Transcripts For WETA Charlie Rose 20111121 : vimarsana.com

WETA Charlie Rose November 21, 2011



defendg ourselves. >> ros what woulyou do. >> well d is very hard to say right now. >> rose: mohammed-jaff ard-- javad larijani next. funding focharlie rose is provided by the folwing: . >> from our studios in new york city this is charlie rosee begin this evening with iran t has been in the news again, over its dispute nud clear program this month. the international atomic energy agency said it had credible information that iran had carried out activities relative to the development of a new clear explosive device. iran has rejected the findings and insist its program is peaceful. the report intensified the debate over iran. joining me is mohammad javad larijani head of the human rights colin in judiciary and close advisor to the supreme leader ayatollah khamenei, i'm pleased to have him back at the table. welcome. >> thank you. very glad to meet you. >> i want to first talk about the nuclear issue. the iaea says it has credible information gathered it from iranian documents and other sources including russian scientists that suggest there is ongoing activities to develop an explosive device. >> well, as iran explained before, the evidence cited by the agency is an old laptop gathering of different pieces which none of them could be considered a document in the professional sense. and four years ago it has been put to iran the agency and iran explained in detail. and it was considered by the agency a acceptable answer. but it is interesting that the whole thing again has been revived. >> rose: they're saying these are new documents and there is new information here, not old information. >> well, information and documents, they have professional meaning in the agencies vocabulary. anybody could pass on the information. but the agency should create documents. countries can claim a lot of things against each other. no single document in the professional sense of the agency indicates that ira is leading or was a tmen tment-- attempting to build a bomb. this is absolutely true. >> but they read it differently. the iaea reads it differently. and they say there is. >> well, in fact, the agency has plenty of difficult times to convince others that his argument is relevant. while suspicion is blown in this case. and a lot of interest. let me get to the crux of the matter. the united states of america with a number of cntries in europe, they are spearheading a wave of facility and pressure on iran. they use-- . >> rose: they make no question abo that, that th are imposing sanctions as much as they can. they are trying to get other governments including the chinese government to restrict their trade and commerce with iran. that's a clear u.s. policy. >> well, i just wanted to make a point that as far as our nuclear energy program is concerned, nothing new is happing. this is th old and the ongoing thrive of iran to develop its nuclear technology for a variety of uses, none of them are military. it is open to the inspection. the agency already visited several times iran. the cameras are there. this is one issue. the other issue,ow to make it a vehicle of pressure on iran. which is, unfortunately, is using this u.n. mechanism quite often. >> rose: is it in your interest to convince the iaea and the united nations and the united states and other countries, including russia and china that you do not have a program. >> well, definitely. i mean negative proves are usually more difficult than pros difficult proves. positive proves, you just show that you have it. but negative proves is impossib sometimes to tell them why you don't have it. in an interview, a gentleman asked me why are you not opening all the country for the inspection. what it means for such a vast country. as a joke i said well, they can start with my bedroom. >> rose: they don't want to go to your bedroom. they want to go to certain sites that they would like to look at. >> what. >> rose: and they've asked permission again. the doctor has asked permission to come back with a group of people from iaea. is it in your interest. >> well, definitely. but ifhey want to --. >> rose: but he hasn't been invited. >> so the point is that when they claim that they want to visit that site, they should at least justify it for us. but why th want to visit, they should give justification that we are also suspicious of the activities of the agencies. so-- . >> rose: are you suspicious of the iaea. >> oh, definitely. there is no confidentiality in the works of this agency. >> rose: you don't have confidence. >> confidentiality. >> rose: in other words, its information they have is not confidential. >> they can leak it to everywhere. so the same way that they've done it before. and so we should have justification. they cannot justross their fing and say well, okay, i want to visit this point. they should give us justification and notification. >> rose: they want to look at these sites. >> they cite information that they have gotten from others, nev releasing that information to us. if they don't release the information to us, it doesn't have any value for us. >> rose: so it would be sufficient to you if they would show you the information they have. >> exactly, yes. >> rose: and then you might allow them to come. >> oh, definitely. >> rose: if they show you its information they have about your activities, you will invite them to come. >> yes, definitely. >> rose: the other question that comes up is this meeting that is going to take place and a vote that is going to happen. clearly there are not going to be more sanctions because the russians and chinese said no, russians said no, chinese said they are abstain. there is a vote in the security colin. there is also-- to put on more sanctions. there is also a vote to express deep and increasing concern. and that seems to reflect a growing-growing opinion. >> well, growing opinion is not with the baroter of security counl. in the agency itself all the nonaligned movement is taken very openly, very clearly that they aren't happy with that. they are not satisfied with the level of acquisition. they consider iranian effort, a safe effort. do if the number counts, i will say with confidence that the majority of countries in the world, they do not share the united states position. >> rose: it's not just the united states. it's western europe as well. >> that's true but the word is not the west. and the rest-- i mean, i want to say that if you are talking about the world opinion, we do have its world opinion with us. even if it is not translated in the decision of the security council. >> rose: dow believe the world opinion is that it does n want to see iran develop a nuclear weapon. >> including iran itself. >> rose: exactly, including iran does not want to see iran -- >> yes. >> rose: so the question of world opinion is whether iran has a program or no >> exactly rses a clear, focused ongoing program. >> yeah. >> rose: to develop a nuclear weapon. >> yeah. >> rose: was there a program that stopped in 2003. >> no, this is-- well, this is absolutely not correct. we were happy to hear that because partially they considered the american intelligence, the considered that iran-- from tha time on, doesn't continue that. but evenefore that, we never had that program. well, i mean our activity is so open. and-- . >> rose: clearly you know better than that. it's not open. >> it's quite open. >> rose: it was hidden. and you acknowledged it was hidden. >> . >> rose: there were aspects of the enrichment that were not disclosed and it only came out because you finally acknowledged it to the surprise of -- >> the point was a difference between the reading the text. whether we should the moment that we put the fuel, the enrichment, we should get the agency to know or the agency said no, from the moment number one, that you decide to do that we should inform us. we were of the belief that-- we are to report to the agency unless we put the uranium in the centrifuge-- based on this idea, which a number of countries they share this with us. that unless before that we should not disclose because before you recharge the centrifuge t is just a piece of metal. is is the difference in the semantic of that rule. >> rose: what would u recommend be done in order to show clely that there is no program, yet you have a right and the united states recognizes this, to develop enriched uranium for a peaceful uses including medical. >> how do you get past this distrust and the evidence that the iaea says it has? >> well, the distrust is mutual from both sides at least. i believe sincerely that the united states of america definitely knows that we are not after the weapon. this is my sincere belief. but politically they say something else, but anyhow, let us assume. >> fair enough. >> rose: . >> let use assume that they are suspicious of us and we are suspicious of them. well, let us start to take this, i mean, this, because confidence doesn't come overnight. my equation is very simple. one step of transparency from iran, one step of cooperation from the united states. >> rose: okay, what would be a transparency from iran and what would be an example of cooperation from the united states. >> i mean there are plenty of modalities in design. ey cannot ask that everything should be-- because transparency itself is gradual and it has a lot of meaning. corporations, it has a lot of meaning. the more we get confidence that nobody wants to deprive us from technological capability on the nuclear area,the more wwill be forthcoming. because at this mome, whatever we hear is that why iran has this technology at all. >> rose: but so you are acknowledging you have not been forthcoming. >> well, no, i don't say that forthcomming in the sense of united states, more than mpt. we think already we have done everything within mpt. >> rose: nonproliferation treaty. >> exactly. >> rose: but let me say it this way. there was at one time this idea that iran could ship its uranium outside and other countries might enrich it and send it back to you for medical uses. is that idea, does it have any possibility of being resurrected? >> yes. in fact this is a good example that you are looking for for the cooperation vis-a-vis the transparency. the whole idea was put by president ahmadinejad. because our fuel for the re-- the reactor in tie ran which has many uses, and ten years ago we bought it from argentina there were several proposals. one, sell the fuel to us. >> rose: sell enriched fuel to you. >> yeah, 20% enriched fuel. if they are not-- they said no, we're not going to sell it to you. well this is very bad sign. i mean this is not cooperation. they could sell it to us. secondly, we said okay, sell as much-- . >> rose: why did you need 20%. is that what y thought 20% was necessary rather than 5% enriched. >> this reactor works with 20% w a small amount, 20%. so the second proposal was okay, sell as much as you want to us, and let u us-- ourselves enrich the rest of it. they said no, no, no, you can't enrich more than 5%. >> rose: then came the question of britain and brazil and turkey. >> then the third proposal. okay, sell as much as you want to us, and then let us swap. we give you 5% as much as needed and you give us 20%. well this was the swap idea, which was a good sign for cooperation. but all of a sudden united states said no, you should get all of your enrichment, because we want to clean you up. the idea that if we have 5% uranium then we are dirty and polluted, i think it's very dirty idea by itself. >> rose: there has been an argument i think by graham allison and i want to be clear about this, in which he suggested, you look at this on a football field. and if-- an american football field. and if you are advancing down the field, that iran is about at the 30 yard line and so it's already gone 70 yards, it has 30 yards to go to have a nuclear program. and on explosive devices. anyou only have po to go. and that you can take 20% enriched and over a process of a couple years make it into weapon-grade material. >> well, this is not a good similarity. i mean we are right now, if you ask in terms of real world, in the field, we are 100 percent away from this. i mean military use. if you ask intensive capability, hypothetically s iran capable to do tt if he decides, obviously yes. any country who has nuclear technology is pable of doing that. i mean, the germans can do it in two months. >> rose: the japanese. >> in less than a month. >> rose: is that where you want to be, though? do you want to be exactly where the germans and the japanese are >> we want to be beyond them. because this is capability. >> rose: yeah. but you want to have the same capability that the japanese and the germans do. >> it is a natural outcome. if you are advancing this area of science, then you will acquire this capability. >> rose: but that's an interesting question. you are saying yes, we want to have the same capability that japan and germany has. >> or beyond that we even want to get more sophisticated. >> rose: then you want to have the capability that would allow you to, if you cided to take the additional step of making a nuclear advice, happen within months. that's the capacity would you like to have. >> so what? should he be punished because we are advanced. >> rose: no. >> i mean it's like i man who is very, quite, i mean, he has faculty of thinking and then say okay, if you are strong in thinking, you may think in the wrong direction. so close out your thinking. i mean this is natural capacity as a nation. how we should be deplifed of that. i mean is there a limit for uranium for advancement in science and technology. >> rose: you basically say we want the ca passit ot make a nuclear weapon. >> no. >> rose: even though we do not have a program to actually make the weapon. we just want the capacity which is exactly what the japanese have. >> the is not the correct word. >> rose: the ability, the capacity, the meria. >> we want advancement in science and technology related to nuclear area, not directly toward the weapon. >> rose: but you want it to be at a level so that it does intenantly -- >> naturally it comes. if you are advanced in being a good machine, then you can make another machine. >> rose:ut then the problem comes in the debate. because there is a great fear of iran having a nuclear weapon as you know because it will destable the region and many other reasoned express and violate the npt. fanned iran violates the npt so, will other countries, as you well know. they worry about that. do you worry about that? >> oh, not at all. >> rose: you don't worry about that? >> not at all. because the stability in the region is not coming system frick iran. i mean violating npt also is not a big problem for united states. >> rose: would you like to see saudi arabia have a nuclear weapon. would you like to see -- >> nuclear weapon or nuclear technology, two things. >> rose: okay, fair, nuclear weapon, would you like to see saudi arabia. >> we are a signature that ture to npt, a sincere cigna ture, we think nonproliferation is a benefit to iran and all of us. >> rose: would you like to see saudi arabia have the same kind of capability to produce a nuclear weapon, capability, if you decide to go that last des dance. >> we are an advocate of middle east free of nuclear weapon but in terms of developing nuclear technology for all other peaceful uses, we are even ready to share with them our capability >> rose: all oit. >> no problem, yeah. >> rose: how close are you, if you wanted to today, today to produce a nuclear weapon? an explosive device. how close are you if, in fact, you made that decision. >> well, professionally i cannot answer that rigorously. the only thing, because it depends on a lot of points. but i tell you personally that to build a bomb is not a big deal. i mean from the technological point of view. >> rose: having the material build a bomb say big deal. otherwise you wouldn't be engaged in this -- >> i mean, you see pakistan already has a bomb but-- . >> rose: many bombs. >> but their technology is far behind of ours. in nuclear sense, and to build a bomb with plutonium they use a-- reactor. but we are not-- we think the area of science and technology in this is so interesting. and i mean why we need a weapon at all? we are so strong in the region. we are capable to deter any imminent threat. why we need atomic bomb? it is-- . >> rose: that's a very good question. >> yeah w we don't need it. >> rose: okay. but dow need the ca passit ot do it you just said that. >> the capacity is national, when you get this strength strong, you can lift the heavyweight this is obvious. >> rose: i hear you clearly. >> yeah. >> rose: there is a report that the sanctions are having an impact on iran. the cost of food is up. inflation is up. it having a serious impact on the people of iran. its food that they want to buy costs a lot more because of these sanctions. >> well, even if this is true. >> it is true, isn't it. your own central banker said that. >> suppose this is true. why the united states will be interested in putting pressure on our people. why the language of threat is so interested. >> rose: because they believe that you have this-- as you know -- >> i done think so i think they know how technology is-- i think their worry in it is from somewhere else. >> rose: what is that worry, do you think. >> this is coming from the whole middle east area. american policy in middle east is stumbling, it's faing part. while their strategic allies are collapsing one after another they are afraid that iran is going for fishing in this area. iran is gaining. >> rose: okay, syria. you're supporting the government of bashar assad, correct? >> well this is very uncorrect reading of our position. we are supporting the movement of the middle east people toward democracy from day number one anywhere in the middle east rses. >> rose: and how would you describe the movement in syria. >> exactly. >> rose: exactly, how would you describe it, the movement for democracy. >> definitely. >> rose: and iit being put down by e syrian army? >> the whole complication of the problem is here. we are against impiecing, infiltrating and invigorating violence in all of these countries. unfortunately, in syria, in yemen, in bahrain the there is a tendency which from united states and allies to invigorate violence and incite violence. the violence will definitely dicalize this movement. >> rose: would you, by that definition dow mean supporting the rebels in libya which overthrew the government of colonel qaddafi s that inciting violence. >> no, support is one thing. but to enter into military-- is another one. >> rose: i'm asking a specific case. take libya, forxample. was that the wrongs policy, to supporthe rebels and prevent in the beginning a massacre inenghazi. >> the number of people has been killed, even with the support, may equal the same way if we let its people themselves. because later-- it was the rebels who won. if nato enter-- did not enter this game, i think their ability. >> rose: ty're not so sure build that. the rebels. >> well, you see, if the rebel, if you read them right now, definitely they are happy that somebody helped them. >> exactly. >> rose: . >>ut they are not happy with the way that she have been helped. >> they asked for the help. >> they did not ask for the nato to just come there and spread the-- over there. >> rose: they clearly asked for the support that they gotnd expressed gat appreciation for. it enabled them to overthrow what they considered to be -- >> it's may given speed to the movement but definitely the movement in these states should go by itself. >> rose: here's my question. and this is for debate. and you and i have a dialogue about it the arab spring was not about iran. it was not about the united states. it was not even about israel it was about a rising of people in an a

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