Transcripts For CSPAN2 Federal Officials Discuss Government Surveillance 20161014

Show being lived on facebook. They have their own, to pardon the reference, they have their own peanut gallery and they go through their life stars so being talk radio in la, i walk in the studio and my show was there and all the lights were on, i didnt have to do a monologue, i served those polls i handled them was all i had to do, i didnt have to think of something or get going. Today, being on the radio is not that big a deal as it was. One subject an hour. Breaking news on wednesday, they insist on knowing whats happening at that minute, they need to know what youre doing is true because there is an incredible appetite and we all may do that in the states, they call me up one day after the hewitt show, thank you for your comments. I decided i would talk about my football draft. And the old competition, you know how they do. And if a listener wants, listen. They will dial in to espn, that went on but thats what they want, breaking news, fairly presented. And from a point of view they can understand. From the people who are winning at the top of the wind, to the left, npr did not block it and i want to go back to your greater points, npr blocks the development of centerleft radio because it is centerleft. Its actually way left radio and the bbc exists and of course theyre going to block it so how you make your way is admirable because you are up against government subsidized competition and god forbid the trend comes back because that is just local content, that is just the hand of government telling people what they want and the case of what i give them, breaking news wrapped up with analysis and guess is not what they get for the government to make their choice, that will be a management. You deserve that to go. What tom hartman has done is amazing. Its his own platform, he has a Critical Mass of listeners that makes a difference in an industry that is not fair. I dont want to see the fairness doctrine come back joe because this side of that point, i have to answer it because nobody else did is that when there was a fairness doctrine there was such a thing as a talk radio industry and there were a few talkshows here and there and most of them didnt talk about politics and a rational governmenthand is going to step in and tell them what they can or cannot do. Or worse yet, take away the license. You could this michael because every year you annually hosted a Talkers Convention in new york and we talk about industry and there are a lot of people in our industry that are sitting on the sidelines of talk radio trying to make the sale that all of us are making a mistake by listening to politics at all. Thats another issue, ill address it. Theres nothing wrong with talking about politics but there are so many singles out there that dont have ratings, dont have business, why cant they talk about Something Else . Why does it only have to be politics . This twodimensional thinking is the people that are talking politics should stop talking about politics and Start Talking Something Else. Number you cant talk about politics too much. Its an important topic, it will never go away. People that apolitics, they dont know history. Politics is forever. But politics is huge, but when you think about all the frequencies out there, all the possibilities out there, even within your own shows, the diversey you could bring as human beings on the air within your show, as larry pointed out, it is a shame theres no other kind of talk radio in politics and sports right now. The great thing about this election, it has both politics and lots of sense. I want to say one thing and then i will stop, im trying to talk as little as possible but have you noticed we havent talked about that . The fairness doctrine, and illbe openminded about it. Im not looking for government and i dont want to seem insensitive to it. I just enjoy that critical thinking. I just enjoy listening to both sides. I enjoy being able to see both sides of it and being able to understand both sides of it. Then coming to a conclusion. I just miss those days and if a program is going to do it voluntarily, i really mean that but you dont hear that now. It just doesnt exist. Joe . You tune into the show and you say i think, i may be wrong. I do need to this particular frequency and itseems like , not just seeing things differently. Its like sports radio, sports homey is a talk radio thats supportive of the local team thats paying him or her for the job. We have a lot of homeys on talk radio, political talk radio but heres the problem in my opinion. We have a poll in which we seek victory at the expense of others. We seek victory at the expense of truth as opposed to seeking truth at the expense of victory and thats why debate and deception and the left and right for the sake of the productive result has gone out of style because nobody is listening to anybody other than what they think so i have a question for each of you, were coming toward the end. I have one question for each of you and some thought. We will start with, and im going to bounce around, im not going to do in order so you dont know where its going to go, be ready. If the election were held today, you think the result would be any different than if it were held six months from now, one month from now or two weeks ago . Do you think there is an Undecided Group in this country, this time around that makes a difference . Any of this discussion, all these debates is having any impact . Tom. Yes i do. I dont think there are undecided people within the democratic signal. Thats just whats happened since last friday. When the second debate went out about donald trump and now youve got not just voters but republican elected officials who are running for the exits so its not impossible, its something similar, not something similar sexually but something equally newsworthy i suppose where you would come out outside of secretary clinton or somebody out of the campaign, its possible something is coming out about donald trump. The old clichc is any journey in politics, its true. Its historically been true but personally i dont think it matters anymore. Weve heard it all. We have National Debates in which the commentators tell you whats going to be talked about and what the candidate should say in order to win. Its like sports. If tom brady has a good day throwing the ball, they will make more points. Great. If it turns out to be the case whether i or russia. Whether its in public, it is a disqualifying knowledge that they are going to make in the next month so it could change quickly. Chris . 100 percent agree with you on that. I wouldnt have taught a major president ial candidate would be caught on videotape sneezing and being lifted into a van three months ago. She was. Ive thought that was devastating and now thats all but forgotten. I agree, i think if secretary clinton has another Public Health episode it could be a game changer but anyone who is trying to predict whats going to happen in this election cycle is really playing the fools game. Ive only made one prediction early on in 2016 when i said on the air that bush would not be the nominee even though all the polls said that he would. Back to that quickly, if you havent seen this such as a giant frontrunner early on, i think mitt romney may have gotten back in. I think he thought jed had locked up all that establishing the money and he wasnt going to be able to compete so he stayed out and met ronnie running again, i think this would be all over. Interesting choice. We are on uncharted territory. If i can just make a protection and be accurate, yes. On the other hand weve never had so much early voting going on. If we can tabulate those results, it wont matter what happens in two weeks if youve already cast your vote. Im actually opposed to all this early voting for that reason. Joe . Its really overnight in your lifetime of politics. Overnight so its the event, no question. Sit tight. I want to introduce the gentlemen who is extremely important in this whole thing happening. He is an upandcoming captain of industry in our great industry. I wish there were more like him. He is the ceo and founder of the media group based out of pennsylvania spreading into new york state, and eventually the world. He has a bold old Media Foundation which im proud to be on the board of directors, which has raised money to support Student Broadcasting and to the of the constitution in that regard. And peace a great broadcaster, and we owe him a debt service, and that for his service. And that is thence. Would you come up and say a few words . [applause] i want to thank the panel. That was great, wasnt it . What do you guys think . [applause] and really a debt to michael harrison. Theres no greater defender of our industry, radio goodness and right here. Please give him a round of applause. [applause] i also want to thank him for making today he one of my worst nightmares come true, which is having to speak after six great radio talk show hosts. I love radio. In full disclosure ive never been on the radio, probably should never be. Im an investor in greater. I believe in the medium. I got out of the air force in 2003 and put a company together to start to acquire radio stations. Im a big believer in the medium, particularly the medium of talk radio. I believe its a modernday town hall. I think its worth americans gather to listen about the issues of the day. It is the ultimate example of free speech and what it must be preserved. I also believe that it has a fantastic future. That we are living in the golden age of audio. The average consumers consuming i had a record clip. More information and more audio every single day. This is radio principle wheelhouse. What we do is create content at the end of the day. Radio today is not just on air. Its on air, online, mobile, social, live and local. Weve got a tremendous a great future. A talk radio medium i think is uniquely important, the most demanding media news and talk format. Its the hardest of the greatest host and it needs a bench. I am a big believer in young people getting into this, young people aspiring to want to do with the great folks here on this panel have done. As such, ive been honored to work with Hillsdale College help them get their first in rare station at the main campus in michigan. Radio free hillsdale. We have two great students. Raise your hand. Up, ma up, up. You guys are why we are doing this. All of this is for you. But general manager acknowledged earlier, hes teaching them radio, and we need that bench. We needed to continue to flourish for the sake of our country, the sake of the medium, and im really proud to been a part of that and what you think all of of you guys are coming here today. Thank you, michael. [applause] thank you very much. Thanks to Hillsdale College. And thank you to this panel. Im very proud to have moderated this panel. Thom hartmann, jesuit, joyce kaufman, joe madison, Larry Oconnor and chris stigall. We made it through 90 minutes of discussion about the most contentious issues of our time. The election of 2016 and we took a very high road and i am so grateful to all of you. And im so proud of our industry, proud of this audience, proud to be social with hillsdale, and i wish you all well. And that concludes this conversation. Thank you all. Thank you, michael. [applause] [inaudible conversations] this event with talk radio host on the president ial election will be available later today in our Video Library at cspan. Org. Overnight another life event, this one of Police Surveillance and due process and possible reforms with intelligence and privacy specialists. And so when sort of nice feature about the use approach is that we the people with clearances come in from outside to look at how things work. When we look at section 702, this was in 2013 after snowden, one thing we found was looking at concrete cases that seven go to see my quite a useful program. In other words, we had real doubts about section 215 Medicaid Program and recommended it be shut down basically. We a different view about the usefulness of seven go to where we thought we knew target specific people that are not in the u. S. , that are not u. S. Persons and you go through the procedures and compliance things that exist, thats getting Important Information from foreign Intelligence National security purposes. Thats one thing. We also had some concerns, and the concerns were about the uses possibly overtime. So our set of concerns were really about ways this could be used against u. S. Persons and mutilatemaybe later and talk toe can talk more about how much the same concern should apply to our friends lets say in germany or england as we do in the u. S. There were three recommendations we made as part of our overall recommendation. The first one was that we should purge certain information when we find out about it unless theres a clear for intelligence value. We find personal information in the database, that seven go to the collected from, then we should purge it from the u. S. Person part. Talking to becky before it sounds like a five year retention is what applies to that. Ppd 28, president president ial directive 20 responded to that sort of thing which is we get rid of it after a retention period. The second has to do with i think something thats closer to the chainlink fence id. In the old days there was a wall between private and foreign intelligence. Chainlink fence is not quite as solid and well. A stepping you through a chainlink fence, as well as that image. We recommended that evidence against u. S. Persons collected under 702, because they were never targeted, you cant target u. S. Persons, so if you find evidence incidentally about u. S. Persons we say we should have a prophylactic rule. We shouldnt use that evidence in criminal proceedings against u. S. Persons. And the idea there is if you want to be paranoid about Law Enforcement people, and theyve announced their own pile about how paranoid they are in the space, you can imagine and Law Enforcement system that says this is great. Lets use 702 to the maximum, a huge database with lots of u. S. Persons and then use it to prosecute against u. S. Persons. Basically you would be using the foreign intelligence backdoor to get into this ability to do things against u. S. Persons. Oneway ticket that pakistan reduce the use of the because you couldnt use as evidence in court. And then the third recommendation, thats not been adopted, it would be everything i think if it were, and in the third of our three recommendations and i will stop, is that in this hypothetical were paranoid huge database of 702, that might be a fun place to go search it you were Law Enforcement against u. S. Persons. And so rather than treating it as a sort of we have corrected this, lets go search it database, we should treat it as it was incidentally about u. S. Persons. It wasnt supposed to happen about u. S. Persons. The whole thing targets u. S. Nonpersons. If youre going to go into this database about u. S. Persons then you should have a warrant, that the should be the right kind of trigger of the right level of cost for that. And began talking to you before, the administration adopted a reasonably likely stand or Something Like reasonably likely is what . Or intelligence spirit for intelligence value. Theres been a not go have fun rule in the sense of Law Enforcement playing around with it, but there has to be a reasonable short of it having for intelligence valley because of the database. The best standard for nsa. And people have been around these, and theres published standards for other agencies . Do we know what any other agencies have said speak with yes. I bet sharon will cover the. I dont want to take her just the last thing, i have studied this on and off for a love you and they keep getting confused. Its complicated, hard to say right. It might or might not be true for other agencies. Theres a complexity to it but i think the overall idea is theres a reason to have targeting against nonu. S. Persons overseas when we think of foreign intelligence value. Thats valuable. And that we built safeguards around isnt what the review group try to be got spill thats the perfect segue. What id like to start with is how has pclob thought about restrictions and what recommendations have been made to change things . Thanks. I also want to thank the project for inviting me to participate today. First of all for those of you who may not be familiar with the privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, our agency is a fairly new independent Agency Within the executive branch created based on recommendation of the 9 11 commission and our mission is to review counterterrorism programs to ensure that appropriate balance National Security concerns with privacy and Civil Liberties. And in 2014 the board issued a fairly conference report analyzing section 702 program. Which included 10 recommendations. I wont go through all of those today but two of them are really relevant in todays discussion because they can focus on the process of querying information that had been collected. As im sure you all are familiar, this was looking at once to the collected seven today than how can and must go through and look at that and when they conduct searches using identifiers that may be social with the u. S. Person, we call that u. S. Persons query. This was an area of particular concern for the Board Members, and a great amount of focus because asked that he has made clear, this program did not initially target u. S. Persons. It cannot. The u. S. Persons are collected incidentally because they are on the other end of conversation with a target, for example. So the board to recommendations split out the fbi on the one hand and the cia and nsa on the other because they do have different standards in different practices. With regard to the fbi it was a twopart recommendation. First the Board Recommends the fbis minimization procedures should be updated to more clearly reflect the fbis actual practices including the frequency with which section 702 data may be searched when making routine queries as part of fbi assessments and investigations. And this is something that therefore it had learned in its review that this is a fairly common practice for fbi analysts to conduct searches the fbi holdings that would run against 702 data. The second part of the recommendation was that some additional limits should be placed on the fbis use and dissemination of section 702 data in connection with nonforeign intelligence criminal matters. I get to that in more detail in a moment. The second recommendation focus on the nsa and cia queries. And the board recommended that queries using United States person identifies really be permitted quote if the query is based upon a statement of fact showing that it is recently likely to return foreign intelligence information as defined in fisa. The board also recommended that the agencys issue some written guidance on what information and documentation would be required to meet this standard. I just want to note, passing that, stating she would not extend a new requirement to meditate greece. So just as an aside, the queries can be conducted through the content of the repositories containing content of communications and there may be separate queries other metadata. So should make that distinction. For both of these recommendations Board Members wrote separately to further refine their views. On recommendation to you regarding the fbi this consisted of additional short statements by each of the music played in what they meant by the additional limits they would like to see on the fbi when they conduct those queries. And on recommendation three with regard to the nsa and cia, there was a further divergence. They wrote separately to jointly recommend that beyond the text of recommendation three they would for the recommend requiring additional restriction on u. S. Person queries conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, namely seeking fisa Court Approval for United States persons identifiers that could be used for such queries. They want to a neutral and detached judicial officer of prudish a person queries. Identified. Is different from the review Group Recommendation that peter was just talking about him that although both would seek a judicial approval, then chairman mckeon and member walls would apply to some lower standard than a full probable cause standard and use the same standard that applies of the reason likelihood to return foreign intelligence information but they wanted a neutral decisionmaker. And Board Members collins also wrote simply to explain that it would not impose such a requirement for fisa Court Approval. And he noted instead based upon the boards review of the current use and quote Excessive Force a just person queries at the nsa and cia, which would ackerley characterized as rigorous, the majority has declined to recommend such a requirement. So before i turn this back over, i just went to pick up on what has happened since the board made this recommendation with regard to their implementation. So back in february of this year the board issued a short recommendation of assessment report, looking at where we stand on implementation of recommendation. With regard to recommendation number two on the fbi the board found that recommendation has been implemented. And this was done back in november of 2015, the fisa Court Approved revised updated minimization procedures or the fbi that incorporated changes that were designed to address those parts of the boards recommendation. The first part of the boards recommendation, make it more clear how quickly they would use these kinds of queries, or address but certain footnotes but do appear in the declassified version of minimization procedures that were released this past summer. And with regard to the recommendation for additional limits, and ive got this clear what i can see, unclassified, for the benefit of raj, the fbi implemented this by including the appropriate text and Footnote Four of those procedures. The actual test of footnote number four is redacted in the version that was put out this summer but i have some clue as to say it isnt there in footnote number four. Is their spirit do you know how many lines are blacked out speak with you can make your assessment. With regard to recommendation three on the cia and nsa, this is also addressed in november of 2015 when the fisa Court Approved revised minimization procedures for both of those agencies, and both included additional language to decide to implement the boards recommendations about the standards come and support us as that did indeed meet that recommendation. Those are both available in the unredacted in the declassified version of the minimization that came out this summer. Want the side is the board did assess the recommendation was still being intimated because with the cia, as we said in the february report, with respect to cias metadata queries using u. S. Persons identifiers, the cia accepted and plans to implement this recommendation as a refined internal processes for data management. The cias new minimization procedures do not reflect changes to government this recommendation with regard to metadata queries. That gets us in the weeds of the different agencies, but over all those either have been implemented via the agency or are in the process of being implemented. Thank you. You have seen these changes into the participate in the discussions whether with pclob full review group for Public Discourse the past few years. You know what the agencies are doing and put out publicly. What you see as some of the big picture issues coming up over the horizon when it comes to post collection use of intelligence information from your seat at the aclu . I want to talk of what the world that i worry about. Its there will be a sealed roosevelt once i think when we think about aclu worries about. We worry about her work with is a lot of collection. Not a dozen or a hundred emails or transactions a year but an order of millions. We worry about those databases and that information being used in part for domestic criminal enforcement. Not to protect National Security, not to find information about an up coming potential terrorist threat, but in your everyday normal criminal enforcement, in which case generally please would be inspired to go to a neutral judge and get award, demonstrating probable cause of someone whos actually makes a medic im for is accused of committing a crime. We worry about all that happened in the world were even if that information was gained and even if it was used in a criminal court, that person doesnt even know. They dont even have enough to say i think the nsa may have collected this and i like to challenge you because i think my rights been violated. So thats the world that we worry about. I want to talk about why i think some of the procedures are inadequate and are leading us closer and closer to this world. I think the first thing i want to highlight is weve been talking a lot about foreign intelligence. User becky and sharon say we are only keeping the stuff as for intelligence value. Or only clearing things if they this would return intelligence. What intelligence is an account with broad term . It could include lets say a journalist overseas communicating with a journalist confused about perhaps a drone program. It could include communications from human rights organizations about foreign policy. It could include information about everyday citizens abroad who are committing with their families in the u. S. Who may talk about issues surrounding Foreign Affairs. First of all we are doing with a situation where we are conceptualizing foreign intelligence. I think much of art than the public thinks we think for intelligence, what they think foreign intelligence taking stopping terrorist attacks and thats not what foreign intelligence needs in under many of these authorities. The second thing i want to talk about is now we have this trove of foreign intelligence information, and were going to allow agencies such as the fbi who also Law Enforcement authority to run queries on it. They are not just running queries in cases where they may want, again, gather information about upcoming terror plot. Theyre also running these queries are running queries on database is that include this information in your normal criminal case. We dont know how many times because despite many requests we dont have a sense of how many of those types of searches are performed but what we do know from reports that it may be substantial because that data is combing over other databases. If im fbi agent and begin an investigation i may do a query and that may involve databases that include foreign intelligence information. The third layer we are seeing increasing the come up is now i am worried not only have you collected information, you quit it and you want to use it for, in a criminal case. But maybe not even a criminal prosecution. Maybe to affect Something Else in my life. I now am subject to additional church, search. Just looking a lets a criminal prosecution, potentially one of the most damaging out of those three options is when not seeing people get noticed in court of how the information was collected. Section 702 is one of the provisions that you talked about. Prior to 2013, there was not one defendant who got notice. Apparently at some point there was a big examination, idg policy and there have been some notice, not a lot but some. We do not that notice is being interpreted. And whether really those provisions that require notice under section 702 are making sure everybody who has information used against them knows that and gets that so they can shout unconstitutional surveillance. We havent even seen an acknowledgment from the government that they have an obligation or duty to provide notice. And executive order 12333 its information through the course of the surveillance of the ultimate issues in a criminal prosecution we dont know whether the government takes the position that yes, they must disclose that to the defendant who can then challenge it. I raise these examples to i think bush is increasing evidence that authorities that have been developed and had been premised o on the idea can we nd this information to protect our country against terrorist threats or proliferation out of those authority are increasingly bleeding into everyday general Law Enforcement activities and there needs to be more to prevent against that lead. Thank you. As you can see we have a range of perspective on these topics and sometimes it can be easy to be dragged into the weeds on particular authorities, particular questions. I wanted to start our discussion with a basic principle just to see how folks react to it. When lawyers in the Intelligence Community think about minimization procedures, there is a holistic view, the legal approach taken. In other words, once a collection issue regime to the station on collection outlined with restrictions on use, sharing, dissemination. So in other words, viewing the use of information holistically. The implication of that is together broader at the front, perhaps more restrictions on how information is used and vice versa, its information is collected and more narrow perhaps theres more freedom to use that information. Our pictures to get perspective on the us of how we should be thinking about procedures generally . Should it be used holistically or should we go restrictions on use and sharing and dissemination separate and apart from how it is collected . If anybody would like to start, thats a general sense. If you like to start. I would say two things. Looking at the front it is important, so thinking about the backend so to speak. I think what to think about not just the quantity of information. I think it is relevant were not talking about 20 or 30 emails. Were talking potentially emails millions of emails to you. Should a Government Agency decide they want to mine the information, the applications at the number of people access is substantial. I think the second thing thats also important is to think about what is the front and protection . The intelligence contact and many of these authorities, the processor to go through to collect information is less than will be required in a general criminal court. So, for example, under executive order 12333 the government is difficult and to abide the court judge or a neutral arbiter said okay, this type of surveillance for this particular target is permissible. Even under 702 where the government goe does to the fisa court is not individualized review. You have to think about the lack of competenc competent to like s and was taken on the front end which then affects the backend and the risk you have from using that information. I also think its important to think about something we dont have data on, but is the way we query data, the type of collection, when we adopt procedures is equity disadvantage certain communities . Lets take a hypothetical scenario where most of the targets come from a particular country. Your incidental collection to your accidental collection may be likely to get information to individuals of some families in this country. If we have clearing procedures that are sort of dealing with is a data set that may have implications in terms of whether certain communes are impacted different and we should think about whether thats happening and if its happened what are some of the solutions. Yes, absolutely the holistic approach is certainly was what the board looked at. This comes from a number of sources. So under the Fourth Amendment, the board declined to express an opinion as well as whether there is a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement. Something the Supreme Court has not yet opined on. But looked generally to the Fourth Amendment regional test, which is a totality of circumstances test. That will look at the collection stage what is the standard, how high is the bark of what you need to show. And that will absolutely have an impact when you look at the totality of circumstances for when and how the government may access that information post collection. And things like query standards are relevant and what the standard should look like. The Board Members reached different conclusions the totality of circumstances and reasonableness doesnt necessarily leave all decisionmakers to the same exact conclusion. As they balanceed circumstances but they noticed in the criminal context if it were to get to that stage where the government wanted to use evidence derived from 702, they did recommend that where current policy does not already require approval of least the assistance of attorney general, they would require such approval before section 702 could be used in this context. They distinguished the investigation where they did not want to create greater barriers to that investigation being conducted to agency discover relevant information that they would need but at the stage looking at that kind of analysis. And one of the things i would point out, the board looked at this and al noted explicitly this is the same kind of analysis and the boards role fundamentally under our statute is to look as a policy matter at are we appropriately balancing National Security concerns with privacy and Civil Liberties and reasonable in test very much the inquiry. Thank you. So i think we absolutely used this process today. If we look at 702 and 333 and under usa freedom act and in each cases we have looked at totality. This question of the uses, its important to keep in mind that its very difficult tension where we are holding our Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement community to no bad things should ever happen. That puts a level of incentive to do as much as possible with no intention of some of these possible impacts but we are sort of setting this expectation up and we want to think about how do we build the safeguards in and then not turn around when the next thing happens and say, will, you could have connected these dots because these were here, and so every one of these policy conversations its important to have both of those in your head. We need to have both of these. We cant have all National Security without any privacy left us in no better place. All privacy and no National Security is equally not going to leave us in a better place. The question of how we take those both and the holistic view has been our approach, there have been lot of conversations of use restrictions so we see those in usa freedom acts in terms of things like you can only disseminate act for terrorismrelated purposes. Thats one of the first reasons we start today draw the lines in this context. Those are hard conversations, hard policy discussions that our policy makers need to have and we want to think about, how do we begin to build those and where do we make sure that ultimately we are not using foreign intelligence for some of these down downstream issues. I would like to talk about conditions, limits in commercial sector because they get talked about a lot over there and that might shed some light. Theres been a process called the do not track process which is one of the rules for companies. And the it turns out that the way the internet works out, theres a tremendous amount of collection that happens logging your website visits, cookies, making sure the advertisements are placed properly, fraudulent. Just to run the online system, theres unbelievable amount of collection that didnt existence years ago and we didnt have the internet and so if youre going to try to figure out what it means to have less tracking or protection through privacy you get pushed to use limits because theres enormous logs on the collection side and i think that part of why we are having this talk about 702 is that in a world where theres censors and logs in lots of places for both commercial and noncommercial purposes, we are going to have a lot of collection in ways that didnt use to happen. How often are you going to be on camera as you walkthrough the city today compared to ten, 20 years ago. Theres a tremendous amount of collection that happens. Thats why i think this conversation that constitution project asked us to come to, i think this is really important because in a world of internet of things of sensors everywhere, just because they happen for a lot of reasons, we are going to have discussions and you cant avoid it. This is a good setup for the next question i want to pose of you. We have tayloring tailoring based on restrictions and if one might think of use of sharing and dissemination what are the types of factors folks should be thinking about is important, is it the nature of the data at issue, is it how the information can be used or not used in certain context, is it the standard for using that data. To your minds, what are the key vectors that we should all be thinking about is important for the Intelligence Community to incorporate into the sorts of restriction . I dont know if anybody has a start, but i will start with you, youre willing to give it a go. Sure. I think all of the things you listed are relevant. All maybe focused on one that are two most important. One, i think that ensuring theres judicial oversight. When the government speaks to query information or when the government seeks to use information is important. In the 702 context, there isnt a ton of frontend judicial oversight. People may differ on how substantial they think it is. Theyre not approving individual targets or individual collection. Theyre approving the program at a Program Level with oversight. In 333 you dont even have that initial approval. I think that to the extent particularly when youre talking about information that the government seeks to query that information, that it should be going to court and getting order. I see that as one of the most powrnt important restrictions. Foreign intelligence is often broad. We have had the conversations in usa freedom act. How can we sort of cabin the type of dissemination and use that we are going to have . Third, i think that we really need to think about whether we want to have wholesale prohibition on use of domestic criminal enforcement like recommended. We shouldnt be using information thats collected for intelligence purposes for general everyday domestic Law Enforcement because we have a process for that and, you know, Law Enforcement goes to court, they get court orders, they get warrants to do that. So those are the top line things i think of ascii reforms and issues when we talk about whats important. Sure. I would say yes to all of those things that you listed. I knew i liked you sharon. The nature of the data in this context what we are talking about, communications, difference between collecting content or meta data. That was meta data and the board did talk about how that also can be highly revealing of sense of personal information and have privacy implications as well. Generally theres a consensus that people treat content as typically being more revealing, have greater privacy implications and so content is treated differently than meta data so this is relevant as well just as what restrictions versus post collection restrictions hereto you would draw distinctions. Its being collected for that. Thats what the nsa and cia certainly are all about. The fbi also has the Law Enforcement mission. When you bring in the Law Enforcement function, then you have much more front and center people, Fourth Amendment right, criminal procedure right. And so thereto likely different standards. I talked a little bit before how Board Members addressed that in the criminal context being implicated and whether its the u. S. Or not, now this has changed somewhat with president ial policy directive 28 that becky talked about a little bit that president issued back in 2014 as policy matter to provide enhanced protections to nonu. S. Persons. Typically and historically grounded in the Fourth Amendment and u. S. Persons are the ones who are recognized to have Fourth Amendment rights. We have applied greater protections to information regarding u. S. Persons and that has even through ppd28 that continued to be the case that u. S. Persons have greater rights and their data should be handled with special handling restrictions. First of all, its sort of nice to have Say Something nice about the board. [laughter] this is a report where theres a lot of skepticism about effort on Civil Society from where we started. People have found reasons to see usefulness and a lot of things have been accepted. The two themes that i think nima and the review group agreed is we want to be careful about using this data in criminal trials against u. S. Persons and careful about creating a database that gets searched indiscriminately. And you can have lots of different standards of exactly how strict you are there but i think those are issues that deserve serious discussion. I do want to talk a little bit about u. S. Persons and not. Im spending about surveillance law of decision makers. Europe isnt thrilled with the nsa. They have concerns. We might get cut off of data by the european privacy laws in various ways. Im going to talk about ppd28 in this context. Here is a reason to really be extra carefully careful of u. S. Persons. One is the Fourth Amendment applies. Beyond that, when you think about checks and balances and surveillance, you dont want to have surveillance agencies going after political opponents. Watergate was a breakin into Opposition Political Party headquarter, the Democratic National committee. When you have that attack on opponents, you can be into slide of bad things. Thats the special reason to be specially careful about u. S. Persons against checks and balances in political abuse. Ic what happened with the discussions with europe in the last few years, since 2013 specially, is the europeans are saying basically, hey, we are people too, im german, british, french, we deserve to be treated as ally and not be indiscriminate target of surveillance. Why should the nsa have open season on me. I thought we lived in a democracy. I shouldnt be a target like this. And so the pushback from, i think, a reasonable place in the european side has been, dont treat our citizens as just targets whenever you feel like, have some thoughtfulness, sure, go after the terrorists, suspects but dont go after the butcher and the baker and the candlestick maker. The u. S. Privacy act was just for u. S. Persons, we are going to expand it basically to allies and now germans and french or whatever. I dont know if any countries have any countries have been lifted yet . I dont think so. Once theres right certification we will treat under privacy act. The point im heading is if we have the post election debates in the United States leading up to the sunset next year, i sure hope the europeans are going to say, hey, what about us, stop indiscriminate searches for criminal proceedings or searching more generally for nonforeign intelligence purposes, stop those more broadly. Whatever protections you give the u. S. Persons, you should follow the president ial policy and have protections for the european allies as well. Im not sure that washington is ready for that discussion. Im not sure people have worked through what would that mean and whats doable about it and whats not doable about it. But i think that europe will push back as part of the 2015, they are very aware. The European Commission is very aware that 702 is up for renewal next year and the u. S. Government has even mentioned, by the way, if you dont like 702 today, wait until next year and you can weigh in on the congressional process. We are going to have, i think, europe and other allies weighing in on this process and its going to threatened our ability to say u. S. Persons only because Foreign Affairs reasons, we are going to have some way to talk to europe about why they deserve the same respect for their citizens as the u. S. Gives to its own citizens. So i guess maybe i will just start and work my way down. [laughter] all the way to the bottom. Or all the way to the top. I want to clarify, did i hear that you thought we should have a fifth, some sort something any time we do a query or just on u. S. Persons because im not sure why we have a Foreign Intelligence Agency if we have to go to the fifth every time i have a foreign intelligence query i want to do. You know, heard you and others say that they dont run on content. I dont know if we have more information if they are run on meta data. To the extent that queries are being run, thats also concerning and you want to go to the fifth and get the appropriate levels of approval. I understand that. I wanted to lay out that i dont think we want to have an Intelligence Committee that every time we look at foreigners outside of the United States that we are going to the fifth to do a query because you would stop the Intelligence Community largely there. Were designed to do these things. The europeans might. The europeans might. Those are going to be really interesting conversations. They have a. Different approach to what it is. I think to peters point, i have as we have had these conversations want to make sure that we arent losing u. S. Person protections for exactly that. When the Intelligence Community when the intelligence functions starts to look inside borders historically that hasnt worked well for other countries. Wing we want to be thoughtful as we have conversations with the europeans that we arent someone diminishing the protections that we do have in place for u. S. Persons, and so under 12333 there arent u. S. Person queries allowed and right now i understand when you look at all the procedures in place, it can be difficult for you to point to that. And so as we are working through process, the department of defense issued new ag guidelines for generally under 12 triple 3, guidelines refer today classified annex are being now worked, now that we have the broader document and we are looking at these questions so that youre not having to back your way through that process but i will just say that you have to sort of draw a couple of lines, its not clearly obvious and i appreciate what that is but we are trying to work on the next wasnt. That being said, when we do training, thats one of the biggest training ones. All the nsa employees that have access have to take a number of different training courses. I dont routinely have access but i take all of the training and finished it last week because it was going to expire and and its sort of, you know, really important things like you have to go ask for all sorts of permissions and all sorts of processes if you wanted to get a u. S. Person. Thats a u. S. Person query. Thats a key function. When i get to a foreigner, if you tell me i cant do foreign queries, peter, what are we doing . I think thats right. Its not 702, we have to have a foreign intelligence purpose against the foreign purpose outside the United States and we have to document that. That was one of the requirements thats put in there. Its not every foreigner is now targeted under 702. Not everyone is you have to have gone through that process and it is it is not the sort of bulk collection on all foreigners everywhere under 702. So we put but because its not that, you have fewer protections around some of the u. S. Person queries. When we get to 12 triple 3, its a broader collection and we start to put more control and safeguards in there. I do think we have an Intelligence Community that is designed to find out what is happening outside the United States to protect the United States from any number of different issues and if we want to you know, we need to have a discussion, sort of policy makers about what you want your Intelligence Community to do. And if youre not comfortable, if we are not comfortable with the authorities that we have given the Intelligence Community, that is absolutely what we need to be thinking about as a democracy and that is where we have to think about. How are the different forms of government really engaging in that conversation . Certainly a lot of conversation was had after snowden, have we really thought about all of those . Those are great conversations and thought pieces we need because not everybody in the United States can have access to the intelligence to the level and degree thats going to make each person everywhere feel comfortable that their Intelligence Community is doing the right thing. We wont have any intelligence. The foreign targets are going to go and figure those things out. I cant put all of the there are good people in the United States over here and tell you what the Intelligence Community is doing and then, okay, if i have my list of bad guys. You dont get to know this. It doesnt work that way. We have to think about how we build the proxies in. Oversight has been mentioned a few times in the conversations and there are a number of overseers in this area. So we have the privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. New folks on the area here. We have the office of director for national intelligence, department of justice, we have the congressional committee. There are a number of folks and internal at nsa, we have a number of folks who are specifically foe focused on oversight and compliance in addition to assistant general. One of the questions as we go through discussions particularly in 702, we shall say are all of our oversights working . Do we have too many of them . Do we have not enough . Are people held accountable and responsible for those activities . I have seen a few times folks say, well, if i have one more person checking to make sure this was the right target, thin that will make sure that we are weve got all the targets correct and it turns out that thats actually people start to lose accountability, the more people they think up are going to find the problem. And so we want to think about how do we design these different activities. Thank you. Can i go back. Yeah. Something that we sort of lost a little bit in the conversation, i mean, when becky was talking about 702 and being a targeted program. I think we lost what a large shift 702 fundamentally was in the term in the way it approached foreign intelligence collection and how that reduced many of the protections and procedures in the backend protections havent been sufficient to address that shift. I mean, youre talking about switching from an infrastructure where intelligence courts are approved individual targets and you have to show somebody with foreign power, relatively narrow criteria and you shifted to a program that provides much less oversight on the front end that are approving procedures and not individual targets and awr youre able to target people for much broader circumstances. The front and large affects what we have to do and affects whether we think queries without oversight in the 12 triple 3, for example, are appropriate. Foreign entities sharing information with us and not wanting to create a global race to the bottom. I want to make sure we werent losing that. We are in a different moment now in terms of collection and that very much affects how we think about these programs and whether the protections are sufficient. In debates about how Technology Changes standards, theres often at least two ways to talk about the status quo. So youve correctly said, here is why we have fewer protections than we used to. We used to have warrants and judges and individualized decisions and now we only have 702. Another perspective is communications lets just say between france and pakistan in the old days and now the email gets intercepted in the United States, in the old days that would have been a 12 triple 3 very few safeguards compared to Fourth Amendment and now raised to 702. To the extent 102 702 is about foreign targets for eem overseas, you can see raising the standards compare today what it used to be. Because its being done in the United States, its lowering the standard. Each side has a good claim for why theyve lost something in this new thing wife since 2008 in section 702. The perhaps Silver Lining or im not sure what the best term is on unauthorized disclosures by snowden is we have had public debate because of unique context and there being leaked information the intelligence agencies made an extreme effort to try and declassify a lot of information that was previously declassified and in particular with the boards report on section 702 we were able to obtain declassification information and pretty big report. [laughter] of that program. Now, there are certain details that remain classified and this is a unique context and its not that i would expect that the intelligence agencies are going to declassify everything, they cant. That wouldnt be effective. We do have a greater commitment to transparency and the creation of beckys position. The fact that becky is here on this panel is really, i think, a change and as we come into this debate in 2017 over reauthorization of section 702, i think the good thing to look at is now there can be a very informed public debate based on a lot of facts of how the Program Actually has been operating and a commitment by the intelligence agencies to engage and have that debate largely and there will be classified details and im sure classified briefings to the intelligence oversight committees but i think thats also an important change that should be recognized. Yeah, i think theres definitely been a shift towards transparency. Do i want to emphasize, theres key facts and key pieces of information that we are missing whether its 702 next year or 12 triple 3 in the future. One of the Key Information that becky knows about is the number of u. S. Persons that have their information collected under 702. This is something that in the report they mentioned they didnt have this information. Its something that civil liberty groups and members of congress have keen to have. To have a sense of what is the scope of Information Collection and how does that impact our rights and implications of people in the u. S. I suspect that we would want information for some 12 triple 3 programs. Thats a good thing. It would be great to be able to test that over time, right . Are we really shifting a lot of our connection into 702 . Is the 12 triple 3 problem not as big as i fear and others fear . Before i open it up, please think of questions. I will in a moment. I wanted to come back to this question 702 since we have talked about it and its up for reauthorization next year and the question of queries of u. S. Personal information has been a flash point in the discussion, its amazing how peoples reaction who dont think about this all of the time vary depending on how the issue is presented to them. If you were to say to somebody, you need a warrant to target a u. S. Person somewhere in the world for surveillance, how is it that you can search on their name in this sea of information and you dont need a warrant . From one perspective it seems like a back door loophole. On the other hand, we have Legal Authority to collect all of this information. I could read it from front to back. Im behind. Im 10,000 pages behind. If i can Read Everything collected, im obligated to do it, how can you tell why should it be the case that i need a warrant to do my work more efficiently . Thats the perspective an analyst might bring. How do we help the public bridge basically two world views, the review group, whether its Judicial Intervention or level of standard and you can see how people who fit in different places in the world view this question completely differently. I would ask for you to think about, folks here which version of the world should they pick and why . The review group, we have finished our report near the end of 2013 and the clubs very fantastic and large report on 102 happened after that and i just have no idea whether we would have come out with exactly the same words if we had had as much study on 102 specifically. I think we did flag it as an issue but i would more say its an issue that needs to be resolved rather than say i know what the right standard should be. Got you. Add to this as you think about it, i will give you more seconds to think about it. Now theres judicial authorization for queries. We have seen a model that we move today judicial authorization but in many ways its a different beast entirely. Its meta data and not content. Should we look to the 2015 program as a model for thinking about queries in other areas . I think your question goes back to totality approach and depending on how you look at that and what your view is of the frontend collection and to what extent you want to balance that with post collection standards and and requirements and that is very much going to affect the lens that you see it through and how you want what kinds of standards you want to create and different people are going to see that differently. Becky, how would you defend the person on the street that says you need a warrant to target me and why you can do a search on my name . What i was going to say is we are relatively new into this concept of transparency with the Intelligence Community. You know, my job is new. Ive been there two and a half years. We now have privacy officers at cia. These are new roles in figuring out how to be more transparent, its going to be an eversortofchanging process. We have increased the amount of protections under 702 versus nimas perspective. One of the things thats important is make sure we truly are talking about the same set of facts to the extent that those are not classified and weve really worked to do that, so whether you think you should have a warrant to do the u. S. Person query or not based on how we think about these things, what i think has been really positive is the fact that we are now talking almost about all the same. So nima and i can totally disagree on this but disagreeing based on own policy perspective as oppose today truly different facts and thats where we want to be in terms of the transparency. I dont know whether im going to defend whether there should or should not be a warrant. Thats sort of the standard today but we can now have the discussion which is a option that we have in the space. How transparent can we be so that we are not giving means and methods and say, okay, how do appear to be these activities, i want to have National Security and Civil Liberties, surveillance, how do we bring those two together and how do we build those, and so, you know, that is part of what our democracy is meant to do. So im not going to defend one thing or the other but i do think that its important that we are able to start having that conversation. How would you talk to agent in nsa, youre telling me to review this stuff and now youre telling me to get a warrant for it . How do you explain to an everyday person in this context you get a warrant and in this context you use a much different standard, you know, i think that when we conceptualize that we have to understand the harm is similar in those circumstances, right . If im a journalist and im worried about information getting out about my sources or im an attorney who is worried about attorneyclient privilege. People say that. We have seen documentation or reports after snowden revelations talking about the effect of knowing that the nsa can collect information having a real effect. I think that thats one of the reasons that we argue for higher protections and close e to criminal context. The information the speech maybe chilled and the information in a criminal prosecution similar to domestic criminal Law Enforcement and i think we cant lose the reality which is that the effect can be the same for some people regardless of the message theyre using. Thank you. A chance to ask questions. If i could ask you to speak into the mic so recorders get it and if you could identify yourself, that would be great. Okay. Carl, net choice, i think the panel has layed out, becky on one end and nima on the other and peter get stuck in the middle. Throughout we have been hearing about security versus privacy. There are a number of other factors that i was wondering if, you know, peter with your group that you were considering when you were going through reviews such as the impacts on american businesses, on a global scale . We have seen harbor take a hit because of that and the impact of the u. S. Reputation and reliability on being able to actually spouse freedoms and not having any other country say, you do this, you do that. Was that part of your consideration, the multitude and other factors . I can answer it. Our charge from the president included looking at Foreign Affairs including effect economics, it included National Security, private and Civil Liberties and maintaining trust and the fifth thing was trying to stop los leaks. Our report had a lot of recommendations about u. S. Place in the world. In some of them are obscured that we are pointing out. One of the ones is we created a process for sensitive intelligence collection including for heads of state that there be a white house process thats more thorough that includes state and includes commerce to think about what the targets are, so rather than having at the extreme allowlevel analyst says lets go in and after head of state, i dont think it worked that way before but as an extreme, now theres a more thorough prioritys process before that happened and thats bringing Foreign Affairs and other kinds of concerns. Another theres a whole set of other safeguards, some of them are in ppd28. A lot of people in europe think the u. S. Uses this stuff to help u. S. Business get a commercial advantage. And our report say that is based on our view u. S. Policy was not to do that, we the United States does do surveillance in the realm of commercial for things like sanctions against iran because otherwise its pretty hard to enforce sanctions but its not used to be handed off to u. S. Business and ppd28 say that is explicitly. So theres been and if you go through and ive got writings up of which recommendations have been accepted or not, theres numerous ways the administration has, i think, very thoughtfully made changes to say this is how we are trying to have an overall information infrastructure that works for our multiple goals and its not just security privacy. We have to have an internet that works for free speech and many, many other things. So unlike the president s review group whose mandate did explicitly include matters, our statute does include board focus and National Security concerns and privacy and lifl Civil Liberties and the policy meshed up with the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test. They have pointed out in that context, in that context and in those engagements that other countries also treat their own citizens more favorably in surveillance context and have also pointed out that none of them have an oversight entity like the privacy of civil lights Oversight Board so our nation is actually trying to take steps to conduct that oversight and to maybe we have one up on them in that context as well. By the way, i dont know what that description of everyone sitting but [laughter] i guess its all a matter [laughter] my name is richard, i have a question for nima particularly on the Fourth Amendment and if im an attorney trying to make a motion to suppress claiming a Fourth Amendment violation fruit of the poisonous tree, is the judge who might be hearing this motion because its a constitutional issue, is the administrations current policy any way relevant . Its relevant in that you might not even will make the motion that allows you to file motion for suppression. So if i dont ever get notice because the governments interpretation of derive is narrow and lets say incorrect, the individual defendant doesnt get notice and cant take it to the attorney and the attorney cant file suppression and say the evidence was not submitted in court because it was gathered connell institutionally. I heard illusion that is they use fruit of the poisonous tree analysis but we dont have the legal opinions that actually say here is how we interpret our notice obligations and we know that in certain contexts like 215 the government said actually we dont have notice obligation and so i think i dont know if im answering your question but thats how i think its relevant to actual people affected by this collection. Im so grateful that you are there. I have a target of prison surveillance. Ididnt understand it until i saw the snowden movie. I didnt know what to do. I tried to get lawyers and people kept saying, well, youre not supposed to know about it. Theres nothing you can do and i went to members of congress that werent aware of this type of surveillance happening in america and when i was i found out that there was nothing, i didnt know anything, i get it. What i wanted to find out political. People who wanted to be future appointees have access to data. Is there any way that we can protect that data, prison data on american citizens and i want to fight back because thank you, if you have any comments, that would be great. Let me start and rephrase the question. I dont think, correct me if im wrong, theres a basis for a potential employee to have access to raw intelligence in the community. You can tell me from your reviews whether thats true or not but perhaps the underlying question is how do we protect against abuse of access of Intelligence Data . And thats a really important question that we worry about all day every day. We have a number of layers of processes starting with training, training our employees when they walk in the door with what the authorities are, what are u. S. Persons, how do we protect those and having compliance checked all the way through the process whether its something as two people have to put their eyes on it before we decide that we want to actually target an individual for collection or whether theres things like technical post query reviews. Theres a number of the safeguards in place as it relates to specifically roth. Thats just nsa. You have a number of different Oversight Organization that is are making sure that what nsa they are doing and those protections are in place are being checked whether its by justice, congress or now by fifth or the privacy of Civil Liberties Oversight Board so there are a number of very specific oversight mechanisms to put in play to make sure that that how we are using the intelligence is consistent with the authorities that have been provided. And and employees have the ability to to talk to anyone with the Inspector General, they can actually come to our office or our general counsels office. If they have any concerns that they have done something wrong or someone else is doing, theres a place for people to have those conversations. Go ahead. So i hope i mean, what youre saying is a sad story and i dont know the facts of your story. Our review showed beginning around 2009 there was a big spikeup in the number of compliance personnel in the Compliance Office at nsa and we also specifically did a lot of look to see whether there was political targeting of any of the nsa stuff. We had among five members people with years and years of experience in the Intelligence Community and we look for this because if we found political tampering, thats super worrisome. We found no evidence of political tampering with the intelligence information at all. So i will just say i was looking i found no evidence to think that it was being used that way based on our review. And the boards review similarly did not find any such abuses of that kind. I think that, you know, the question also speaks to a broader problem which is lack of redress, people overseas, its not going to provide that much because its natural security exceptions. In the u. S. If you have a complaint, what are your avenues to redress . To me thats an area where we need to do a lot more work. Yes, sir. Hi, thank you all for being here today. So i heard quite a bit about some of the recommendations for former round defining the conditions under which certain queries can be conducted. Theres also been reference made to internal training procedures. You mentioned post query review. I wonder if theres been any conversation about more posttalk analysis of the way data is being used. For all the same reasons that collection has become and such that the users are conducting the analysis are generating data of how theyre interacting with it. Have there been any recommendations made on how logging are use today actively how the systems are being used apart from aggregate methods or things like that or actually doing investigations on how this data is used . Thanks. Theres a number of within nsa activities but also Inspector General goes through and is sort of looking at different ways the information is being used to make sure its consistent with the authorities. We also spend quite a bit of time in our office, civil lights and private office, i have a staff, we are part of the Senior Leadership at nsa, we are not sort of buried somewhere down but i report directly to the director and we look at some of the questions because just the query i have a selector and a pretty simplistic approach and we want to be used the same analytics in the private sector but in doing that we have responsibility that those are consistent with the authorities provided. We have a number of different mechanisms. I think your second one had to do with are we looking at audit logs and things that people are being consistent with the uses and there are different situations where, yeah, that would be used. So the board and 702 report did not make any specific recommendations in regards to audits. The report focused on efficacy and recommend that had the government should develop counterterrorism programs. Not just 702 program but more generally, are you getting what youre looking for, so when you have any kind of privety privacy intrusion to make that worthwhile as you balance, that should have the program itself have some value in getting the counterterrorism, and so at that level looking at the use is it appropriate or ineffective. You have people to do research demand the process o. In connection with the consideration of section 702 certificate application, i thought it said something about doing sample of targeting decisions that would allow look or maybe thats not right. I thought it was different. The board did recommend in the context of targeting that the court should have more information about actual practice. So tasking sheets and query are being turned over, thats in the ballpark, somebody going back afterwards to see what actual queries are being done and thats what i thought was the answer to the question. Thank you for a great panel. For those folks particularly at home who are saying librarians, what do they care about privacy, a lot. The foundation of democracy essentially, if you have a Chilling Effect you dont have intellectual freedom. You have a problem with your democracy. Against that backdrop i have been interested in the kind of perhaps natural tendency of the discussion to dye dichotomize a little bit. We have saying on behalf of the public, becky, not unreasonably and you with respect to the analysts, say trust us. So how do we bridge the gap is the question thats been posed. We certainly have a perspective and im asking from that perspective. As something who has been around washington for a long time and has done gorilla fighting what you want to do is what the other side is saying and undercut arguments. So, becky, i were you and maximize trust, what maximizes trust, well, whats the other side saying, warrants. Why isnt my question, finally, why isnt the Intelligence Community, maybe it is, sitting around saying, how do we salutely maximize the use of warrants in the process so people trust us more so we wont have to get a warrant every time we want to query information about somebody overseas. Isnt the bridge for that divide process in between from trusted entity like the courts and therefore why wouldnt we want to maximize the use of warrant as nima has suggested . As a practical matter as was noted in the transparency report, there are 94,000 targets under 702. As a practical matter i would agree with you trust us is not an acceptable answer. Forgive me, just to clarify, 94,000 warrants would be tough to arrange with respect to u. S. Citizens. Im sorry, with respect to u. S. Citizens. Again, if we are going back to u. S. Person queries and for 702, i will i will just say that there are many different perspectives on it. Im not going to give you one way or the other. I hear what you are saying. We had a little 4500 u. S. Person terms that were used in 2015, so i dont know what that would look like in terms of the process associated with getting a warrant for every one of those or how that would work, so im im going to not answer. Can i pick up on the 92 for a second . Sure. The target according to transparency report are 92,000 in a year. So you get numbers like one and a million or something for people outside the United States depending on where you do it. I dont know what the population of washington but baltimore 3 million, 3 million will be targeted under 702. The scale theres been talk about europe about massive surveillance and matching to three to four people in the whole Baltimore Area is a pretty different image. [laughter] if we were in paris if we were in paris would be ten. That might not give enough in paris given they have had problems there. We cant forget all the people those are the targets. That would be warrants. You would get everybody they talk to. Absolutely. Different frontend of protection in certain cases. Yes, maam. Im the director of National Security program in thirdway and full disclosure, im one of the drafters of 702. One of the things that we didnt when we wrote statute we were careful and thought about issues raised here today, use of foreign intelligence, because the intelligence jurisdiction does not include use in Law Enforcement context, the ways in which congress thought about protections for u. S. Persons were not as clear and were not as well articulated an well thought through as protections and limb limitations community side. I think nimas concerns about the use of u. S. Person information in the law context and failure to notice and how that information translate how intelligence information gathered absent a warrant translates to Law Enforcement context where a warrant is actually required is a concern that makes most americans really nervous about the statute. Im curious, did you intend to go back and look at questions about 702 information and whether or not not just in Law Enforcement context but in other contexts where rights were abridged like right to travel, how was that use with notice provided with the u. S. Person, what were the appropriate protections there and sort of relatedly when will the ploc will release second report. I dont know. On the first one, as nima pointed out the administrations policy is to provide notice at least current policy to provide notice when section 702 information is used in a criminal proceeding and as i mentioned a little bit high level before, this is an issue that split our board. All the Board Members called for additional restrictions on fbi queries that run across 702 data and when you look at foreign this is collected for foreign intelligence purpose. It was foreign intelligence crime. That was on one side but looking very much at this issue of nonforeign intelligence related more traditional crimes or drug crimes and so forth on how could this information be used, when should an agent have access to it and all the Board Members agree there should restrictions. Those range, members colins wrote supervisory approval for an agent that was not in the foreign intelligence space would be appropriate kind of enhanced protection and chairman medine and member walsh wanted to have approval of those kinds of queries. Its a difficult question and something that split our board. So did you take a different view of the application of the constitution to foreign intelligence versus foreign nonforeign intelligence in saying that, well, if you you need supervisory review for foreign for nonforeign intelligence crimes because you thought there was a did they think there was a a lesser constitutional standard given to space or same constitutional standard for foreign intelligence crimes occurring on u. S. Soil as nonforeign intelligence crimes . The constitutional analysis is all in circumstances test and the board made clear, though, that that analysis was similar to policy analysis. It didnt ultimately draw constitutional conclusions but in this context, on the recommendation to looking at the fbi queries, its how the members wave the waive the information. That is the predicate that they are showing when they are doing the election collection in the first instance. Its tied to that purpose. When you look at secondary use for a crime that is not a foreign intelligence crime so more divorce from what is showing you did make at the front end, thats where they felt additional protections were required because it was further removed from the initial foreign intelligence purpose collection. Can i just make a point about baselines and status quo. One baseline would be any time the government gives evidence of any american you need a warrant. Another if the government often comes across evidence in all sorts of ways without a warrant and so when when 702 is related you might pick up the information and the government may become aware of information, it doesnt need a warrant there. You have to decide whether 702, any time it touches a u. S. Person or some of it stuff you stumbled across almost in plain view. You can have different views whether its natural for the government to see evidence in front of their eyes or it always needs warrant for the government to have access to that kind of information. And 702 is in the middle. Targeted foreign people, communications happening outside the United States and so thats a long way towards not warrantland and if you assume its all warrants, then theyll be pushed back from people who say usually we dont have to get warrants there. I think we have time for one more. Sure