Its been around for a long time and computers didnt cause it. But when people die because of a tweet, there has to be a tech solution. Expanding the marketplace of ideas is all well and good to welcome you to brookings this morning. I see lots of old friends in the audience and its a pleasure to invite you to the event with randall schriver. Weve been fortunate to engage him over the past decade. While hes been serving in the Administration Since 2017, and, randy, thank you for your service to our country and the Important Role you play in this administration. Randall schriver was appointed as assistant secretary of defense on january 8, 2018. Previously having served as Deputy Assistant secretary for east asian and Pacific Affairs under which portfolio he covered, china, taiwan, hong kong, and australia, all the easy stuff. Earlier he held the role of chief of staff to the deputy secretary of state and also served as an active duty Naval Intelligence officer. Beyond his government career, randy has been a leading thinking on a range of issues that play into the u. S. china relationship over two decades and hes been a lrobust voice. With that background, we couldnt ask anybody better to join us today on assessing chinas role in the world. I think we all recognize now that china has emerged as a global actor. Its cast aside its strategy of hide and abide and is seeking influence not only in asia, but well beyond. The effort of this project is to capture a baseline segment of that trajectory of that role. It draws on our deep bench of experts, but also pulls in the expertise of our institutions, security, strategy, regional, technology to try to capture the full scope of chinas activity. It will focus on several key areas of research, chinas influence in critical regions. Today well have two sessions. Well have a panel that draws on three sets of the papers that are being launched today, a contributor to an early set of papers of young voices looking on the future of chinese policy, also looking at the democracy drivers, and strategic competition, all of which are moderated by our team. Before i invite randy to the stage, it is of Course Campaign season which means that think tankers are trying to influence political campaigns as well as doing their day jobs and at brookings we disclose all of that. We can look at the bios. But its an important way to look at that. Of course we also have scholars working in the Trump Administration as well as with bide biden. Second, i would like to thank the Ford Foundation for its support of this project which has not only allowed us to do this research, but to communicate it broadly to the Scholarly Community and to policymakers who will use the evidence that we provide and have a baseline approach to china policy which i think we all understand will be a defining feature of defining american policy in the coming generations. And with that, let me welcome randy to the stage to give us some opening remarks. [ applause ] thanks, bruce. Thank you for the invitation to return to brookings and i appreciate being part of this rollout of this impressive project. Ive been following some of the papers that have already been released but hearing your twoyear plan to help us really bottom deep dive and really baseline this enormous challenge is really encouraging to know that youve got this project under way and thanks for allowing me to speak as a part of that. What i thought i would do is talk about our approach to china, our competition, and what i thought i would do is go into a little bit more detail on the fundamentals of this policy. A lot of people, you know, sort of jump right into were in strategic competition or a competitive environment without really talking about the fundamentals, what are we competing for . How is competition implemented . How is it different from confrontation or conflict . And if i could take a few moments to do a deeper dive and explain our perspective from the department of defense, i hope it would set the stage for this discussion. With respect to our strategic competition, we believe that it is a major element of our Overall National security strategy. We feel as though were in competition fundamentally because we have different visions, different aspirations, different views of what regional and Global Security architecture should look like. If youre familiar with our National Security strategy, National Defense strategy, and our dod indopacific strategy, you know we talk about a free and open indopacific. Our free and open indopacific is on principles that are widely shared and believe that theyre principles that benefit all countries if countries embrace them. These include respect for National Sovereignty no matter a countrys size, fair trade, rule of law, and rulesbased order and peaceful dispute resolution. We fundamentally believe each nation must be free to determine its own course and we believe that all countries can both benefit as well as participate. We observe that china under the leadership of the ccp has a different view who are developing the tools to pursue its vision and seems willing to accept more and more friction in pursuit of that vision. Were competing with china because we see chinas leaders have assessed that theyre in competition with us, both our ideas and capabilities, globally china seeks to shape a world consistent with its awetori authoritarian rules. Its less respectful for human rights and dignity and that they are even being to export some of these tools such as facial Recognition Software and surveillance capabilities to other countries who are learning from chinas governance model. Were concerned that china is applying pressure against other countries into pursuit of its vision. We observed china using influence operations to interfere in their domestic politics of countries using economic coercion, and weve seen recent examples of that, promoting state sponsored theft of technologies, exporting the most effective tools from its domestic tool kit for surveillance and potential use of for internal repression. We see them expanding a military presence oversee and expanding the one belt one Road Initiative and we see deploying advanced military systems despite pledges that they would not do so. In dod, we focus on the military component of chinas growing global activities and we take china at their word. They seek to be a world class military by 2049 and they are making progress toward that goal. Theyre seeking to erode u. S. Military advantages, theyre working to become a power in the indopacific region while under taking plans to sustain operations farther from chinese shores. We see china widening the operational reach to matter what its leaders consider to be the Global Nature of its interests. Press reporting indicates that china that has sought to expand its basing and access in the middle east, Southeast Asia and the western pacific. Xi jingping has called for a system to strengthen protection of its overseas interests. Chinas defense minister has sited its coordination with other countries. At the most fundamental and basic level, what were competing for is to sustain a position within the regional and International System which allows to protect a rulesbased order. All of this matters because if the ccp and china were to be successful in its authoritarian approach would happen, the world could look much different. States would have less control over their political decisions, institutions could become less independent and less effective, su the freedom of those bodies of water may be challenged. We could see a normalization of the lack of respect for individual and human rights, all of this protends a less free and less open and less stable of indopacific region. As i said, we view competition as being different than confrontation and conflict, a strategy with china is not meant to lead us to conflict. For the United States we seek to maintain competition as a stable deterrent. While we compete with china, our military to military contacts are aimed at reducing risks and promoting International Norms and standards. Well cooperate with china where our interests align while competing in a rulesbased framework. And we will continue to call out chinas behaviors that are counter to that he has ruledbased order. Dods response and as i said, changing our mind set, we seek to regain the advantage and play to our strengths. Our goal is to deter china from pursuing and to improve our capacity to deter. Meeting the china challenge requires this shift in our mindset. We are no longer in a period of overwhelming american dominance, but rather one in which our armed forces are fighting against nearpeer competitors who are fielding sophisticated capabilities. Instead of expecting to dominate our opponent, were learning to be contested through a fight. Our National Defense strategy in our indopacific strategy within the department focuses on a couple of pillars that will be key enablers for us to succeed. Namely the first two pillars of our National Defense strategy. The first line of effort, preparing a more lethal joint force, takes into account the scope and pace of our competitors ambitions and capabilities and prioritizes investment in moderning key u. S. Capabilities. O it looks to see how our force can be more resilient. Within my office, were also changing how we organize for long term strategic competition. In june, our deputy secretary approved the establishment of a new Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for china. The inward part being to help us drive alignment on china across the department as we carry out our National Defense strategy in its implementation. The second line of effort in our National Defense strategy is strengthening alliances and attracting new partners. Americans alliances and partnerships are a crucial and durable available that no other country can match. For countries that value a ruled based order, we can demonstrate our support by the actions we take. Our alliances and partnerships are important for many reasons. Militaries that train together and trust one another are more adaptive, agile and survivable. The department is expanding planning, requests for u. S. Military sales to deepen inoperatorability and strain for combat missions in exercises. We look to strengthen both traditional partners and relationships and were working to integrate our National Defense strategy with japans National Defense guidelines and were also working very intently and seriously on important emerging relationships such as with india, singapore, indonesia, and vietnam. The u. S. Navy forced tested missions in our u. S. Maritime exercise last month. Were enhancing our engagement in areas such as the Pacific Islands to preserve a free and open order. And we have enhanced our engagement in the freely associated states and beyond in that record. Beyond the indopacific, the department is engaging allies and partners across the globe and we have brought the china challenge into our discussions in europe and the middle east, for example, china and others recognize our advantages and are actively looking to disrupt our alliances and partners in these key areas but we nonetheless see strong interest in greater alignment on these challenges from our partners. We are also exercising with our partners in real world operations to include enforcement of the sanctions against north korea. Japan hosts a command center of eight countries to include south korea, australia, canada, new zealand, the United Kingdom and france. Were also working in with our partners in the maritime spaces to include thesea, and are working with partners to build capacity through initiatives such as the Maritime Security initiative which has boosted key partners abilities and helped them conduct Maritime Security and awareness operations. Were also part of a whole of government approach, which is allied in partner centric in response to chinas expanding influence and coercion and their interest in acquiring and advantaging themselves in the hightech area. We have ongoing deep conversations with our allies about protection of the Innovation Base and about the risks associated with new technology such as 5g. To conclude the unfolding longterm strategic competition with china is the defining challenge of our generation, and we embrace that at d. O. D. Our current trajectory is largely driven by the ambitions and choices of the chairman and the ccp elite. The acquisitions of capabilities to apply towards those ambitions and policy choices and actions which demonstrate active pursuit of those ambitions. We remain open to changing this trajectory and it is inclusive and affirmative for any country, china included who choose to support the enduring principles embedded in our vision. We should be clear we do understand these to be consequential times and consequential decisions must be taken. The costs associated with complacency could be extremely high, but the benefits of competing well and competing to prevail are equally high. With that, i look forward to the conversation with ryan and the questions and discussion that may follow. Thank you. [ applause ] well, first of all, thank you for being here with us. Thank you for providing a rich and nutritious overview of the work that is being done in your area of responsibility at the pentagon. I want to give the audience a chance to jump in because i know there are a lot of questions they would like to pose to you. Before i turn it over to this distinguished group, i did want to ask you a few scene setting questions. First, you talked a bit about the u. S. China Military relationship. I was wondering if you could just sort of take us into the engine room a little bit of that. How is it working, and is it being insulated from ups and downs in the overall relationship, or is it a derivative effort . We continue to hear from our chinese interlocutors that they want the relationship to be a stabilizing force in the overall relationship. We welcome that, so we have maintained robust level of engagement to include high level engagement. I think 2018 was the first year on record where there was both a sec dev visit to china and a counter part visit in the same calendar year. By that metric our engagement remains robust. Our focus is on how we engage with china in this context of overall competition, so that places a premium on confidence Building Measures, on safety of operations, so things like the military maritime consul tative agreement, other measures that help us ensure a safe operating environment while we know we operate in close proximity to one another with greater frequency, how we make sure theres no unintended incident or accident. So that continues. I plan to go to china next week, so our policy talks continue. Our emphasis on confidence Building Measures and safety continues. So there are pro toe bagss, but i see many oldtimers in the audience. Were more insulated from the political ups and downs than we used to be, and i think thats a good thing. I agree. Thats great. Strategic competition was a theme of your presentation. Its also one of the themes of this event today. Can you talk to us a little bit about where that competition is felt most acutely in your daytoday work and also where you expect your successor ten years from now, 2029 to feel the competition most acutely . So i would say theres an inside aspect to that and then an external aspect. The inside aspect is were doing a lot to drive the defense enterprise into alignment for this longterm competition. I mentioned the standing up of a new daz d. A lot of that is to help us internally with the joint staff and the services as they make their respective decisions to make sure that its appropriate for the competition and the environment that we see. The external piece is, again, working with allies and partners. We do think that thats an asymmetrical advantage that just cant be matched, and of course also some contested areas, South China Sea, some relationships that might be contested where china has ambitions where we want to invest more. So i mentioned the Pacific Islands and parts of Southeast Asia. So its playing out, were sort of building the airplane as were flying it, if you will, because were in a competitive environment now, but to get to your second part of your question, i think the work inside the enterprise is the work that will continue for quite some time because the nature of our business. We buy things, you know, big programs that last decades, and decisions now and five, ten years from now will have lasting impact. So we want to be investing wisely. I mentioned some of the new domains and areas of focus in my remarks, but its a dynamic environment that could change depending on the directions that china goes. I mean, that they will largely be a pacing competitor for these decisions, and we have to be dynamic and flexible and make those wise decisions along the way. Yeah. You mentioned alliances. You have built a reputation as being a Strong Alliance manager, an advocate of strengthening our alliances. How are we doing . Well, i think we have a very Strong Demand signal from our partners. They want largely well, to generalize it, we see a lot of interest in stronger defense and security relations with the United States. I think were being resourced for that, and resourced not only in budget terms but how our senior most leaders are spending their time and attention. Secretari secretary esper just took his first trip. Secretary mattis did the same, so i think were making the investments. Weve got the demand signal as i said, and were trying to meet countries where they are. We have more advanced and mature alliances, so i mentioned japan and the work thats doing to align our National Defense strategies and what the implementation of those will look like. We have emerging partners who are not allies but a place like vietnam, we pull at 92 favorable as a country in vietnam. Ive been to vietnam five times. Ill be going next week, and then ill return with the secretary, so that will be seven trips to vietnam in two years, if thats any metric. S to i think were doing okay. You know, weve got a region that china plays very prominently in, and they have the ability to use economic weights and their own diplomacy. It is a competitive environment, and then we have, you know, a different approach to issues like trade, which also i think some of our partners are trying to get their hands around and understand the trajectory of that. So you know, thats part of the environment we work in, but i wont give aus a grade, but i would say overall were doing pretty well on the partners and allies front. Good. You mentioned polling, vietnam is a bright spot, 92 favorable ratings for the United States. Other allies have a slightly different picture. Pew polling in our allies in the region has shown that support or favorable ratings for china has gone down considerably, but for the United States has gone down as well. This is evidenced primarily in australia, but in other places as well. How does that affect your daytoday job . Well, some of it is understandab understandable. I mean, when you talk about burden sharing, thats a stress in the partnerships that will sometimes be reflected in public sentiment. But its something thats important to the president , and i think previous administrations as well, but i think this administration has been more aggressive in trying to pursue equitable burden sharing. Some of the countries, you know, were going australia, i dont know the exact numbers, but i would guess were going from high 80s favorable to low 80s, high 70s favorable. You can fact check me on that. Some places like the philippines, you know, we have a different kind of leader there whos who makes a lot of public commentary on the United States, yet we remain over 80 favorable in the philippines. Maybe were down historically, but still quite high. So its an important metric, but its not the only metric. We need to pursue, you know, the president s goals on burden sharing and things of that nature as were doing what we think we need to do to compete with china. Right. While were on the topic of alliances, japan, korea is a relationship that appears to be in a downward spiral at the moment. Youve spoken publicly about this recently. Can you just give us a sense of where we are, where the bottom is in this free fall, and what role the United States can or should play in seeking to bring our allies back together . Well, i was meeting with a prominent chinese scholar, i wont say his i wont mention his name, but he remarked on the growing tensions between japan and south korea, and he said chinas very pleased about this. And i said i said, well, why is china pleased about this. He said isnt it obvious . So i think what we need to continue to remind our allies is that the countries that are benefitting from their tension is china, russia, north korea, and thats not a good place to be. We at the Defense Department do maintain trilateral relations. I believe this morning, at least well, i wont comment on that because im not sure it actually came off. But we will soon have an opportunity at oscoeo defense min sta secretary esper will meet. That happened at shangri la with then secretary shanahan. We have regulatory action at my level. We last met on may 9th in seoul. It was one of the days where there was a missile launch, missile test, and the south Korean Defense minister called the delegation leaders up into his office, previously unplanned, and said this is why we need to strengthen our defense cooperation and trilateral work, and he said it in japanese, by the way, the south Korean Defense minister a japanese speaker who studied at the japanese war college. So were trying our best to insulate the defense and security relationship from the political tensions that obviously are present. I think one of the reasons we spoke out on jasomia is because that was spilling into the security trilateral work in an unhelpful way, but overall i think were doing okay. Its a tough environment for the defense ministries respectively in tokyo and seoul because of where their Political Leadership is on these things. But i think we ultimately are going to be driven together because of the prevailing security interests and security environment. I dont know where rock bottom is or how much time it could take, but i do see so much that pull us together. If you give the list of things that the rok and japan themselves would acknowledge they agree on, rules based order, respect for human rights, and human dignity, work in Southeast Asia on health issues, development assistance. You know, the list is quite long, so well play a role if we can. I mean, theres some suggestion we havent been engaged enough at a high level. I can tell you secretary esper in both capitals spent considerable time on this. Secretary pompeo has, former National Security adviser bolton before he left office spent time on this. And were open to other ways we could be a Constructive Party here. What typically happens is one country asks us to go straighten out the other country and tell them why theyre wrong, so should we be a more active mediator . If both sides can agree on what that looks like and if it could be a constructive role. But were open to finding ways to help bring the two sides closer together. If i could just ask one more question, ask thennd then i wil it over to our colleagues here. Taiwan is an issue youve spent considerable time on. Youve thought about deeply, youve worked on it for many years. Right now beijing is intensifying pressure on taiwan, particularly in the run up to a president ial election in january. What should the u. S. Response be to that intensifying pressure . Well, i think weve got the framework through the taiwan relations act, which gives a lot of flexibility to enhance certain aspects of our approach. Weve made some decisions recently on security assistance, that was consistent with the law and the growing threat from china. I think this is a particularly tense period because of the election, so were doing certain things to support a fellow democracy in carrying out a free, fair, and noncoerced election, so theres, you know, i think very little doubt that the chinese will seek to meddle in that election. Theyve tried it in each of taiwans previous elections in 1996 it was missile exercises. In 2000 it was a finger wagging lectu lecture. This time i think its a little more sophisticated with the use of social media and cyber means. So were supporting taiwan as a fellow democracy interested in seeing free, fair, uncoerced lexe elections particularly on the cyb cyber piece. Over the longer stretch well need to continue to be that security partner, good economic partner, and preserve space for taiwan to keep its unique status until the two sides are in a better place to work things out between them. Thank you. Id like to turn it to open now to any questions. Well take two or three at a time. Well start out with this gentleman with the tie. Can you help me remember if were doing two or three at a time. Dave lawler from axios. You said in your remarks that china recognizes the advantages that the u. S. Has in its alliances and partnerships and is seeking to undermine or counter that. I would wondering if you could expand on that idea, thanks. Thank you. If we could go to the gentleman in the back. Thank you. Secretary with china, the agency of hong kong, and assistant secretary, did you watch the web live of the military parade in beijing today . Whats your takes on that . Thank you. Okay. And lets take one more question from this lady with the red sweater. From radio free asia, and i have a question on north korea. The United States and north korea are going to resume the negotiations this saturday, and how would you assess the u. S. China Cooperation on getting north korea to give up the nuclear programs, and well, actually, the Chinese Foreign minister in his United Nations speech mentioned about the sanctions relief to north korea, so how do you assess the u. S. , China Cooperation on north korea . Thank you, so we had a question about north korea, military parade and alliances. Just in order, on military alliances, it relates to the comment that i conveyed from the chinese scholar that china benefit when is theres tension between our allies and tension between us and an ally. And as a result well seek to drive wedges and find those opportunities. A lot of times its through their economic weight. A lot of times its about, you know, in the information space, theres quite a bit about the United States being, you know, an unreliable partner, a capricious power who, of course, will be drawn back into the middle east, and you know, this interest in the region is fleeting and so, you know, they do it in a variety of ways. You know, i think thats just part of the overall competitive environment and why it doesnt bother me as an assistant secretary that places a premium on our Alliance Relationships and providing that reassurance and explaining where the benefit is in continuing a Strong Alliance and keeping it moving forward. Thats fine. Thats a burden i carry with no hesitation. The military parade or the national day events, i went home and spent time with my four kids and family. I did not watch it. Im seeing some reports on it, and it seems like theres an impre impressive display, and its meant to send a signal, i suppose internally and externally, so well do the postgame analysis on it, but i think its in line with expectations. And then the last question was about. North korea. North korea and chinas cooperation in particular. I think as under secretary said in public, china can be do a letter better on sanctions enforcement and cooperating with us in an overall effort to get north korea to the negotiating table in a constructive way. Weve seen some slippage on sanctions enforcement, and we are willing to work with china to strengthen that enforcement effort. Ive said this probably people have heard this story, but secretary shanahan, then acting secretary, went to shangri la and he presented minister of defense way with a gift. He said minister, i have a gift for you. He was very pleased with that, and then he handed him a picture book of north korean illegal illicit ship to ship transfers happening in chinese territorial waters. That was the gift, but the gift came with an offer. Wed be happy to work with you on curbing this. We can hand off targets at your 12 nautical mile sovereign territory, and hand it over to you. We can do something more robust if thats of interest. Wed like to work with china on this, but right now what we see is actually chinese vessels shadowing our forces that are trying to enforce the sanctions rather than enforcing the sanctions themselves. And so we hope that they can change the course of that and do a little better on sapgnctions enforcement. Thank you. We have time for two or so more questions. Well start with this gentleman here. David little with herding cats. Is china trying to insert its role into the conflict between pakistan india over the kashmir and how are they doing that . This woman over here. My names elise kim, im a reporter with voice of america. Assistant secretary, you said earlier that china was happy about frictions about south korea and japan, and my question is more about bilateral relationship between u. S. And south korea about the two countries have been suspending the large scale military exercise for long, and only south korea has requested the u. S. To expedite the handover of the more than half of the bases of the United States military in korea. Does that send wrong signal to china that the weakening sign of u. S. And south korea relationship . So we have a question on i think india, kashmir and south korea . Okay. Well, china has a longstanding relationship with pakistan, and they have growing competition with india. I think india seeks a stable relationship with china. We have an important visitor this week after Prime Minister modis big event in texas and then his work at the u. N. , foreign minister stayed behind and were having consultations with him, and weve talked about the relationship with china. They want a stable relationship with china, but theres no doubt that theres growing concern and competition there as well. So i think on a range of issues to include kashmir, china has leaned toward pakistan. Tha theyve supported pakistan in international, theres some discussion about whether kashmir would be taken up in the u. N. , china would support that. But in terms of something beyond that or more active, i dont see it. I think many have concerns that pakistan keep a lid on militant groups that might conduct cross border activities as a result of the kashmir decisions, and i dont sense that china wants that kind of conflict or would support that, so i think its mostly diplomatic and political support. With respect to south korea and our relationship, you know, it is a longstanding deep alliance, and we have issues from time to time, but its a very Strong Alliance. When we look at Something Like op con transfer, i mean, the remarkable thing is we are pursuing it and talking about it. I mean, were talking about one of the most dangerous areas in the world, and were actually involved in a process that will ultimately lead to south korea being in charge of combined forces that include u. S. Forces. Thats a pretty significant statement of confidence in the alliance. Now, we think it has to be conditionsbased because of the seriousness of the security environment there and the need to ensure that were as capable and prepared as possible. And so when we look at things like command structure, when we look at things like certain key capabilities for that contingen contingency, were going to be pretty insistent that south korea acquires those capabilities before we agree to the transfer and not be tied to any political calendar. On the exercises, we made some adjustments. President trump felt that it was important to make an adjustment to give our diplomats space to work on this issue. I would just tell you that, in a combined environment what you really want to stress and test is decisionmaking. How you in a crisis make decisions in a combined environment, and you can do that through simulation and war gaming and command post type exercises. We can train on all the other Mission Essential tasks in ways that are lower profile, some off the peninsula, some just smaller elements, training on the Mission Essential tasks, so i think if general abrams were here, in fact, i know if he were here because hes testified before congress, we have made these adjustments to give our diplomats space but still maintain high readiness, still ready to fight tonight, and still ready for the emerging challenges. You know, if there are further adjustments which im not aware theres any plan to do that, wed want to maintain the same kind of readiness, and again, its really focused on the decisionmaking combined environment where we need to be excellent and so i think were able to do that. Well, mr. Secretary, thank you for spending time with us this morning. I promised your staff i would allow you to return to your day job at 10 15. That time has come. On behalf of all my colleagues, thank you for giving us such a clear and valuable insight into whats happening in the region. Thanks, appreciate it. [ applause ] we will have our next panel join us on stage momentarily. Everyone thanks for being with us today. Im a fellow with our project on International Order and strategy, and also a center for security and emerging technology. We really have a stellar panel to reflect both on the remarks that you just heard from assistant secretary schriver, and also to talk a little bit more about chinas growing global influence. Were not going to have any prepared remarks. Were going to jump right in. But before i do, it is brookings, and i want to hawk the papers that we just published. So the papers that we published in this tranche of the project are focused on domain and strategic competition and then the domestic Drivers Behind some of chinas Foreign Policy moves, so among those papers today that i hope youll take a look at, we have dan byman writing about chinas approach to Counter Terrorism policy. Miko hanlan who is writing about china in the gray zone. He has a paper focused particularly on what escalation could look like in the sin ka cue islands. Kaitlyn tallmidge has written a book about Nuclear Competition between the United States and china. David dahler has a paper about chinas belt and Road Initiative, and mark harlan and leah dreyfus have written a paper about chinas overseas basing ambitions, and we have with us today chung lee who has written about xis transformation as a populist and what that means for chinas Foreign Policy. Jamie has written a great paper on the shift in chinas Legal Development and the growing role of the party in that, and then rush has contributed to a prior tranche in this series which was focused on continuity and change in chinas Foreign Policy and what role president xi has played in it. And so has audrey as well where her focus has been on economic state craft. So lets jump right in and rush, i want to start with you because i think a lot of current debate about the United States policy toward china and also how many other countries around the world are reacting to chinas rise really turns on what you think china wants, what kinds of resources and risk china is willing to wager to achieve some of those ambitions, which is essentially a debate about what many would call chinas grand strategy. And theres a lot of debate about what that grand strategy is. So i want to pose to you a question that has three parts. So the first is tell us first what the contours of that debate about chinas grand strategy look like. Second, what are some sign posts that we should be looking for, particularly in the domains of strategic competition that were focusing on today, whether thats in economic and Infrastructure Development or security competition or the clash of values, and third, picking up on some remarks that the assistant secretary made this morning, you know, he said the current trajectory of u. S. china relations is really being driven by president xi. Tell us a little bit about how xi has shifted chinas grand strategy if he has. Sure. The first question is basically about grand strategy. Its a pretty abstract term. I think we all kind of know what we mean when we use that term, i think of it, and i think many of us think of it as the coordination of multiple different instruments of state craft to advance an overarching strategic objective. That coordination is what makes grand strategy grand. That coordination is extremely hard to pull off. That coordination is undertaken by a country with a 12 trillion economy, rapidly modernizing military force, it has pretty significant implications. Thats what we mean by grand strategy. When you pull it off, you can reshape sort of global politics. There is a debate about whether china has a grand strategy, and i think that you really can divide that debate into two categories. On the one hand you have individuals who would say that it really doesnt have a grand strategy. I call them the skeptics. On the other side youve got people who might say it does, or the believers. The believers have not really attempted true persuasion, and the skeptics yet remain unpersuaded, and so why is that the case . We have had a lot of works come out recently arguing that china has a longterm plan. Theyre kind of more commercial works. Theyre kind of a little bit more glib. Theyre not really getting into chinese sources. Theyre not really looking at chinese behavior in a serious, rigorous way on the other side people say its just too complicated. We dont think china even knows what it wants. They dont have a clear process that makes it easy for them to implement whatever it is they do want. That theres vested interests that corrupt the pursuit of nationalist interests. Theres nationalism that occasionally prevents china from pursuing a more focused strategic set of objectives. I dont greep with all of those objections, but thats the current debate. How do we know whos right . How do we know if china has a grand strategy . First you look at how they think about strategies. Thats grand strategic concepts. Do they have a set of ideas about the ends, the ways, and the means to accomplish strategic objectives. Then you look at capability, can they pull it off . Its really hard to pull off a grand strategy. Do they have the ability to override vested interests, parochial interests et cetera. And finally you look at conduct. Are they taking action consistent with what we think those concepts are. I think across all three the answer is yes, and hopefully i can get into the weeds a little bit later. I want to answer the questions at the top level first. What would we expect to see if china really had a grand strategy, one question, one big debate is are its focuses primarily regional or increasingly global. Does china aspire to displace the United States globally . Thats a big question. I dont think its been adequately resolved. Its very difficult to resolve in any kind of empirical way. Increasingly theres evidence maybe theyre thinking globally. You see that in some of the china russia Security Cooperation thats gone global, not just in asia but the arctic, and additional cooperation that takes on allies of japan and south korea. You see that in some of their efforts to shape local institutions. You see that in the discourse of the party, which is now the number one funded topic within the think tank system in china. Theres all this circumstantial evidence suggesting theyre seeing things in a global light. We should look additionally in the financial space, are they going to seek to build Financial Systems or undermine the u. S. Dollar. Last point very quickly, how much of this is about president xi. In our past batch of papers we answered this very question, all of us independently, all of us coming to the same kind of conclusion. My personal view and its a strong view, if president hue gin tow had a third term, a lot of what were seeing now would continue. A lot of it rooted in actually the party and its own vision of how global order should be arranged, how the regional system should be arranged. What National Rejuvenation looks like, all of which has certain degrees of continuity. This is great entree i cant to your paper. You have said in your paper, there is a debate as rush just described about xis impact on Foreign Policy, but theres a broader debate about his standing within the Chinese Communist party. On the one hand hes clearly consolidated his power, giving himself lifetime tenure, writing himself into the constitution. As you point out on your paper, appointing supporters at the national and provincial levels of leadership, building a new populist brand and then focusing on Poverty Alleviation and the development of mega cities. But then on the other side of this debate, and you also have analysts like Richard Mcgregor who focus on the backlash to xis rule. Help us better understand this debate and including, you know, whether there are ways in which both elements of this debate could be correct. Well, rich is a good friend of mine, and hes a very respected scholar on chinese politics, wrote a fascinating book a while ago, called the party. His new book, i havent looked at the new book, but i read his article in foreign affair us. Now i think its fair to say i think richard probably agree with me, just as no one could hold the whole truth and the thing is not so much of black and white, you know, its a little bit of the complicated yac i think that we should avoid this kind of black white to a certain extent because based on different perspective. The title of my article i borrow e. E. Cummings, the term called the proregress. Its a combination of the progress and the regress. Actually, i got this word when i visit shanghai art exhibition, which was last year. I also was in that museum a few weeks ago. The title that is proregress to describe the art scene and also the ever changing world. And also interested in just an equivalent chinese term which was actually hardly used in chinese, you know, language. Its the term called yufu. Its based on the taoist mysterious dance. A dancer seems like its moving forward, but its simultaneously moving backwards and vice versa. Now i think this is very important from different peoples perspective, we look at the different assessments about xi jinping. Now this is also related with the harvard professor, robert putnam. He wrote about two decades ago, socalled two levels of chess games. Sometimes politicians, the state leaders playing the game simultaneously domestic chess and international chess. It does not make sense that if you look at one chess board to make perfect sense you look at the two chess boards, so thats the dynamic we should look at that. I agree with rush that xi jinping is a continuation with too much talk of the chinese kind of are trajectories. I think its a continuation. He is battling to a certain extent by the entire leadership, especially top leadership, and finally, i think its very, very important to understand that the xi jinping is also constantly adjusting environment. Its the action, reaction process, for example, that he has early on in his first term, he was quite kind of a conservative towards market, talk about the market and reform, but after that the countries dropped. But recently hes shifted back. It started from last november. Six points policy to promote, you know, the private sector, but of course he will continue to emphasize the state role and the state capitalism, et cetera. Now all these things tell us that its not just a simple like true or false, right or wrong, of course theres some facts but its important that we should also look at perspective beyond ourself, and be also aware that a lot of dynamic things going on. This is my take about the argument. In china certainly its a backlash. For some international, you know, communities also a backlash, but not necessarily for africa, latin america, middle east, some of the people see is really the opportunity to promote their development. So again, different perspective with different assessment. This should not be surprise for us, but its very, very important for our policymakers to appreciate that kind of different layers and simultaneously you see progress and regress in the case of xi jinping and to a certain extent in the case of china. So you do talk, though, about xi jinpings populous brand, so if we could just play out a little bit concrete ways thinking about some of the tensions in the u. S. china relationship right now, the trade war, reaction to the protests in hong kong, the detention of wiegurs in shin jan and the report that some of this may extend to other populations. How does this new brand of populism play out . What are the implications . Certainly these are real challenges. Real problems. I dont want to, you know, underestimate these challenges. Trade war first time hit chinese middle class and as the country were hit more, especially china steel put a lot of emphasis on exports. Now, be tut the interesting thi is xi jinping made some adjustment, in addition to what i said about promote private development, but also he played the card of e. U. And the u. K. And japan. There are at lo lot of Economic Development going on in that region. And also that china was probably rumor or true that the u. S. Power would stop the listing of chinese companies, but china really prepared, its like a science and technology, stock markets lists in shanghai quickly approve. So these are all preparations to deal with the trade war so that would give xi jinping some leverage. Most importantly i spend a lot of time in my article talk about also the contradictory move on one hand. Xi jinping, political elimination, not politic reduction is a promise. Xi jinping is lucky enough in the point to announce that by next year china will eliminate also use more policy mechanism to implement that. New Term Position policy elimination to really announce that hopefully that the next year he can announce that. This is making him very popular among poor people. Now he reach the middle class in the major cities, shanghai, and beijing, ands bay area and corridor. So if these places actually previously three, four years ago almost none of these leaders, top leaders, Party Secretary and cabinet or mayors, xi jinpings protege, now the majority of them are xi jinpings proteges. So carry out this kind of delivery on this trade front now as regard very much interested in whats going on in hong kong, these are big challenge, but nationalism underlies, for example, just to talk about hong kong, i think the chinese leader may not be as anxious as many of us here believe because why they should be too nervous. Yes, if its embarrassment, but now it sounds like theyre getting used to that, and because they certainly demonize the protesters, students, and blame United States, u. K. ,est behind this protests. Its not my view. Thats most of the people in china feel theres probably some evidence for that. And also its not beijings incompetent. There are some of the policymakers or leaders, and finally they also blame are the business tycoons. So the pressure for beijing is very, very low if you look at these kind of thins goigs going. They dont want to see that happening. Its already happening, they have the leverage, was it right or wrong. At the moment i do not think this kind of thing spread by china, populism, national you feel and the national parade. Certainly you can see theres a tremendous discussion in china talk about china coming of age, emerging as global power. United states wants to put china down. That interpretation more and more people believe. Previously intellectuals, especially prou. S. Intellectuals cynical, the majority of them are probably still cynical about that. You see the switch, some people now persuaded that some people in the United States want to put china down. So at this time they want to back xi jinping, back the leadership. So thats the situation we enter. This is a way to answer your question about the concern. So i think well have everyone will probably want to weigh in on some of hong kong and shin sun as well. I want to turn to you, i think most china specialists generally are aware that the party sits atop the state np chinin china,e story you tell in your contin contribution to our series, that under the president xi is being institutionalized in a fairly unprese unprecedented way through law, and you argue this is in some you warn that the partys heightened involvement without corresponding legal accountability and its continued resort to exceptional legal measures to deal with perceived enemies may undermine the stability of expectations at home and abroad that the party needs to succeed. Why are we seeing this move now and why are we seeing it under president xi . Thank you very much for the question and restating my thesis for me. I guess to start off with first is the continuity piece, which everybodys been talking about. There is a lot of continuity under xi jinping in the legal area, primarily when xi jinping came in, one of his very first priorities was to elevate what he calls rule of law socialist rule of law with chinese characteristics and the country in accordance with law or lawbased governance. He elevated the legal project to a higher position. He devoted a whole plen up to it as well. What weve seen under xi is a continuation of the push to modernize the legal system that would deliver rulesbased solutions in the majority of cases to both promote Economic Development and maintain social stability. On the other hand, what is new, and what i see as sort of a shift under xi jinping is an effort to then also legalize the status of the party. So the party is not registered under law. Some people argue it always has had constitutional basis because the partys mentioned in the preamble of the state constitution, which discusses the history of the prc, et cetera. But for most of the prc history, the party has not been mentioned specifically in the main body of the constitution, and this is one of the constitutional amendments that happened in march 2018 when they removed the term limits and also set up a new branch of government, the Supervision Commission to take on anticorruption responsibilities. They wrote the party into the constitution, the partys role in leadership to constitutionalize it. In addition theres been a push to write the party and its leadership role into more law and nationally applicable regulation. So prior to xis term, the party was mentioned in something called the legislation law from 2000. In 2005 actually they amended the company law to require that all companies private, foreign invested and stateowned have to establish and support party organizations. So that was already written into the company law, but under xi the party has begun to be written into of course the whole suite of National Security related laws that theyve come out with in xis first term, but also in state Council Regulations as well. So it sort of raises the question why is the party why do they feel they need to do this . The partys leadership as you note and all of us know has always been asserted over everything, but under xi hes made a big point of asserting and making very explicit the Party Leadership over everything including law and legal institutions. But again, as rush was talking about and chung as well, theres the words and then theres the reality and the practice. What ive also seen, and so in my area i began to sort of watch this. I follow the state Society Interactions et cetera, and i k begun to see again part writing itself in procedures for rule making. We always knew the Party Controls legislation. They control the National Peoples congress. They control the state council, but again, they felt it important now to write this actually into state law and make it very explicit, and beyond this theyve been asserting or institutionalizing their role in state governance in a whole variety of other ways that i go into excruciating detail in this paper, but it has to do with jointly issuing regulations with the state, the merger that happened just after the march 2018 National Peoples congress of serl state entities into party entities, the epitome of all this, is of course the status of this Supervision Commission which was given institutional status as a branch of government. Its given its own organic law, but in fact, is just the state face of the parties discipline inspection commission. So you have a lot of these more now merged parties, state bodies dual facing, but increasingly taking on state governance activities. And why is this concerning . As you point out, its because the party, even though theyre trying to legalize their position, theyre not accountable under law. So for example, if the party jointly issues a regulation with the state council, if its a state Council Regulation they have to go through notice and comment procedures. You know, the regulations are made public. People can go to court and sue to enforce them. If its a party regulation, none of that applies. So the party then removes these statement functions outside the purview of the law such as it is. So thats one shift that ive seen is this push. Now, on a broader level it sort of reflects and the arguments been made that xi does recognize t and appreciate the legitimating power of law. Thats why xis elevating or the party is elevating law as a corner stone of their new governance strategy. The fourth coming up is going to be devoted to discussing modernization of the partys governing capability and governance capacity. Now, another thing now that is still disturbing. How do you square this importance of law and the legal system with this sort of extralegal treatment that we see the party doling out to perceived enemies of the regime. So this was interesting to me to just focus on the fact that theres been a persistence of a concept of two contradictions. So you have nonantagonistic contradictions among the peoples. These contradictions can and should be handled in accordance with law, but then you have cont contradictions between the people and the enemy, and those contradictions, which threaten the stability of the party state, those then are handled outside through extrajudicial and often extralegal coercive methods as well, and thats another concerning aspect of the partys move because this indicates a kind of conditional attitude toward law. If youre deemed to be among the people and its a normal contradiction, then the normal legal system, which is increasingly professional, autonomous, rulesbased et cetera, that kicks in. If youre perceived to be an enemy, then youre outside of that system. And all of this, of course, is implications for chinas role in the world and dealing with actors both, you know, Foreign Companies operating in china, but also chinas activities overseas. Its not again, look at the words, theyre concerning. And i was trying to identify why does this party legalization project make me feel uncomfortable, and ive tried to articulate its partly because it removes it from the area of state governance and kind of undermines, in fact, the whole leg legitimation through legalization project that the party seems to be carrying on now. Its important to see how it plays out in practice now. I totally endorse what colleagues have said here today, when youre looking at china making policy, yes, we must take the party at its word, but then go beyond it and see how is this actually playing out in practice, and try and analyze how in each situation this may impact us and our interests. Just to take one example of how this starts to play out in practice. Huawei has been in the news quite a bit. One of the arguments that has been made that has been made is, well, china actually does have some Data Protection laws that may complicate efforts to secure data from huawei service, for example, but your argument would seem to suggest that as the party essentially begins to eat state law and to think about it in one way, those claims would seem to become more and more hollow. Would you agree with that . Or would you think about it in a different way . Well, again, its a complicated situation. I think the huawei case is pretty special. Its got a military background, et cetera, et cetera, and its everywhere in the world now, so theres a great deal of interest and concern about it. But to back up again looking at facts on the ground, its very interesting to me to see that the party is still doing a fairly light handed approach to the private sector, you know, as chung mentioned they realize as the economy slows, china really needs the private sector. Theyre the main source of gdp growth, of job creation of innovation. And weve heard stories, for example, that, you know, the party state has to negotiate with the Big Tech Companies to get access to their data, you know. How much, how often, and what form, et cetera, which is very similar to say, uber negotiating with new york city before it went in in terms of what data they would have to turn over to the state as well. If you look at the Party Regulations and policies, they do treat the private Companies Different from say a stateowned enterprise. So, for example, in the state owned enterprises there were logged news reports a couple of years ago about this new requirement that the party have to write the partys committees role into the s. O. E. , the corporate charter articles of association, and they were applying this also to the joint ventures between s. O. E. s and Foreign Companies as well. That was raising a lot of concerns about what exactly is the role of the party. I mean, traditionally theyve always had a requirement wherever theres three or more Party Members in an entity, whether its a law firm or a company or an ngo, you must the Party Members must form a party organization. But now theyre taking this requirement and trying to legalize it and make it a legal requirement either as a matter of law or in this case the party i mean the corporate charter. They havent imposed that same requirement on private companies, and although because we know theres a big push for all the companies to set up, you know, party organizations, a much smaller percentage of private companies do, et cetera. Clearly the party knows theyre trying to while they really want to be able to control them and get access to data and other and their innovations, and they also dont want the private sector to be competing with the party state, they know they cant kill the golden goose. So you see a very interesting dance going on here. When it comes to National Security, though, i think the suite of National Security laws i mentioned, which include Counter Intelligence and National Security and the data, Cyber Security law, et cetera, where theyve written the party into it, the National Security card could trump it, but even in that case, i think, the party would be careful on how they deploy it. Just like our government is, even though in their case you couldnt go to court to prevent the party from the access there, too. So its a very complicated answer to your question, its a complicated situation. Audrey, lets come to you. So you contributed a paper to the series earlier this year, and youre also writing a book about chinas economic state craft, and youre making the case that in some places chinas focused on subversion, which you find is going around an established political processes and institutions, and in other cases you see them engaged in what you call stake holder cultivation where theyre going through those institutions and processes. So tell us why do you see different tactics in different places, and how is this playing out throw chinas belt and Road Initiative . Sure, so i think economic state craft china has by and large used the strategy of which investments projects tenld tend to circumvent regulatory procedures, often involves use of corruption. I think in terms of the belt and road, this has generated a significant amount of public and political backlash. We see political incouple bants losing office, in companies that are strategically important for china and vri, malaysia, sri lanka, theyve accepted corrupt infrastructure loans from china. This is important because it means that were seeing resistance to chinas belt and Road Initiative across a range of developing countries, even those with perhaps imperfect democratic this has produced a demonstration effect in which we see pub in Different Countries becoming more skeptical and worry of accepting chinese financing and being more weary about chinese intentions. This has created a a Bad Reputation over the last couple of years thchlt means that the china has not been broadly successful in its political intentions of having very ambitious goal of trying to buy over bipolitical influence using economic tools. At the same time, chinas also learning. In my conversations with china, my executors have acknowledged some mistakes that chinas made, a need for better public di ploep diplomacy and respecting regular laces in receiving countries. We see this learning ining rhetorically as well as in practice. In terms of rhetoric, we see it as rebranding the belt and Road Initiative. China has tried, has announced plans to declare corruption. Implement better monitoring for projects and second belt and road r forum in april this year, china went beyond the usual bland rhetoric of cooperation to really emphasize the importance of debt sustainability, working with other developed countries and the letter of institutions and investment of financing and Infrastructure Development. And in practice in the context of relationships, we see Chinese Government getting pressure to address the strategy. And malaysia for example, weather seen a huge controversy where a major project was suspended under the new hi elected government after elections last year. China underwent a renegotiation process where the same Railroad Project is now moving forward with improved terms from malaysia. A scale and cost, something that makes more sense for malaysia. An example, myanmar, where again, the government negotiator the contract with the help of the Usa Department and leaders publicly stated of having vri and Chinese Investment be able to support the local people and populations. And one of the indications perhaps for how u. S. And the country should think about the belt and Road Initiative i think first, china hadnt been as effective at buying political influence. Ive seen a lot of skepticism. If youre thinking about vri as part of the strategy to increase prominence and popularity, that hasnt really succeeded as of now. And so for the u. S. , i think its really important to think about economic state craft as a component of brand strategy. Not just in terms of how chinas operate, but how the u. S. Responds as being an International Order today, prominence of economic and nonmilitary tools in these efforts to gain and geo political competition after gaining political influence so we need a more comprehensive and strategic way of thinking about integrating ways and think iingf this security and economic activity. Good. Tell us more. What would that look like and youve written about how yuts yids should respond. Perhaps you could join in as well. Sure, i think by and large, National Strategy and thinking how its been tentative favor think about military options. I think thats a very important tool, but there needs to be better coordination across different United States government so think iing about r example the Usa Department is organized by geographic regions. If you want to think about and understand chinas belt and Road Initiative and its efforts the United States crafted, you need to overcome these styles and have a more great er approach i looking at chinas strategy in different region of the world at the same time. Sure. Let me say a few things very quickly. This is a great example of continuity in chinese strategy. Theres a 2009 speech by president hu where he just set the guidelines and in that speech, he proposed a network of infrastructure that would chris cross asia and basically tie countries the china. Thats his speech in 2009, many years before the belt and road was announced. That was proceeded by chinas going at it initiative to make sure china was able to make its soes more competitive, to invest in infrastructure, et cetera. Theres longer term in history to announce these that was elevated under president xi. Why do i mention that . Because this is something that is not completely about branding. Its not completely random. Not about vested interest. Theres a larger rationale thats been there for a long time, but it was described in political terms in key party documents. So when people say the belt and road was a failed example and backlash is a shrine that chinas facing challenges, i say two things. One, well, they dont see it that way, they see it as something theyve been trying to do for a long time and second, i would argue there was a belief in china and the belt and road is quite sill yent. We have heard about backlash. Take sri lanka. Turning over a port to china. They went back this january for a 1 billion loan from china for highway construction. Audrey mentioned really well where china was adaptable. In myanmar, in e nepal, where there was a case where one Political Group was opposed another group one. They went back, restarted the projects and started a new rail line. So theres a lot of examples of where its sort of the resilience is really on display. The reason i mentioned that for u. S. Policy is because the u. S. Belt and road is more resilient, is t no going to be b enough to collapse under its own weight. Thats something the United States is going to be doing. Opec is a part of f that. Other countries are also interested in cooperating with the United States. Thats part one. Part two, this goes again to what audrey was talking about. Making sure people are aware of the problems belt and road has with respect to governance. So there are extensive examples of some of these soes being involved in corruption all the way from latin america and ecuador, which might have implicated several senior leaders. All the way to pakistan to africa where it was getting chaos to sri lanka and on and on it goes. When that information comes out as audrey mentioned, it can shape the politics of those countries. The committee is, will it come out. Theres an informational component to battle iing finalli shouldnt say combatting. Because the belt and road isnt a bad thing. Lots of it can be good. All this is good. It should be done in ways that are consistent in standards for governance and strategic maneuverability so they dont feel indebted and those kinds of tweaks to the program are going to require a u. S. Alternative and better strategy. Just to add a few things. Based on what my colleague just said. We do need to ask whether china as a Regional Power and increase the global power has its own legitimate National Interests to develop belt and Road Initiative. Number one. Number two. Is that the predetermine trying to use the belt and road to undermine or challenge or kick a u. S. Out of asia, asia region. Is that the predetermine, evil plan . So im cynical about that, but of course its possible if our policy continues to be in china at the moment it will be like this. And finally, whether china could improve the belt and road because of the challenges. My answer is yes and as you can continue. So i think this is the three things i just add. From the legal point of view, everybody studied belt and road. Like the fall Employment Initiative for the world these days. But i look at it from the legal and governance point of view and a couple of things. One, the problems theyve run into initially, too, is is because china had this plan to go out there and subvert established procedures and engage in corruption et cetera. Its a very messy, non institutionalized project and a lot of what the pressure on china now is to try and impose more institutionalization on it and at the belt and road forum in april, there was an intent to start having a clean vri as well as a green bri. Transparency is huge issue and from the point of view of American Companies and Engineering Consultants and our lawyer, they would like to see an open procurement system. We could partner with the eu, which is also putting pressure on china to open up on all levels as well. In addition to having counterstrategies, which we should, we have to find ways to cooperate with other allies and also with china on making the belt and road be a much better initiative. Ill just jump back in by saying the belt and road isnt always a bad thing and there are ways in which be leveraged to do good things for the rest of the region, but its also not one thing. Many different projects and the appropriate unit of analysis is not the overall program. Its the specific projects. And if you look at some of the specific projects, many of them long proceed the announcement of the belt and road and if you look at those project, some of them, including the ones in sri lanka, myanmar, bangladesh and pakistan, are about a particular kind of strategy. That is a belief that certainly ports have a lot of value. That belief is not uniquely chinese. Every power thats ever aspired dating back to portuguese has recognized those same places matter and those are places where you find extensive chinesement. Dontake the word of the oesic administration who wrote in a paper twice that he thought those ports could be useful opportunities for the peoples lit ration army. Thats an official source. President xi has talked about the military of the belt and road so theres a discourse out there that sees this as a good thing for asia and its a public good. We should take them at their word on a lot of these projects, but some of these projects, the ports in other place, some of those have clear strategic rationale. So its important not to paint with too broad a bush brush stroke. Xi talks about the belt. He says in the first phase of the project, hes now in the second, that didnt happen in the forum. That was announced the year before the forum and the fifth anniversary of the belt and road in 2018. In that speech, he says its time for phase two. What was that going to be . In phase one, we focused on the big brush stroke, phase two would be smaller. Greener. Loaner. It cou leaner. Cleaner. More likely to better benefit individuals and easier to talk about in ways that was less controversial. A lot of problems with the belt and road arent always about a nefarious chinese man. Some are about fps financing plachbl some are endemic of the economy. The point there is the belt and road issi changing and much is good but we have to focus on the areas where it foposings a significant challenge. How much should we be concerned about the don ver jensen of the Surveillance Technology . David dollar mentions this in his paper, a project in zimbabwe focused on facial recognition. How much of these are going to be intertwined do you think . Well i think theres a big component of the belt and road talked about as the digital belt and road. The silicon component to it. I dont know that chinas deliberately exporting its system. I dont buy that. Its really hard to pull off. Irng the way this works is more implicit and i think youve written about this as well so i should plug our moderators paper on the subject which suggests some of the ways in which this kind of dissemination of chinas system will take place will be through channels that are not always evangelical. Huawei wants to sell, theyre involved in helping one country sensor its internet. Right so thats something thats use f useful for that country, but not because china wants to make the world more liberal. Its just because theres commercial opportunity there. There are other ways in weve seen Surveillance Technology in zimbabwe. Its really hard to pull off. Going to take a long time to get there. But its important to watch this space because this is a key question. Will the rise of china to true Global Status be a competitor of United States mean lliberal val exist. The its something were going to see and maybe to colleagues point, something we can shape with good, coop rative policy. Sure. Just decide on a couple of points. I agree its a messy project. Its you know involved with a broad range and multiple competing interests. I think for a lot of audiences outside of china, they see chinese firms as agents of a Chinese State. Whether that is completely true or not, i think this is feeding the way that chinas offering often corrupt with has fed into a negative perception, opportunities and tensions and what chinas trying achieve and the effects china could on processes in these countries. Its not crede bable for the United States to criticize countries in the belt and road to say you cant take chinese money and move it out. Thats not credible. At the same time, i think hard for pure competition and financing because of the ability of Chinese State to resources. Working with allies and institutions, promoting and processes and institutions. I think that will increase access to alternative sources of financing. One way is for the u. S. To share technical expertise, know how, provide dwins to receiving countries so they on the ground, both the elites and Public Opinion are more aware of whats going on with the kinds of investments that chinas offering and i think thats a Cost Effective strategy of you know, insuring that in pushing china to ensure that theres better transparency standards and government standards. Lets open it up to questions with the audience. Scarlet has the mike. Lets start here with this gentleman in the fourth row. Why dont we take questions in the fourth row together. Im peter. Analyst and diplomat. I look at chinas military build up in particular and marvel at it because nobody is thinking about attacking china. Its nothing more than supporting the communist party and when you look at chinas grand china, isnt it really just making the world safe for autocracy . Because then the better the chances are that the party can survive against democratic pressures. If you wouldnt mind stand wheng you ask your question so we can capture you. Mike, pbs online news hour. In discussing grand strategy, how much of this is driven by internal dynamics versus an assessment of the vulnerabilities and strengths of other countries. In other words, do the chinese lock now on whats going on in washington as a shortterm gift or part of a longer narrative of decloin and withdrawal and to what extent is there serious debate about the longterm strengths and weaknessss of countries like the wiUnited States. Two great questions. Sure, ill start us off. On the military question, i dont think the purpose over the last 30 years has been primarily b about just the party itself. 1980s, china was think iing abo building the kinds of platforms that would be important in winning a conflict with its neighbors in the south sea. They were thinking more about Aircraft Carriers. There were some books that showed in the mid mid 80s. It didnt happen. The reason was because of three years. 1990, 1991 the continued disillusion of the soviet ewyuu and those three led them to think the United States was the primary adversary. So that meant not buying vulnerable platforms like surface vessels in large quantities, but instead in vestives investing in asymmetric territories. That gives rise to what weve now called antiaccess area of deny ial approach to china. Many of those capabilities were not useful for take iing anythi. They were useful for denying things. That changes. In the last 15 year, weve seen a shift away. About building and acquiring the platform they once delayed. L bpds, for example, that they want to use and tang and hold territory to use in amphibious operations. Thats a change. A shift from defensive. You could think of f a more defensive strategy to a more offensive one. Not because they want to conquer the world, but because they have important National Interests close to home. Thats hopefully an answer thats useful on the military side. On the grand strategy side, i think that question was very useful. How much of the grand strategy is internally driven versus external. Thats a key question. I happen b to believe that a lot of chinese grand strategy is externally driven. A lot of domestic behavior might be more domestically driven, but key projects are more externally driven. I say that for a few reasons. The party sits above the state. Penetrates every level and together, that means it has the ability to override some pa roke yal interest. He had a lot of influence and clout. He was on the standing committee, but he was shot down time and time again because it wasnt the right time for china to be building an Aircraft Carrier so they didnt do it. Thats a good example. The second opinion, china, theyve done it before in the past so theres not that clear past that domestic politics can play. The last question is about how much of it is shaped by external factors. Heres what matters. I think the primary factor that drives chinese grand strategy is its assessment of the United States because United States is the biggest challenge to its core interest and the most important relationship to its Economic Development. It is the thousand pound gorilla. It has to Pay Attention to the United States. Thats been true for a long time. And the way that strategy changes because its tough to adjust. Its like an oil tanker. Hard to do a u turn. When theres a sharp change of the United States, where does that happen . 1989, we went from quasi allies to adversaries. 2009, china went from thinking the United States was extraordinarily powerful to realizing it had certain weaknesses and now we see the that the election of president trump, brexit and the crisis of the west and liberalism suggests that again, the u. S. Is less threatening and maybe theres an opportunity for more ambitious global agenda. This can be debated. None of this is bulletproof or airtight, but this is how i see it now and im writing a book that makes the argument more clearly. I see those two questions linked together. They have money and want to spend money in the military and you look at chinas map. From their perspective. They can see a lot of fresh spots. Not only the northern part of china, but the north korea, East China Sea and particularly the taiwan issue. Its very much chinese. This goes to the question about the which part is more important. I would say theyre linked, but its a domestic concern, a primary driver because without which the other one would have leadership thats become irrelevant. You do need to consolidate your power for success. Its largely determined whether you can defend the interests. And any way were in big trouble if you see what independence or china has been too soft with the United States. Thats the dynamics that we got involved involved. Because china become powerful. In need of foreign market and resources that the military is also a part of the process. Sometimes we also feel that the United States our interest, global power, is so we can buy the global challenge. The budget will increase dramatically in the coming years. So thats the period we are entering. So many ways, its a very dangerous period. And just to come back to the last part of the question is what does the debate look like about how to take advantage of this moment where in the United States, we have a lot of domestic turmoil. How would you describe that . I think our way probably experience a a lot of vicious end fighting. I do not see the moment this vicious power struggle going on. I think under the pressure, china just have tendency united together do. Do not mean they have disagreements or the potential power. But at the moment, they were united together. So we enter this kind of full dynamic so i think as american, we need to think about you know, the challenge for us. And chinese nationalists and are on the rise, but that can clash if our leadership is you know, continues those kind of things. We entered election season. That could be to chinas advantage. Its true. The internal and external dimensions are very linked. The key, the reason those are relevant is for internal political reasons. If you fail on taiwan, the stakes are exten shl. I see a focus on Foreign Policy in the United States. Ill make it more tangible and concrete. Weve heard art the phrase, buy time. This phrase. In many documents, that phrase is also tied to chinese perception of what they Call International balance of power. And that linkage is basically about the United States. Thats a textural linkage that you see. Doesnt mean a chinese leader isnt think iing about internal policy and whether if they lose taiwan, their rival will outmaneuver them. The primary question, thats the primary variable. How are they thinking about the moment when the west is struggling and if its been the case that for 30 years, theyve linked their grand strategy to perceptions of f the United States, what does that mean now . I dont have good answer. Compelling evidence one way or the other because we dont have all the documents. But what i have seen is a few things. One, the very emphasis i mentioned on Global Governance in think tanks. That means greater funding. Second, were probably seeing interesting phrases in Certain Party documents. Xi has use d this one phrase a number of times. A once in a century opportunity including his discussion of belt and road. I havent been able to unpack what creates this once in a century opportunity but theres indication among commentary that its really to the United States and finally, the assessment of the system in the Congress Report and in other documents is a lot more positive for china. A lot more instability in the balance of power and more opportunity as well. And global governments, with we see far from ref reasons reinces in those that under president hu. Thats a far more interesting shift. This gentleman here. Then here. Several in beijings military parade such as 17, b and 41. So wa kinds of f messages would you like to read from this . For mr. Rush and lee. Thank you, panelists, for coming here today. Im from policy bot. We use data science and Machine Learning to utilize policy intelligence. My question for you guys today is about how brookings is analyzing global or chinas how chinas use iing their global i fluns to honor the digital platform to influence other countries. Its to this informant, to disorder. How we think about how do we vote. But off the carrying. So quite recently, dr. Howard from Oxford Institute has push lisched an article on how chinas using additional means to influence the hong kong protests in the western world so for the first time, you have this prop began ta so my question is how are you analyzing that at the moment. I thought you were going to ask me which was my favorite missile. I dont have a favorite. Theyre all so hard to choose from. I remember the question very well. A small joke. I didnt think of it as maybe this is contrarian, but i wasnt worried. I didnt think it was a strong message being sent. Military parades are not new. Lot of countries have them. Granted, there were more missiles displayed on this parade than many the past. They have nor missiles now than in the past. So i didnt thireally think of message. If there was a message being sent, i dont think it was particular hi concerning and i didnt view it with any undue concern. I thought it was fine. If thats what they wanted to do and display the military technology, thats fine. Im more concerned about what happens within region parade is is irrelevant. The other question was about data. Under some of our china work under lee increasingly taking chinese documents and digitizing them and putting them in a data set and then sort of using that data set to do quantitative analysis. So some of the stuff ive talked to you about today comes from the dinlgtization of mass. Thats fo get questions. How many people watch the live broadcasting and tv coverage . Not many. Its not symmetrical, the information. I assume china, so many people watch and to show chinas muscle. Chinas coming of age. Modern modernization. But in this country, first, we are not well informed. But this is not my point. Its as kissinger said. That if we United States and china engage in a war, this is a war that would be no winner. We should not fight if theres no winner. We still need to cooperate. Its very, very important. In modern war fair, you have no idea how its going to be faukt and in what time frame. Certainly not like a right. 2,000 years ago. In greece. Now we have we have a lot of things unknown. I mean so so again we should avoid 21st century world. 19th century. Its not so much for military strebt strengths per se. I understand why china want to show that as this critical moment from chinese perspective, but i see from this audience, its really very few people watch it. So that is a pr perspective. E we need to communicate muff r r b much better through dialogue. Its about the vice premier is coming to down in a few days. Trade issues is not as important as tech war. And security issues. At the same time, United States and china should continue to engage economically. If we dont do that, theres not much left to see. So i perceive that way. So we do need to continue to promote a cooperation with educational culture, certainly we have a lot of tensions. Your questions, different ideology, different political system. Now sounds like china, but im quite critical of a lot of things going on in china, sensorship and the legal system that in many ways is a lot of cynicism. Probably Even Stronger from outside world. And my friend scholar, law professor, actually published a book of him a few years ago. Tried to sensor forever. But at the same time, i did a research about a professor. I ranked the Top Ten Private legal firms i found more than half the partners. They come from the elite schools. Harvard, columbia, stanford and duke law school, berkeley. Name it. But also interestingly, so75 o those partners actually thought past the new york. Pa partners there. That could provide some hope. At least on the economic front eventually can spread. So thats the die nynamic we sh see. Its a paradox on one hand the Legal Profession is not contained, but at the same time, the dynamic changes in society and even the legal process, its also contradiction and under his watch, he devoted one party plan on reform for not causing backlash, particularly the term limits. So again, we should put in that perspective. More broadly on political influence, how much do you see efforts to shape Public Opinion on chinese engagement with china economically as an element of china state. Is that you think we should expect to see more of . Sure, i think especially with regard to the recent backlash, i think china has ramped up its Public Diplomacy efforts and Chinese Investment projects across malaysia this summer and people are tell iing me, oh, we see these videos of a woman the and chinese lady singing nogt chinese exhorting the benefit of cooperation. How good relations can bring women benefits to all parties. I think chinas realizing they need to work more on that. It will go hand in hand with how china actually conducts these investments. Youll see more about this in the yum coming papers in east asia where theyll be discussing in east asia. Lets take two final questions. Yes. One here. Im sure weve all heard the phrase let a thousand flowers bloom. That comes to mind as i listen this afternoon. The question i have is to what extent is Chinese Culture embed ed in the design empation of economic state craft and what would be those aspects of culture that we could identify as specifically affecting how these policy initiatives emerge . In the very back. Thank you. You mentioned a lot about the grand strategy. I wanted to ask specifically about that because im a grand strategy. As we see china made in china 2025. And things like that are creating a lot of decoupling between the u. S. And china and economic terms. I think dr. E lee touched a bit on this, but one of the main reasons why we say u. S. And china would not have a conflict is because of the economic benefits we both gain so as we see more decoupling happening, what are some of the main things that we can do to u. S. And china together especially when theres amplifying on South China Sea that bring a lot of tensions. Two minutes. We start with china. We no longer use the term made in china. They realize its really kind of embarrassment if you want this industrial, china ok pies 70 , 80 , 90 , how does it work to business. So thats realization make china be sensitive in this area. But does not mean that china will abandon the industrial policies. So with that going on, we will see some opportunity in market success. We should have more patient. This kind of a western trend probably will important. It will Legal Development, the law and the common front and they are beyond. So this is, thats why i think the Economic Cooperation should continue and create a moment. Now the culture things, i dont want to become too much. Because for so long, particularly in the first seven years of prc that chinese economy not really doing well so that tells you its not just the culture. Sometimes, political system, policy, et cetera. Its relatively speak, less as a culture. So i would not emphasize too much on that regard. China still looks to the u. S. In experience and law when thinking about performing the legal system. People dont realize what the judicial reforms that have gone on around and the areas i work in, open government, they adopted notice and comment rule making from us. As well as ideas of transparency. They have a freedom of information act which again, they have sent people here to study and look at our experience with it, too. Xi thinks about western style constitutionali aal constitutionalism, but wants people to learn the beneficial experience from the west. They look to negative experience as well as the president obaosi. So i have seen the normal legal system continue to progress both in terms of substantive laws, antiDomestic Violence, Sexual Harassment has begun to be explored now even though politically, its still sensitive in china. A whole range of issues. Men talg health, et cetera, they continue to look to us as well as europe and other countries, too. So i would hope not just the western trained lawyers, but at many levels. The judges, the prosecutors, the police. We brought police from china, the Public Security people, to meet with counterparts at se seminars in florida, for example, to discuss how do you handle Domestic Violence issues et cetera. All this kind of exchange continues today and i would hope it doesnt cease. This talk of decoupling is very concerning on many, many levels, but certainly in the legal area as well. Even though there are a lot of contradictions in china and there are a lot of things were concerned about, theres a lot of progress and Development Going op. Not a finished story yet. I want to echo both points and i agree. It would be a real shame if we saw less People Exchange and especially less exchange in legal areas between United States and as competition identifies. Its an american and chinese interest. We have a colleague, jamie and i have a colleague who works on some issues relating, weve had people from china wo work on issues related to gender discrimination and law. Theres a will the of interest at high levels of the party on getting that issue right for the United States. So there are areas where we can cooperate and advance values we have in china. On the main china 2025 question, i never thought the initiative was important, but i thought it got more attention than it deserved because so much of what was happening in that initiative happened way before that. Tech transferred through investment vehicles, through theft, cyber esespionage, throu students sometimes. A lot of that was fake directed in the past and continues to be in the present. That was a poor branding choice by china. Because it sort of gave coherent target for it. But as chung mentioned, its no longer visible. A think tank has done a quantitative analysis showing it disappeared from china. Just gone. Which tells you that they kind of realized they messed up, but the point you raiseded about decoupling remains serious. That would be a shame in some ways, but its inevitable. On the cultural point, i very much agree with my colleagues. I think institutions matter more so i didnt want to get too far into it. But others can give you more information. Theres a rich discourse on how u to quantity certain aspects. Yeah. Maybe, man. On promoting Economic Cooperation, ipg efforts to weaponize independence on the part of the United States is going to excel as a divergence and the two economies and political systems. Culture, specifically, if you think about economic state craft, this is not a culture argue of any means, but the way chinas conducted its activities does reflect about its domestic political economy and nature of state market relations and business relations and chinese proclivity to use government to government relations. This is a reflection of the political system and its not our culturalist argument but we can see trends in how chinas conducting. One final plug in addition to paper, please also look out for a podcast series thats hosted by our colleague. Lindsey ford, every day, shes putting out a new one with some authors in the group of papers. I hope youll stay tuned for more events. More papers in the series. Thank you for being here and see you again soon. This evening, a look at how 2020 is shaping up with with charlie cook. Hell talk with bill press in a conversation hosted by the hill center in washington, d. C. Cspan will take you there live or you can listen in live with the free cspan radio app. Week nikts this week, were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available every weekend on cspan 3. American history tv was in the classroom as the university of arkansas professor elliot west gave a lecture on the Environmental Impact of the California Gold rush. You can see that tonight at 8 00 eastern here on cspan 3. And enjoy American History tv this week and every weekend on cspan 3. The Supreme Court justices return next week with the Court Hearing cases on employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Trump Administrations winding down of daca and state funding for religious education. Listen to significant Supreme Court oral arguments on our website. Cspan. Org and watch on cspan. Next, a discussion comparing International Terrorism and domestic violent extremism. The Center Hosted two panels on the evolving nature of terrorist threats in 2019 as well as solutions