weapons i do not know where this comes from. i could never find out. [laughter] >> that looks like it is taken from the ceiling. the chairmen of dead russian armed forces have stated repeatedly that all weapons are in centralized storage is. the premier has said the same that all russian tactical weapons are in storage. but i have doubts that all of them are in storage is. maybe some of them but in no question about it. i've visited the basis casting away with him, he was getting into them proves and also the strategic warheads and the ballistic missiles and then bringing them to a capturing the facility and eliminating them. that is a great problem. keep its tactical nukes only on its territory which actually russia does now. and to have a formal agreement that those nuclear weapons would be kept in storage and not deployed with operational conventional forces. if you want to go further than that and insist that all of them are in centralized storage, you would have to have verification procedures by which russians would be able to come to every american air force and naval base to make sure that in the depots of these bases, there are no cruise missiles or for any other weapon. in charleston, according to available data, about 100 nuclear warheads or cruise missiles. it would be prohibited and russia should have the right to come to every base and to say that as strategic. if it is tactical, you would have to get rid of it. that might be possible but it would be extremely difficult. >> let us take two questions. >> thank you very much. i have a question on ratification. those of us who have been through other treaties no complicated and politicized ratification debates can they hear in the united states but also in moscow. can you explain more your thoughts on ratification of whether you think this will go smoothly or will be extremely difficult in moscow. >> introduce yourself. >> i am with the arms control association. your markets are insightful and provocative as usual. can you give us more insight into the thinking on the russian side about the curious bomber warhead counting rule and the new start agreement. ? you think the russians would be concerned about the american ability to do bomber of flooding given the greater historical american reliance on the bomber leg of the triad. , the lack of the kind of inflation of all kinds of problems on russian heavy bomber aviation during the 1990's for research problems. -- for resource problems. can you tell us why the russians pushed for this provision? >> let me start with the second question. in my talks with russians who are in negotiating position, they were not very happy about such accounting rules. the fact is that neither russia nor the united states have presently nuclear weapons actually loaded to bombers. all nuclear weapons are at depots at the airfield. they are not operational and deployed. under vladimir putin and george bush, russians did not want to agree to the principle of operational and deployed weapons as the criteria for accounting rules. now, the major russian concession was to agree to that principle. i think president medvedev played a big role in persuading russian military and those who might be opposed to that that that is in the best russian interest to accept that. it will permit russia to deploy more workers on missiles within a set. if the bombers are counted as one or head, there is more space for deployment of warheads on submarine launch ballistic missiles. russia will eventually give -- bring their program to the end . they might introduce a new missile which will provide russia with local available warhead deployment. from this point of view, this liberal bomber accounting rule may be favorable to russia. >> in talking to people here, the more accurate number would have been zero which is less acceptable and starts to raise the question if it is zero then why do you have them? they are not for strike weapons. they are not to stabilizing so it reflects a really does not necessarily an accounting reality, but it is more of a political reality that they are useless but you don't want to say that. >> it is not really deployed on bombers. >> pettitte should be 6 -- so then it should be sex. ix. >> first of all, to support and that ratification does not take too long. remember the start ii treaty took seven years for russia to ratify. the position to the new treaty would not be weaker than the position to start ii, maybe it would be stronger. a lot depends on how the size of -- how the size of the president and prime minister are -- how decisive the president and prime minister are. there will be a big campaign against this treaty and it has already started, as i have mentioned. it is important that the new treaty becomes a ground for better relations between russia and the united states rather than an arena for mutual recriminations and suspicions and accusations. it quite easily may happen but it will be that. in this case, the new treaty will not improve relations as far as public opinion is concerned. that would be very bad. that should be avoided. lastly, the new treaty should not be ratified as accelerating a weapons program. by way of a trade-off. the united states has a missile defense program that will be used by the republican party as a bargaining chip. in russia, it will be the heavy missile, the new system and some other programs and that also would be detrimental to our relationship. in russia, prime minister vladimir putin is to be engaged by the united states to help the ratification of the treaty. up until now, he has kept silence on the negotiations and of the new treaty. he has never publicly supported it. it is important for the united states to directly contact him and asked him to do whatever he can to accelerate and to insure its ratification. you have to remember that it is not president medvedev who rules the majority but vladimir putin. he has enormous influence over all the russian military institutions, public opinions, and the party of the majority in both chambers of parliament. he has to be on board. that would be very conducive to ratification of the treaty. >> this gentleman here and wait in the back. -- and away in the back. >> it seems to me that the discussion you have about russia and america moving towards ratification but some kind of future vision, one thing you talked about were some things that american could do that would be helpful but i thought there was a need, on the other hand, for russia itself to take some vision with that perhaps with the signing of a tree or some more calls for both either together or initiating a vision of where you want to go in productions and for the relationship itself. what could russia to do that would both help the ratification here to provide that vision and make the russian elite see it as a positive? >> request and, let's take the one in the back. >> my question is somewhat parallel. as usual, your statement was important of and perceptive. i had the feeling that if you have given that statement before the u.s. armed services committee or foreign relations committee that would not have helped ratification on the american side if. you were asked to testify in washington for ratification, not on the basis of what the obama administration will argue but in terms of what would you would argue is in the interest of the united states, skeptical democrats and republicans, what would you say to that senate committee? >> i think russia has to be more constructive on the subject of joint ballistic missile defense. "until now, -- up until now, russia has made some agreements but there is a widespread impression that this group assessment of threats and whatever is done in joint ballistic missiles has, for russia, lever to put the brakes on an american program. i think it is time to come out with new proposals. maybe you think what vladimir putin proposed on on the joint data center on mitchell -- missile launchers but also move forward whe. vladimir putin and president medvedev proposed that we have to have joint missile defense with the united sates and the european union. how about the russian people living in asia. ? are they entitled to protection or not? many people are going away from that but still, if we are to have ballistic missile defense coverage in asia and america would like to cover their asian allies, there is the question of china. both russia and the united states, not jointly but in bilateral format in parallel should start serious consultations with china on ballistic missile defense so that china does not become an obstacle to russian-american cooperation. we would have to persuade that ballistic missile defense is not against china. america has to be clear on some important issues. is china entitled for its own @@@@@@#&"@ @ @ @ @ @ @ g $n,ku) involved. that is important. my first recommendation to russian government would be to start being very practical and technical on ballistic missile defense. it would be very difficult to come with a grand design of strategic ballistic missile defense because we still have a balance of forces which are targeted at each other. i think that is something that we have to start the list with strategic ballistic missile defense and take care of rogue states who are the most urgent threats. i think russia should be tougher on iran. i think iran has overplayed their cards. iran is treating russia like the tail was wagging the dog. that should not be permitted. i think russia should take a more tough position, sanctions against iran, for two reasons. this is because iran has crossed to many barriers, too many red lines and secondly because this is a prelude to war in the persian gulf. if it is not the united states, -- if it is not because of the united states, israel would not tolerate iran getting closer to nuclear capability. this is the argument i would use in russia and the united states, that the new treaty should be the basis for a much greater calculation on the fence and on iran. it can be like that. the fact of signing and ratification of the new treaty will already affect iranian policy. they are touchy on the question of russian-american policy. whenever we have contradictions, a rent toughens its position immediately. -- iran toughens its position immediately. >> terry taylor for the international council of life sciences pres s. given your view that this nuclear agreement, if it is ratified, is a big political deal rather than a military one, i was looking for your views on the political troubles arising from this in strengthened cooperation between the rrussia and the united states, how do you think that the leading political establishment would respond to the view you expressed on iran? is there a real prospect of real collaboration between russia and the united states on this? >> a quick question -- it seems to me that you predominantly reference the perceptions of what we might call the key leaders in russia -- the elite in russia and to what extent is the popular opinion in russia concerned about the specifics of a nuclear arms agreement and also, to what extent is popular opinion concerned about the gap between the actual and perceived power in the world between the united states and russia? . . >> there is a notion that the nuclear route -- nuclear-weapons are not the only color remaining in russia. the balance of power is not in russia's favor and we have a lot of foreign policy problems. second, it makes up for progression inferiority in other aspects. it will take a lot of persuasion. hopefully a clear stance by the prime minister to make russian public opinion complacent about the new treaty. russian public opinion is enormously concerned about russian vulnerability, the economic liability, financial vulnerability, a vulnerability to terrorism, vulnerability to nato, and in prospect, to china. it recently has come to the foreground of russian public debate, and there is much greater concern that is openly expressed about china and the way china treats russia, and the way things may change in 10 or 15 years with respect to china. for many people, this is an additional argument that we have to avoid making china an enemy because obviously the balance is so much in china's flavor -- chuck's favor -- china's favor. we have a huge border with china where russian and the structure was virtually dismantled. with respect to iran, i think that russia will support sanctions with some exemptions. the ban on weapons transfer will not be supported. russia would certainly provide defensive weapons to iran. not so many, after all. iran is not our primary partner any longer. but this ban would not be supported in russia. some things that are not proposed that may come in the debate like doing something with [unintelligible] project, russia would not agree to that. russia would agree with other sanctions, particularly the embargo on supplies to iran of oil products, gasoline, and others. that will meet no objection from russia. the main problem is to have germany firmly on board and to persuade india. with india, it will be very difficult. india makes iran its primary ally in the indian ocean and they're building a military port facility in iran, competing with china. china is placing its emphasis on pakistan and myanmar primarily. so it would be 80 gm-economic data it would be a geode- economic game. in principle, there should be sanctions, but sanctions should not be at russian expends. the most effective sanctions would be an oil embargo. that's a subject for the united states to negotiate now with russia, but europe, japan, china and india. after a new wave of sanctions, it would be wise to revise our policy toward iran. i think the previous crop -- the previous policy, no encouragement, safeguards, it has not worked. -- no in richmond, safeguards, it has not worked. unless there is a threat of an embargo or military action. i think we should change the emphasis to the primary emphasis on iaea safeguards, the acceptance of the 1997 [unintelligible] the second approach might be to shift the emphasis to agree to make iran agreed to withdraw and rich uranium elsewhere. not keeping the stock of enriched uranium, while having the permission to continue operating its existing cascades of centrifuges. some new ones is needed with respect to enrichment, and said of stating once again for the sixth time, no in richmond, or else nothing. -- no enrichment, or else nothing. do not expand further and agreed to withdraw the low-enriched uranium to moscow will it -- where it will be converted to fuel rods and returned to you for your research reactor. maybe that would be a more effective approach and then iran could say was a victory that we have the right to have industrial enrichment or whatever they call it. on the other hand, it makes the time between political decisions a nuclear weapon, much longer than if iran kept the stocks and stopped the centrifuges. >> going back to the earlier questions and things you said about nato and the number one threat perception in russia being made at. let me ask the question a 5- year-old asked. what is it that russian security things nato would do to russia? it's fine to say nato is a threat, but what is it that russia has what is the military action nato would take against russia that causes all of this concern? >> the russian military doctrine is something like [unintelligible] music, it's not as bad as it sounds. the globalization of nato and movement of data to russian borders is the number one military danger, not threats. russians make a difference. threat is something that is already here that threatens war. danger is something that potentially might lead to bore. in the list of dangerous, this is number one, but it is not on the list of threats. there is a specialist of threats and nato is not mentioned there. second, moving nato military infrastructure, moving alliance to russian borders, this may be hair splitting, but it's different from saying nato movement to russian borders. russia is concerned about infrastructure. ballistic missile defense structure in romania, air fields in lithuanians. russia cannot understand why it is going on. there is no