Transcripts For CSPAN3 The Civil War 20140621 : vimarsana.co

CSPAN3 The Civil War June 21, 2014

War, is the war in 1864. Good morning. If you could all take a seat, please. I am pete carmichael, professor of history here at gettysburg college. I am also the director of the civil war institute. It is my pleasure this morning to introduce brooks simpson, the Asu Foundation professor of history at Arizona State university. He is a historian of 19th century america. The american presidency as well as the civil war and reconstruction. He has written extensively about ulysses s. Grant. He is the author of let us have peace . S grant and the politics of reconstruction, released in 1991. He is also the author of u. S. Grant triumph over adversity. That earned distinction as a New York Times notable book of the year. Just recently, he has published and edited a boeing by the library of america a volume by the library of america, voices of the civil war. Sharesy brooks Stephen Brooks shares. He has given talks focusing on the war and the east and we know he is a superb battlefield guide. Many of you will have the leisure on monday of following him around the wilderness. Those who have been with brooks before were at antietam, where he managed to get his coat tour cotour guide to ford antietam creek. Is he going to go bushwhacking in the wilderness this year . Take some players. We do not want to lose them. Brooks is going to speak to us. Contingencies and circumstances, u. S. Grant and the problem of virginia in 1864. Brooks simpson. Well, good morning everyone. First thank the team at the civil war institute, especially allison and iron, as well as peter. I must admit that i feel naked up here without a scarf on. Know peters fashion attire will understand that reference. Out thatnt to point while peter recognizes that his advisor, jerry gallagher, made mistakes, my advisor, richard sewall, did no such thing. Intrigued byo peters presentation, which dwell ont seemed to the Sexual Practices and fantasies of confederate generals and their historians. [laughter] i thought i would tell a little story of my own in this regard. Not about me. That is a tmi moment. Youll have to join me on facebook for that one. Several years ago, my wife cheryl and i went to whitehaven, which is a plantation where ulysses s. Grants inlaws had lived, and later was owned by grant during his presidency. And we went in. Not tosked my wife reveal who i was. I had worked there before, what whenever you go to a place, it is better to try to see it, at least from my point of view, as if you are someone they do not know. It says that way you can see what kind of presentation they give to normal visitors to the area, as opposed to somebody where they say, you know this. Cheryl has made it through. It is 14 years and cheryl has made it through exactly five chapters of my grant biography. She says that once they begin firing at each other, she goes to bed. But she had read a certain description of that book. Grants memoirs, she talked about, when her fiance went to war in mexico, she had, as was the want of many women at the time, name dave that named a bedpost after him. The guide looks at my wife and things, women like to look at kitchens to see what modern 1860s. Is were in the he says, what room would you like to see . Without batting an eye, she says, i want to see the bedroom. Ive got to see that bedpost. [laughter] the rest of the trip was marked by that peculiar exchange. What i am here to talk about about the problem of of unionin the minds military strategists, and none more so than ulysses s. Grant. Virginia was more than just a state. Was more than just a state of mind, although it seems to take up space rentfree in the minds of many union civil and military leaders. The majoria was obstacle facing Union Military strategy for two reasons. The state contended the confederate capital, richmond, virginia, which soon became an obsessive point of attack for union planters. And because that capital was defended by none other than robert e lee and his army of Northern Virginia, the largest fighting force the confederacy had to offer, led by its most brilliant commander. Richmond,ons, lee and transfixed Union Military planners. Therefore poses a problem, and poses a problem. Ilitarily for Union Planners it is, after all, the home field of lee and his army. The army of Northern Virginia won all the big ones in virginia. If they left virginia, they might encounter a little difficulty, but in their home ballpark, they acquitted themselves exceedingly well against numerically superior union forces. How do you change that . Pattern, inreak the the tennis parlance, of Holding Serve . In fact, that army was the primary target of an army with Serious Problems of its own. The army of the potomac, which today could be a fine reality show, at least in terms of its officer corps, its dysfunctionality i do not know who Kim Kardashian would play in this army, but someone would. One. Governor warren. It was a dysfunctional and defeatist officer corps at many points in the war in its command element. Its soldiers may not have felt the same way. But if the army of the potomac had ever fought the confederates as well as they fought each other, we would not be having a 1964 conference today. 1864 conference today. It seems that in virginia the army of the potomac always found a way to use to lose. Up until 1864, the biggest victory in virginia was a battle it had never fought, mine run. Had not assaulted lee in december of 1863 in an assault that would have been a catastrophe in the minds of general war in warren and some other people. Just like entering empty cities was the fantasy of George Mcclellan beforehand. Militarily, virginia poses a major problem. It also poses a major problem politically. It is the focus of 19thcentury media, because of the proximity of richmond and washington. People Pay Attention to what happens in virginia in a way they do not Pay Attention to what happens in tennessee, mississippi, or any other state west of the appalachian mountains. 1862,m lincoln notices in how can we win in the west and be so hurt by a week in the east . Why do people pay such attention to the east . To this day, we are still easterncentric. Story about Confederate Military generalship is a story in the east. No one is seriously going to make the argument that Braxton Bragg and joe johnson, earl van others, were the cream of the confederate leadership crop. If you go into town, you will not find a cup with a bragg picture on it. [laughter] so you rearview camera can back up like joe johnson into a parking space. But when we talk about confederate superior generalship, we are talking about the Eastern Theater. It isurse richmond said the east was everything. Richmond, as a target, not only had military value, but it had symbolic political value. It was a notion which, by the way, would have been betrayed by anyone studying military history, that if you captured the opponents capital, you want. We know that is not true. The American Revolution shows that. What still, if you capture richmond, the war will be over, no matter what else may have. Een logistically, a problem, given the resources provided by the Shenandoah Valley. Its ironworks, its manpower the confederacy augmented its military manpower when virginia seceded in 1861. Slaveo augmented its population. People forget the second largest export in the commonwealth of virginia in 1860 were enslaved human beings. You are adding 400,000 people who are enslaved to your workforce, your coworst, it involuntary workforce, but a valuable one if you are waging war. Topographically, virginia poses problems, although it also offers opportunities. You are familiar with the eastwest network of rivers, each providing an excellent point for confederate armies to sit behind and defend themselves and challenge union attackers, the most famous of which is still the rapid dam and Rappahannock River network. There are lots of defenses for a confederate network to adopt. Those rivers plus the chesapeake bay, and especially the james river that runs all the way up to richmond, if union forces can in a cooperative armynavy campaign, you can penetrate rather deeply into the commonwealth of virginia. And you can do so with fairly secure supply lines. You can cut railroads, which you really cannot cut a river. There is an opportunity for military planners. We know somebody who did take that opportunity and did understand that, George Mcclellan, and look how that turned out. There is a legacy from that, which is that afterward it would be very hard for the union civil high command in other words, Abraham Lincoln and edwin stanton, secretary of war to accept the notion of another waterborne operation against the richmond area, it says that would suggest that mcclellan had been right all along. That is something you do not want to risk admitting, especially in a year when you are running against George Mcclellan for president of the United States. He all know about the Shenandoah Valley. T runs towards washington and other interesting places, like gettysburg. Ofruns away into the middle nowhere, in terms of southwest virginia. Although i am sure someone will tell me Virginia Tech is not nowhere. Almaliki al mackey. The Shenandoah Valley allowed the confederates a superhighway to launch quick strikes, counter blows against invading yankees in the center part of the state. The confederacy a lot and poses a lot of challenges for union commanders. It is those challenges, those lessons, those solutions i want to talk about, as they involved in the mind of ulysses s. Grant between 1863 and 1864. Situation,sesses the tries out solutions, adjusts in response to circumstances, improvises, innovates, there is one thing interesting about grant. When things did not go well, grant had another idea. He did not simply pout and say, it did not work. My plan was perfect, it went tough luck. Remember the reason i bring it back to 1863 is, in august of that year, grant heard there had been a movement afoot to have him replace george meade as commander of the army of the potomac. Clear in himself made correspondence that he did not want that job. He knew the capabilities of his generals and men where they were. He also knew the devils that were there, like the recently ousted John Mclennan mcclernan. He would have to learn a new if you went east, fight and new with men he did not know, their strengths and weaknesses, and he knew the last time a westerner, john pope, had gone in, things had not gone well. Feathers were ruffled. And he knew the army of the potomac would resent the imposition of another outsider. Theis already aware rumors about the army of the potomac have already made their way west by the middle of the conflict. In january 1864, however, henry asked grant to outline a plan of campaign not only for the west in 1864 rent is now a western theater commander but he also asked grant, what is your thinking about the Eastern Theater . It turns to Cyrus Comstock and baldy smith, was of whom had experience in the Eastern Theater, to draw up a strategic plan. This is something you should understand if you want to understand what happens in 1864, what grant did do versus what grant wanted to do. And the whole plan was based upon the notion that the best way to deal with virginia was to avoid it as much as possible. That while the army of the potomac might still stay in North Central virginia, its major job would be to protect washington and keep lee in place. Operation would be an amphibious operation against the arth carolina coast, where column of approximately 60,000 men would land, penetrate into north carolina, where it was known that many white southerners were dissatisfied with the confederacy, where you could snip all the rail lines linking richmond to the rest of the confederate heartland, where you could enlist African Americans in support of the cause of the United States and freedom. This invasion plan was not only militarily interesting, but it also had political ramifications which would have shown just how revolutionary and address become, the issue of the hearts and minds of many white southerners, as well as the thirst for freedom of many black southerners. Thisould be neutralized in , unless he went to north lee state. Nless once lee is put in command of the army of Northern Virginia, he never visits another confederate state. You may forget that leap, before he had that position, did in fact spent some time in south carolina, georgia, the coastal defenses. But once he is put in command of the army of Northern Virginia, he is never going to go into another confederate state. He will go into maryland, into pennsylvania, that he is not living virginia. This plan would have forcibly to either come out and fight or in a disadvantageous position in north carolina. At least that was grants hope. The plan is rejected. Halleck makes it clear we are not going to do that. He made it clear, we do not have enough men. In fact, they had enough men in 1864 to execute this plan. This column was supposed to be about 60,000 men. You will see how many people grant had in the overland campaign, plus the army of the james. There was sufficient manpower. Why didnt halleck want to do this, the general in chief . How active i did a map and an empty file cabinet to fill. Points out that we are committed to the overland strategy as much as possible. I point out this plan and say, grant really did not want to fight in virginia. It made a see that lot of sense to fight robert e lee on his home turf. And far from this notion of a war of grinding attrition, this attempt,nts initial this is a war of maneuver, using the Union Advantage in naval power to seek to move the war out of virginia altogether as a theater of decision. Told by his superiors, you are not going to be able to do that will stop in fact, that plan never comes up again, even when grant is named general in chief of in march of 1864. Grant goes back to the drawing board. What is he going to do this time . Grant has learned about his future. He is going to wear three stars, be general in chief of the army of the United States. He is going to have to face the challenge of robert e lee, a cause that is what everybody wants, and he cannot go back west. He has got to go east. People expect him to take leon titans. Sh of he also realizes when he is in the east that people in the District Of Columbia medal far too often meddle far too often with the army of the potomac, and some people in the army are far too interested in what is going on in washington. The first time grant meets meade withrginia, he goes back me to washington, because meade had to testify before the joint defeat aton the great gettysburg, and how he was saved by dan sickles and dan butterfield, and a cast of midgets. [laughter] and that teaches grant something. Lessons is, you cannot go to washington without an escort. There is not been a be anymore of this backdoor backstabbing that has been so characteristic of a Civil Military culture that had been promoted in part by none other than the president of the United States, Abraham Lincoln. Grant had to meet the challenge expectations. You have to address the problem of virginia and on. And so grant devises a plan which you have heard elements of already. A plan which, in virginia, has , and operation in southwest virginia, and operation southward through the Shenandoah Valley, a column moving toward richmond and petersburg along the james river , and then the main Army Maneuver in North Central army of thee potomac, that would move to engage lee. This was, again, a plan that did not loop toward bloody battles of attrition. Hoped to shred the confederate logistical network, threaten richmond indirectly, and force lead to fight a battle not of his own choosing. That if this plan worked, the union would finally possess the Shenandoah Valley, thus depriving the confederacy of that superhighway of invasion. If the plan worked, either richmond or petersburg would fall, or the railroad south toward the rest of the confederacy would be severed, and lee would find himself either in central virginia, trying to do something against the army of the potomac, or rushing back to defend richmond with the army of the potomac on its heels. A sentenced this is called the army of the potomac on its heels. This is not something you will hear except in imagination, and is not something youll see until april of 1865. You are going to force lead to fight in a disadvantageous way by threatening his flanks, his rare, his logistical network. This is the way a shrunken version of i guess what you could call the comstocksmith plan. Instead of going south to carolina, you go south to the james river. You threaten lead posterior and flanks at the same time. There is only one problem with this plan. Grant still had to suffer a certain subordinate commanders of sufficient seniority to demand army commands, including sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, and Benjamin Butler with the army of the james. His plan would also be tha

© 2025 Vimarsana