So this is a panel where we going to spend some time each of our is going to spend about five or 10 minutes introducing a particular president ial transition and highlight a few of the big takeaway interesting points, Lessons Learned. And so well go im going to im going to we wont go in program order. Were actually going to go and in Chronological Order of the elections that theyre going to be highlighting and then do that. About 50 minutes or so. And then open it up for discussion and conversation and questions. So so let me im going to go forth and im going to introduce everyone at the top. And then we will they will go in turn. So im going to introduce folks in the in the order in which they are going to speak. So first, we are going to have lindsey stravinsky, who is a senior fellow at center for president ial history at Southern Methodist methodist university. She is a historian of the presidency, political culture and the government, especially the president s cabinet. Her first book, the cabinet, George Washington and the creation of an american institution, was published by the belknap press. Harvard University Press in 2020, and it is now out in paperback. Her next book, an honest man the inimitable presidency of john adams, is under contract and will be published in fall 2024. I like that. Thank you. Yes right. Just in time for another election. And she will be talking the transitions after the elections of 1796. In 1800. Second up is ted widmer. Ted is a historian, writer, librarian and musician who, currently is a professor in the macaulay or Honors College at cuny. He also served as a white house speech writer and historical advisor to bill clinton and was an advisor to hillary clinton. She served as secretary of state. He has taught at harvard washington college. He has served as director and librarian of the John Carter Brown library at Brown University and director of the cooley center, the library of congress. His book is lincoln on the verge 13 days to washington. He is a 2022 recipient of the guggenheim fellowship. Congratulations, ted. Thats leslie dunne. And well be talking about the transition after the election of 1860. So you can tell were choosing the good ones. Rachel sheldon is associate professor of history and director of the richard Civil War Era Center at penn state university. She specializes in the long 19th century and writes and teaches about slavery and abolition the civil war, the u. S. , south and political and constitutional history. She is the author of washington brotherhood politics, social life and the coming of the civil war, published by umc press 2013, which received Honorable Mention for the wiley silver prize for the best first book on the american civil war. She is also coeditor with Garry Gallagher of a political nation directions at midnineteenth century american political history, published uva press in 2012. Her current project, the political Supreme Court, examines the political world. The us Supreme Court. The u. S. Supreme Court Justices from the early 19th century to the 1890s. And rachel will be taking on 1876. Joshua sellers is associate professor of law at the Sandra Day Oconnor school of law at Arizona State university. He holds a j. D. And a ph. D. In political from the university of chicago, where he also served as an articles editor for the university of chicago law review. He previously taught at the university of Oklahoma College of law and was a postdoctoral fellow in law and politics at Syracuse Universitys maxwell school. Before entering teaching, he was a law to judge rosemary burkett of the u. S. Court of appeals for the 11th circuit analytic nation associate at and block llp in washington, d. C. His principal areas of Research Teaching are election law legislation and regulation. Constitutional law. Civil procedure. His scholarship been published in the penn law review and law review. Vanderbilt law review. Stanford law review, among others. Joshua will be talking about hanging chads and tim russerts whiteboard. Yes, you got it. Election and transition of 2000. And last but hardly least. David marshak is a scholar of and participant in president ial administrations and transitions and an adjunct professor at the tech school of business at dartmouth. In 2021, he served in the biden administration, ceo of the u. S. International development corporation. Margaret previously served as director of the Nonprofit Center for president ial transition, where he worked for the Biden Transition Team on transition planning efforts. He also spent 12 years as managing director of the Carlyle Group and held several positions in the clinton administration. David will bring us closer very close to the present day by discussing the 2020 transition. And with that, i will turn over to dr. Stravinsky. Well, thank you all so much for being im very excited about this panel, which i had the privilege to put together. And it was really just an excuse to talk about the things that im working on and able to find people who were interested in many of the same topics. Im sure all of you recall your history textbook lesson on election of 1800, the revolution of 1800. This is usually described as the first major transfer of power, and i would like to say that that is very wrong i think its really important that we look at both the election of 1796 and 1800 and the transitions that come after as two sides to the same coin. If we look at our constitution, what it says about president ial transitions, there are some more statutes that have been written today, but how these things are supposed to go. But in 1796, there almost nothing on the page and. So every single action from how people would enter a room, how the transfer of power would take place, what would they would wear, who would be present . Everything had be crafted from scratch and. The context is really essential because in 1796, the last that most americans had witnessed was the french revolution, which was, of course, characterized by a heavy use of guillotine and running through the streets. So not a great model to follow. Ideally, everyone present, everyone aware that was participating in this situation and was acutely concerned. The fact that this was pretty much unprecedented. It had never been done. It required extraordinary care and attention and detail to make sure it right. John adams wrote in his in his letters to his wife that he was gratified and surprise that washington had shown up, that not a guarantee his presence was essential to sort of giving the stamp of approval and then he walked out of the room behind. John adams i dont know that washington had out of a room behind anyone and at least eight years, if not longer. So that entire process was one of crafting from scratch, crafting something with with really no model to follow and having to be very thoughtful and attentive about those details and everyone that was present in the room later. How remarkable it had been that one son had risen and another had set and had all been done peacefully and the nation hadnt fallen. That sounds kind of hyperbolic today because we know how it all went and we know that the nation survived. And there were many other elections, but they meant it and they were not being melodramatic at that moment. A few notes just to sort of remind us of the timing of the transition, how worked at that time, because there was no media, because there was no cnn. There were there is no decision desk. There was no Dave Wasserman saying, i have seen enough. They were not really sure what the results were going to be. John adams felt confident enough on december 30th, 1796. So several months after the elections had begun to write back to abigail saying, i believe that. I know the outcome. But he wasnt sure and he wasnt sure until he himself opened the results on february 8th. 1797 in declared himself the winner that actually left him just about a month for the actual. So the timeline i think essential there fast forward four years. Of course the result a little bit different the by the time he came around to opening the earth excuse me by the time Thomas Jefferson opened the results in 1801, it was pretty clear everyone knew that john had lost, but it wasnt clear who had actually won. And just a little of a refresher, of course, aaron burr and Thomas Jefferson were tied in that election. It took 36 ballots to select who indeed going to be the next president. And in that process, john adams, Thomas Jefferson and burr were all invited to meddle that process to try and put thumb on the scale to determine who was going to be the right person. And as these deliberations were taking, john adams invited Thomas Jefferson to a dinner at the white house. Indeed the white house at this point, because he had just moved in and they committed to one another that they would not meddle the election and they would let the house decide who was going to be the next president. It must have been a spectacular, early, awkward dinner, because at this point they hated each other and had spent months criticizing another and their supporters writing really terribly dreadful things in the newspapers. Nonetheless, they committed to this peaceful transfer of power, and it was the first transfer from one party to another. A couple of takeaways of. This of these two elections together, peaceful of power, dont just happen. They require attention and care. They require commitment to that principle. The participants 1796 and 1800 understood that. They understood how fragile these institutions were. They did not take peacefulness for granted. I think one of their greatest gifts to, the people that came after them, were that we could take it for granted, at least until 2021. So that commitment to ensuring the central piece of a democracy although i get yelled at on twitter when, i say that a democratic republic that commitment to ensuring central peace was was essential and understood by the early participants. And as i think one of the things that we have lost a bit and one of the takeaways id like to bring to our discussion. Thank you, linsey. Nice to see david. Who i talked with a lot a year ago and have not yet met in person but im happy to be here virtually with david and physically with all of you so ill talk about 1860, which i think is still the worst transition of all time, but its its close. We may we may have a spirited debate. And, you know i think the verdict is still up in the air. And after last night, you know, im troubled all over again. Thank god, there wasnt a guillotine in washington, january six. And rachel is also an expert on 1860. And she just me. I was a moderator or a year ago of a panel in which she was the expert on the 1860 transition. So may that was supposed to happen on on january six. Thats right at at the massachusetts historical society. So why was it so bad . It revealed a fatal flaw in the architecture of our system, which is that the losers of an election would accept the result. And in 1860, as in 2020, a very significant part, the population refused to elect it, but they didnt claim the election rigged. They simply left the united of america. And thats thats a simple version of what happened. But at every level. It was very, very complicated. The government slowly fell and then was rebuilt by a complete who a little over a little actually under a year before the election was so unknown to the american people. In late 1859, a book of which listed the 21 most likely people to get the republican nomination in 1860 failed to contain abraham name and that was just one of many things i discovered in a whole lot of research was really on only 13 days of lincolns train trip, the end of the transition. But in order to do all that research, i looked at what the country is like before the election. During the election, and in the very long after between the election of november six, 1860, and lincolns first inaugural of march 1861. And its just an extraordinary drama. And i learned, to my surprise how much of it was already planned. You know, its kind of akin to what were hearing on tv about january six. But how i was seriously in concerted the plan was, well before the election took place. I found an article in the richmond enquirer from december 1859 saying if a socalled black republican is elected, will simply leave the country, well take the armaments and conduct a new from richmond. And it was very similar to what actually happened and also in december 1859, lincoln gives a speech and hes, you know, an extreme outsider at this point and says if they to accept the result of a legal election, we will have deal with them as we have just dealt with john brown, because lincoln was a stickler the law and he considered it before, during and after the transition illegal to secede from from the union. So there are these two amazing dramas happening at the same time in 1860 and early 1861, the actual of the union and the rise of a political supernova who was barely known. I think we overstate his popularity after the lincolndouglas debates of 1858. But he really was an extreme outsider. There were all these very slight ways in which the doors open for him to walk through, one of which also happened in december 1859, a vote the Republican Party leadership by one vote to have the nominating convention in chicago and not in saint louis. And i think, if it had not been in chicago, lincoln probably would not have received the nomination. So he is a dark horse, he gets the nomination in may of 1860, then the campaign happens. Its an extraordinary campaign. Before the election, there were actually four people running the Democratic Party splits in half. It, too, has a sort of northsouth divide just like the entire country Stephen Douglass is the candidate of the northern Democratic Party and he violates a taboo by traveling and giving campaign speeches. So i think for the first time in American History, lincoln stays home and its clear, all observers, that he will win electoral strength in the midwest and north is such lincoln is going to win the election even before it happens. And he and he does. And then you we enter this strange twilight of for very long, difficult months in which its not clear how the United States government is going to keep it. There is a president james. Hes a weak coming in and in late 1860 hes really falling apart. Its a situation kind of the opposite of. Trump in 2020, in which a president just isnt doing, hes the schism of the country of the body politic seems to some observers to also be happening inside his actual body has facial tics and has troubles making his mind even the smallest decisions. Its a bit like wilson at the end of his his presidency and his cabinet is split also are few northerners. Theres a very southern wing. There, three cabinet members, especially who are actively involved in dismantling the United States government that is under their charge. Get ready for whatever is coming next. So the secretary of is a virginia named floyd and hes sending armaments from northern arsenals into the south. The secretary of treasury is cobb from georgia and essentially bankrupting the United States treasury and the secretary. The interior is a mississippi named jacob thompson, whos traveling around the southern of the United States, drumming up support for secession. And hes also when hes in washington, reports, putting on cabinet meetings and sending the information back to. The secessionists in South Carolina to leave the country. So its as if i mean, i dont want to overstate the comparison to 2020, but its as if theres another country ready to start and the people in the final months of the government are putting all the strength can into this new country that doesnt quite exist yet. Of course, theres a lot of activity in the south, especially in charleston, South Carolina, where they leave no doubt about their intention to secede. There is a lot of militia activity. There are people Walking Around with rifles. And interestingly, again in the 2020 context, they talk a lot about 1776. They call themselves minutemen and the gadsden flag the dont tread on me flag flown by them. I think we might as historians do a little more work to connect the very strange appropriation of the American Revolution on january six with whats also on in the south, 1860 and 61, as theyre doing the opposite of the American Revolution, theyre tearing the country apart. South carolina sends, a diplomat to washington, begin to negotiate for most favored nation status. Theyre actually for short time, south is thinking its a country unto itself called the palmetto republic. Its the seeds. December 20th, followed by mississippi alabama, georgia, louisiana and texas. So seven states have gone out of the union. By the 1st of february, which is still over a month before lincoln. Can can get to washington. And theres just a general panic feeling in washington of the social quality of the city has has evaporated. Northerners and southerners cant even go to the same parties together. There is some violence. Congressman from new york is beat up while walking home from the capital one night. But what is scariest in this winter, which henry adams whos there is a very very perceptive observer called great secession winter. What is scariest a feeling that washington is really extremely vulnerable. A military way to southern that might just come over from virginia, which is still in the union, but has a lot of hotheads who are pro, pro, south or maryland, which is also full of hotheads. Washington, d. C. Is surrounded on all sides by slave territory and without too many militias, it would have been a Pretty Simple matter to just invade the capital and take over the Capitol Building and maybe a couple other buildings and begin the operation of something that would have been very. But again, its a bit like six it would have been a continuation of the buchanan presidency. But without james buchanan, who probably would have been removed and his Vice President would have created as a kind of acting president he had actually just lost to lincoln in the 1860 election. His name is john breckinridge. Hes from kentucky he was the candidate of the south. But fortunately, two very impressive southerners up to their fellow southerners and prevent a takeover of washington from happening. And one is Winfield Scott, whos still the commander. Hes a very elderly and not very good shape physically, but hes still the commander in chief of the United States. Hes so old and infirm, he cannot sit on a horse anymore. But hes impressive. And he comes in, he surrounds capital with cannons and loudly threatens to manure. The hills. Washington of arlington, the fragments of the body of anyone who will try to take over capital and he is a virginian defending the u. S. Capitol from southerners in the crucial weeks of december and january and february and john c breckinridge, who i just mentioned, the Vice President is a lot like i mean, very, very much like mike pence. I was always by these echoes my ancient research of what was happening in 2020 and 2021. Breckinridge to preside over a counting of the electoral certificates held on february 13th, 1861, in which like on january six, the house and senate gather in the House Chamber and each states electoral certificates opened in the presence of john c breckinridge, who is the person who would have benefited most from a decision to out the results. And actually i found that the the electoral certificates themselves those were sent to his office. So he might easily have lost them or declared that they were altered or not signed or sealed all of these ways you could declare a document fraudulent. And to his eternal credit, he declared that the election was valid and in reading newspaper accounts i found that there were angry mobs of people chanting the u. S. Capitol on day of the counting of the electoral certificates. So exactly january six. But the key difference, Winfield Scott was there with his cannons and he wouldnt let anyone in. So the election came off as it should have and as that election happened, lincoln already en route and. The premise of my book is that the whole thing was hanging by a very slender thread. But on the train he gained strength just act of coming in to washington, which had been very difficult for earlier president s and one of the reasons William Henry harrison may have died so soon after becoming president is the trip came through a lot of snow and rain. He just seemed sick by the time he got washington. But with lincoln its kind of the opposite. The train moves fast. He can speak to large audiences. He finds his footing. In a way, it is the campaign he never had. He stayed at home in summer during the campaign, but on the train coming in, he finds his voice, his large size is impressive to people and he seems to get a little bigger every day as the south seems to get a little smaller in a crucial day is 22nd. George washington birthday word lincoln gives a beautiful history loving speech of taking back the American Revolution and saying what it really was about, about the declaration of independence and the promise of equality in jefferson davis, whos already the president of the confederate states, does nothing to remember the americans. So Current Events are a big deal in transition. But choosing what you remember from earlier history is also pretty potent politics. And lincoln did that well. Oh, i think im supposed to press. Press this year. Yes. They push right. Its great to here thank you to lindsay for organizing this panel. Im going to try to talk briefly about the election 1876, but anyone who knows anything about the election of 1876 knows how impossible that is, because it was an incredibly complicated and difficult election and transition. But im i want to sort of make three broader points about this election in how it relates to sort of our modern understanding of elections and and electoral transitions, but also in what made this election different and unique in some ways because the context of of partizanship and how partizanship worked in this period the structures of federal government. So federalism and also relationship among the various branches of government and then also the aftermath of the civil war and the meaning of that for understanding sort of the context of how people were operating. So just general reminder of how the election operate. You had rutherford hayes, the republican from ohio facing samuel j. Tilden from york in 1876, you needed 185 electoral votes in order to win the election. And as the polls closed, it was clear that tilden 184 but there were states in dispute South Carolina, florida louisiana and oregon as a result of a sort of a rogue electoral vote problem. So because of this, congress convened and was sort of unsure what to do, debated for about two months and then together to create the federal Electoral Commission, the first of its kind in the only of its kind has not existed again, despite ted cruzs insistence that it should, in the 2020 election and. That body consisted of five members of the senate, five members of the house, and five members of the Supreme Court chosen by their partizan affiliation. This an important thing to remember going forward. And then over the course of february february, this commission, all of these four cases and resolved them on a party line vote, 8 to 7 in favor of Rutherford B Hayes just a couple of days before his inauguration. So i want to talk about sort of parts of this transition that i think are really interesting, although there are many others that we could discuss. And one of them is thats probably whats alarming about this electoral transition, is that almost everyone saw it coming this was not a surprise to congressmen. They had been talking about the problems the electoral system for many years, for at least five years, because there been problems before. So in the 1872 election louisiana had just as they would in 1876, submitted to sets of electoral returns and didnt end up mattering because grant wanted a landslide. But it could happen, as they noticed. And yet they did not do anything to reform this problem. There was a rule in place known as the 22nd joint rule. People who are our congress nerds probably really into particular problem. This was passed in 1865 and the basic idea behind this rule was any either of the houses could object to returns from any and then they would be thrown out. So you can imagine what would happen if all of a sudden divided congress, the house and the senate controlled different parties decide that they want to get involved in the election and start out electoral votes. This would this particular election into the house of representatives and they knew this was a problem. Democrats insisted that this was still in force in 1876. Republicans disputed this. There was not really clear resolution. One other really incredible thing happened in 1872, which is that losing candidate died between when the election happened and the counting of the electoral votes. All of these problems, everybody knew about. Nobody had any solutions for. This and i think that the real reason for this is that in particular did not really see democrats as reasonable contributors to a conversation about how to reform the electoral process. They were still thinking in the terms of the democrats are the enemy theyre the enemy they fought against us in the civil war. They did not believe in true small our republican governance or democracy. We dont think that are reasonable to negotiate with. That created a real impasse in how any of this could be. The second thing i want to talk about briefly is the makeup of the Electoral Commission and the sort of the particular political and constitutional there. As i said, the commission was funded partizan and it was by design partizan by design partizan in its makeup, partizan in its outcome. We assume that this is a bad thing because is a dirty word in ways in our understanding of american. This is not the way people thought in the 19th century although there were plenty of people who were antiparty this was not a large group of the American Public that wanted by partizanship not a word that existed in the 19th century, not a word that anyone would have been in favor of, because politics was a life and death sport in this particular period. So having a partizan make up of the commission was by and this was not necessarily a problem. And i want to say in particular that this was not necessarily a problem. Supreme Court Justices who were on the commission. So there are five members of the Supreme Court on the Electoral Commission. They chosen specifically for their partizan background or for their partizan proclivities in 1876. So you had to known as democrats selected because they are democrats to republican known as republicans selected. They are republicans. They do a thing about, you know, why theyre choosing these people because of their circuits. But in fact, everyone knows that. Its because there are two democrats and two republican and they were in charge of picking the fifth Supreme Court justice. And this is one of my favorite stories, all of American History, to tell you what happened with the electoral. If you dont know this story already. The idea was that the fifth justice was going to be david davis, who was Campaign Manager in 1860 while serving as a judge on the illinois circuit court. And he had come to the court by abraham lincoln, but was, you know, sort of with the Republican Party to the point where he had been a president candidate in 1872 for the liberal Republican Party, not the same thing as the Republican Party, not an offshoot of the Republican Party, a separate party altogether. So idea in 1876 is you get this guy whos going be the fifth vote who is not a republican and not a democrat. They called him independent. But that doesnt mean the same thing in 1876 as it does today. Independent a separate thing in the 19th century. Glad to talk more about that. So they decide theyre going to pick david davis, the illinois the Illinois Legislature meanwhile makes the decision that they are going to elect david davis to be the next senator from illinois. This happens just the house and senate are passing federal Electoral Commission bill so they decide that they are going to choose davis this is done in part because tilden. Tilden friends, including his nephew, were convinced that if they were able get davis this position on the senate that he would be compelled to vote for tilden on the federal commission. So a sort of a bribe. This is how they understood. You read the letters from this time. And so this doesnt happen because davis may be, you know, in a in an in ethical be good way decides that this is inappropriate and he cant possibly serve on the Electoral Commission once he has elected to the senate by the state legislature in illinois so he declines and hes replaced joseph p bradley, a republican who votes with the republicans. And as a result you get result of the election of 1876 where hayes is going to become president. I want to stress again, this is completely understood to be partizan issue and that result was expected once. You get bradley on the commission some. People think maybe he will change his mind, but in general, democrats had been very excited about the commission. They been the ones pushing the commission in congress and they sort of had the upper hand because if the joint if the 22nd joint rule was enforced, the election would go to the house and they were the democrats were running the house. So they thought we might be able to get this election all but as soon as bradley becomes the fifth justice, theres an understanding that this is not to go their way last thing i want to mention is that our sort of understanding of the election of 1876 in sort of modern times and in the context of the last election, i think is really problem because there sort of this assumption that 1876 worked, but it went well, you know, i mean some people think its the fraud of the century that that is also a storyline about the election of 1876. But it didnt actually work very well at all. We many you im sure know the famous story of the compromise of 1877, which is a myth. It did not actually happen. Thats the idea. Hayes got the presidency in exchange for ending reconstruction and pulling out of the south. Lots of reasons why this is a myth, one of them being that there were not very many troops left to begin with in the south and that southern governments had reclaimed our southern democrats had reclaimed power in of the Southern States and were not really that concerned about the election from that perspective because they had engaged in the kind of rule that they needed in home states. So the election didnt matter. As much as you might expect. But the other reason why this well, one of the other reasons why this compromise a myth and is clearly a myth is democrats did not accept the results of the election. In fact, right after the Electoral Commission came down with its decision, the democrats in the house on a resolution that said tilden was the rightful president. So they did not it they did not attend the inauguration include. Those supreme Court Justices who are democrats did not attend the inauguration. And tilden insisted that his in the house in the coming years the election investigate what had happened in the to prove that he had been a fraud and famously in 1878 with what was known as the Potter Committee which tried investigate what what happened with the point of proving that republicans engaged in all kinds of corruption it backfired spectacular which i can tell you more about but i dont want to take up too much more time. So the things that i think are the main about this particular election are, that this was a real political battle, that through partizanship in a way that people understood that partizanship could achieve certain kinds goals and those were positive goals. From the perspective of the republicans, it we we won the civil we need to maintain the way that things operate now and for democrats was. Well you know we want our power to so in that from that perspective i think there are similarities to today but it also was sort of a unique moment in American History i had no idea about that. It was a bit i mean, i thought it was a everyone does this in every textbook. You want to bring your microphone and microphone. Yeah, right. Its so i mean, bring us into the modern era and talk about the uneventful. Election of 2000 where of course, nothing happened. No. When we think of 2000, we think of versus gore. Of course, thats the first thing that comes to mind. And we think about hanging chads and we think about, you know, maybe Jeffrey Toobin on National Television fumbling around with the decision to report on it quickly or something. And what that protract that litigation left us with was a really compressed transition period. You know, it was, i think, 38 or 39 days when it was all said and done. So thats one of the i think, you know, key of this transition is that it was very and so you would think that because it was short, it would necessarily be kind of chaotic and that it would be disorder sized. But the scholars who study this actually believe that this transition was pretty smooth, all things considered. And clay johnson was the executive director of the bushcheney transition, has talked about how george bush, told him as early as june 1999 to start preparing for the transition. So we might hear that and think, you know, this is hubris on the part of bush or something but i think theres an important lesson for us consider about just how long a transition actually takes and how much preparation is required to execute it effectively, particularly in the modern era, you know, one of the biggest differences from these past transitions to 2000 is, of course, just the size the federal government. Right. Its just a massive bureaucracy. Now, incoming president s have thousands of appointments to make over 4000. We have a vast service rate subsequent to all of these events. We have the pendleton act. We have protection for the Civil Service. So a new president s coming in trying to negotiate, right. The Administrative State and think about, you know, how do i want to run, right . Who who are going to be my key personnel figures. So if were trying kind of conceptualize a framework for thinking about transitions, i think obviously the timing aspect and how early presidencies would be presidencies should start should be at the top of the list. Another important detail, this was, the first president ial election to occur after the amended president transition act. This was a statute that was first enacted in 1963, but had been amended over the years and actually has been amended subsequent. But among other things, what this does is that it authorizes General Services administration to give office space and Staff Compensation for members of the transition. So, you know, folks whove worked on these transitions will tell you theres a theres a firm difference, a remarkable difference between the Campaign Staff and the Transition Team. And so thinking about how to finance the transition is another, i think, a key aspect in trying to, you know, think about lessons we might take from from 2000 and beyond and the president ial transition act and some of subsequent amendments also requires there to be orientation sessions. The Outgoing Administration, the Incoming Administration, as well as a transition director. And so one of the you know, i was listening to lindseys one of the sort of remarkable things that this still remains a pretty lawless, you know period there just is not really a lot of rules and regulations governing president ial. I mean of course well hear about some that im sure when we talk about 2020. But its really kind ad hoc in a lot of ways. And so if were thinking about reforms, we might about statutory reforms that would formalize and regularize the transition and part of that course involves transparency. And so by requiring a transition directory, at least we, the public, can know, you know, who are these individuals and what role are they serving in the transition . A little in the weeds, but soon after the transition, march 2001, this was the first time that the congressional act, which is a first enacted in 1996, was to disapprove of an agency rule. So why do i mention that . I mention that because during the transition president ial transition, the Incoming Administration is often concerned right with . Reversing a change in Political Party right. From one president to another. Theres concern about reversing the regulations that came in right at the end in the last months of the Outgoing Administration. And theyre sometimes referred to as midnight regulations. And so the congressional act is a way for congress to with within a 60 day period, provide prevent some of those regulations from going into. But at the same time, the incoming president is going to be, you know, what regulations they have, you know, individuals who are tasked with doing this, trying to assess what regulations are fresh, which ones are new, why do we want to right as a as a priority in the first month and beyond that. In terms of other lessons we can take from 2000, i think there something to be said about the role of lawyers in private sector lawyers. The Bush Administration relied heavily on lawyers from the banking sector, come in and work on the transition. And so again if were talking about reforms or things to focus on, we we might want to Pay Attention to who is serving in these positions. We were interested as well and folks moving from Campaign Staff onto the Transition Team and some of the ethical issues that might be from those kind of moves. Again, we just dont have rules and regulation to govern this process, we have a key and this is, i think, one of the key lessons from this transition is Getting National security position staffed quickly. Right. The 911 report talked about how the failure to have a lot of the National Security folks in place contributed maybe to the oversights that led to 911. So if were talking about staffing and personnel filling those positions, maybe you know, on the front end or, you know, other positions should take priority. The for president ial transitions emphasize just this as a persistent problem dating back to the bushcheney transition thats still that still exists exists. I would also mention financing the transitions right. This came up in 2000 again because it was and so the administration said, you know, we have funds that we can release to the bushcheney transition, but were not going to do until the election is decided and determined. And so bushcheney Transition Team set up a501c for they can received for certain purposes through that vehicle and so you have private financing of Transition Teams. So this Campaign Finance concerns, it raises some ethical concerns. So suggest that maybe devote more money, you know, through statutory command to the actual transition and so that we dont have private funders are actually financing transition. So thats a thats a concern as well of. Course, we have to talk about the judicial role in resolving elections. There are its not that, you know, elections have become contested now. And we expect federal courts and the Supreme Court to be involved during president ial transitions. Its that some of the arguments that were actually raised and found themselves into the bush gore opinion are actually being resurrected now by some of the conservative on the Supreme Court. Im speaking specifically about whats known as the independent state legislature doctrine. The idea that legislatures have autonomy and independence to decide electoral rules, particularly when. There are cases of, you know, when theres dissension or debate about whether certain votes should be counted or not. This arguments that we should give unilateral authority to state legislatures to establish rules so that allow state legislatures to override state Supreme Courts, for instance, who would resolve these cases. So the origin of these arguments is the bush v gore decision. And as our elections become more contested and as i think we can anticipate, i mean, we hope this is not the but as we anticipate, almost inevitable litigation in federal court during president rule transitions. Those arguments, again, we first saw in bush view gore are going to become theyre going to be foregrounded. So thats a quick summary. I of kind of some of the lessons that we can take from transition. But theres plenty more to discuss, including the role of cheney, who, as you may recall, as you know, was first tasked with identifying a list of potential Vice President ial candidates and then concluded that, well, you know, shaped the pool such that came off looking as the only real option bush wanted. John, the senator from missouri. But ultimately thought that, you know, cheneys the way to go. I guess ill say one more thing. If were thinking about this, a kind of social network thing. Again, im trying to think how we could think about this from method logically. How would we study president ial transitions transitions . You know, social Network Theory might be something we could work with just looking at key figures, you know, whether its clay johnson or whether its cheney. You look at who found themselves in the Bush Administration and these are all decisions, right. That made during transitions. There are people who known commodities right in this. There are people who are known to the bush family of them had worked with h. W. Bush. We could talk about the fact that, you know, john roberts and brett right. Were players in this you know as well. And you know have found their themselves on the Supreme Court. So theres, i think something to be said modern transitions about kind of the social aspect of not sure how you would study that necessarily, but thats definitely, i think a lesson we can take from from modern transitions. Great. Thank you david. Thank you much again. Im sorry, i cant be there in person. I, i could but my son is graduating high tomorrow, so i should probably be there that hopefully, hopefully makes it till tomorrow and me say its great to see friend ted widmer. I did consult with him a lot during the last cycle and for those you who havent read his book about lincolns train trip to washington its its its a page turner its its wonderful i was thrilled that that lindsey and others organized this panel for this conference because president ial transitions are one of the least studied aspects of the american presidency. We have a book coming out with a couple of coauthors in october on the history of president ial transitions where we take bunch of interviews that we did with, historians and protagonists, different transitions, and we study every modern president ial transition from carter, ford plus, some of the worst transitions history including 1860 1932 and others that books being published by the university of rochester in cooperation with the miller center, the uva. When i interviewed eric, who was a historian from davis for the book, he wrote a wonderful book on the 1932 to 1933 transition. And i kind of jokingly said, well, why are you writing another on roosevelt . There seem to be a lot of on roosevelt and said, well, i feel that the the 100 days before roosevelt took office whereas important as the 100 days after he took office and most historians focus on 100 days after that i felt like the 100 days before were as important. And after all, during that period, you know, ted widmer highlighted the horrors of the 1860 transition with seven states seceding before lincoln could take the oath of office in the 1932 to 1933 transition, the Great Depression peaked. We had bank runs in 25 states. Hitler came to power. Japan withdrew from the league of nations, adding tension in asia. Our european allies defaulted their debt and there an assassination attempt on roosevelt, miami, as you know, and hoovers idea of cooperating. Roosevelt was try to convince him to abandon the new deal. After all, hoover looked at roosevelt and said, this is a person who is feeble in mind and body and not worthy of presidency, and im not going to help him. So what weve through history is that the transition period can literally life and death for america success or failure, prosperity or recession, a president ial transition is challenging enough and normal times as josh highlighted, the modern transitions are very, very challenging in a period of 77 days, a president to develop his personnel, her or her personnel strategy. There are 4000 political appointments they need to prepare a budget they need to prepare first day executive orders that will survive a legal challenge. They need to prepare their legislative agenda. And importantly, they need to make the transition campaigning to which had highlighted lincoln did during his is famous train trip in 2020. And this is something maybe this group can debate a little. The nation faced four crises and perhaps the greatest crises. A president elect faced lincoln took office. President elect biden faced a Global Pandemic a huge deep recession with 25 million americans out of work, a racial and political reckoning over the in the United States of george floyd and others which led protests and also a political crisis and more america fans died in january 2021 than any other month. And hundred and 76,000 americans died. The interregnum from covid. 176,000 americans. So ken burns was nice enough to be interviewed for my book and he said in june of 2020 he had an optimistic take on transitions. He basically said that in the 233 years between, the time when washington handed the reins to adams and whomever, the successor to trump would be no arms had been raised. Those shots had been fired. And there had been peaceful transition of power. All of that occurred this year. And so what we did in preparation for this transition, potential transition, we obviously didnt know who would the election was. We looked at history to figure out what Lessons Learned we could take from history to apply them to prepare for the potential of the most challenging transitions since lincoln took office. So we learned from ted that a lot can change in the country during the political interregnum. We learned as highlighted from the 2020 transition to 20 transition, that day counts. Bush had 35 days compared to 7778. In a typical transition. And as josh said, that impeded his ability to get people into their seats. So eight months after bush took 911 occurred and that moment bush only had slightly over half of us National Security officials in place at dod, the department of justice which obviously investigated and deals with terrorism and state department. So every day counts. We learned from the bush obama transition that the cooperation from the outgoing with the incoming is critical. Bush actually, i gets credit for for the Gold Standard for transitions because he was he felt like he was by his shortened transition and 911 occurring so quickly after. And he basically said whomever wins after me, whether its mccain or obama, im going to roll out the red carpet them and cooperate. And he instructed his chief of staff, well in advance of the transition to cooperate with both obama and mccains to aid their ascension into office. Because we were facing two we had two wars and the Great Recession at the time of the of transition, we learned from carter and clinton transitions that focusing on the white house staff as a priority over the cabinet is more important. Carter and clinton focused on their cabinet and it set them back. And so biden and actually bush did a good job focusing on their white house staff versus their cabinet. And then we also learned from president carter that campaigns, the transition staff need to cooperate. This something that josh highlighted, carter was the first modern president actually devote resources and put together a Transition Team he 50 people devote a campaign. What he didnt do was he didnt tell campaign that he had a separate transition operation. So about a week or two before the election stories started appear in the press about what carter had planned and the staff had no idea where he was coming from. Stu eizenstat went to president , took governor carter at the time and said, where are these coming from . And he said, oh, i have this transition staff. Theyre 50 people preparing for. When i win. So we worked with the biden team, all of this and actually took it one step further. They actually to create a workstream, which they called unconventional challenges, which was to try to anticipate all of the issues that they might face a result of a President Trump being unwilling to cooperate or unwilling to accept the outcome of the election. So working together, they anticipated a potential delay only because of the delay in votes, because covid and our absentee ballots being our records, but also the potential if trump did not authorize the General Service administration to ask ascertain the outcome of the election which we know happened and the actual cooperation was not triggered for over a month. They anticipated lack of briefings from the outgoing officials as to the incoming officials. Biden had teams to cover more 100 agencies, 600 people to cover 100 agencies and to meet with them to figure out whats going on, what the priorities, what the personnel challenges are. And they anticipated not being able to launch those because of the delay they anticipated delays in Intelligence Briefings. So typically, as soon as theres a president elect, they start to get Intelligence Briefings, will trump in authorized those for some time. And then, most importantly, josh highlighted this person. Al is everything during a transition you need to get people place quickly so the biden focused on an unconventional to get the the non confirmed officials in place as quickly as possible on january they had 1100 Officials Take Office that were non Senate Confirmed thats more than obama and trump had combined at 100 day mark in presidencies. Biden knew he the senate would be slow in confirming people not only because the delay in the ascertainment that the problems of january six but also just the there was a Georgia Election on january six and the senate could not organize itself so confirmation hearings were obama had 25 cabinet officers received pre inauguration confirmation hearings before. He took office and more than a dozen officials took office on inauguration day. Biden had one official in place that was confirmed on inauguration day. The director of national intelligence, avril haines, the secretary of state, secretary defense. They werent confirmed until the next week. So like we learned in 1860, 1932, an effective transition, a matter of life and death. The key thing that the biden folks wanted to cooperate with, the Outgoing Administration was on the was on the covid 19 vaccine straddle. And i remember talking to Jake Sullivan was then the head of policy and now the National Security adviser about the most important policy priority on january 20th. And he said its logistics. Its getting shots in arms and the delayed for the delayed cooperation made it more difficult for the biden team to get their strategy in place because they couldnt work with dod, they couldnt work with hhs, they couldnt work the office of management and budget on their distribution strategy, i would just close with this because historians love to debate these issues and ted widmer i debated this quite a bit say the best transition in history was bush to it was the Gold Standard cooperation and the laws that josh talked about. Right. Were were put in place on the example that president bush shaped on his Outgoing Administration, the worst transition in history. I think it to be 1860, as ted highlighted. And then one can debate whether 20 was worse than 1932 and perhaps can have a view on that. But im thrilled to participate. Im sorry i couldnt be there in person. And thank you very much for organizing this important session. Thank so much, david. And thanks to all you. I mean, just random applause for everyone. But i to open it up to to questions and discussion, i have to i cant resist because i think of this very illustrious group i happen to be maybe the person whove worked on both a campaign and a Transition Team and so much of what said here, particularly josh david, was me. Think about 1992, 93, that was and i was very, very young. But i was but, but one thing that was distinctive about that clinton transition was one that the line and certainly i was in the little rock transition little Transition Office and the Line Campaign and transition was almost invisible and it was all same campaign people. And i think that raises all of you raised this interesting that transitions are such this interesting animal where they are are they political processes . Are they administrative processes is and when they work well, it is when some political person when George Washington goes out behind john adams when breckinridge counts the votes and some or al gore or you know there a moment where somebody or george bush, George W Bush says, im going to make sure whoever comes in, im going to do it right and that is its that that particularly in the modern era that is so critical. The other thing thats reminding me of the clinton transition. Yes, way, way too much attention. The cabinet and the white house was really the same people in their early thirties who were the campaign aides. And that was of one of the problems of the first year of the clinton administration. And there was not an agenda. And i think part of that, too, was this real and curious what everyone think. I was struck by by ted, your remark of you know that basically everything falls apart. So abraham has to rebuild the government and of course, thats the most dramatic moment. But this kind of institutional ism, an Institutional Knowledge, you know, one striking thing about the clinton transition and the early white house was this really resolute, turning away from anyone from the from the Carter Administration by large. And there were a couple of people, donna shalala, who at one point was my boss, was was it was in carter. But in terms of that Institutional Knowledge, because carter was a one term president , but he was the last whod been in the job. So there was almost no Institutional Knowledge and there was so much resolute know were from outside washington so. You end up with someone like mack mclarty whos, a Business Leader from arkansas whos the white house chief of staff, incredibly smart guy. Im from arkansas. Thats one reason i was on the campaign. I can tell you its a state of 2 million people. It does not prepare you for that. So that was part of the problem. But there was real. So you ended up with these kind of junior the hill aides like George Stephanopoulos in very, very high level consequential positions and a real turning away. Anyone with Institutional Knowledge of the executive branch. And that was a huge huge problem. So thats my thats my those are my kind of, you know, reminiscent time but it was i think thats so resonant thinking about this the kind of this weirdness is it political is administrative, is it being treated and how are Different Actors . And certainly in 2020, you had Outgoing Administration was very much treating it as entirely political as youre. Thats a good point. I just have a memory, just very briefly, that when bill clinton was he elected governor, very young. I think in about 1978. Yeah. And then he lost the only time he lost an election. And one of the reasons he lost is because jimmy carter or president jimmy carter sent in those cuban prisoners into which was very unpopular and helped clinton to lose in 1980. I think so. Maybe it was some payback for that . I think so. Warring southern democrat politicians. All right. There are i i want to open it up to discussion if anyone has a question, comment. If you do speak, please get yourself near one of these lovely devices and press the the at the bottom it says push. And so the green light comes on the people in the outside world can hear you any. Any comments or questions. Yes hi, ted frantz from, the university of indianapolis enjoyed this discussion quite a bit. And in to give something that all of you whether youre here in person or out in the ether could respond to. Rachel, you talked about partizanship being a good thing and it strikes me that youre probably have the only example of that where thats true. And so im wondering for any of you, how, how you might see partizanship playing, its 1796 or 2020 and how the American Public thinks about partizanship and transitions. If we had a different view of that, how we might actually our president ial transitions, i would make 111 caveat. I dont know. Its probably i am, which is to say maybe maybe i dont know if i said this directly that it was maybe not a good thing but it wasnt considered to be a bad thing is sort of the a slightly different thing and and i think whats important about that is that there is an assumption that it exists. And so its just sort of a given that people are going to behave in partizan ways and that that partizanship does not have to go down just a democrat or just republican way that we assumed is today. Right. There were many parties in, the 19th century, many parties interacting the time. And thats the important point about davis is that partizanship is more complicated than just there are republicans and there are democrats and its a lot about legitimacy from perspective. But ill let others is is what i would love. I would love to. I totally agree with that. And i think so many to tie into one of the other. I think you made point that there have been several moments in of these elections actually, where it was really clear that problems were coming and they were pretty obvious many years in a row. So, for example, in 1796, hamilton behind the scenes had been trying to throw the election on to the vp candidate and make sure that adams lost. So it was clear to people that this sort of electoral were very much possible, and yet they sort of seem surprised when indeed fact it happened in 1800, of course, 1860, 1876. But i would also say in 2020, in 2016, trump had said that he wouldnt the outcome of the election if he lost and. Yet there was a debate that whether or not that would happen. And so i think a lot of our our problems with anticipating issues are that we dont expect to come into play or. We think that there are positions that people somehow check their partizanship at the door. And so if we were much more open about yes, partizanship can cause problems and it can be a very intense, nasty element of our system, but its there. Lets own it and like see what we can do to to mitigate that. It would go a long way. So one of the things that do you and i do remember if talked about this or if im stealing someone elses but the person who is responsive for the ascertainment is a political appointee and as is responsible for, their job to the person who they are potentially kicking out of the white house, which was kind of the problem in 2020. So you have a nonpolitical appointee if you a Civil Service person, if you have a commission, whatever it is, its not that partizanship wont come into play. But lets be a little bit more honest about those motivations. Yeah. David, were you . Yes, i would add that up until this in the modern transition context, which i would say is since carter. The transitions have been largely bipartisan. Theres a cadre of officials who have worked in the incoming and Outgoing Administrations and transition that that cooperate they collaborate that share experience says in order facilitate smooth transition of power. So for Example Organization that i was working with the Partnership Service organizes a transition conference every cycle at which everybody has traditionally together. So for example in the previous cycle we had Hillary Clintons team, Bernie Sanders team, ted cruzs, you know, there were multi ball players that participated and they all collaborated. The romney team cooperated very closely with their successors. Romney did a very good job planning his transition. Obviously, he didnt win, but he took the approach much like a management and had a very methodical, which others have benefited from. So this year it was an exception and hopefully the future we can get back to kind of a nonpartisan approach to president ial transitions. Great. Yes, here and then. I have a question about the Supreme Court. And so i think its at least the first instance, mostly for rachel and josh, but as i think about it, lindsey with her sense of how in the early republic backchannels communications would happen among, you know, different branches of government quite openly, you to each have with and presented on elections. The Supreme Court played a decisive role obviously the role certainly as a formal matter was radically different. And not everything needs to be better, worse. But im just wondering to hear your thoughts, if you were to compare the role thats played in those circumstances, an overtly political role that were calling on, people who have certain institutional credibility to play versus an institutional role played by people we know channel in part political interest mean right like here both of them leave uneasy but im wondering you all and anybody sort of thinks about that that role an institution but at least historically has been an important legitimate ear for good and for ill. You want to assert i mean i like you. Well. We know, of course, that resolving bush v gore and i dont think this just because the legal reasoning questionable really damage the institutional of the court. You know. Im not yeah. I mean im aligned with many others and i think the court is continuing along that path. But for a lot of people, they point to bush v gore and say thats the first time when i really questioned the court as a kind of neutral and saw it as a political institution. So its inconceivable to me, at least, that the justices would play a kind of active role today, as seemed to be the case then. So i, i dont think we would anything by. I dont think it would be necessarily preferable to have. I dont want the court resolving elections. I guess let me let me just say i dont want the court resolving elections, whether its under the guise of neutrality i dont want this court playing an active in the resolution of elections. And im afraid they will. And obviously President Trump believed that they they might and and some of the justices eager to do so. And so i dont want them playing a role. I dont think. Theres much daylight, to be honest, between the kind of partizanship that we saw in, you know, 76 and the kind of messages and signals that were actually getting from some of the justices today. I dont i just dont think theres very much daylight between that. So my my suggestion be, you know, criticize that be, you know do our work of trying to expose basically and we see partizanship and bias creeping these decisions and do whatever we can to try to keep courts out of the business of resolving. And, you know, i could talk at length about that, how we can have precommitment strategies and ex ante rules that are established and such, but know having courts resolving these issues ex post i think is is worrying. So i would say there has been a long sort of historiographical tradition saying that there many people in the 19th century who wanted the court to resolve 1876 election really. A lot of books that compare the age and 76 election to the 2000 election, in particular say that. But i dont think thats true at all. Actually, i think there was a very small minority of folks who were really interested in the in the court deciding the election. And they were mostly republicans because they expected that the court would decide in favor of. Hayes because it was a mostly republican court. So in general, i think the main point there is that the court did not have that kind of power. It just did not have the kind of power to decide really anything involving. Elections, courts on the state and local level played a huge role in the 1876 election. It is not true that that courts were separate from the election itself, but the Supreme Court, because the justices had these political proclivities and people knew that, i mean, they couldnt be in charge unless you really wanted to swing it for republicans, which some people did. So i would say maybe the lesson is just that the court should not have so much power if you accept that they are more of a political body and engaging in partizan politics in certain ways. Right and you can still could still be an honest judge and have partizan that those things are not necessarily in conflict. Right. But so if you acknowledge and then the court does not have as much, then maybe its not as much of an issue. So i think i think theres an understanding going on in 1876 and maybe this relates to some of the other comments about the interrelationship among politicians in washington. All of the same people are involved in all of the same things. And many of the lawyers who are in front of the federal Electoral Commission are people that are very with the justices and were part their political campaigns and careers. So theres no way of taking that out. And its a much better acknowledgment. Thats just how things worked at that point and that maybe it wasnt such a bad thing as long as when they got cases they were deciding them on the basis the case and not the partizan issue. But in the 19th century, when you dont have final authority over the constitution as the supreme. Then it matters less that you have those person proclivities, other bodies and other people can say, no, we dont agree with what the court is doing. I think if we take it a step back then i think we take it a step further back. I would apply the same assessment and actually i wrote down the social Network Theory when josh this because i mean the early republic is just like the most incestuous place there has ever been because. One of the main sort of plots behind the election of 1800 was from alexander hamilton, who had written john jay. And it was clear that maybe the new york electors were going to go republican. And john jay, who, of course, had been the first chief justice, who was now the of new york, because chief justice was not prestigious enough, because the Supreme Court wasnt powerful enough. And he said, why dont we change the way the electors reported . And that way we can swing them to the federalist case and just kind of like put the letter to the side so that he didnt have to acknowledge that it happened so that the election could go ahead smoothly. But all of these people knew, each other and all of these people had very relationships. Thomas jefferson and, John Marshall were cousins. They despised each other, which was what a lot of the Supreme Court animosities were about for the first decade, in particular. But they were able to draw a distinction partizan judges and super partizan judges. And so they knew the partizanship was there. They just were to sort of like accept it until they were so ridiculously partizan that tried to get them kicked off Supreme Court like savages. So i dont that the early republicans necessarily a good Supreme Court model for what we should aspire but i think that there is a space for partizanship thats accepted and acknowledged. And i actually wonder if our Supreme Court, our relationship with the Supreme Court would be better if we stopped pretending like they werent partizan. It functioned, they werent partizan and said like, yes, these are the spoils come from the presidency. Like go and approach it that way. Mm hmm. Yeah. I saw a hand over on this side of the room earlier. Yes, i think this is on. Okay. And rob baker, im from georgia state. Im having trouble formulating a coherent question here because my head is spinning, listening to this wonderful roundtable. Its been just fabulous but im really struck the partizanship of the 1876 election. I gather that a lot of people are. I knew the corrupt bargain wasnt all right but but i not know that there was a celebration of partizanship. There and that kind of that actually struck me because there are a lot of instances right around that time of people elevating constitution, nihilism and office. I think just off the top of my head like benjamin or curtis, you know, kind of coming out of retirement to defend johnson and the impeachment hearings, you know, and or lincoln, for that matter in 1864, holding an election in the middle, a war like these. These are moves where they are elevating democratic norms above what would be personal partizan interest, maybe. And so im wondering if theres a tension here with this appointment of the commission, this idea that its a good thing, that its partizan or wasnt accepted. Yeah. Yeah, thats i mean, i guess im i dont want to believe that ill put it that way. So i was going to say i dont you and see if you can i think my my friend and coauthor Erik Alexander is in the in the audience in the back and we written quite a bit about this and i think that the key is just to have a different understanding of what partizanship is and what it looks like in the 19th century. So the idea that you have to Political Parties that are fighting each other out at all times is just not the case. There are lots of parties. And the idea that a Political Party is going to last forever is not universally held. So i would say in 1864, lincoln, of course, an election during the civil war. Yes. That is upholding democratic norms, but its with a different political that he is trying to create into his own political organization. The party. Right. So this is not like well, im a republican. I could, you know, become a dictator. Its well i need to build a political coalition. Im going to do it in this way. In 1864, as opposed to in this other i mean, i dont think all of these people are super unprincipled. I think they just had an understanding that, you know, if you wanted to achieve something organizing group of people into a party try to advocate for a political perspective was the way that you did it so even people argued against partizanship they were often just arguing against party not both parties is right just the idea that well i dont like partizanship but im going to organize myself into a party to fight against the party exists, right . So like thats the no Nothing Party right there. So i would say thats just sort of it and acknowledge moment that partizanship is going to inflect the way that people behave and and if you understand that then you can better understand why people are engaging in what engaging in and a belief that the other Political Parties are not legitimate right. Your Political Party legitimate. So im going to be partizan because partizanship is important for me to achieve something but the democrats theyre not a legitimate party. Of course they supported the right so i think its more of a complicated relationship to partizanship than good versus bad and more. Ive just sort an acknowledgment from that perspective. Dont know if ive answered your question, if ive convinced you, but im glad to talk more about it, to ask the question. Yes, david, id love to ask you a question. Im sorry to put you on the spot on this, but so moving forward, we have another election coming up. So in theory, there would be another transition coming up. How does bipartisan transition work if one side wont play along . Okay, great question. So obviously, President Biden has said hes running reelection. He his team will hope that they win the election. They will also be required under the president ial act of 1963, as amended as. Josh has highlighted to prepare for a potential loss. And so they will he will need to instruct his cabinet, appoint Transition Coordinating Councils and instruct his cabinet to prepare memos and prepare a plan for. If he does lose and there are requirements to report to the congress and the public on the implementation of the law at the six months mark prior to the election and, the three months mark prior to the election. Actually ironic only in the last cycle. President trumps team did a very effective job up until the election, there was a fellow named Chris Liddell who was the deputy chief of staff. He was also the person that ran romney transition. He worked very under radar screen to the law as required only after the election when President Trump got involved, did those plans kind of go the rails and liddells he was handcuffed essentially. So president did this under the laws well when he ran for reelection and his team actually worked with. Romneys team to prepare for the potential that romney could have won and obama on the way out. In 2016, actually did coordinate with both Hillary Clintons team and with then candidates. Trumps team. So there is law that requires this type of cooperation. The culture, washington up this year has been that there is a group of bipartisan officials that care about transitions deeply and that work to create an environment where a transition is seen as this kind of holy and very important part of of american democracy where the outgoing cooperates with incoming and so thats been the tradition its the and hopefully that will happen in the future. Can i just follow on that david . So my understanding is, are these kind of memoranda of understanding that the respective campaigns agreed to, right . And there are also these ethics laws that are in place to prevent know someone from i dont know coming in from a law and doing certain things on the campaign then going back to the law firm that kind of stuff. I dont know that any thats actionable is i what is the actual what is it there are there a series of of obligations that that the incumbent administration has to execute a of understanding with with each of the candidates after the nominating conventions. The recognizes the to be official nominees the after the nominating conventions and they start to get as you mentioned staff offices access Government Computers mobile phones in one of the post911 reforms they can submit names to the department of justice and the fbi to get security clearances so that their people are ready during transition to receive Intelligence Briefings ready to go through the Senate Confirmation process and then theres also a memorandum of understanding negotiated between the white house and, the campaigns or the transitions for how the outgoing and the incoming will cooperate. Again, all that was done prior to the election under trumps trump admin. The trump administration. It just wasnt implemented after the election because, trump impeded the execution of the plan. His staff actually did a good job of of pursue doing prior to the election. So thats its one of the Untold Stories of the last transition is that the people below trump actually did a good job up until the election and then once the election occurred, trump didnt allow them to execute plan as required under the law. Well, at least we know the laws were there. Thank you thank all of i want to thank all our panelists in person and virtual. I want to thank all of our audience inperson and virtual all this has been a really terrific and really interesting roundtable. I have a feeling that the conversation will continue so thank you to all thank you lindsey for bringing everyone together. Thank you all. Yes,