Transcripts For CSPAN2 Book Discussion On FDR And The Jews 2

General eisenhower wrote on november 18, if we dont get to tunisia quickly, we surrendered the initiative, give the axis time to do as it pleases, encourage all of our enemies in the area. The battle is not, repeat, not one. On november 20, the premier gave a speech in which he expressed his hope for a german victory in the war to prevent communists and jews from gaining control of france, and extinguishing french civilization. Back in washington, roosevelt had our to ask congress to pass the third war powers act which contains an interesting provision, authorizing the president to suspend laws and regulations hampering the Free Movement of persons, property and information in and out of the u. S. We do not know why that provision was in there. We do know why it was taken out. The house ways and Means Committee worried that the president would use this clause to open the doors to unrestricted immigration, stripped it out. In late november, in fact on thanksgiving day, the president tried to persuade house and Senate Leaders to restore it, but the speaker of the house declined, and roosevelt backed off. This was the climate, this was the time, two days earlier, when undersecretary wells called rabbi wise back to washington and said, the state Department Investigation confirms your deepest fears. For reasons that you will understand, i cannot give these to the press, but there is no reason you should not. It might even help if you did. Again, think of wells as a proxy for president roosevelt. The president had on his desk, metaphorically if not literally, plenty of reports from the state department, from the office of strategic services, from the office of war information, and from military intelligence that all too many muslims in north africa saw the allies as fighting a war on behalf of the jews, something that nazi propaganda emphasized day after day. In late november, assistant secretary of state burley wrote in his diary, only god knows whether the arab tribes will rise. When eisenhower made his way to algiers, he found rumors that he was jewish and that he had been sent by the Jew Roosevelt to establish a jewish state, not in palestine but in north africa. Shortly this and the fate of allied troops in north africa was the most immediate reason why Franklin Roosevelt did not speak out personally and forthrightly against the nazi policy of genocide. At best, it was a distraction that brought complications. At worst, it might damage the success of the invasion. Of course, his earlier worries have not disappeared. He was still worried about american perceptions that he was manipulated by his jewish advisers, and American Jews generally. We think he was excessively worried, but this is much easier to say in retrospect. So, whys held his press conference and publicized weidners telegram, and the evidence collected to support it. He got greater publicity than any single atrocity story had obtained before. But that was only a relative success. The New York Times put the story on page 10. The Washington Post on page six. The Los Angeles Times was the best of the major papers, put it on page two. Late november was also the time when the now famous career, polish career surfaced in london with his own alarming stories of nazi extermination camps. Is the briefing in london put some pressure on british officials to do something, and washington and london began to negotiate, something which did bear fruit in middecember. On december 5, the president told visiting canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King that he thought, he really meant he hoped, the german situation resembled that of 19171918. Germany might crumble at any moment. That would have been an easy way out of what faced him. But roosevelt had missed read the lessons of world war i, which germany lost on the battlefield, and germany, in 1942, was far from crumbling. Even as he spoke, hardened german troops counterattacked in tunisia, and the battle dragged on for many months. On december 8, 1942, the First Anniversary of the president s date of infamy speech about pearl harbor, for American Jewish representatives entered the oval office at me and. At noon. He greeted rabbi stephen wise, the only one whom he knew personally, and wise introduced the others, an orthodox rabbi named rosenberg, led a brief prayer. And then everyone was seated. Wise read a portion of a memorandum, very detailed memorandum that the World Jewish Congress had prepared about the evidence on the nazi policy of genocide. He appealed to the president to bring this to the worlds attention and to make an effort to stop it. One of the participants in this meeting later wrote a detailed reconstruction, which is the only firsthand account, and thats what im quoting from. Roosevelt responded, the government of the United States is a very well acquainted with most of the facts you are now bringing to our attention. Unfortunately, we have received confirmation from many sources. We cannot treat these matters in normal ways. We are dealing with and in same man, hitler insane man, hitler, and the group around them represents a national psychopathic case. We cannot act towards them by normal means. It is not in the best interest of the allied cause to make it appear that the entire german people are murder is or are in agreement with what hitler is doing, because there must be, in germany, elements now thoroughly subdued. But who at the proper time im sure will rise up in protest against the atrocities, against the whole hitler system. I shall certainly be glad to issue another statement as you request. When roosevelt asked for other suggestions, one of the other jewish representatives mentioned asking neutral countries to intercede with the germany, and there were few other suggestions. Roosevelt then shifted the discussion to north africa. He said he had given orders to free jews from concentration camps of their, and to abolish the shes special the shes special discriminatory laws against jews. He then said that muslims had also suffered under French Colonial rule. They have fewer rights than frenchmen and jews, and there were 17 million muslims. The u. S. Would fight for equal rights for all. It was not in favor of greater rights for one group over another. Most people who have analyzed this meeting, including meeting at end earlier stage of research and writing, have looked at roosevelts comments on north africa off the central point. Actually, they tell us what was foremost on roosevelts mind. It is not necessary to see Franklin Roosevelt as indifferent to the holocaust, or as an antisemite. It is better to see him as a juggler who had just taken on a new and very difficult task in north africa and was worried about the consequences of failure. The American British negotiations did produce a statement on december 17, 1942, the allied governments collectively issued their First Official denunciation of the nazi policy of extermination of the jewish people. This was a step forward, but it was neither as dramatic know as influential as nor as influential as they personal president ial speech would have been. Each person will have to decide whether roosevelt behaved properly or improperly under these circumstances. That discussion will probably continue for a very long time. You will have to read our book to see exactly what we say about it. Instead of going there, let me conclude by saying that another correspondent said to us, you know, your final quote sums up the whole book. So let me read you the final quote. Two weeks after president roosevelts death, Supreme Court Justice Felix frankfurter wrote, fluctuations of historic judgment are the lot of great men, and roosevelt will not escape it. But if history has its claims, so has the present. For it has been widely said that if the judgment of the time must be corrected by that of posterity, it is no less true that the judgment of posterity must be corrected by that of the time. Thank you very much. [applause] well, we now do have some time for questions and natures, and i would invite people who would like to ask a question of her speaker to come to the microphone in the two stairwells and i will try to move from side to side to keep is even. Thank you, officer breitman. [inaudible] we were both expert witnesses, but the question is about a lecture he gave you a 93, which ties into todays theme. Where you pointed out despite the auspices and the resistance of the state department, all the state departments, opposition to holocaust rescue collapsed after the publication of the memo by the three Treasury Department officials. Thats how i remember it, and at that point the u. S. Policy, the were refugee board and started operations. In your opinion, about how many jews were saved by that period . Weve seen figures as low as 20,000, figures as high as 250,000. Id like your the storable opinion on that. Lets hope this is all. I feel the need to move around a little for questions. Are you hearing in back okay . All right. You ask this is a request for precision, and i have to explain first the complications before giving you a number. First of all, the war refugee board did a lot of things that involved encouraging of others to try to rescue, broadcast the occupied countries in europe, warnings to nazi satellite countries, request neutral countries to engage with nazi officials in budapest and elsewhere. So thats one problem. If youre talking about direct numbers, youre talking about a small figure, 10 to 20,000 people directly saved by the war refugee board. But most people are now familiar with the efforts in budapest. He was sent with the encouragement and given the funds of the war refugee board, and while his efforts combined with american war news to the hungarian government an accident bombing in budapest which reinforced those warnings helped to persuade the hungarian government to cease deportations for about three months. And as result of that cessation, about 100,000 jews in budapest survive. So if you start to add in the indirect things, you quickly get to the number that approaches, or approximates 200,000. And that is a number used by one of roosevelts harshest critics, and its also a conservative number that weve used in our book. So i dont feel were going far out on a limb with that. Can you confirm my memory that roosevelt allowed the very small immigration quotas from Eastern Europe to be used up to the year 2000 . I dont know when it was, but it did as i remember it allow certain relatives of mine to get into the u. S. Okay. We now get into the whole complication of immigration quotas and to the changes over time. I will say that this is a major area of emphasis in the book, because it fed into our conclusion that roosevelt was very different at different times. We talked about the four phases of roosevelts attitudes and policies. So the first term roosevelt did not do much to attenuate the restrictionist policies of the state department. But the second term roosevelt did, and most of the immigration quotas, not only from germany, but the smaller quarters of the Eastern European countries, were filled in 1938, 1939, and in many cases into 1940. So i guess im confirming your recollection. At that point a lot of things changed, and roosevelts attitudes change, but above all the state department decided that we had a Great Security threat, and all of the earlier progress was reversed and they became extraordinarily difficult for jews and other foreigners to get into the United States during much of the war. The war refugee board changed things in the way of action in europe, but even the war refugee board had trouble opening the gates of the United States. Thank you for an interesting talk. I teach history at George Washington university, and every semester one of the most widely discussions i have with my students is this very question of u. S. Response to the holocaust. And certainly very interesting counterpoint on roosevelts concern and how that might affect the war in north africa. I hadnt considered that before and it will in the future. But some issues my students like to discuss the most, easy to touch upon, things like the impact of the great depression, impact of world war i, domestic politics in the United States, and thats of course begin because you begin your discussion in 1941 but it interested to know why you decide to start in 1941 and how you feel those other incidents in midtolate \30{l1}s{l0}\30{l1}s{l0} would impact the story. I have lectured about other portions of this book elsewhere. I thought that the holocaust museum, roosevelts reaction to early news of the holocaust was kind of a natural. I do think that yes, influence of world war i in the way of creating a kind of revulsion against american involvement in european quarrels and the influence of the depression certainly had tremendous impact on the willingness of the government officials and also the public to accept immigrants. In fact, the sharpest cutback in immigration came in 1930, not as a result of anything that was happening in nazi germany. There was no nazi germany, by president hoover issued a new instruction that anybody who wasnt independent and wealthy was likely to become a public charge and was therefore ineligible. And roosevelt in 1933 have to decide whether to loosen those draconian cutbacks, and he kind of wanted to do something but he didnt want to take a lot of political heat for it. So in his first term he didnt do all that much. Thats as well as i can do quickly with that question. What was the role of Eleanor Roosevelt . Did she concretely change her husbands attitudes or behavior at any key point . I am aware that Eleanor Roosevelt still has millions of admirers. [laughter] and i always disappoint. Governor roosevelt Eleanor Roosevelt grew up in antisemitic family, and some of her early letters are filled with negative comments about jews. She grew out of it, gradually, but she was not a mover and shaker on most of what we call holocaust issues. She did have a particular concern for children, and she was a supporter of the Wagner Rogers deal in 1939 which proposed to admit 20,000 german children who outside of the regular quotas. It failed. She took a public stance in favor of it. Her husband did not. He was waiting to see how things were going to go in congress, and it didnt come close to passing. She wrote a daily newspaper column your she first mentioned nazi persecution of the jews in 1943, and she wrote that she didnt know what to be done except to win the war as quickly as possible. She was a critic of the state department, but she was more concerned with the fate of persecuted intellectuals than with jews generally. Eleanor roosevelt came to reflect on what happened, and at the very end of the war and in the immediate postwar period, she became a strong supporter of a jewish state in palestine. So just as we talk about a process of change over time with franklin, we have to do so with regard to eleanor, but we dont know what went on in private quarters, but it is very unlikely given the public evidence that she was the force behind the scenes for the more humanitarian phases of Franklin Roosevelt. Your last comment is a segue into my question which is also a little off your central topic but i hope youll indulge me. Based on your historical research, if roosevelt had served out his term, which had been a safe israel in 1948 . Well, probably. Truman had to grow into believing that a jewish state was necessary, and roosevelt probably would have he did endorse the idea of it at the democratic platform in 1944. There was an endorsement of it, but he was a little uncomfortable doing so. And then two months before his death, he conferred with the zionist leader, rabbi stephen wise, and wise came away thinking that roosevelt is still with us. He believes in a jewish state. And then roosevelt met with the nonzionist jewish leader, and he came away thinking, roosevelt has misgivings about a jewish state. Theres no guarantee, but i think teamed themed in that direction he probably would have grown the way truman grew with the force of events. I would like to thank you for your talk also. I have two questions which bear on details of what you talk about. You indicated that eisenhower said that is most excruciating time was waiting for operation torch. If you could elaborate on that. And my second question is, the more i hear over time, the worst the french, out. If you could elaborate on that also. Eisenhower, you have to realize that the American Army of 1942 was completely untested. And that the major Amphibious Landing was a big gamble. You put these two things together, and eisenhower had reason to be worried as to whether this is going to work. Nobody knew whether the americans could work well with the british. So there were all kinds of concerns at that time that there were not by june 1944. Of course, that was a very risky operation, too. Because there was at least potential that the germans would be very well dug in and ready to mobilize German Forces against a small initial force. Fortunately that didnt happen, but 1942 was kind of the first time, the baptism by fire. And eisenhower had plenty of reason to be worried. Im not sure i got all of your concerned with the french, but let me talk sort of generally about the vichy government. It is wellestablished today among the scholars that the vichy government was not simply obedient to germany, but actually persecuted jews in france on its own, first foreign jews but then french jews as well. And so the notion of deporting jews for what they nazi said was resettlement, was not a smooth sail, particularly if there were benefits to be obtained for the