comparisons to similar decisions by other presidents. the center for presidential history at methodist university hosted this event. ado, it'shout further my pleasure to introduce the chair of this panel, dr. william imboden, who is the director of the center in boston. unique, butnot certainly worthwhile perspective, dual perspective, of being a person who both study decision-making in the white house and been a part of decision-making in the white house. he was a valuable member of making the network connections and the interviews that are the underlying factor, underlying base of this entire project work. i thank you for that. and i turned the mic over to you. [applause] thank you very much, jeff. i'm honored to be moderating this panel with four very dear friends and colleagues. there is a concern of foot that, as a moderator, i might try to interject myself into this discussion, so i will beat sitting myself there and come back up during the q&a time. you have the detailed bios of each of the speakers, so i won't repeat those. a few things i want to highlight for the people we are hearing from, the first is professor richard. his bio says he recently retired from temple university. that may be correct. he does not know the meaning of the word retirement. we're close friends and collaborators. he continues to be very active as a scholar and mentor, and as scholarscitizen in the and historians. next to him is professor mel. history.other titan in i started reading his books as an undergrad, continued to benefit from his books today. mel is the only one of our four who technically does not have a chapter in this collection, but what i've given too much in the review process, let me just say he played an important role in seeing it came to prince with cornell university. our interloper is dr. cory shockey here, who is technically a political scientist and protege of tom schelling. frankly, cory is a longtime dear friend and colleague from the bush administration, as well, has had many important roles in academic think takes in london, and is frankly, a better historian than card-carrying historians. we are honored. ,inally, professor anja preston a canadian by birth, did much of his education and studies in the united states, now a professor in the u.k. at cambridge university, also a dear friend and contributor to the book. with that, we turn it over to our panel. each one will be reading his or her comments. i assume we'll have a q&a time. please welcome our panel. [applause] it's good that the podium is set up like it is, otherwise i'm mic upll had moved the to his level and i will have been jumping up and down to reach it. so, let me begin by saying i'm thrilled to join this project, accept jeff's invitation. because of the drama controversy and implications, ongoing implications that attended the bush administrations to go into iraq, and i will underscore the word historian, the subject is really irresistible, making it that much more attractive was the chance to contribute to what really is a first cut at history. morning,cussed this and both sessions, the archival evidence is still classified, most of it. decadel remain so for a and probably more. in fact, if i have one thing to all of you who participated, do everything you can to get this material released. i spend a lot of time with archives and it's becoming increasingly difficult to get any material released in any presidential administration. and that's going to be a problem for the future. that, we do have access to the oral testimony of a remarkable number of pivotal contributors of all different levels, which really is virtually unprecedented for this type of project. i also have a more personal interest. i have been starting national security decision-making and policymaking for some four decades. it began back in the 1970's, when i began to observe the policies of the eisenhower administration, which has come up several times, largely because those processes have become legendary even though the assessments of them can often be diametrically opposed. i'll come back to that in a moment, but you can understand why a project aimed at drilling down into such a momentous, yet complicated decision, held such great appeal for someone like myself. you can therefore also understand easily why the appeal grew even greater as i poured through the interviews. a consensus quickly emerged, really serviced among contributors, regardless of there --spective, that that their process was outstanding. the adjectives ran from textbook to model to highly effective. and, in fact, the worst that can be said of them is that they were good. indeed, except for a few who lamented that the process took longer and even then, there was an upside to the length that it took. that is discussed today. there was really only one dissent. described as strange. itt even in that case, worked in the essays -- in the case that president bush can make a courageous decision, and i think there is ample evidence that that was the case, and though courageous does not necessarily mean wise or right, it certainly was perhaps better than the alternative. now granted, and a number of respects, this was predictable, given the nature and some extent that conception of the project. there's the famous old adage that history is written by the victors, attributed to winston churchill, although historians don't know if, in fact, he did say it. one could make sense that that applies to will -- oral histories. and most oral histories. the judgment, in this case, those who were interviewed, and i think again, this was reinforced today, and i'm not suggesting it was wrong, is that the decision was a good one, largely because that the outcome was good, was the right one. this seemed true even to those who were not on board, at least early on, and those like condi rice would be an example of that. she did not come on board until the end, but said she was very proud of how the whole process unfolded. conversely, those who might be called losers, donald rumsfeld, for example, in terms of this context, cannot, through the fault of the project, but they were silent. there were not interviewed or agreed to interview, actually were. lee did not agree to be interviewed. sam is george casey and many interviewed -- military leaders. now, till get me wrong in any way. will be learned from the oral histories is originally, highly informative and fascinating. studentrrific for any of national security decision-making. it provides us with a surge beyond anything we prepare vt before, and thus, in my opinion, the book should be used in any course anyone teaches on u.s. foreign policy or u.s. relations. but as i said, it is the first cut, and we have to keep that in ways, it wasmany our appetite for many of the story more of the analysis and more documents. i do hope that among those, there will be more that pertain to what scholars often call the missing dimension of international relations, which is intelligence. that was mentioned there. i have a personal interest in this. i would much like to know not only the correlation between the intelligence and decisions, what kind of input it was, but what i think is a fast any question, whether the reforms that took place between 2004-2005 made any effect in terms of how consumers of that intelligence did so. i was interested in peter's' saidnt, in which he intelligence could not guarantee. intelligence can never guarantee. all he can do is inform uncertainty. but one of the reforms, which is near and due to my heart, with the intelligence would have different types of scenarios, which wasn't always easy for the consumer, but nevertheless, that was pivotal and required. to me, that's a whole other parallel story, which i would love to be explored. i don't know how and when it might be. anyway, let me circle back to the process itself and reiterate it was my study of eisenhower's national security policies and the architecture that generated them that was the initial spark for my interest in national security decision-making. e i'mny ways, and whil reluctant to use eisenhower as a read mynd when will essay, he blasted me for it, and i'm really doing again. waynot suggesting in any that all administrations should make -- mimic that architecture or suggest administrations should not have to adapt their process to the contemporary environment. what we referred to as the interagency process is much broader and much more complex than it was in the next 50's. for that matter, through the end of the cold war. for example, today's national security council dwarfs in size and scope anything eisenhower put together in institutionalized in the 1950's. conversely, i would argue, and this is something to explore in the third or fourth volume, the power of the state department, which under eisenhower, remained the core of the process, and whose secretary of state was the unparalleled leader and spokesman of the foreign policy community and god for bid, anyone tried to cross him in the 1950's, the authority and power has receded steadily. even as the pentagon increased. i got to stop pointing. um, and there's situation which is also inortant, which has come up several different context in terms of conversation, that no president since eisenhower, with the possible exception of george w. bush. i have to mention that, since jeff is here, not have come close to his reputation, stature, or the experience or political capital. and because of his military authority, i think there was no one class. that was very important. nevertheless, the fundamental pillars of his process are as applicable today as they were then. i'll just mention quickly a which of them, including, are engaging the right people at the right level at the right time, providing an environment conducing debate that cuts across agency line, into which the president is an eyewitness, ensuring they witness all options and scenarios, the success for which requires a custodial manager, advisor who walks a fine line between honest broker and policy entrepreneur. some sort of mechanism that ensures once a decision is made and implementation begun, monitors the progress to decide whether or not some sort of change is necessary. to repeat, i'm not claiming that process or architecture are models. i am historian, not a political scientist. every president must be able to devise an architecture he or she is comfortable with. but it will argue that all of those elements should be present in one form or another. now i'll quickly go over my criticism. anythingappy discuss during the question and answer. it was not a mechanism to trigger a review or a monitor, and to trigger, eisenhower had an appendage of the national security council called the coordinating board. it never work as well as it was intended to work, but it'd assure that an execution of the policy could not continue indefinitely without some kind of appraisal of that policy. said,ntinually, as fred but it would be at various intervals. in this case, there was no mechanism to trigger that review. sort of automatically. and even though from late 2005 to 2006, many national security officials and entities at different levels expressed profound concern with u.s. policy and direction that there wasn't a review. meetings, many meetings, referred to as stylized, but they didn't necessarily get them to where it needed to go. finally, the nfc itself, for its elements really forced a review. covertly, took place clandestinely. i don't know what word you want to include, in which it basically cut out the secretary of defense and many of the service or uniformed military. again, that i really could not have happened. that leads to what i consider one of the strangest episodes in decision-making history, that which surrounded the camp david meeting that june, which it was teed up, and the meeting never really got off the ground again for a variety of different reasons. i'm just going to quickly summarize, but my general point is that even though, well, let me just add one more thing to go. then there was the issue that comes up very clearly, that the nfc does conduct its own informal review. you have other ones going on. but it's the nfc that really develops a preference, if that would be the word, or puts on the table the notion of having a double down strategy, which ultimately becomes the surge. it is not generated one of the agencies, so it is difficult. again, that's in violation of the eisenhower model, which it would have been put up, it would have had to been mentioned, unless no one thought about it at all early in the process. to the credit of the nfc and the particularly the credit of steve and so many of those that were here, assisting to the other eisenhower principal that the organization, number how good it is, is really only as good as the individuals that are a part of it. so in this case, it was the individuals that negate everything as it because it had been compensated for flaws in the structure, relying on extra governmental inputs, officials outside the chain of command, ceiling deliberations from others or whatever. the nfc did ultimately arrive at a recommendation that enabled president bush to make this courageous decision, a decision the nfc wanted to make, and clearly president bush wanted to make, especially for the second half of 2006. it surely was acreage decision. i'll leave it to history as to whether or not it was the wisest decision. the question is whether the system worked. maybe it did. if the fact that the barometer is that the policy ended up where they wanted to be. but i don't think that's the right question. i would like to ask those who were involved in it if they were writing a textbook on decision-making process is whether this is the pathway they would recommend to get from point a to point b. and i think not. and actually, i sort of hope not. thanks very much. [applause] >> so first of all, i want to begin by thinking the organizers for asking me to attend today. i think that it was really inspiring this morning and earlier this afternoon, scholar andth as a simply as an american citizen, to listen to the thoughtful reassessment of the decision-making that went into this search. -- surge. i think that it is incredibly impressive for us, as americans, to think that we have had such people, whether we agree with their decisions or disagree with their decisions, making policy in the highest echelons of the white house, the state department, and the pentagon, and elsewhere. and i think it behooves us, all of us as americans, to think how different things are today, and how consequential it is that we thoughtful serious, minded people engaged in the process comparable to the ones that we heard today. i also noted to preface my remarks by saying i don't have a stake in this flame. i was not interviewed for it. i was not written an essay for. i was an outside referee. but i also hope that peter fever will take my comments thoughtfully, as an objective scholar, because i did not sign the letter as an ma in 2000 -- as an academic into this into opposing the war, and i think i would like to come to the views that i have, in context of going to war and the aftermath. economic, i don't inspired.d opinions know, but 10ion, i minutes i now, i know i will not get your affirmation. but at least, probation now. i want to make some overall comments about the book and the surge. i think it's a wonderful book. the interviews are really illuminating. edited.me is seamlessly interviews are brought together in a way to where they provide a chronological overview of the decision to surge troops in iraq. i also very much admire the essays. i admire them because they are verse such different perspectives. there's an essay by three of the key policymakers, steve hadley peter,on o'sullivan and one essay from them. and then six or seven other renowned scholars, three of who are on this stage. what's significant about these essays, they make you think deeply about process, strategy, and president bush's overall decision-making. what i want to do in the minutes that i have is to talk about the three matters, process, strategy, and overall decision-making. first of all, in terms of process, richard, who you just heard, is very critical of the process. but actually, so are some of the policymakers like philip. nonetheless, in my judgment, steve hadley and peter fever and macon offer a compelling defense essay.process in their they make two really important points. they see the process give the president, most of all, the option that he wanted. and secondly, the big point they make is that even more importantly, the process enabled the president to forge a consensus among top officials, which is by no means, and accomplishment. of course, as you heard, richard is not convinced. and what he does in the volume is to compare bush's national security council to ike's national security process. and richard claims to be assisting. richard claims that president bush was not sufficiently involved from the inception of processess, that the was belated, that it was siloed until nearly the very end, and that the outcome was prepared to turn -- predetermined. was interesting, i think, is that steve and peter do not really directly rebut those sayicisms, and they don't there process is a model that is a textbook model. they clearly don't make the claim there were trying to emulate eisenhower's process, the process president eisenhower employed so effectively. that's not what was on their minds. but they make the larger point throughout their interviews and throughout their volume, they make the larger point that we've heard this morning, that the process work. that's what counted. the process worked. that's used over and over again. the assertion that the process worked invites examination of strategy, not simply process, but strategy. what does it really mean to say that it worked? jervis, onee, bob of the most remand -- renowned scholars in the world, notes man there is much dispute a -- among experts, with it made a lasting difference or whether it was even decisive in the short run. and in part, doug underscored that today and said that there were many ingredients that made this search worth it rather than developments like the sunni awakening, may well have contributed more to the outcome, more to making this surge worked in the deployment of traditional troops itself. that theyly believe are far too skeptical of the short-term impact of the surge. in my opinion it did work in the following way. it worked in that it significantly mitigated and insurgentings attacks. in fact, according to the newly published history, the official in the iraqhe army war, a volume that just came out a few months ago, 1300 pages long, it points out that, not only did civilian casualties and deaths significantly decline during the surge and afterwards, but that insurgents are tasked to -- 140 per day in early 2007 to virtually none on a routine day in 2009. that to me suggests that it worked. at least tactically. but along with bob, richard, josh and other scholars of the volume, i'm inclined to question aether the surge, albeit tactical success, and operational success, was a strategic success. surge, steve the hadley and peter and meghan o'sullivan do a truly wonderful job in their interviews and in the essay explaining how -- how theyumptions explain the changing assumptions that motivated the surge. they eliminate how they interrogated previous assumptions and reconfigured them. but what is interesting, both in their essay and in the interviews is that they actually say rather little about overall strategic goals. "omission allude to " but they don't specify the goals question mark in 2000 2003, when the administration invaded iraq, the goals were to rid iraq of weapons of mass destruction