Our panel will be talking about three topics. First, the thinking of the lusitania itself and how that came to happen. Second, the Propaganda Campaign spurred on by the sinking of the lusitania that helped convince americans to go to war. And third, president wilsons leadership and strategy leading up to his declaration of war on april six, 1917. We have a distinguished panel of experts. First, rear admiral samuel cox, retired, the director of navy history and heritage command and curator for the navy. He is responsible for the navys museums, art and artifact collections. The research library, 150 million pages of archives, and for collecting and interpreting u. S. Naval history throughout the world. A graduate of the us naval academy, his 37 year naval career focused on intelligence and he served as director of intelligence for the us cyber command. Professor Richard Striner, who comes to us from washington llege, he is a professor of history and author or coauthor of ten books and numerous articles. For this event, we should note his book, Woodrow Wilson and world war one. A burden too great to bear. His new book, how america can spend its way back to greatness, comes out at the end of the month. John maxwell hamilton comes to us from Louisiana State university, and he is also a senior scholar at the Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for scholars. His career has taken him from journal liaison to Public Service on capitol hill and in the carter administration. Before academia, the book he is working on now focuses on propagating and press censorship during world war one to set the stage here. Admiral, start with you. 100 years ago today, a german uboat sank the luxury liner lusitania here, just south of ireland, as it steam towards port, killing all 1200 or killing nearly 1200 passengers and crew, submarines and torpedoes. As you know, were an Untried Technology as the start of world war one. Can you give us a quick synopsis of the evolution of the submarine warfare, particularly in the Imperial German Navy . And tell us why the german navy moved so quickly to unrestricted warfare that upset all the rules of engagement on the high seas. Okay. Thank you, gill. In the interest of brevity, ill skip several centuries of failed attempts at submarines. And ill start with an incident in 1899 where the american inventor of the modern incarnation of a submarine, john holland, was testing his six attempt to build a submarine that either the u. S. Navy or the royal navy would buy. He was in sag harbor, new york, and it turned out that clara barton, then 77 years old and head of the american red cross, came down to the dock to take a look at the submarine. And holland talked her into taking a five mile underwater joyride on the submarine at which and she lambasted him because she could not believe that an american would develop and create such a terrible weapon of war. Holland replied that because it was so terrible, the submarine would prevent future war. Today you could argue that Strategic Missile submarines you know, fulfill that deterrence of nuclear war. But in 1914, the events of that war prove that clara barton was right and john holland was wrong because the Technology Advanced so rapidly that the thought processes of both the Political Leadership and the military leadership did not have a really good sense of how this weapon worked and what the implications were. The germans got a later start than the u. S. And the british, but by the time and they learn from our mistakes. So by the time world war one started, german submarines were as technologically advanced as anybodys. They lacked numbers. They started the war with only about 18 submarines, compared to 75 in the royal navy. The u. 20, which is the boat which sank the lusitania about 200 feet long crew of 40 men. It operated on the surface, which where it operated most of the time on on diesel engines with a speed of about 15 knots or 18 miles an hour. The diesels powered a generator which charged the batteries. So when the submarine went underwater. It operated on battery using electric motor and when it was underwater, it could only go about 80 miles at five knots. And if you cranked it up to mach speed of nine, youd run out of battery in about an hour. So submarines actually spent most of their time on the surface and only went under water to either attack or escape. The submarine carried u20 carried seven torpedoes, which didnt actually work very well. It was hard enough to hit a ship with a torpedo when the ship was moving, and about 50 of them that were fired accurately didnt work. So it was a major challenge for the for the the for the germans at the start of the war, both the british and the and the germans viewed submarines as kind of a closed in cost of defense weapon. Neither had this vision of using them in long range, open ocean attacks against merchant ships. The first attack, the first success of submarine attack during world war one was spectacular in a bad way. The german u9. Attacked three British Armored cruisers who werent expecting to be attacked by a submarine. They were cruising in a patrol, you know, starting the british blockade of of germany. The submarine torpedoed one second cruiser stopped, pick up survivors, submarine torpedo. The second one, and then the third one stopped to pick up survivors of submarine torpedo. The third, 1400 something british sailors lost their life during that, as all three ships went down. The first attack against a merchant ship was about a month later in september, actually about october of 1914. And that was one where the german submarines were trying to follow the accepted types of warfare that had existed for, well over 100 years, in the sense that the first attack, the submarine, surfaced flag, the the the merchant ship down, told it to stop, put the crew in the lifeboats, put their own men ashore, went down on the ship, opened the valves and the ship sank of its own accord. The skipper of that boat was not sure whether he was going to be Court Martialed or a hero when he got back, because there was no rules of engagement for what the what the uboat captains were supposed to do. These captains were young, 30 years old, and as the war quickly developed, they were you know, if youre going to get your blue max, which is the highest german award, you know, for airplanes, you know, the aces, you would shoot down, you know, however many airplanes. Well, ships come in all sizes. So if youre going to get a blue max, it was dependent on on tonnage versus how many ships. So what a uboat captain wanted most of all was a big fat, juicy target because he got the end. Plus torpedoes being unreliable and extremely expensive. He wanted to use those very careful at the start of the war. The british started a blockade of of germany. They didnt call it a blockade for legal reasons, but thats effectively what it was. The german propaganda to look at this as okay, you british, you are starving our women and children as a means of defeating us. And so we are justified in getting back at you. And they were trying to find a way to do it. So the submarine offered a means to do it. The other thing was that the war didnt go any way anyone expected. No one in europe had seen bloodletting and carnage on the scale that that they did not understand the impact of machine gun on the battlefield. And so it didnt take long before the political leaders were desperate to find a way out. They wouldnt admit that the whole thing had been a mistake. But theyre looking for some Wonder Weapon to get themselves out of this jam. So the british are doing the blockade. The germans hit upon the submarine warfare, the german navy, which initially wasnt keen on submarine warfare, theyd engaged in this massive, expensive battleship building arms race with the british before the war and had lost. And they knew that if they went on a traditional battleship, the battleship conflict, they were going to lose. So all of a sudden, this expensive navy is useless to the kaiser, and the german navys looking for something to get back in as good graces. So the german submarine, they latch on this capability and they they get the zealots say, if we send the submarines into, you know, off of ireland on the west coast will sink all the british merchant ships. Thatll bring a quick end to the war because the british wont be able to sustain that. The problem initially was at the germans didnt have enough submarines. You could only keep about two on station at any time off of the western approaches to england. So as a result, you know, it didnt go quite as well. What the germans expected, but thats basically how they got into using the submarines that quickly in the war. Well, can you quickly explain how did the u. 20 come to choose the lusitania Passenger Ship as a target . And was she a legitimate target . It was sheer coincidence. Basically, that those two ships were in the same part of the water at the same time. British intelligence was had the german codes track the u20 out of her port up to the northern part of the northern sea because theyd go over scotland and down off the western coast, ireland, because it was too dangerous to go through the english channel. The british knew it was the u20. They knew where it was going to operate, intended operate in the irish sea. Took the u20 longer than expected due to fog, weather harassment, whatnot to get to the operating area. But two days before the loose titanic was coming across into that area, she started sinking ships. First one was a sailing fishing kind of boat that the u20 sank with guns, which was the preferred method for sinking ship like that. And then she torpedoed two other ships right along the track where the lusitania were supposed to go. The british admiral tree recognized this. The lusitania was sent multiple warnings, but they were conflicting. The first warning said stay away from the coastline of ireland. Second warning said theres german submarines operating a particular area was right in the middle of where you would go if youre trying to stay away from the coastline. So the skipper, captain turner of the lusitania, was trying to split the difference, but the lusitania came out of a fog. The u20 had decided that they werent going to go to their normal opera because it was too foggy to, you know, they were going home early and as they were going west, south of ireland, the lusitania was coming east. Lusitania came out of a fog. U20 had like it was a submarine dream. The last course changed the lusitania and made several course changes, trying to get an accurate fix of where they were because they didnt know. Having been in the fog. So they can accurately calculate when they would arrive at high tide at liverpool because they didnt want to get trapped, circling around outside the port, which was a sure fire way to get sunk by a submarine. But the for the u2 party, the lusitania is last course chain basically doomed that ship because if ships coming directly at the submarine if it zigs submarines still has a perfect shot. If a jags still has a perfect shot, if it comes straight, the submarine just moves aside, which is what happened and has a perfect shot. And it wouldnt have mattered how fast the lusitania was going for the first torpedo. For the second torpedo. If the first one had missed chasing a sub, you know, chasing something as fast to lusitania would have been but an issue. But schweiger, who was the captain of the boat, fired one torpedo. It worked and hit in exactly probably the most vulnerable spot on the ship. Resulted in a secondary explosion. A few seconds later that was most likely caused by a main steam line rupture. But the way the lusitania had been designed, outfitted originally as to be a potential auxiliary cruiser. But she was never fitted out that way. So she had no guns on board, but served some of her structural characteristics, resulted in her rapidly flooding in her longitudinal coal bunkers. And because a lot of the portholes were still open, it you know, a lot of people thought how could a torpedo sinking ship that big . Well, it can, especially when it hit where it hit. And the second explosion basically, she lost her power shows. She neither could stop or go ahead, couldnt launch the lifeboats safely, know it was basically a catastrophe for the ship went down in 18 minutes. Before cspan we cant do questions until later when we have. But the question was whether submarine was underwater. No submarine was was underneath. The submarine was underneath the water. There were reports after the war that it served a circle. And heck, although none of those were true. You know that the swagger took one torpedo, one shot, watched very quickly, determined that he only needed one torpedo to sink the ship because she was going down so fast as schweiger left, he could stumble across another merchant ship. Several hours later shot another torpedo, which didnt work, and then proceeded on back to back to germany. So lets go. Jack hamilton. There we have this catastrophe, 1200 people killed, 400 and some americans. What was the initial impact of this news among the American Public . Well, we, of course, news was incomplete and remained incomplete for some time. But the initial the initial stories were much like you see with the New York Times that we flashed up here with big, broad headlines and stories that suggested the sort of brutality that the germans had inflicted on the on the ships, even newspapers like William Randolph hearst newspapers, which had been more balanced. I would argue more balanced, but at least more open to the german side of the equation. Frame the stories in pretty negative terms. But that was fairly short. The press coverage was fairly short lived, will get in later. I think, through how president wilson calculated all of this and decided not to go to war. But by june 15th it had stopped being a big regular news item as the Chicago Tribune said americans would sooner have the bubonic plague imposed on them than war. And so the result was that this was not going to be an event that dragged us immediately into war. It was, however, an event which is where i think you want to go with this conversation. It was an event that clearly opened up the floodgates for people who were more war minded, people like Teddy Roosevelt to begin to argue strenuously that we should be prepared and that we should think about entering the fray. And and the part of the story that i that interest me is the part that involves the propaganda side of this. The germans in a sense, the sinking of the lusitania was a kind of metaphor for for what had been wrong with the way germans did propaganda. It was a stupid idea to sink the lusitania the war value, the actual value they got out of that from a war point of view was nonexistent effectively, but framed for most people overseas of the United States to frame this idea of them being a brutish country. There is actually a case to be made that and the wilson ministration admitted it that it wasnt illegal for them to do what they did and they did have a case to make that in fact, the way the blockade was being used, which, by the way, the british blockade was unprecedented, there was there was a conference there had been conferences, including the london declaration, which basically which, by the way, the british didnt sign. But even though it was in london, which basically said you cant have you cant have blockades of the scale and theres great debate about how many people actually ended up dying as a result of the food shortages. It wasnt usually starvation. I dont think it really was starvation, but it was malnutrition and the low end of the scale with 300,000 people. So its not as though the its not as though the the germans didnt have a complaint and a lot of the rules of of sea warfare were unwritten because, for example, the treaty of the declaration of london didnt even talk about submarines. So there was the rules of what you should do and so forth, were up for grabs, but it was nevertheless, it was a very stupid move on the part of the the germans. And it was then compounded by their using very stupid propaganda techniques. They could have, for example, tried to make a better case for why they had to do this, although they were somewhat limited because they didnt want to admit that this food shortage has had an impact on them from National Security point of view. And since all propaganda was really being run by the military, they the military views were always overlaid on the propaganda machinery. But they gloated over what they did. The newspapers gloated over it. There was a man in the United States, bernard berg, who had been set over here to run the propaganda operation. And he ended up in cleveland. And he was he was so over the top in his defense of what the germans had done and so insensitive that he effectively had to leave the country. He was going to be sent out. I mean, it was just a matter of time. So he left, in effect, burns for the german ambassador, said that after the lusitania are our ability to do propaganda, United States was severely limited. Theres more to that story. Yeah. Lets get into the propaganda, but lets first let rick steiner here talk about how Woodrow Wilson reacted to this news. Woodrow wilson reacted to world war one right away in august 1914, he took a number of very important positions, decided some very important things. One of them was that he would attempt to mediate the war himself to try to end it, to bring the parties together, to peace conference before august 1914 was over, wilson had sent a message to to the heads of state of all the warring nations, offering his services. This was extremely important because wilson fervently believed that it was possible for him to do it. It was his obligation to the world to do it, and to a certain extent, his destiny to do it. He was a very religious man and many times during world war one, he spoke about the hand of providence, you know, guiding events. He took this very seriously, literally. And his correspondence, colonel edward houses diary, his speeches attest to this over and over again. So he made that effort and he decided that in order to end the horror and be an honest broker for peace, the United States must absolutely avoid getting dragged into the war and to that end, he resisted calls for military preparedness that were already being advanced by people like Theodore Roosevelt in the autumn of 1914, the british imposed their blockade ad in the autumn of 1914, in early 1915, the germans proclaimed a counter blockade, submarine blockade of the British Isles and in that span of months, a number of other important developments had had accelerated the the scope of the war. The carnage was indeed unbelievable. By december 1914, hundreds of thousands of dead. The economies of the nations were being stressed to the maximum, and already orders were being placed in the United States for weapons and munitions and agricultural commodities. There were calls in congress to forbid that. Wilson decided to permit it. The reasons i can comment on the reasons, but ill add several more items before i do that. The allies, the western powers were the side that was positioned to take advantage of of buying munitions and weapons of war in the United States. The Imperial German Navy was not able to fight its way out of the north sea. The royal navy could convoy transports to pick up the weapons and bring them back. But by the spring of 1915, after the germans had proclaimed their submarine blockade, the germans began shipping weapons in munitions in the cargo hold of passenger liners like the lusitania. The british knew it. The American Public knew it. There was newspaper coverage of it. And the germans took out ads in american newspapers warning americans dont travel on british ships. You do so at your own risk. And all through the spring of 1915, secretary of state William Jennings bryan was advising wilson to to dissuade americans from traveling aboard these ships. Wilson refused to do that. And so you have this set of preconditions, you know, leading up to the lusitania sinking. Now, there was a wide range of of opinion on on the different sides of these different disputes, whether the United States should or should not forbid the exportation and sale of weapons of war. Whether the federal government should or should not warn americans against traveling on these ships, that if they did so, they did it at their own risk. Wilson took this series of positions that left him in a very unstable position in terms of policy. After the lusitania went down because Theodore Roosevelt called for war immediately and will soon. Certainly didnt want that. But in the summer of 1915, because of the lusitania sinking, he decided that his earlier opposition to preparedness legislate and had been a mistake and he authorized the war in Navy Departments in the summer of 1915 to begin drafting Preparedness Measures and these were put into shape in the autumn of 1915. And then in january 1916, wilson made a whirlwind speaking tour of the midwest, heartland of isolation of saddam, and advocate rating the preparedness legislation, the lusitania sinking, played a crucial role in the sequence of events. However, the legislation was opposed in congress substantially, and wilsons own party. It took all of. Wilsons skill to get these measures through the senate and house. By summer 1916. Finally, in the autumn of 1916, wilson signed the acts into law and only a few more months remained before the United States was at war. Wilsons early opposition to preparedness put the United States far behind the curve in terms of being able to put troops into battle. In 1917, it took a long time. The United States was far behind the curve in this. This really cut back on wilsons leverage with the british and french on war aims and in a lot of ways. But the lusitania sinking, though it certainly did demonstrate the issue that would finally force wilson to go to congress for a declaration of war did not in some ways represent a process that was in any way inevitable because the fortunes of war shifted back and forth. That was one of the things that made it so hard for wilson to be a peace broker. The losing side at any given point was usually more than ready to cut its losses and sit down and talk peace. But the winning side, especially in light of the saccharin fires as the cause was inclined to play its advantage and win. And wilson went through through almost endless gyrations, you know, chasing the phantom of of of the peace conference, that he could somehow bring about. And he never did. Now, during 1916, as he fought the preparedness fight and as he saw it, reelected on the slogan, he kept us out of war. The germans, for reasons of their own, decided to behave themselves. They eased up on submarine warfare, whereas in 1916, for reasons of their own, the british engaged in maritime tactics related to the blockade that struck wilson and other americans as so high handed, so outrageous. And i daresay Many Americans know little, if anything, about this, that by the autumn of 1916, wilson had actually begun to tilt toward the germans. They were behaving themselves, whereas the british were being outrageous. There theres a remarkable session that colonel house recorded in his diary late in 1916, where he warned wilson, if you keep on pushing the brits, we may have war with them. And wilson said, fine, im ready for it. And house was absolutely stunned, and thats the way it was playing out. By the end of 1916. And then everything changed again. The british decided in early 1917 to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Several historians have said one of the stupidest decisions in history because there there were no restrictions. If if the germans had targeted military vessels, if the germans had placed any restrictions. But it seemed absolutely wanton and savage and forced wilsons hand. But after the germans made that decision, well, saddam was almost in a daze. He he had persuaded himself that he absolutely could. And would end the war through a peace conference. And he he said to house at one point, its as if the world shifted in its rotation and was going the other way. I dont know which end is up. I dont know what to do. Of very strange sequence of events in terms of of wilsons policymaking. He was, in many ways making it up as he went along, except for the fact that from beginning hed had this idea that he could end it and to end it, the United States had to stay out of the war. The United States had to be absolutely neutral, impeccably neutral. And in a letter to walter hines page, who was americas ambassador to great britain, wilson explained why he would decided not to oppose the sale and shipment of american weapons to the nations at war. Why . He decided not to warn americans against sailing on british ships. He said to to broker a peace. We have to be absolutely and perfectly neutral. Therefore, if it is our right as a neutral nation to do x, y and z, we should do it to demonstrate vigorous use of neutral rights. If it is the right of american citizens, as the citizens of a neutral nation, to travel on ships and not be savagely murdered by a vessel that should surface and give warning and let them get into the lifeboats. They absolutely should vigorously do that. We have to keep doing these things a very far fetched line of reasoning by my standards. But that was what wilson said. Lets get the if anybody wants to jump in here with. But that sam cox, weve talked a little bit here about what the how the german high command reacted after the lusitania on unrestricted submarine warfare. Have we missed anything about the reaction in germany itself . The the initial attack was met by was pretty popular within germany itself. It was seen as striking back against, you know, the british who are starving our women and children and and therefore justified. And it becomes a case in make believe in your own propaganda. But the germans very quickly realized that they had a disaster on their hands in terms of relationship with the neutral countries around the world, particularly the United States. And there had been plenty of senior people within the German Government before the war zone was declared around great britain, who had argued that, you know, the submarine force is not Strong Enough to do what they claim theyre going to be able to do. And all youre going to all youre really going to do with the submarine warfare is antagonize the United States and bring them into war, which which everyone recognized was a really bad thing for for germany. And like it was explained either, you know, it kind of they cut the age back after that, the lusitania was shocking or the kaiser went, oh, i wish i would have never sunk a liner like that with all those innocent people on it. Well, submarines were under orders to attack british merchant ships and gave warning that they couldnt be sure that they wouldnt sink neutrals because the british were busy flying neutral flags on their ships, painting out the names on the ships. They began arming the merchant ships, which a uboat on the surface against another ship thats armed is extremely vulnerable. So then the germans had less and less incentive to, you know, if they tried to do it the old way, they would be at a disadvantage and that submarine would be lost. So they more and more went to the, you know, surprise attack by a torpedo with no warning. But they did go through the hiatus period there where they pulled back and reassessed. But as they became more and more desperate, as the war went on, the argument shifted back as and also as the now 1917, they had 100 submarines and they are okay, well, now we have enough and some of the savagery that was talked about before was was was quite deliberate in the sense that theyre trying to the germans are trying to make sure that the neutrals, like the United States, stay away. So they are they are doing things to terrorize, neutral merchant shipping. It didnt work, really. And certainly didnt work against the british who just kept getting on the ships and coming in. And as the night in 1917, when the the unrestricted warfare was resumed, it was extremely effective at first. And it was so effective that the british immediately had to adjust their tactics. They started conveying the they pulled destroyers off of of duty and other places and brought them back to guard the convoy as they made better use of intelligence, which was one of the problems during the lusitania. As i described, the British Intelligence had a good understanding in 1915 of how many german submarines were out and where they were operating. What they didnt have was a good mechanism for taking that intelligence and using it while at the same time protecting the source. So the things i talked about, intelligence, knowing about the u20, they were like seven people in the in the british admiralty who were aware of that and the lusitania and the british commanders in that region werent werent among them. So that was a significant event. The other reason why the british werent able to protect the lusitania was a couple of was a couple of mindset issues. One, the lusitania was extremely fast and there was this belief that that speed was enough to protect the ship against a submarine. Submarines are relatively slow and in most of the cases thats true in World War Two, the queen mary, Queen Elizabeth made many transits carrying thousands of troops safely because their high speed did protect them. And also, we had intelligence to send them where we knew the german submarines were. But in i lost my train of thought on that one. Oh, but. But in the case of lusitania, that the speed doesnt work if you drive over where the submarine is waiting and thats what happened in that case. The other was the, you know, almost kind of like a pre 911 mindset. This this, this, this disbelief that the germans would really do it, just people could not grasp that, you know, theres 100 years of how you wage warfare at sea in basically a humane way dont sink passengers. Dont kill innocent people. And it just hadnt sunk in yet that the germans meant what they said and did what they said they were going to do. Well, jack, when i talked about Woodrow Wilson and the National Press club, i made it seem like he really like reporters. Did you really think that was true . How do they deal with reporters especially after the lusitania . Right. Okay. Im glad to answer that. But i think i need to i mean, i know why we had to go and talk about wilson, but i think we need to finish the picture of the propaganda. Yes. Well, lets do that. And the reason for that is actually its kind of a microcosm. We got what was wrong with the german side and we never found out what was wrong with the british side, which is indeed exactly what was the problem for the American Public. The germans were clumsy and made bad decisions. The british took advantage of those that clumsiness to its great advantage, a tremendous advantage. Part of this was because they were so clever. They had something called Wellington House, which was created to do propaganda. It was so secret members of parliament didnt know about it and it worked in the United States as one of its prime areas to work because of course they wanted to drag the United States into the war in the same way that the germans wanted to keep us out of war. They were very crafty about the way they worked with opinion molders. Its interesting, for example, that one of the big sort of news events was that they found a guy named another person who was a german propagandist and they a secret service agent, managed to get his beliefs and it became news all over the new york world. It was leaked by the the secretary of treasury, mcadoo, although they never admitted it was leaked. The story was there without saying what the source was because the secret service was treasury officials, agents were tracking germans. Meanwhile british spies were meeting with colonel house all the time and he had a he had a very strong relationship with people. And and there are wonderful documents in the british archives. The talk about how how worked in the United States, how they their work was not known, how they managed to place stories in newspapers. And in fact, theres a wonderful story about this dr. Albert event, where this this story ran. They took these documents and ran it for days and days in the new york world. Theres one little squib in the bottom of a story that says theres a lot of concern treasury officials may be leaking information to the germans, even though theyre running all of these stories that were leaked by the british or by treasury officials that were supporting the british. So it was a very lot it was very lopsided. And that was exacerbated by yet another problem. On august 4th, the day that war began, one of the first acts of the of the british was to go and sever the transatlantic cables. And as a result of that, it was very difficult for news to be said by cable for by the germans. It was the germans cables that were cut to the United States. They had wireless, but the United States took over the wireless stations and the wireless stations didnt work very well. In the beginning of the war, they worked a little better later on. So in the New York Times and and chicago newspapers do use a sample in the first year, 70 of all the news was news from the allies, and only 30 was news that came from the central powers. And even the news that came from the central powers, if it came by cable, if they managed to get it by cable, it ended up being censored by the british. So germans had a great deal of difficulty telling their story in the United States, as want to make sure that story was balanced with regard. But that back in with regard to wilson. Im glad to see that he had some good experiences here. But by and large wilson would not have been a was not a person who enjoyed mixing with the press like Everything Else in this world is complicated. He actually employed a large number of journalists and actually an astonishing number of journalists went to work for him. Bryant actually had been owned a newspaper, and of course, Josephus Daniels, the secretary of navy, was a prominent newspaperman. Secretary lane had been a journalist in. Page, whom you mentioned and brant whitlock. And then later on, Norman Hapgood had all been journalists who went to some of the most important diplomatic posts. And then, of course, there were journalists who went to work in all kinds of other. And one of the most interesting examples is ray standard baker, a very principled journalist, extraordinary journalist. What i might say, one of my heroes who actually went abroad pretending to be a journalist, but he never a story during the whole time he was overseas and he was in britain basically filing reports for the state department about what was going on and then later went to italy for them in france. And then when the versailles peace treaty started, he was their press secretary instead of george creel, who was who had so blotted his copybook, they couldnt give him that job. So wilson, that part of that story is very strong, but he did not enjoy mingling with journalists after the lusitania. He did not hold one other press conference until december. 20 20. I think to 18th, december 18th of 1916. When he actually held a press conference and told the journalists that as a matter of fact, were not going to try to do anything to bring about peace, something rick was bringing about, talking about. So dont report about that. It was off the record, by the way. Dont even talk about that. And then two days later, his piece, he sent that afternoon, his peace proposal, suggesting that he would mediate peace. And the journalists were furious about this. And then he had a couple of other press conferences. And then the war came and he had he created the committee on Public Information, which was his propaganda arm, the beginning of all american government, systematic government propaganda. And after that, he never had to meet with the press again during the war because he had just what he wanted. He had a Propaganda Agency between himself and the press and he didnt deal with them. And one small aside, and then ill let some other people talk here. But theres a wonderful line where he says the colonel house, that theres only two times when its okay to lie. When youre talking about a womans honor and when youre talking to journalists about foreign policy. Its very yeah, its. Please, rick, i jump in here. Wilson certainly did have very interesting relations with rest edward baker and a number of other top journalists. David lawrence, a former student of wilsons, was washington correspondent for the new york evening post, i think at that time. And wilson would often use lawrence to try to, you know, tips to the press, tips of the sort that he wanted the press to pick up. But at other times, his relations with lawrence turned quite cold and even bitter. Wilson im sorry to have to say, it could sometimes be something of a hypocrite. And the first of the 14 points drafted in within a few hours, one morning with colonel house was open covenants of peace openly arrived at no more secret treaties little problem of enforceability there if its secret, youre not going to know about it, are you . But wilson and house violated that provision time and time again. That house gray negotiation was from autumn 1915 into spring 1916, trying to work out an agreement that would force a peace conference. And it was all done in total secrecy. Secretary of the department kept largely in the dark. The American Public kept largely in the dark. And wilson would continue to use house, you know, in in various confidential capacities as a personal envoy during the war, working with the allies on issues, war aims and in the autumn of 1917. David lawrence got wind of some of the things house was doing and wilson just flew off the handle and berated lawrence you news men need to learn a thing or two about the you know when to keep your mouth shut another newspaper man who was important to wilson was frank cobb, who was, i believe, the editor of the new york world just before wilson decided he had to go congress for a declaration of war, he supposedly called frank cobb into the white house and and and shut it engaged in this spy tenuous outpouring of pessimism, of despair. Know with regard to what the war would do to american democracy. You know, our liberties will go sky has for some time debated whether cobbs account which was published in a book that he wrote in the early 1920s, was really, you know, accurate reportage. But the consensus of opinion by the late 20th century, led by arthur linke, who was the dean of wilson scholars and his generation, was that cobbs account was probably authentic, most extraordinary outburst by wilson. You talk about selffulfilling prophecies. You know, all the suppressions, you know, of free speech under the espionage act of 1917, sedition act of 1918. Wilson, before the fact, predicts that all this will happen, says that its going to be absolutely catastrophic and then adopts this defeatist position inevitable. Nothing can be done about it and then, you know, goes ahead and makes happen very, very, very strange. Very strange indeed. If i could. Yes, please. Just a little bit on the on the german propaganda that the germans had had a case, the lusitania one, she was stuck, was carrying several million rounds of rifle cartridges and several thousand cases of artillery shells, not in in a condition that would have caused this famous second explosion. But it was more material that would be used to kill germans later on. You know, once it got to the front and on a previous voyage, the lusitania had actually carried artillery. Other british liners were being converted and used to transport troops, which is what the german submarines were looking for. So the germans had a case to make the but the unprecedented. You the loss of of you know, sending women and children and, you know, some 30 or so, you know, infants to their deaths was something that, you know, just overpower any story that the germans could muster in in conjunction the fact the british did a really good job of suppressing for many, many any knowledge that the lusitania was in fact carrying munitions. I believe divers actually went down and photographed some. Yeah, yeah. You know, i mean. Thats right. And and and the germans complained about that. It was much harder to describe what starvation looks like than the immediate this immediate thing was actually Something Else that happened in the middle of all this, that we shouldnt forget to mention that the british had started an investigation into what had happened when the germans into belgium and when the lusitania went down, they stepped up production on this and Wellington House, which i already mentioned five days after the lusitania went down, they issued a report and called the brits. The brits report and its a its a complicated document because some of its true. But a lot of it was unsubstantiated information. And historians today realize that much of what was said was over the top. And so the result of that was that in addition to the lusitania you now had this other item out there. The flip side of that was an artisan. This story, some people may know its very famous, but we want to make sure its told is an artisan in germany created a its a private person created a medal that commemorated the lusitania lusitania sinking and you know that from our point of view that wouldnt be considered a thing you might want to do a medal about. But he did it. You had to get 500 of the british found out about this. And so took it and made it into a huge extravaganza. And they actually Wellington House produced 50,000 of these. And then they and they distributed them all over the United States and all over the place to show like this is what the germans do. And then selfridges, the department store, actually picked up on it and they would start selling them and they gave the they gave the proceeds then to the red cross. But here was an example of the way it was portrayed. Its like every german had one of these medals. What was this character in munich who did it . It was one person and they managed to make that into a huge, huge media event that suited their purposes. And the german medal maker actually put an incorrect date on the medal that preceded the attack, which then added to all this, was a predetermined german attack on the you know, theyd already made the metal before they attacked the ship and british made you know, huge, huge propaganda gain by this german blunder. Lets talk a little bit about press censorship. Was it effective . Was it even necessary, do you think . Well, i think this is what ive been working on mostly. I think the fact is that the press was really willing to censor itself to an extraordinary degree and theres all kinds of evidence for that. There was concern about the german american press. There was greater concern in actually. That gets to this story that rick was telling, because two things happened simultaneously after we went to war. One is that george creel, your committee member, came up with some guidelines. Um, and simultaneous, honestly. Wilson in the espionage act sought to actually have and promoted a clause that was a, a censorship well call it a censorship clause which read almost exactly the way the British Defense of the realm act read, which meant, you could the government could pretty much decide anything they wanted to censor. And these were its a quite a complicated story and complex story because we know that wilson saw the voluntary guidelines that nonstatutory guidelines that creel had written because he actually made amends on the document. At the same time, hes when hes promoting these, hes also then promoting this very this very open ended. And and very broad censorship clause. And it ultimately didnt pass because people were so outraged and even people who were democrats didnt a lot of them didnt like it, i believe actually, wilson could have gotten a which is scary, but in the times they could have even gotten a somewhat slightly rewritten clause. They could have gotten that passed. And ill tell you a little story. I found a letter from the New York Times to Josephus Daniels with a clause of the New York Times, the new york world, the new york evening post, and the new york american wrote that said they would by as a statutory censorship law is that right . And i was stunned when i realized what i what i was seeing. I dont know what happened to it, went to daniels. And it was they were pretty far along in the debates. And by the way, the times said wed rather not do this, but if you want to have a censorship law, heres one. It was it was still pretty broad. So i think the the the were fortunate. Were very fortunate. That didnt pass. I think from a point of view of Civil Liberties, especially when we consider that initially the Supreme Court supported the stuff that was in the espionage act that still could be used in a very heavy handed way. So heaven forfend what they could have done if they had a stronger act thats the one piece of the of the of what happened in the war that didnt live on because of course, gradually the Supreme Court began to roll back and change their view on the First Amendment. And in a wonderful little of history, perhaps the most important Supreme Court justice, who the way for what i would consider liberal interpretations of the First Amendment was wilsons opponent in the war, Charles Evans in the president ial election of 1966, and Charles Evans hughes, who went on to be the Supreme Court justice. And i you know, what ifs in history are funny, but i think if he had been the president , i think we would have had a little different way of we handle Civil Liberties. So the bottom line is, um, that it was bad enough as it was, but the press for the most part, there were transgressions here and there. But the press was willing to go along and in fact, i have another document where the ap said an internal document really said whatever. Creel writes, we thats going to be our rule and every news editor is going to follow it. And that was that was all voluntary. So they were pretty patriotic. I dont think that there. Yeah, the the suppression of Civil Liberties that wilson had lamented before the fact and then helped to usher in the espionage act of 1917 was used to deny mailing privileges to a number of opinion journals that opposed the war. The act gave the postmaster general, in this case, albert burleson, the right to deny such publications access to mass mailing rates. But the espionage act, which still on the books, was worsened very significantly in 1918 by an addition that became known after a while as the sedition act, which permitted prosecution for simple opposition to the war. And it was the sedition act that led to the prosecution of eugene debs, who was in his 0. 60 to ten years in the federal penitentiary, simply opposing the war. His pardon by warren harding. But the Supreme Court in the case of schenck versus the United States in early 1919 upheld all the constitutional of the espionage and sedition acts and the majority opinion was written by. Oliver Wendell Holmes and holmes was so vilified by civil libertarians in that he began to drastically change his position and and became, you know, a champion of Civil Liberties in many ways in the decade that followed. But but holmes, you know, wrote this really draconian Union Decision in the schenck case. We should start questions from the audience if there are any. I dont see a microphone set up there, but i can pass one around here if anybody has a question, you can. Yeah. Lets start at first. Oh, yeah. Good. Heres here comes to mind. Yeah. You want to start, tom . And then well go to edwin i was just where would you put the zimmermann telegram and all those i mean were looking at one cause and i dont want to i mean i know thats words the parties right now, but i was just thinking in terms of how you would weigh it without going into it too much. Me yeah, well, whoever knows well the timmerman telegram was very, very important. But by the time british revealed its existence to the United States government and then it was later revealed to the press, wilson had already made the the the wretched decision about going to congress or war declaration because of the german decision on unrestricted submarine warfare. It had certainly made a more convincing case for the war declaration. Theres no doubt about that. And it certainly increased the the vocal support for a war declaration by people like Theodore Roosevelt who were already advocating that. But its really interesting that that even after the zimmermann telegram was released, there were huge antiwar rally in major cities around the United States. The American People were very, very conflicted about this. And thats exactly why you know, in 1917, 1918, the issue of sedition, you know, disloyal of treason, it was not just a handful, you know, of radicals, large numbers of of americans and elected leaders believed that the United States had been dragged into a war that could and should have been avoided, that wilson had been manipulated, you know, and and. And in many ways, thats exactly why there was such a difficult time of in 1919, getting the versailles treaty with the league of nations covenant ratified the the socalled iraq and salable, you know, opponents of the league of nations, particularly in the Republican Party, but not just in the Republican Party by any means. These were convince noninterventionist and an ideological terms. There was a case to be made for noninterventionism among liberals or progressives, and among conservatives, people who were committed to isolation had had distinctive, you know, ideologically distinctive reasons for arguing that. But they came together and made common cause in 1919 to to oppose the league of nations. So there is a theres a continuum. The American People were very, very deeply divided all the way through. And make one quick point about zimmerman, if i could. The Zimmerman Telegram is of course, is a is a is well known historically. But whats interesting about it is that it wasnt the only crazy note that the germans were sending and and people who worked over here who were german agents would come up with ideas that almost look like keystone cop ideas, which this just happened to be one they found out about. So that gets to the second point. How did they find out about it . Well, the british had control of communications without getting into all the details, didnt want the United States to know how they knew it. It went to the United States and then went from the United States to mexico city. And because the british didnt want them to the United States to know what all that they knew and all that they were listening to, that they actually had to have someone go to mexico city, an agent in mexico city, to go to the post office there or the telegraph office and get a copy of this. So the copy they would give to the ambassador in britain page was one that came from mexico and not one they had gotten that had come through washington. So thats another example of the british using their leverage. Edward i think this was primarily for professor hamilton. How would you characterize the presss view of its role in shaping Public Opinion about entry into the war in the first place and then supporting the nations war aims once the was at war . And how those views compare to today . You mean how did they how did they see their role . So thats an interesting question. The press for the most part, was not hungering to go to war. And there were some some members of the press, like hearst, who was one of the, you know, really fighting idea ultimately, he, as i think, has been discussed here, that we we get so far along that its hard to roll it back. But its quite true. And its important to remember as rick said, that there were a lot of people in the country that werent enthusiastic about going to war. But theres another side to it that part of your question that i think is worth getting into. One of the things about progressives, even the the the most aggressive muckraking progressives, was that they used the word publicity in a way that would be foreign to us today. They talked about doing publicity. They would say, im going to raise standard bankers and to like raise anybody would say, im going to go out today and do publicity. And by what they meant by publicity was bringing it to light. Facts that would enlighten the public so that they make the right decision. They also knew that the railroads were doing publicity, but that was bad publicity. And what you had that was true publicity was the idea. And so many journalists thought in these terms, the word publicity had much different connotation than than it does today. It had more of the Edmund Burke Ian kind of connotation, except it wasnt just tell us whats going on in government. Tell us whats going on in society and believe that that contributed to the large number of journalists who went into government, people who went to the committee on Public Information, who who were who came to came of age as journalists with that mindset that they were going to that they had been i dont want to be held to this be exactly literal, but i think its worth saying as a way to stir pot a little bit. They had been raised in the idea of busting trusts and using publicity to do that. But in the end, what they ended up doing was creating a publicity trust that was in the hands of the government. So its really a story almost entirely about good people trying to do good things and ending up in summary aspects, doing bad things. Because what happened with with what we did in propaganda in this country had some very bad features to it. Anybody else out there of. Yes, over here. Can we get the microphone over to this woman and. Uh, were the british shipping munitions on only their own flag ships, or were they using neutrals . They were doing a bit of everything. Um, any way they could get the material through. So, so, yes. From the german perspective, the british were definitely playing fair and they werent. And who are anybody else mad . Yes. Lets get lets get mad here. Thank you. The sinking of the lusitania fire occurred less than one year after the outbreak of world war one. Can you any of the panelists describe the change in u. S. Public opinion among the general populace, and how soon that occurred after the sinking of the ship. Well, i havent. Done a lot of research on changes in Public Opinion that took place within a time span of that short duration. The sense i have from the research ive done is that. The sinking certainly did energize people like Theodore Roosevelt. The sinking certainly did increase anger and outrage, you know, among those who had already taken a stand that the United States needed to get in and essentially taken side, as you know, as to which side the United States should be on. But among people who were opposed to the United States getting it at all, among those who believed that that the horrors of world war one demonstrated miller, you know, out of control, people like William Jennings bryant, secretary of state, who had told wilson we should be telling americans to stay off these ships, we should finding ways to to prevent and if necessary, mediate, you know, these these incidents so they dont lead us in the direction we dont want to go. Finally well not finally at all right away. Within a month after the lusitania sinking, after brian had tried to get it again to to to get wilson to to seize upon the incident in a way that that would. Create an opportunity to to put more mediation processes into play. Wilson proved too feckless at the time, by brians standards, to do that. Brian quit. Brian resigned and became a strong opponent of wilsons preparedness legislation. By 1916, when wilson was running for reelection, brian got back on the Democratic Party reservation. He was no fool. He wanted a, you know, preserve his own future influence within the party. But until then, there was a huge falling out within the Democratic Party. Many left of center. Activists had come to believe that war in its nature was a. Was one of the worst features of of profited sharing imperialism. Brian believed that very, very strongly of many people in the Democratic Party remembered the 1890s. They remembered how when what was then the worst economic depression in American History. Brians own 8096 campaign on behalf of of common you know, suffering people the ill fated populist party and its attempt to displace the Democratic Party with with a more, you know, a radically energy ized party operating on behalf of the common man. It really seemed like grassroots activism was about to transform american politics in a decided leftward direction and then came the spanishamerican war and economic recovery. But in the second half of that decade, in the mckinley era, the populist party began to wither away. Mckinley seemed to be on an amazing lucky streak. Everything he did seemed to work out the spanishamerican war led to easy victory, but then there was a nasty aftermath as the United States began to simply take the place of spain as imperial overlord. In the philippines, for example. And there was a big debate. There was an antiimperialist league in 1898, in 1899, very strange bedfellows democrats, republicans, industri, realists like andrew carnegie, labor leaders like samuel gompers. You know, masanori of people who disagreed on almost Everything Else, decided this is absolutely at odds with american traditions. We must not become an imperial power, you know, with territories. And mckinley went on the stump making speeches about the need for markets. You know, abroad. Well, in 1900, brian got the democrat nomination again. And campaigned on this anti imperial platform. At the time there was an insurrection going on in the philippines that had been a National Independence insurrection against spain. The leaders hoped the United States would be the guarantor of their independence. And then the United States took the place of spain. The guerrilla war continued against the us, and there were atrocities committed in campaign that through censorship kept out of the press. People like brian found out about it later. Well, this is wilsons secretary of state, you know, and the association of war with selfish imperial aggression, the association of war with a political process that kind of short circuits, you know, the the the political chances for economic democracy at home. All of this powerfully active within the democrat. Now the Republican Party and among conservatives. I can give you other ideological reasons why they, you know, were averse some of them anyway to international commitments. But in wilson its own party and after the United States got in these feelings remained active then a lot of you know in many, many people in wilsons party, they resented what had happened. They thought been duped. Yeah. If i if i could add on that the the news of whats hard to add on that but but the news of the lusitania came with a barrage of other incredibly bad news. You know, the first use of zeppelins against cities, you know, bomb strategic bombing, civilians from the air, first use of poison gas a month before the the bloodbath at gallipoli. Theyre all kind, you know. And Everything Else going on in that war that as visceral reaction as had to the lusitania. Mania sinking it was accompanied by why on earth would we want to get in the middle of that mess thats. Their problem we should stay out. So i dont think that lusitania itself would have gotten us into the war absent the germans being stupid and and doing submarines know doing again what they did in 1915. We never have gotten in that war just because why oh question here then. Then where do we have a microphone . There we go go. Did people continue to take liners across the atlantic after the lusitania . And if so, did we make any attempt to see the british didnt loaded up with munitions . Well, the the the transatlantic trade was already way down by the time that happened, most of the british Steamship Companies had laid up their major liners. Lusitania was kind of the last one. That was that was doing that. And traffic dropped off even, you know, after that, i think the number of people, you know, going joyriding across the atlantic went went low. Now the that was on that the munitions that were on the lusitania were legal by by us at the time. So as far as i understand that that kept on ongoing whether they used liners or not you know i cant answer that one but there were certainly plenty of american material the british were using to wage war that. Was crossing the atlantic on british and neutral and u. S. Ships question in the back there was some discussion about who knew how much before the sinking occurred and i read some speculation that perhaps churchill was more aware of the possibility of a bombing of the sinking of a boat than the americans were ever allowed to. Understand, i know after World War Two there was speculation that roosevelt knew in advance about the bombing of pearl harbor. Was there similar in the press about. Well, yeah. I mean, the the the conspiracy theories revolving around the lusitania are immense at the time, Winston Churchill was was the first lord of the admiralty, and he was one of the seven people who were, you know, read into the intelligence that that was coming across. And at one point, he was quoted as saying, we want to keep we need the neutral nations. We need this stuff. We need them to come bring to the united to the United Kingdom in order to sustain our warfare, war effort and some of them get in trouble. So much the better because that would work to to englands advantage in against the the the germans now its a far cry from that to to then say well he was complicit in any way with what happened in the lusitania he actually he left for paris two days before the attack. So he actually wasnt in any kind of position to be control knowing what was going on. And when you look at the track, the lusitania and you look at the track of the submarine and the countless individual decisions and actions that resulted in them being in the same place at the same time the idea that that could have been manipulated by anybody have that effect is really, really far fetched. But you know the fact that there was, you know, one torpedo was in two explosions. The fact that the british went to Great Lengths to cover up the there were munitions on the ship went to Great Lengths to hide any of their knowledge that they gained by intelligence. The lengths they went to scapegoat, the the captain of the ship in order to divert attention from, you know, basically their own incompetence and how they provided warnings to lusitania, plus the actions. The germans there there were german spreading rumors in United States before the ship even left port. You take all of that together and has resulted in 100 years of of conspiracy theories about what really happened at the lusitania. You know, my assessment would be and, you know, conspiracies sell. Theyre very entertaining. But what fundamentally had you had a competently operated submarine with weapon that worked the way it was designed to work skippered by captain who was doing what the naval high command him to do. And you know, thats not all that glamorous, but thats actually the real story and all the speculate about whether there was other ammunition or whatnot that caused the explosion. Lots of studies have gone into that. And none of those bear bear fruit. And in fact, as the captain of the lusitania turner, you know, his his position on, the second explosion was that was a mainstream line explosion, a captain ship. Youd be the one most likely to know. And after all these hundred years of all these theories, you know, the thing that that best fits what happens was, was that main steam line rupture and not some kind of nefarious plot by the british to set this thing up, to be sunk or some predetermined sabotage charge by the germans. All of those have been out as theories and none of them, none of them really fit the facts. Now, we are coming to the end. But i do want to have one more question, since we are trying to establish a world war. What world war one did in American History or in World History . This was supposed to be the war to end all wars. But in fact, it was the war that started all wars. I think some of you might say, can we go around and talk just a little bit . Because you, each of us could write a book on this. What was the impact of the war on a subset of queen history that i know we talking about there . Whats going on in the middle east now . Yeah, well, i mean, the war was was a cataclysmic event with a scale losses that that dwarfed anything that had proceeded you know, you go back to, you know, ancient times hannibal and cannae and something to find battles that were that, you know, disastrous but nothing that that lasted that long. So that war changed the and has affected everything thats occurred since we were talking about, you know, the middle east and you know and wilson for you know open treaties and whatnot whether the sykes pico agreement which was between britain france a secret you know agreement that arbitral really set the boundaries of nations in the middle east that that didnt match what the tribal or the ethnic boundaries were you know left the kurds out in the cold, you know, created iraq and syria as we know it, created lava. And basically you can trace the mess we have in the middle east. Back to sykes pico and those agreements that were made as a result of world war one and and, you know, as i said, you know, we could dig up sykes pico and shoot it be for the benefit of all mankind, richard, could you have a on that. Yeah, it was a global catastrophe. Nothing short of it from the napoleonic war onward through the 19th century and european that century was really quite peaceful. You know, you had the crimean war and the francoprussian war, but it was our civil war that that was represented, you know, carnage that foreshadowed was going to happen from 1914 to 1918. War to end war. Well, id have to talk long time to discuss wilsons hopes for a non vindictive piece to talk about the chances that he might have had if hed played his cards better and use strategic leverage to commit the british and the french or even pre commit them to a non vindictive piece. He blew it, in my opinion. Many, many over. But the war in the view of some many left of Center People you know laid these autocratic regimes brought down you know these oppressive dynasties the romanoffs the hobsbawm, the hohenzollerns and now the people, you know having fought a peoples war will usher in new epic of democracy. Well, no afraid not. It ushered in the soviet union. It didnt lead directly to nazi germany. No, but the vindictive piece of 19, 19 created a weimar so weak, suffering so many troubles in the 1920s that things and especially after the onset of the Great Depression with, the germans needing u. S. Bank loans to fund their reparations payments after the Chain Reaction from wall streets spread to our Banking Sector and a lot of loans got yanked, skyrocketing unemployment in germany. And from 1932 1933, the rise of hitler was relentless. It led to modern totalitarianism and. You know, this hideous second world war, monstrous as the first one was, that it was dwarfed by the monstrous mass of the second one, which one of the reasons why the first one faded in american memory . Good reason. It was horrid as catastrophe. Rather, taking a big cosmic look at this, i think you could Say Something simple like world war one is the beginning of information warfare. Certainly the beginning of a government manipulation, systematic government manipulation of journalists in this country, and even if you can think of Something Like what the committee of Public Information did, which was something called the four minutemen, where they took them to movie theaters and they mastered idea that somebody would talk for foreign minister, the changing of the reels with the highly orchestrated speeches that they giving in their campaigns, its exactly what social media today. It goes to places where people being entertained to give the messages you want them to get. So in that sense, i think from the point of view of people who are, for example, journalists and care about information and news, it changed the game. And that is awfully good place to start. At the National Press because thats what we wanted to talk about. And i want to thank our our wonderful panelists here, admiral samuel cox, professor Richard Striner and Professor John maxwell hamilton, jack, this has been great and i thank you all for coming and we stand adjourned. I left. Sure. That was all that border. Thank you. Bye