suggesting that the legitimacy of the government had been eroded? in what way did you understand him to say it had been eroded? presumably it related to — say it had been eroded? presumably it related to the _ say it had been eroded? presumably it related to the barnyard _ say it had been eroded? presumably it related to the barnyard castle - it related to the barnyard castle incident and the government response to it —— barnard castle. it incident and the government response to it -- barnard castle.— to it -- barnard castle. it was havin: to it -- barnard castle. it was having an _ to it -- barnard castle. it was having an impact _ to it -- barnard castle. it was having an impact on - to it -- barnard castle. it was having an impact on the - to it -- barnard castle. it was having an impact on the 27th | to it -- barnard castle. it was i having an impact on the 27th of to it -- barnard castle. it was - having an impact on the 27th ofjune in relation to the government dealing with local mayors? yes. in relation to the government dealing with local mayors? yes, i resume dealing with local mayors? yes, i presume that _ dealing with local mayors? yes, i presume that is _ dealing with local mayors? yes, i presume that is what _ dealing with local mayors? yes, i presume that is what we - dealing with local mayors? yes, i presume that is what we were - presume that is what we were referring to. on the castle incident, it is not fair to focus just on the incident and dominic cummings own press conference because that was contained unmanaged. i was concerned about the reaction of the health secretary and the attorney general afterwards where i felt they were undermining the legal framework and some of their communications and we had to get that under control. it would have been the whole incident, though, and notjust the incident itself and the press conference from dominic cummings. it was a broader question. dominic cummings. it was a broader cuestion. ., ., . , question. you say the mayor... why did ou question. you say the mayor... why did you not — question. you say the mayor... why did you not believe _ question. you say the mayor... why did you not believe the _ question. you say the mayor... why did you not believe the secretary . question. you say the mayor... why did you not believe the secretary of| did you not believe the secretary of state, himself a minister of the crown? i state, himself a minister of the crown? ., state, himself a minister of the crown? . ., , . ., state, himself a minister of the crown? . _, . ~ crown? i felt, and we may come back to this, it felt — crown? i felt, and we may come back to this, it felt by— crown? i felt, and we may come back to this, it felt by that _ crown? i felt, and we may come back to this, it felt by that point _ crown? i felt, and we may come back to this, it felt by that point that - to this, it felt by that point that rather than treating the mayor as a partner in governance, he was being treated as a political opponent and there was a politicised approach and this is a very short hand discussion of the kind one might have on the phone, it is important to remember, just a whatsapp exchange. and i'm asking simon case who was on this full by this stage, asking him what was behind all of that. i’m full by this stage, asking him what was behind all of that.— was behind all of that. i'm not concerned _ was behind all of that. i'm not concerned with _ was behind all of that. i'm not concerned with the _ was behind all of that. i'm not concerned with the exchange l was behind all of that. i'm not - concerned with the exchange between simon mr hancock in the local mayor, but who do you believe the honesty and candour and the reasonableness of the belief in the mayor or mr hancock into issue, and one of them was your colleague, secretary of state, minister of the crown? that is rather surprising?— is rather surprising? yes, but one was also a — is rather surprising? yes, but one was also a senior— is rather surprising? yes, but one was also a senior local _ is rather surprising? yes, but one. was also a senior local government figure and all of these, if you are a cabinet secretary, are important. further down the page... you say... is that chris whitty? i further down the page. .. you say... is that chris whitty?— is that chris whitty? i presume chris wormald _ is that chris whitty? i presume chris wormald but _ is that chris whitty? i presume chris wormald but i _ is that chris whitty? i presume chris wormald but i don't - is that chris whitty? i presume chris wormald but i don't know is that chris whitty? i presume - chris wormald but i don't know why i would have said that.— would have said that. further down the page- -- — would have said that. further down the page-- l _ would have said that. further down the page... i mostly— would have said that. further down the page... i mostly blame - would have said that. further down i the page... i mostly blame hancock, deja vu, that was how we spent the early spring. and then, i only have just realised we have no senior officials anywhere near this, where was the lead dg? there is no one around driving the policy side of operational lockdown on matt's behalf. and you say, welcome to the last six months. two points, firstly, the process by which mr hancock's truthfulness or candour or lack of candour, however you describe it, and it is a matterfor the inquiry, was not an issue that was confined to one or two individuals, notably dominic cummings, there was a general problem surrounding mr hancock, is that a fair problem surrounding mr hancock, is thata fairsummary? problem surrounding mr hancock, is that a fair summary? yes. problem surrounding mr hancock, is that a fair summary?— problem surrounding mr hancock, is that a fair summary? yes, you heard from helen — that a fair summary? yes, you heard from helen mcnamara _ that a fair summary? yes, you heard from helen mcnamara on _ that a fair summary? yes, you heard from helen mcnamara on that - that a fair summary? yes, you heard from helen mcnamara on that last . from helen mcnamara on that last week, yes. from helen mcnamara on that last week, es. , , ., from helen mcnamara on that last week. yes-— from helen mcnamara on that last week, es. , , ., ., , week, yes. the issue of where was matt's perm _ week, yes. the issue of where was matt's perm secretary, _ week, yes. the issue of where was matt's perm secretary, there - week, yes. the issue of where was matt's perm secretary, there is - week, yes. the issue of where was matt's perm secretary, there is a l matt's perm secretary, there is a weird absence, was there at the same time a problem functionally with the operation in so far as on the civil side, civilservice operation in so far as on the civil side, civil service side of things, there were failures to produce policy or stand up and be counted when it came to negotiating policy and producing material that central government requested? it and producing material that central government requested?— and producing material that central government requested? it looks from what simon case _ government requested? it looks from what simon case saying _ government requested? it looks from what simon case saying in _ government requested? it looks from what simon case saying in that - government requested? it looks from what simon case saying in that text i what simon case saying in that text that that is the case and he is clearly concerned that the hse as an official level is not on top of the leicester question and that was probably the first time that element had been drawn to my attention. by then we had the covid task force and what this exchange is revealing is how challenging it was for them as well in dealing with a situation where the secretary of state is essentially in a high—profile political row with the local mayor. another topic, you proposed in late may the establishment of covid s because helen mcnamara produced advice on the 22nd of may which recommended the establishment of those committees, and evidence has been received by the inquiry in relation to their operation, so why did you propose that there be a division of between covid s and o? division of between covid s and 0? and was that not duplicative of the covid task force? titer;r and was that not duplicative of the covid task force?— and was that not duplicative of the covid task force? they were cabinet committees — covid task force? they were cabinet committees so _ covid task force? they were cabinet committees so essentially - committees so essentially ministerial committees with officials attending to support and the task force was the official group combining teams who had been in number ten group combining teams who had been in numberten and group combining teams who had been in number ten and the cabinet office into a single official group and the task force was the group of officials led by simon case and s and o officials led by simon case and s and 0 were cabinet committees. there was an obvious risk of duplication between s and o and i would not necessarily, although we called them strategy and operations, in some ways it was the big decisions the prime minister needed to be personally involved in in s and o, personally involved in in s and 0, those he could leave to a wider group of ministers chaired by michael gove as the duchy of lancaster, and it represented the model be applied to brexit the previous year where brexit policy was driven in a group chaired by the prime minister. no deal planning was led in a group chaired by michael gove so it was a straight replica of a model which we knew work for that prime minister. the a model which we knew work for that prime minister.— prime minister. the covid response machinery was _ prime minister. the covid response machinery was not _ prime minister. the covid response machinery was not the _ prime minister. the covid response machinery was not the same - prime minister. the covid response machinery was not the same as - prime minister. the covid response machinery was not the same as the j machinery was not the same as the machinery was not the same as the machinery dealing with the preparation for a no—deal brexit. there were echoes, though. did preparation for a no-deal brexit. there were echoes, though. did you find in reality _ there were echoes, though. did you find in reality that _ there were echoes, though. did you find in reality that there _ there were echoes, though. did you find in reality that there was - there were echoes, though. did you find in reality that there was a - find in reality that there was a degree of duplication between s and 0 degree of duplication between s and o and in terms of the officials who attended zero and cts, there was a degree of overlap? i attended zero and cts, there was a degree of overlap?— degree of overlap? i imagine there was some although _ degree of overlap? i imagine there was some although i _ degree of overlap? i imagine there was some although i don't - degree of overlap? i imagine there i was some although i don't remember anyone bringing it to my attention as a problem that needed to be resolved and the task force would have dealt with both of those. made the intui have dealt with both of those. made the inquiry presume _ have dealt with both of those. made the inquiry presume that _ have dealt with both of those. made the inquiry presume that from the need to rearrange the arrangements in the heart of the cabin office, from the report reduced bite helen mcnamara —— produced by helen mcnamara, that there were matters that were fundamentally wrong with the operation of the cabinet office between february and may? it is imortant between february and may? it is important to _ between february and may? it 3 important to look at the sequence. the task force, s and o, important to look at the sequence. the task force, s and 0, they were established when we were in calmer waters and coming out of the first lockdown and had a much better understanding, and they were planning the future, but when we established it we were going into the storm of the first lockdown in of course seeking to accelerate preparations that were not ready for that lockdown so we have got to be careful not to overdo the distinction once because they were operating in different circumstances but in terms of the officials and the institutional culture, the first point is, the report that had mcnamara and martin reynolds did was triggered by me and the phrase superhero bun fight was used by my private secretary with me and i said, we better get onto this. there were some reasons for that. going into the lockdown, the intense phase, i was conscious that we would lose people and there would be people sick, isolating, mental health issues, and i deliberately over resourced and made sure that each dg had a primary function and an understudy function as well so when someone became ill, they were not able to operate from home, there would not be a break in service, if you like. as people returned to work there are clearly some tensions around that and some people had been throughout and some people were you and some people returned after illness and it was necessary by that stage to restore a more normal way of operating but it was right to over resourced going in. that was my experience of other crises. worry about, worry less about overlaps and more about gaps. the about, worry less about overlaps and more about gaps-— more about gaps. the prime minister's — more about gaps. the prime minister's own _ more about gaps. the prime minister's own chief- more about gaps. the prime minister's own chief adviser| minister's own chief adviser describe the cabinet office as a dumpster fire and describe the cabinet office as a dumpsterfire and being bloated describe the cabinet office as a dumpster fire and being bloated with too many senior levels and too many director generals, duplication, confusion, huge numbers of communication and engagement staff, and on the functional side, as essentially failing in its core function which was to synthesise data information policy from other government departments to liaise with them and to broker between them and to hold the heart of government together. what do you say? some of that but not — together. what do you say? some of that but not most _ together. what do you say? some of that but not most of— together. what do you say? some of that but not most of it _ together. what do you say? some of that but not most of it is _ together. what do you say? some of that but not most of it is fair. - together. what do you say? some of that but not most of it is fair. i - that but not most of it is fair. i have explained why there was deliberately some duplication going in and ifelt deliberately some duplication going in and i felt it was necessary to over resource and i have also heard him say we have the wrong people in the wrong jobs but in the key directors general who worked on covid, clearly have the confidence of the number ten machine because they were retained or in some cases promoted into other roles for them. the cabinet, the wider cabinet office outside the cabinet secretary, i don't know if he was referring to some of that, but we sought to clarify that as we went and it was necessary, we had to set “p and it was necessary, we had to set up three dozen programmes across government to make sure the government to make sure the government was able to respond to the crisis as it moved up pace in march and inevitably there was quite a lot of friction around that and we sought to not that into shape through the course of march and into april. through the course of march and into aril. ., . . april. you have given evidence in relation to _ april. you have given evidence in relation to the _ april. you have given evidence in relation to the failure _ april. you have given evidence in relation to the failure at - april. you have given evidence in relation to the failure at the - april. you have given evidence in| relation to the failure at the heart of government to appreciate that there was an absence of cross government planning and to bring the departmental planning such as it was into shape and into the centre, and there was a failure to appreciate and to become aware insufficient time of the scale of the crisis and there was a dawning realisation of there was a dawning realisation of the systemic problems at the heart of the dhse, the primary lead government at the heart of the crisis, they were all failures, which occurred within the cabinet office and on your watch, do you agree? office and on your watch, do you atree? , ,., ., office and on your watch, do you atree? , ., ., ,, agree? yes, we sought to address them as soon _ agree? yes, we sought to address them as soon as _ agree? yes, we sought to address them as soon as we _ agree? yes, we sought to address them as soon as we realise - agree? yes, we sought to address them as soon as we realise that i agree? yes, we sought to address| them as soon as we realise that we have those issues.— have those issues. turning to the prime minister, _ have those issues. turning to the prime minister, you _ have those issues. turning to the prime minister, you will- have those issues. turning to the prime minister, you will be - have those issues. turning to the j prime minister, you will be aware have those issues. turning to the i prime minister, you will be aware of the evidence received by the inquiry from the director of communications, that this was the wrong crisis for this prime minister's skill set, and to summarise the criticisms from dominic cummings, for all his undoubted political skills, mr johnson's propensity to oscillate, to be unable to manage a cohesive team and to direct government machinery consistently and effectively. do you agree with those opinions? i effectively. do you agree with those oinions? _, , , opinions? i recognise them but i would not _ opinions? i recognise them but i would not express _ opinions? i recognise them but i would not express it _ opinions? i recognise them but i would not express it that - opinions? i recognise them but i would not express it that way i opinions? i recognise them but i - would not express it that way myself andindeed would not express it that way myself and indeed i think there a separate point which is essentially, in essence a question for me which is, as i said in my witness statement, but myjob as i said in my witness statement, but my job was as i said in my witness statement, but myjob was to build around any prime minister a mechanism that enables them to make decisions and then those decisions to be enacted effectively. i did not think it would have been responsible to say, well, the prime minister's way of working is not effective in these circumstances and then throw my hands up. it was myjob to make it work. so, briefly, one of the reasons i sought to create forcing mechanisms, collective mechanisms, was that i knew the process in number ten was dialectic and i have seen this with the prime minister in 2016, notoriously, and also in the autumn of 2019, he would be gung ho for no—deal brexit in one moment, and much more reflective and trying to identify the landing zone for a deal especially in private with me, in another moment, and i recognise that was how he got to big decisions. it is exhausting to the people in his inner circle but my job was to make sure we had a mechanism around that which are used, which would force a decision and once the decision was made, make sure that the government stuck to it —— which are used. sure that the government stuck to it -- which are used.— -- which are used. there is a considerable _ -- which are used. there is a considerable amount - -- whic