rule, the scientific impact was what was described by sage as a continuum not an absolute rule and that litigants could be put into place when it's not possible to adhere to two metre rule at all times. so the science lent towards and in favour of the two metre rule but it recognised itself that it was a movable feast that they could be mitic and is put into place and that it was a policy choice for the government and it was a matter for government and it was a matter for government to decide. yes government and it was a matter for government to decide.— government and it was a matter for government to decide. yes and i 'ust no back to government to decide. yes and i 'ust go back to important i government to decide. yes and i 'ust go back to important points, i government to decide. yes and i 'ust go back to important points, the h go back to important points, the world health organization... i don't want to ask — world health organization... i don't want to ask you _ world health organization... i don't want to ask you about _ world health organization... i don't want to ask you about what - world health organization... i don't want to ask you about what support| want to ask you about what support was for it in policy terms but it's obvious the government was entitled to produce that policy but also there was a risk but that it was a risk which the government was entitled to run.— risk which the government was entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that _ entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that the _ entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that the chief _ entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that the chief medical - in mind that the chief medical officer sat on the review panel that published the final recommendation about moving to one metre plus. we do need to remember that. the review panel included chief medical officer and it was their recommendation to move to one metre plus or one metre with mitigations that the prime minister accepted. the with mitigations that the prime minister accepted.— with mitigations that the prime minister acce ted. ~ u, minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on _ minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the _ minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the review _ minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the review panel- minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the review panel and l officer was on the review panel and the review panel recommended that they would be that reduction but the chief medical officer position himself was, there is a risk that it is a matter of a government not need to resolve the degree to which that risk is entered into by virtue of this policy decision. he never said in terms of the epidemiological risk of you with the government going ahead with the two metre reduction to one metre rule with my blessing. that's just not what occurred. my that's just not what occurred. ij�*i recollection that's just not what occurred. m recollection is that's just not what occurred. m1: recollection is different and i'm looking at my witness statement to jog my looking at my witness statement to jog my memory but the review panel, i was not involved in the work of the review panel, it was chaired by the review panel, it was chaired by the permanent secretary to number ten and included the chief scientific adviser and the chief medical officer in the chief economic adviser. it says here and i am quoting from the report, the guidance should change to state that two metres or one metre with risk mitigation are acceptable and that businesses should set out mitigations they will introduce. the review was a _ mitigations they will introduce. the review was a policy review which the government was entitled to implement, that is common ground surely. it was a policy decision which the government could take and date. {iii which the government could take and date. . ., , �* which the government could take and date. , �* �*, ., date. of course. but it's an important _ date. of course. but it's an important point. _ date. of course. but it's an important point. my - date. of course. but it's an - important point. my recollection of it was the prime minister deliberately established a panel to bring together the input from the science advisers, the medical officer as well as the economic analysis, considered them together to come up with recommendation and i think the report and its conclusions said the guidance should change. so thatis said the guidance should change. so that is a recommendation jointly from the panel as i read it which is different to what you said but i'm just quoting from the panel summary of recommendations. in just quoting from the panel summary of recommendations.— of recommendations. in that debate an important — of recommendations. in that debate an important part — of recommendations. in that debate an important part perhaps _ of recommendations. in that debate an important part perhaps as - of recommendations. in that debate an important part perhaps as equall an important part perhaps as equal as the economic considerations was the question of risk. the siege meeting and the coronavirus meeting and the cofidis meeting on the 22nd ofjune made plain that obviously in that decision was a balance between the transmission risks and the economic consequences of not doing it and covid s to which you would a party, you were present in that meeting, was made aware that the potential for higher occupancy effects risk. it's an obvious point. the question of transmission and risk for something that had to be debated and it was resolved in favour of the economic opening up. do you agree?— do you agree? maybe it would be helful if do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we _ do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we bring _ do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we bring up _ do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we bring up paragraph | do you agree? maybe it would be i helpful if we bring up paragraph 257 of my witness statement. that contains the panel's summary of its conclusions and there is a specific point in paragraph c where it says mitigations can reduce the risk at one metres so that it is broadly equivalent to being two metres apart. and then the paragraph the is the bit i was quoting from saying the bit i was quoting from saying the panel concludes the guidance should change and again this was a panel i was not involved in that contained scientific and medical advice alongside economic advice and it went to the prime minister and not to me and he acted on the recommendation and rightly brought together all sides of the debate. there is no doubt that the review panel made a policy recommendation and it was instituted, the point is and it was instituted, the point is a different one. in making that decision the government was assisted ijy decision the government was assisted by expert scientific advice on the risk. in the very nature of that decision there was a balance between the transmission risk and economic consequences. that is what the debate was all about. so i'm simply asking you to recognise that in that debate an important consideration but ultimately not the winning consideration was what risks are attendant upon such a social distancing change? do you agree? i wasn't privy to the deliberation of the panel. all i can point it was a letter i sent to the prime minister which you have an evidence which explained my specific point of view about the economics. i explained my specific point of view about the economics.— about the economics. i understand that the in your _ about the economics. i understand that the in your witness _ about the economics. i understand that the in your witness statement j that the in your witness statement it makes plain that the panel considered the risk, risk is an important consideration. that review of course took place as you know and was published on the 24th ofjune. on the 8th ofjuly you presented your plan forjobs to the cabinet and mr hancock said in evidence on the 30th of november that it was at that cabinet meeting on the 8th of july that he had about the eat out to help out scheme for the first time. the scheme was announced on the same day, the 8th ofjuly, as part of the plan forjobs. given that the eat out to help out scheme encouraged the coming together of different households in indoor spaces, why was that plan not put by the treasury in front of sage, in front of the secretary of state for health and the chief medical officer for the consideration of the very same issue of the absolute risk of transmission? the same issue of the absolute risk of transmission?— same issue of the absolute risk of transmission? the first thing to say is wh do transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to help _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to help out - transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to help out at - is why do eat out to help out at all. ., , ., ., ., , all. no, there is a method to my madness- _ all. no, there is a method to my madness- i'm — all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking _ all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking you - all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking you why . all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking you why in| all. no, there is a method to my - madness. i'm asking you why in light of the obvious issue of risk of transmission inherent in any scheme that encouraged households to come together did the treasury not consult with sage, the cmo, the secretary of state for health or anybody else outside number ten? because it out to help out had been designed specifically in the context of the safe lifting of mpi is that had already been signed off as part of the plan which had reopened hospitality, indoor hospitality. that had already been part of the approved plan. eat out to help out only operated within that context andindeed only operated within that context and indeed they were a significant range of mpi is in place including social distancing, covid secured guidance, table service, contactless ordering, one—way systems, all of which have been put in place but the overall reopening of indoor hospitality had already been implanted and as we discussed before modelled and involved scientists and eat out to help out was designed to operate within that context of the safe lifting of mpi. this was a micro—policy to make sure that capacity which the scientists had already said was part of an overall package which could be safely delivered was actually used and it was done very much in the context. in the same way that other economic decisions like a vat cut for hospitality or for low decisions like a vat cut for hospitality orfor low or decisions like a vat cut for hospitality or for low or anything else wouldn't ordinarily be cleared with medical advisers, knows this because we had already made the collective decision to reopen indoor hospitality and this was a policy that sat beneath that. in addition to the obvious _ that sat beneath that. in addition to the obvious economic- that sat beneath that. in addition to the obvious economic policy i that sat beneath that. in addition - to the obvious economic policy which was to encourage consumption in the hospitality sector, to encourage people to use restaurants and preserve the jobs of women in the lower paid and people from ethnic backgrounds, it's obvious that the plan was designed with a meritorious consideration in mind. but it is also part of that plan was it not to address what you had called the fear, the fact data showed that our country was far and away the least likely to get back to normal and to promote what you've described in your article is an optimistic counter narrative. you wanted to bring about a change in behaviour, to encourage more people than had previously gone to restaurants, to encourage people to come together. that was part of the policy objective was it not?- that was part of the policy objective was it not? they are one and the same- _ objective was it not? they are one and the same. my _ objective was it not? they are one and the same. my primary - objective was it not? they are one| and the same. my primary concern objective was it not? they are one - and the same. my primary concern was protecting millions ofjobs of particularly vulnerable people who worked in this industry. all the data, all the evidence, all the polling all the input from those company suggested unless we did something, many of those jobs would have been a risk with devastating consequences for those people and their families. consequences for those people and theirfamilies. that is consequences for those people and their families. that is why independent think tanks had recommended doing some things at this and other countries has done things like this because everyone was grappling with the same issue of how to ensure those jobs are safeguarded. that was the primary driver for what we were doing. find driver for what we were doing. and all that material, _ driver for what we were doing. and all that material, internationally, the material from all that material, internationally, the materialfrom industry bodies and the like, all referred to the balance inherent in any scheme to encourage households to come together in greater numbers. the issue of risk of transmission. putting aside its obvious economic advantage and putting aside the obviously good policy reasons for encouraging restaurant use in the context of restaurants which were already covid safe, there was no getting away from the fact that an issue for you and the treasury was willing to have an impact on transmission? it's the elephant in the room. it couldn't be avoided could it? ., ., ., could it? no. you made the point, it was about covid _ could it? no. you made the point, it was about covid secure _ could it? no. you made the point, it was about covid secure openings. i was about covid secure openings. indoor hospitality had been opened as part of the road map and not openedin as part of the road map and not opened in a casual way, it had been opened in a casual way, it had been opened with a significant set of restrictions including social distancing which limited and reduced significantly the typical occupancy of a restaurant with one—way systems, signage, screens, shift work, contactless payments. there was 55 pages of government guidance for the hospitality industry supplemented by 100 pages of guidance from the trade association including the need for individual risk assessments so there was an extraordinary amount of work that had gone into the safe reopening of hospitality in a way that it was not previously and it was a different set of hospitality and within that context this policy was designed to ensure the capacity that was available and that had deemed to be safe would actually be used in order to safeguard the jobs of some vulnerable people. the to safeguard the jobs of some vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting _ vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of— vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid _ vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid s _ vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid s which - vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid s which you i the meeting of covid s which you attended on the 22nd ofjune make clear that professor chris whitty in the context of the debate about the reduction from two metres to one metre rule said the most risky areas of the package were indoor hospitality and the prospect of reopening schools in september. so there was a clear flag to the issue of transmission in the context of indoor hospitality. why did the treasury not raise expressly the scheme for eat out to help out in the covid s meeting of the 16th of july, the meeting on the 22nd of july, the meeting on the 22nd of july, the meeting of the 6th of august, all of which were concerned with transmission risk, august planning, self isolation period, schools, nothing about it out to help out. why was that question mark? ., help out. why was that question mark? . , ., , , mark? that illustrates my point because what _ mark? that illustrates my point because what people _ mark? that illustrates my point because what people have - mark? that illustrates my point i because what people have missed mark? that illustrates my point - because what people have missed in this conversation is that there was almost a month between the announcement of the doubt to help out and its commencement. a month for people to raise concerns they may have had and actually it's precisely in those three meetings you mentioned on the 16th ofjuly, the chief medical officer in the minutes talked about to significant risk things, schools and winter. he did not mention it had to help out. on the 22nd ofjuly the agenda item is august planning and again it was not raised by the chief scientific adviser or chief medical officer. on the 6th of august again four minutes show returning to schools was a single risky element of the government plan. those three meetings all happened after the announcement of a doubt to help out and all of them involved the chief scientific adviser and the chief medical officer and they considered specifically the forthcoming risks and end up none of those meetings was it raised by them as an issue andindeed was it raised by them as an issue and indeed the pps to the prime minister has also been specific in his evidence of this inquiry that he doesn't recall representation is being made to them to revisit the policy. i know he has been a lot of commentary on this point but there was almost a month between announcement and commencement as i've outlined my reasons why we implanted the policy and what we thought it was the right thing to do and i believe it was the right thing to do in the context of the safe reopening that had already been agreed, but none of those moments in those meetings, there was plenty of opportunity for people to have raised it out there with me or the prime minister and i don't recall and the do not suggest it was raised at all in the three meetings you mentioned. at all in the three meetings you mentioned-— at all in the three meetings you mentioned. ., , , mentioned. those meetings were raised by you _ mentioned. those meetings were raised by you and _ mentioned. those meetings were raised by you and your _ mentioned. those meetings were raised by you and your own - mentioned. those meetings were i raised by you and your own witness statement as examples of meetings were no concerns were raised but do you accept that the issue of eat out to help out was never raised by you or your department at those meetings or your department at those meetings or at any other earlier meeting and that by the date of those meetings the scheme had already been announced following the cabinet on the 8th ofjuly and announced to the public the same day? but the 8th ofjuly and announced to the public the same day?— the 8th ofjuly and announced to the public the same day? but why would i raise it as a — public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk— public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk when _ public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk when i _ public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk when i didn't - raise it as a risk when i didn't believe that it was because it was designed in the context of the safe reopening. the onus is surely on the people who now believe it was a risk to have raised it at the time when something could have been done