty special. It combines an old and effect i constitution effective constitution with an experiment, at least important steps towards or racial equality in a Diverse Society. Which is almost unique in the world. And i actually think that i personally think that the combination of still very strong Democratic Institutions with a history of at least some success in ethnic assimilation and integration, we for all of the horrible performance of this country and this society with issues of race and at times treatment of immigrants, i think a pretty good case can be made that everybody else has done worse. I think if theres a country that has a shot in the decades to come at establishing itself as a truly multiethnic democracy, its ours. In the last election cycle, it was clear that people on both sides of the aisle felt very disenfranchised, that their preferences were not being taken into account and were not making a difference at the end of the day. I was curious if you could comment on this, and something that maybe you didnt commenten on was the amount of money in politics and corporate interests and the way that those potentially have led to some of that disenfranchisement or maybe in your research you looked at some countries that have more than two parties or that rely on referendums and other kind of Democratic Institutions for people to be able to have an impact at the national level. Yeah. So very good question. I think youre right that there is evidence its not just the United States, its across, again, advanced democracies. Theres growing disaffection with mainstream Political Parties, and parties are transforming all around the world. I mean, theres new parties springing up in spain, the current governing party in spain is about to collapse, and theres new parties. And in italy as well, so all around the world. And this comes from some deep sense that democracies arent delivering. So, you know, what is this driven by, again, theres lots of factors at work. Economic inequality is certainly one part of this. But think also in the United States in particular, Political Parties are supposed to express peoples interests and preferences about politics, and theres a disconnect. And i think part of the problem is that parties have been hollowed out, to a large degree. We think of parties as being very strong, but american Political Parties are quite weak. Theyve lost control of money, and theyve lost control of the message. So with the opening up of campaign finance, this means that outside groups are able to shape the political agenda in ways that normal citizens cant, number one. And number two, with the transformation of media, theres a way in which parties, you know, newspapers used to be named after parties, you know . The press democrat. There was a way in the which parties and media were closely connected, so voters identified with newspapers, with parties, but theres a way in which parties have lost control over debate. And so theres a disconnect then as a result of this. So i think, again, i mean, this comes back to a theme id mentioned before. Political parties are an invention of the late 19th century. They need to be reinvented for our current age. Professor ziblatt, im in your current politics of europe class [laughter] and yesterday in lecture you mentioned that history can can e disguised as periods of punctuated equilibrium and we have moments where there are critical opportunities to make choices, and we end up on a specific path. Do you believe were still in that critical period, or are we already on a set path . Yeah. Good question. [laughter] dang harvard students. Yeah, right. [laughter] one of the things about this is that often its hard to know if ones in one of these moments. Its easier for historians to identify youre in a period of opening. I think, well, i think our political system runs on multiple streams. So theres certain things that are open, theres other things that are not. One thing thats very sticky is our constitution. Its very hard to change our constitution. People ask about the Electoral College and, you know, changing the senate, and, you know, theres all sorts of proposals that people can dream up of why our constitution is something we should just junk, but it turns out its very hard to change american Political Institutions in particular. So i think thats very sticky. I think something thats not sticky and something where there is a potential for opening now i dont know, steve may disagree on this, but a kind of realignment of the Political Parties. You know, we have these two parties. We kind of know what they stand for, but theres, you know, a sense in which, you know, increasingly i aevents attend events with moderate republicans where theyre talking to democrats and things are in flux when it comes to party realignment. And this has happened in American History where, you know, you have parties shifting in the 1960s, in the 50s, lincoln taliban the Republican Party, the mod lincoln began the moderate Republican Party. Theres all this flux, the idea of a third party coming along and challenging the two main parties, theres maybe more opportunity, more theres a bigger opening there than we might imagine. I dont agree with that. [laughter] but i can point to, let me point to, let me play an imaginary game and point to what might have been a critical juncture. Im very worried about the way that our party system, the dynamic of our party system today in which the republicans represent a declining White Christian, very homogeneous White Christian what used to be majority, now minority. I think as long as that dynamic holds, eventually this will get them into electoral trouble. Nobody knows exactly when theyll become the california Republican Party. If they continue, itll happen, but they can do a lot of damage between now and then. So its really problematic that they got on this path. After losing the 2012 election, the republican Party Leadership thought very seriously about what it could do to become a more diverse party. They did this autopsy, and they thought seriously about making the changes that we argue critical to reducing polarization in this country. Theyre also becoming a country that deals with a 21st century Diverse Society, that can live in such a society. Because, as daniel correctly pointed out, there is no republican Party Leadership. Its completely hollowed out. Theres no establishment that can impose that vision, impose that lesson, impose that line. It was just a holdedout party that donald trump was able to grab and pull in another direction. Had they actually had a real Party Leadership that could impose that vision of a more diverse party, we would not be hurtling in the direction were hurtling today. Youve addressed this somewhat, but when the framers were putting this government together, they looked at this issue of democracies going all the way back to the beginning of time. I guess the greeks or whatever. And they determined that the biggest threat to this particular democracy would be the growing inequality between the haves and have nots. So as i said, you seem to have addressed that, but you didnt mention it in your lecture, so thats why i ask the question. Youre saying this government, this democracys not terminally ill, but at the same time you suggest that the system of checks and balances is possibly not e equal to the challenges and threats to the system. So im just wondering if you feel the time has come for maybe a new Constitutional Convention, or do you think thats going too far . Yeah. So i think yeah, good question, thank you. I think our checks and balances, some of our checks and balances are working better than others. So i think our Legal Systems working quite well, our judiciarys working quite well. Social institutions, media is working as robustly, you know, New York Times subscriptions are up and so on. [laughter] our congress is not working well. I mean, our congress is supposed to be a guard dog of our democracy and constrain the power of the president , and the guard dog has turned into a lap dog. [laughter] and so this is, its not serving its constitutional role, and i think part of this is driven by polarization and the radicalization of the Republican Party in which the congress is turned into a shield for the president when its the same party and a weapon when its the other party. I dont think that we should have, i mean, im nervous, and this is movement for a Constitutional Convention, but i sort of would want to issue a warning about this. I mean, theres lots of discussion, it turns out, for proposals for a Constitutional Convention where states could propose call for a Constitutional Convention, and theres a different route through which a Constitutional Convention could be called. What makes me nervous about this is you have to imagine whos going to be at the table, and what kind of agenda is going to be pushed. And i think, you know, its possible that the things we could imagine ought to be changed in our national government, but if you kind of open the door, who knows what will come out of this. So i think its a very dangerous kind of prospect. That said, i think there is the opportunity for an institutional kind of being creative with institutions, but i think a lot of that should take place at the state level, and thats actually whats happening. In california, for instance, there was a kind of redesign of the way that electoral districts are drawn. Rather than having state legislature do this so they just gerrymander seethes for themselves, a neutral administrative body was set up for themselves. These types of experiments are taking place in maine, maybe where this kind of process should begin. Im from the philippines, and when you [inaudible] you could easily conclude the warning signs that you were talking about is pretty much present in the behavior of, for example [inaudible] so my question or my interest is does your research or your book have insites to offer in insights to offer in terms of dealing or responding to our context where political systems or Political Parties are weaker compared to, for example [inaudible] of the United States . Thats a great question. We dont have a lot of solutions in terms of how to save democracies in crisis. I think if i did, id have a better paying job. [laughter] the, i mean, you know, philippines is a country of, as you said, weak Political Parties and relatively weak institutions. So a demagogue with a weak commitment is not going to be a happy, theres no happy ending is what im trying to say. A demagogue with a weak commitment to Civil Liberties and to constitutional norms can do a heck of a lot more damage a lot more quickly in the philippines than in the United States. Because the sort of robust judiciary and press i mean, its not extremely weak in the philippines, but its much weaker than here. So a president can do much more damage much more quickly. It takes robust opposition particularly when institutions are weak. Really the only way of, the only, the only way of stopping them is through society. It takes Civil Society, takes opposition parties, trade unions, human rights groups, people power to stop an abusive president. Were a bit over time, so thisll be our final question of the evening. [inaudible conversations] so i was in gov20 with you last semester, professor levitsky, and now im in politics with you, professor ziblatt gutton for punishment. [laughter] you talked a lot about the incentives that politicians and parties and voters have for certain actions that they take, and when you were talking about how one of solutions for the polarization would be for the Republican Party to stop representing mainly the sort of White Christian that you, like, group that used to be in majority, what incentives do you think people have in the party to do that . Because it seems that im not able to think of any sort of events that could spark that. It seems that before it was historical events like you mentioned the Civil Rights Movement that sort of diversified Party Affiliation across, you know, religions and ethnicities and race, so i was wondering thats a great question. First and is foremost, it would take an electoral spanking. The problem right now is that the current Republican Party strategy has got them in control of the presidency, the senate, the house of representatives, 30plus governors mansions, and theyre about to have pretty solid grip on the Supreme Court as well. So it seems to be to working pretty well. Its actually not working as well as it seems. Theyve lost the popular vote in two of their victories, two of the last four victories. But, and they know, in fact, that this electoral strategy, that what is essentially a raciallyconservative appeal cannot win in the medium run. They know that very well. This is one of the arguments that david frum is making in his book. The republicans are very aware of the fact that they are either that if they continue down this path, they face a very, very tough electoral future which is one of the reasons that theyre starting to cheat. [laughter] no, thats david frum. Its not me. So the clearest incentive is to lose badly. You know, had Hillary Clinton won by ten Percentage Points the 2016 election, there would be a lot of soul searching going on in the Republican Party. The problem is that, again, the republicans dont really have a party. They dont really have a national Party Leadership. This is a decentralized party, and in much of the country many of the Congress People and the senators that are coming to washington are coming from deep red states or districts. So even if the Republican Party takes a thumping at the national level, theyre still going to do quite well in much of the territory. And so its going to take an electoral beating thats so bad that it pervades not only North Carolina and virginia, but south carolina. And we are basically out of time, so ill have to ask for a very, very brief question and a very, very brief answer. [laughter] i just wanted to say that i think everybody ought to realize and think about the points you raise in your book. But in particular, the congress of the United States needs to read it and think about it. [applause] i dont know the best way to do this, but if somebody wants to load up a cargo plane with a few thousand copies of how democracies die, i would be glad to contribute to the effort. [laughter] [applause] we can give a short answer and say we agree. [laughter] thank you. Thanks very much. [applause] thank you to our speakers this evening. Thank you to all of you for being here. As i said in my introduction, we have books available for purchase outside the doors. If youd like to get a book signed tonight, you can line up down this aisle to my right, and the signing will be right up here on stage in just a moment. Thank you for coming. [inaudible conversations] youre watching booktv on cspan2, television for serious readers. Heres our prime time lineup. At 7 15 p. M. Eastern from the recent Rancho Mirage writers festival, authors and historians jon meacham, Margaret Mcmillan and Douglas Brinkley discuss their favorite historical features. At eight in their newest book, a recounting of the nixons Administration Efforts to apprehend timothy learly after his escape from prison in 1970. Then on afterwards at 9 p. M. , former u. S. Trade negotiator and former Democratic Senate staffer ira shapiro argues that the u. S. Senate has lost its political center. Hes interviewed by former Senate Majority leader tom daschle. At ten, william remple talks about his biography of movie industry mogul kirk yes corps january and we wrap up with emily dufton with a history of marijuana in the United States. That all happens tonight on booktv, television for serious readers. I had three criteria, and the criteria were, one, the person had to be important or teach something important about the valley. And, two, they had to have a truly interesting story. I mean, for fun i almost exclusively read fiction, and i think that a narrative arc especially when youre talking about something as complicated as this technology and the whole notion of building a company, to be able to take a person and tell their story was important. So i needed people who had interesting stories. And then it was important to me to have people who were not as well known. I mean, when the book opens, i talk about this party that i went to a long time ago, and there was the, i think he was the cio of a tech company with a very, very famous celebrity ceo. And this person started singing a little song, and only her ricks to the song were lyrics to the song were i did all the work, he got all the credit. [laughter] and i think that, you know, innovation is a team sport. And the analogy that i usually use is of a baseball game where the pitcher has thrown a perfect game because anyone who was at that game sort of watches in awe, you know, as the first baseman just steps on the bag at the last minute, and the outfielders going to and the catcher is making this, the perfectly calibrated calls. But the only thing that goes in the history book is that the pitcher threw a perfect game. And the, you know, anyone who is honest about how they succeeded in the valley is going to tell you it was a team effort. That was true then, that is true now. And so i really wanted a way to tell the story of the people who were just outside the spotlight but without whom the person in the spotlight wouldnt have been there. Lets tell one of those stories. Which one do you want to start with . Sorry, mic. [laughter] how about mike . So ill tell the story of mike, always dangerous when the persons sitting in the audience, because they can jump up and correct you. So i think that a lot of people in this room know who mike is. But as ive gone around to other places asking who knows who mike markel is, not very many people do which is always a surprise to me. When people know about the founding of apple, they know about the two steves, steve jobs and Steve Wozniak in the garage in 1976. And what they dont know is that there was somebody else who owned a third of apple, and that was mike markela. And the way that mikes story came to me, luckily, we had gotten friendly after my first book which was a biography of a really important friend to mike. And so since i do a lot of history, i knew that there were so many of these little startup Computer Companies all over the valley. Also, i mean, all over the country, right . And they all had their brilliant engineer not as brilliant as wos, perhaps, and their brilliant marketing guy, not as brilliant as jobs, perhaps, but what was it that made apple come up . The more i looked into it, the more i realized and he would say, well, there were a lot of people. Thats true, there were a lot of people. One of those people was mike because when you look at apple in 1976, steve jobs was 21 years old. He had 17 months of business experience in his entire life, and that was working as a tech for atari for al alcorn, as a matter of fact. [laughter] and Steve Wozniak, he wanted to stay an engineer at hewlettpackard. He didnt want to start a company. So how did those two guys end up the youngest company ever to hit the fortune 500 . And the answer is that mike came in, and he brought with him a cadre of people from the microchip industry. I mean, including gene carter who i know is here. And if you look at apples s1, you know, when they went public, you had good night you had the president , the vp manufacturing, the vp marketing, the vp sales, the cfo, the vphr, you had several of the major investors like sequoia all brought in by mike through his connections to the semiconductor industry. And that, to me, is a story that is just remarkable that people didnt know that. And it goes back to what i was saying about the importance of building on what came before. I mean, how foolish would it have been to feel for those two guys to feel like, you know, were going to do it ourselves . Because everyone else around them tried to do it themself, and they didnt have the same success. You can watch this and other programs online at booktv. Org. And many other authors. Later in march its the virginia festival of the book in characterization,. [inaudible conversations] all right. Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome