Okay, thank you for coming out. Its wonderful to see you here today hello, my name is Christopher Mcknight nichols, im a historian at oregon state university, scholar of intellectual history of the u. S. Role in the world. I specialize in isolationism, internationalism, and globalization. My work is called promise and peril, america at the dawn of a global age, just out in paperback, you can buy a downstairs. I have the distinct pleasure of being the chair and coorganizer of this panel. Its a fascinating panel. Our panel is entitled turning. 1916, u. S. Foreign relations before and after that kept us out of war election. This is not just about u. S. Foreign relations, but also international relations. The spark for this panel is this intending all of the 1960 election in which Woodrow Wilson ran on a he kept us out of war platform, despite military intervention ongoing in the mexico and caribbean. This roundtable brings together superb historians to discuss whether 1916 should be as the end of the era or the beginning, or was 1916 a turning point . Any of us have firm stances, many of us will probably equivocate. Here i wanted to give special thanks to university of illinois historian kristen hawkinson who helped organize this. She helped come up with the idea. Would also like to thank the American Historical Association and the panel cosponsors. The society for historians of the gilded age a progressive era and the society for historians of American Foreign relations. Our aim today in this panel is to consider and to reconsider how recent transnational, international, imperial, political and world historical scholarships has affected our assessments of u. S. Foreign Relations Relations in the years leading up to and following 1916 although of fungible mental issue of our panel will reach share and recent trends and opportunities in u. S. Is street, and World History and in foreign relation scholarship pertaining to foreign relations. Each of us will make brief remarks i hope, five to eight minutes, i will keep us on the clock these are designed to be thoughtprovoking rather than comprehensive. We will touch on a variety of themes here including humanitarian relief and the environment, human mobility, great power politics, military interventions, inter imperial rivalries, colonial policy, anti colonial struggles for sovereignty and the animating debates of concerns around isolationism and internationalism. And offer to offering a variety of fanatics, panelists also contribute a range of geographic perspectives i think this is what maybe makes our panel unique. It stretches us to think more about areas outside the United States. To think about europe. Do you think about mexico. Haiti and the caribbean. East asia and beyond. Were hopeful of generating a dynamic discussion not just across the panel, but also with you all. In that vein, i just wanted to say at the outset that we would like you to please come few up at the mics when it comes time too cute for q as. Right as we begin, its incumbent on me to talk about a bit about the election of 1916 and then we can move on to the most fascinating details. Having served one term, with europe and the world embroiled in the great war, alongside significant u. S. Disillusionment with progressive reform, Woodrow Wilsons path to reelection in 1916 was our from certain. Ultimately, he became the first democratic president sent and since Andrew Jackson in 1832, to be elected to two consecutive terms in office when he defeated Supreme Court justice republican Charles Evans hughes in the president ial election. Policy figured prominently in the campaign. While its true that entry into the war in april 1917 produced a formal party truce in the interest of national unity, this did not shield the Woodrow Wilson administration from fierce congressional criticism culminating in a breakdown of that truce. Of course, the election took place while world war i was being fought in europe and while mexico was going through the mexican revolution. We will hear more about that soon. With u. S. Troops on the ground in roughly a dozen locations throughout the world. Republican candidate cues primarily and harshly criticized wilson not for his spirit stance as were not taking necessary preparations for facing the conflict of europe. Given this and given hughes is lack of attention to the socalled mexican problem, most scholars argue that will sense commission as an anti war candidate was reinforced by this campaign and not just by his facile slogan. Diplomatically, u. S. Public sentiment leaned toward the british and the french. The allied powers. But the country remain neutral, at least formally, towards the conflict in europe. We will hear more about the ways in which that formal neutrality was actually undermined by actual trade and loan practices and other policies. The democrats Reelection Campaign painted wilson as a peacemaker and highlighted such recent efforts in 1916 as a january initiative to bring together all the powers of europe for a mediation conference. However, during the course of 1915 and 1916 leading up to this perhaps turning point, germanys aggressive wartime naval tactics brought the u. S. Ever closer to entering the conflict. For instance, in april, 1916, wilson defended neutral rights as he had after the sinking of the lusitania in 1915. He threatened to sever diplomatic ties with the germany following the sinking of the passenger very sussex by a uboat in the english channel. The attack marked the beginning of a new you boo you vote campaign, or when they had been planned, but the bluster by the Wilson Administration led to the germans backing down this uboat campaign. So there was a divide in the response of the mecca american electric. Pro wilson voters saw an assertive trump of u. S. Diplomacy. Some might call it leading from behind. In terms of the war of 1916, there were a number of major events and we do not have enough time to go through the. There were major battles. There were many months long battles at burden and the sum which resulted in 1 million total casualties. 1916 can be seen at least as a watershed in terms of the fighting of the war itself. Politically in 1916, wilson had the advantage of incumbency, but rightly feared a potential of a reunited Republican Party. Much had happened of course since in the four years since the last election when he faced off against william taft, Theodore Roosevelt and socialist unit dabbed is. As a historian sean, wasnt recognized, as Many Democrats had in fact not, in the west in the south, that the u. S. Could be drawn into the war at any moment by an act of some obscure german subcommittee. Therefore, while wilson advocated continue neutrality, he also called for military preparedness. The apparent tensions between those two policies troubled Many Democrats, particularly irish americans and driven americans. It led to some intense political vulnerability for wilson in the election cycle. At the Democratic Convention in the summer of 1916 in st. Louis, wilson one on the first ballot as his Vice President trumps marshal of indiana. The platform called for military preparedness, a World Association of nations to maintain peace after the war in europe had ended, pan american unity, a ban on child labor, womens suffrage, and prison reform. During the convention, the delegates cheered most vigorously for the now Famous Campaign he kept us campaign slogan, he kept us out of war, which world conditions really made more of a hope and promise. As wilsons private notes made clear, he understood this all too well. He made the core of his campaign there for three peace. Peace, preparedness and progressivism. He sort of added a fourth piece which was prosperity. This is important to think of in terms of the International Dynamics because it was allied stimulus, war orders and loans that led to a shift back from a recession that had begun to occur early in the war, particularly for southern agreeance. Although Teddy Roosevelt thought it would he would bring him into the white house, the champion intervention. The accused wilson of cowardice for his mediation efforts. But the outspoken roosevelt failed to really understand the depth of the divide he had generated in the election cycle before. The republicans nominated Charles Evans hughes, a very fascinating character. We might get into him a little bit more. Roosevelt famously turned him a bearded iceberg. But cues earned the nomination on the third ballot and former Vice President under Teddy Roosevelt, charles fair banks, also of indiana, swing states, not getting too deep into the politics, but states like that were import in the election, became the republican Vice President ial nominee wrapping up the course of this. Perceptive observers were confident that use would win in november. Even wilson seems to have had doubts about his path to reelection according to historian jonathan cooper, ever the fighter, he relished the struggle but was not necessarily optimistic about the outcome scholars tend to note, Republican Party stood united behind a single candidate and the democrats had won only three president ial elections since 1860. Voters seemed apathetic and perhaps wary of progressive reforms and the key accomplishments of the Democratic Administration of the last four years seems scant at the time. He was Foreign Policy more overemphasized a straightforward Preparedness Program which seems far less muddled than wilsons simultaneous calls for neutrality and preparedness in the same period. Critics charged wilson with wanting the nation, both in the war and aloof from it. A utopian stance that we still hear from many historians of political scientists today. This seemed remarkably unrealistic, at least to his critics in 1916. Famously, hughes and his staff went to sleep on november 6th, certain that they would win the election. It was not clear until at least two days later when he returns from california and ohio came in that wilson was the likely winner and it took another two weeks for hughes to actually concede. So what happened . Im short, wilson one, he secured 30 states to use is 18, he won 49. 4 of the popular vote, though his share of the Electoral College vote in 1960 was much smaller smaller than 1912. More to the point, wilson looms so large over the party that he could take credit for the narrow victory in congress. Not the least part of wilsons accomplishment in 1916 had been, quote, the widespread approval he gained as a mandate coming out of the election for his shaping of americas response to the cataclysmic war that heading got europe two and a half or two and a half years earlier. The degree to which this electoral and public achievement therefore marked a turning point for wilson is something i hope we will talk about. But the degree to which this heralded a change or a real scene change in American Foreign relations and world relations is our main topic for today. Having dispensed with what happened in the election and some of the cause and consequences, we now get into the more animating concepts and debates about what the consequences and stakes were. I will first introduce our initial speaker. Im pleased to introduce professor julia erwin, a professor of history. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarianism. History of u. S. International civilian aid in late 19th and early of 20 centuries. Shes working on a book entitled catastrophic diplomacy, a history of u. S. Responses to Global Natural disasters. Please help me in welcoming professor julia erwin. [applause] professor erwin thank you for the introduction to the whole roundtable. I promise i will keep within my five to eight minutes. My research focuses on the role of u. S. Military and aid in u. S. Foreign affairs. Aching about war relief and Disaster Relief, and the roles they played in u. S. Foreign relations. Both International War and disasters as i shown my work have long been important elements of u. S. Diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural relations with the world. Both before world war i, before 1916, and indeed, well after. From my perspective as an historian of u. S. Foreign aid, should 1916 be seen as the end of an era in u. S. Relationships with the wider world . My short answer to this question is the ever unsatisfying yet typical historians answer yes, and no. I promise i will come back in the end was something more. Seen through the lens of u. S. International humanitarianism, 1916 does mark the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the world in certain respects. At the same time, i think we can identify many more points of continuity in u. S. Military efforts. Trends which link the decades prior to 1916 with those that followed. In my brief for march today, i would like to touch on both of these points of continuity and change. Lets begin with the former, points of continuity. Why should 1916 not represent a turning point in u. S. International humanitarianism, and by extension, u. S. Foreign affairs more broadly . Prior to 1916, the u. S. Government and u. S. Citizens both took part in many humanitarian operations throughout the world. For well over a century prior to 1916, the United States provided limited amounts of aid for the victims of many periodic wars, famines, and disasters and other nations. U. S. Involvement in overseas humanitarian aid moreover had accelerated greatly in the 1880s and 1890s, and all the more so during the first 15 years of the 20th century. During these decades, the United States provided millions of dollars in cash, material supplies, and other forms of assistance to foreign victims of war and natural catastrophes. Much of this work was carried out by the private sector, the missionaries, charities, american corporations, and American Financial houses and private citizens. Often, with the active support and assistance of the federal government. Significantly, the u. S. Government itself was also starting to play a greater direct role in humanitarian assistance during these years, providing increasing levels of state Department Support and involvement, congressional funding, and military assistance for humanitarian crises. One of the most memorable examples of this comes in late 1908, early 1909, when a major tsunami in southern italy, the u. S. Congress allocates 800,000 in Disaster Relief to this event, which is a pretty substantial amount for this time. This assistance i argue serves key strategic diplomatic and moral objectives of the United States, as it was expanding its role on the global stage. Something we cant get into in five to eight minutes. But if you read my book, im sure you will learn more. Building on these foundations, the years 1914 to 1916 with the further developments in u. S. Foreign aid. During this era of u. S. Neutrality in world war i, americans provided significant levels of food, medical assistance, and other forms of relief to european soldiers and civilians. On both sides of the conflict. Many americans, moreover, delivered humanitarian aid on the ground in europe. Herbert hoover and the commission for relief in belgium are the most famous. But not the only providers of u. S. Assistance in these years. Wilson, in other words, may have campaigned on the fact he kept us out of war slogan in 1916. The United States was hardly uninvolved or out of the war. Or for that matter, outside of the world. When we take into global humanitarian activities into account. The channels of humanitarian assistance, u. S. Government and citizens had been involved in World Affairs for decades prior to 1916. But nonetheless, the election of 1916 and the subsequent u. S. Entry into the war this is really the more important turning point here can be seen as a turning point in u. S. Humanitarian aid, in at least two respects. First was the nations incredible willingness to mobilize for humanitarian assistance after 1916. Statistics on the American Red Cross, the nations preeminent wartime aid agency, make this trend starkly visible. Counting just 286,000 members in 1916, the American Red Cross would see his numbers explode to 22 million adults and 11 million children, about one third of the u. S. Population at the time. During the same years, u. S. Citizens gave 400 million to the American Red Cross to fund its relief operations. 400 million was not pocket change in 1917 and 1918. U. S. Entry into the war as the statistics suggest generated an unprecedented level of support for u. S. Military aid, that was never seen before the nations past. A second clear shift with the u. S. Governments increasingly formal involvement in u. S. Foreign aid after 1916. After the armistice, the u. S. Government would formalize its role in International Humanitarian aid further still. When congress established and bonded the American Relief administration, the u. S. Governments First Official overseas military agency. After 1916, the government was playing a much more formal role in foreign aid than ever had in the past. Foreign aid was transformed really for the first time into an official instrument of u. S. Foreignpolicy. Something that it would increasingly become in the century that followed. In conclusion, seen through the lens of u. S. Military and aid, i suppose i would argue that 1916 was less of a turning points and more accurately, a new chapter in the history of u. S. Foreign assistance. A moment in which trends that had really emerged in the late 19th and 20th centuries began to coalesce, solidify, and intensify. I think that is how i would leave it. I look forward to discussing all of these issues in greater depth with the rest of you. [applause] christopher next up is professor rebecca mckenna, assistant professor at the university of notre dame. Her book manuscript is american imperial pastoral. United states designs on the philippines. Its a project that examines u. S. Colonial hill stations in the philippines as a way to explore the literal and more figurative architecture of the u. S. s new empire. Help me welcome rebecca mckenna. [applause] professor mckenna thanks to chris for organizing this roundtable, im very excited to be part of it. As i think chris made clear, my position is to offer advantage or reflections from the vantage of u. S. Philippines relations. Its worth noting at the outset that we often recall efforts by the man who we would come to recognize ho chi minh, to meet with Woodrow Wilson and make the case for selfdetermination. But less remembered is in that year, some of the United States very own colonial charges, were also making the case for independence. One they had been making since the very start of the u. S. Occupation. Between 1912 in 1916, in part text of the fact that democrats that sees the white house and congress, and also do to the consolidation of philippine nationalist politics, there were serious discussions about philippine independence in the u. S. So that by 1916, the year in question, we see passage of an important piece of legislation, and one that gives us an opportunity to consider the significance of that year to the relations between the imperial United States and one of its colonies. In that year, the u. S. Congress passed into law the jones bill, which was named after the chair of the House Committee on insular affairs. More formally known as the philippine autonomy act, and it was a measure that considerably alter the structure of the Colonial Government by effectively enhancing home rule. On the one hand, and maintain the position of the governor general, essentially the top dog in the colonial and administration. The person in this position was appointed by the u. S. President , and maintain that position. It provided for an elected upper house of the Colonial Legislature to replace the philippine commission, which was the colonial governing body that had been appointed also by the u. S. President. This upper house would join the existing elected Philippine Assembly in a bicameral Colonial Legislature. The measure is important because it constituted the United States first declaration of intention to withdraw sovereignty over the islands with it has stable governments, or so was the language of law stable government was the linkage that was used. The law was consistent with the democrats longstanding vision on the philippines that independent should be forthcoming. It followed wilsons intention to deprive the United States of its philippine frontier as he put it in december of 1912. It was a goal he put into action by calling for the philippine innovation it substituted filipinos for americans and the colonial administration. In advancing degrees of philippine sovereignty, we might say that in the jones bill and the politics of philippine independence, we can mark something perhaps of the global vision, the global ambition that wilson would later articulate one advancing as a new relationship between geography and power. That turned from balance of power, old empire territorial colonialism to the ideal of a postcolonial world order, one ordered by International Organization and by the principle of free trade. Going beyond 1916, wilson would present especially in his 14 points, this vision of a stable, postcolonial world rooted in the peaceful coexistence of nationstates. As historians of shown, in making the world safe for democracy, wilson was also aiming to make the world safer capitalism and create what we might say are the clinical conditions for capital accumulation. In this new world order, it would be conditioned by u. S. Economic power, one backed by the threat of military force. This aspiration for a postcolonial order, and one in which the u. S. Would enjoy significant hegemony was one the u. S. Had already been rehearsing in the western hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine as others have pointed out. It was being worked out in some respects in the philippines, notably if you look at the jones bill, the u. S. President retains the right to reject measures related to the tariff, public land, immigration, and part of the philippine economy, which the u. S. Had significant return to toward american interests. It had accomplished this in part by instituting freetrade by 1913. Free trade in the philippines tended to benefit american exporters, and also, filipino elites, filipinos who had been well invested in agriculture. This is something of a relationship that will make filipino elites increasingly ambivalent about full independence in the years ahead. This is a position that was contrary to the view of many ordinary filipinos. We find something new with the relationship americans were forming with the filipinos. Despite wilsons stated desire to rid america of their philippine frontier, filipinos did not gain a clear timeline for independence in 1916, or for that matter, under wilsons tenure. One will not come until the mid1930s. The jones act was, in fact, a far less radical of a bill that versions proposed beginning in 1912 and versions supported by filipinos. One had asked called for independence within two years, so i think the law speaks in these ways to wilsons gradualist approach to the philippines. He had rejected those more radical versions. The approach that americans ultimately took, arguably was premised on longstanding assumptions about racial difference and civilizational hierarchies as indicators of fitness for selfgovernment that still had traction as a Republican Opposition to independence reminds us. These assumptions were conveyed in the lost preamble. It implied that filipinos were still unprepared for Self Government and still needed american tutoring. Filipino resident commissioner who drafted the first and later versions of the bill addressed these characterizations in 1914. Delivered a speech before the u. S. Congress, they bring to americans about their antiquated ideas of filipinos. A set of ideas that we might attribute, in part, to the campaigns of retention its. Those who want to promote the continued occupation, u. S. Occupation of the philippines. He emphasized that no matter the celebrated benefits of u. S. Rule, education, material improvement, material prosperity. He said these, quote, alone will not be jalapenos happy or induce them to concede the necessity of that rule. Filipinos would not forget their rights as men as a nation. So the point is that this measure and not granting a timetable for independence ultimately tended to prolong the u. S. Occupation as kramer has argued as well. What came to past with a democrat in the white house wasnt altogether different from policy under republican since the turn of the century, even if the democrats has introduced this language of stable government. As a requirement of a forthcoming independent status. In this respect, i think we might say that 1916 was no turning point when assessed by the effect of the jones act or by the logic of continuing to deny independents based on assumptions of filipinos limited for Self Government. Next. [applause] all right, so hopefully you are all keeping a tally. Maybe, no, not quite that simplistic, but we will keep moving forward. So next up we have a nancy mitchell. Shes professor of history and North Carolina state university. Her book, the danger of dreams, german and american imperialism in latin america examine the u. S. Perception of a german threat to latin america, which obviously looms large in this moment in 1916. She contributed a chapter to the u. S. And europe, 1900 to 1914, along similar lines. For most recent book is jimmy carter in africa, race and the cold war, which will be published by Stanford University press this spring. Help me in welcoming nancy mitchell. Thank you very much. Thank you and christopher organizing this panel. I just have to brief comment to make. The first, i will begin with a comment, which is imagine yourself trying to convince a haitian or a dominican or a nicaraguan that 1916 was a turning point. I think that would be a very difficult thing to do. I have no ambiguity in my answer to the panel question, which is absolutely in terms of the caribbean and Central America, 1916 was not in the least a turning point. It wasnt as julia irwin says in her paper, it wasnt even a new chapter. It was pure annuity from the 1890s, particularly from the spanish american war. Right on through, i think you could really make a strong argument, right on through, with total continuity to the present day, with a few little blips along the way. If there were to be a break, a turning point, i think we might have expected it in 1913 when wilson came into office. The fact that there wasnt any turning point in 1913 i think explains why there wasnt a turning point in 1916. Wilson, and particularly William Jennings brian, who became his first secretary of state, campaigned rhetorically in a way that might have led some very optimistic or naive lawtons to have expected a change. And yet, when wilson comes into office in 1913, he absolutely continues to have stellar diplomacy. In fact, only intensifying it. Intensifying it both in terms of economic and military penetration of what was called americas backyard. The reason i think is very simple. By 1913, the United States had significant vested interests already in the region. And secondly, in a costbenefit analysis, the costs of applying and asserting and tightening american hegemony in the caribbean and Central America were negligible compared to the benefits. The benefits werent great, but the costs were so low both in terms of military expenses for the United States, blood and treasure, economic expenses, but also in terms of public opinion. Public opinion in the United States and the United States congress and the United States press and also in europe. By 1913, and certainly by 1916, europe had ceded any rejection of american hegemony in at least north of the amazon. The war in europe expanded the opportunity for the United States to tighten its hegemony. It also made the United States even more, the u. S. Government, even more eager to assert, to establish stability in the region. When there was so much turmoil in europe, it became even more desirable to try to impose a date. What americans considered stable governments in the countries of Central America and the caribbean. When the election of 1916 occurred and wilson said that he wanted to keep the United States out of war, there were of course u. S. Troops in haiti and Dominican Republic and in nicaragua. He did not need the United States to intervene in every country in the caribbean and Central America. And away, its a little bit like lynching. You dont need to lynch everybody. You lynch some people and that is the lesson that people learn. It is very possible to intimidate. In 1918 and 1919, intensifying american control over the region, wilson, despite his rhetoric that he was saying at that moment and versailles, crushed revolt in the Dominican Republic and in haiti mercilessly. So i would say absolutely no turning point if you look at it from the Vantage Point of the caribbean and Central America. The second point that i want to make is that this matters. It isnt just, oh well haiti, the Dominican Republic, lets look at france and england and what they say. No, i would make the very strong argument that it is where the United States had latitude. Where the u. S. Government could do what it wanted. Where the United States government did not operate under strong constraints. You really get a sense of that government and you get a sense of Woodrow Wilson. If historians had reprioritized and looked more at wilsons policy in the caribbean and in Central America, it would not be a surprise as it seems to have been to some readers of the New York Times recently, that wilson was a racist. Its in this region that these very important aspects of wilson ianism become very clear. [applause] excellent. Next we turn to professor Benjamin Montoya for his insights. He recently earned his ph. D. From the university of colorado bolder. His dissertation in title asking measurable harm, the diplomacy of immigration restriction in u. S. Mexican relations, considers how american efforts to place a quota on mexican immigration affected Foreign Policy between the two nations. He is coed under and contributor to beyond 1917, American Legacies of the great war, forthcoming from Oxford University press. He recently began teaching for the International Affairs department at the University Colorado boulder. Please help me in welcoming professor montoya. [applause] good afternoon. I think my comments will tell yes votes in a moment, but we will see. A raid on mexico in march 1916 would market permit and u. S. Mexican relations. After that year, the United States would never again directly or indirectly try to steer the course of mexicos revolutionary politics. After its beginning in 1910, the United States was keenly interested in what was going on in mexico and really try to put a lot of effort into basically shaping the direction of that revolution, largely through regime change, largely through the denial of arms and so on. I will give a few examples. So in late 1912 and early 1913, the u. S. Ambassador to mexico under taft, he played a key role in orchestrating the demise of the president. Moderna was viewed as ineffectual in protecting u. S. Interests in mexico, whether they had to do with business or special property. The following year in 1914, Woodrow Wilson denied arms to a regime in mexico city by authorizing the occupation of the party very crews. This action was pretty much done to aid his revolutionary enemies, two of which included poncho villa and [inaudible]. Woodrow wilson would later act a similar act and a poncho villa. He prohibited the sale of arms. They just recognize the government and trying to crush it. By 1916, by the year of the columbus raid by the year of the punitive expedition that would follow this raid, wilson and u. S. Government had and its diplomatic repertoire at the idea of using intervention to try to steer the course of the mexican revolution. What is different about 1916 is that columbus and the punitive expedition, it brought risks and dangers to the u. S. Government that they did not anticipate and probably did not face in other parts of Central America. It probably speaks to the distinct nature of u. S. Mexican relations. It speaks to the distinct details of the mexican revolution and its pilots. In short, what happens in 1916 is wilson almost goes to war with mexico. Despite his effort to avoid war, the punitive expedition in a bizarre way is a way to find a balance between public animosity, or public anger about the columbus raid in the United States, at the same time as hes trying to apprehend via and government. The paradox is only one of those goals is accomplished. Its hard to describe the punitive expedition so briefly, but the longer short of it is this. For the better part of the year, six to 12,000 u. S. Troops in the Northern State of chihuahua in mexico searched for punch over the and were never able to find him. They face hostile locals and rain. They specially face trouble from the government in mexico city. Throughout that year, he will give repeated warnings to the u. S. Government. The longer they are in our country, the more likely what will occur. These are empty warnings. There are several skirmishes between mexican troops and u. S. Troops. When i say mexican troops, i say qurans is forces and not potential villas troops. By the summer of 1916, probably during the events that we are talking about already, war is almost brought between the two countries. The tensions are eventually disabused through prisoner exchange. By the end of the year, both countries negotiate a withdrawal of the u. S. Troops. The final contingents of troops leave in early february of 1917 but there are consequences to this turning point. We will never again seen mexico after 1916, this will be the case for the rest of the region, but in mexico we will never see such direct kind of pointed efforts to steer politics in that revolution. There are consequences. A lot of them are negative and most of them affect mexico. The first one of these consequences has to do with the fact that the mexican that corranzas government is stabilized. His attempt to bring stability back to mexico is deeply