>> our generation is very successful. because they were born in the soviet union, they know their roles might change, they are not waiting -- [inaudible] more mobile, so that's why mostly -- [inaudible] who are not journalists are very successful, very successful lawyers, businessmen, bankers. the problem is by 35 they started to feel like, well, okay, i got my family, i got my house, my mansion, all these things, what to do next? and they start to be very close to the problems of their own families. so they tend to think mostly about these things. they don't want to think -- maybe because it's not very effective to think about politics in be russia. it's not very -- it might prevent a good career, so why to do it? for many it's big challenge, they just don't want to talk about these things. and it's one of the problem that we almost lost public about important things. nobody want to talk about -- [inaudible] nobody want to talk about new initiative of medvedev to suppress troublemakers by new technical system of -- [inaudible] and things launched just two years ago. for many, well, they're white secure, yes. some terrorism might happen in moscow. it happens, okay, but we, we don't want to think about it. >> what do you think when your generation is 50 and not 35 that you're just going to carry on the same stuff, or will they think about opening it up? >> that's a big question for us. it's a very big and open question. i just don't know. maybe there's some more people who might be active in many more years, but to be frank, i'm not -- i think if you want to be active in politics, you need to start not at 35, but at 21 and 22. and the idea is not to forget about it afterwards. for many of my friends and we have some -- my good friend, lars -- [inaudible] late '80s they took part in demonstrations. now they pressure them to take part in -- [inaudible] mostly in support of kill journalists or kill -- [inaudible] it would be quite -- [inaudible] but, for example, we have a number of manifestations just for open speech, in fair of open -- favor of open speech. >> okay. >> thank you. my name is gregory -- [inaudible] currently, russian internet at george washington university. you wrote interesting pieces about russian internet and cooperation between -- [inaudible] groups a few years ago. so i wonder what is the current state related to internet activities, and to what extent -- [inaudible] do they have the writers to follow everything, what type of activities are they doing now and what is the current state of russian blog surfings? >> and i would add there's a chapter on this subject in the book, so i call your attention to it, please. >> in fact, this is quite smart to keep distance of hackers, so it's not the fsb who are -- [inaudible] there's a number of people, and according to our information they support not directly by the fsb, by the kremlin. so it is the same, we can compare the -- [inaudible] and some people, some bloggers are recruited from the -- [inaudible] organizations and supervised by the same people as administration. what the fsb does, they encourage activity. when something happen and, for example, they had very famous attack in the united states, there was complaints and there was call to local fsb office to ask, well, you have the students. they said, well, students were -- [inaudible] we had nothing to do with them. >> they were just patriots. >> patriots, yes. they were just patriots and that's why we don't need to persecute them. and now as far as they see and we note this once, the fsb tried to find a way to some groups of hackers, again, but not to pay them. not to order them, but to encourage them. because sometimes it would be enough. because in this case they might keep this distance, and you see it turned out to be very successful in case of historian. the evidence is, well, it's, again, we have to talk only about just russian hackers. and -- [inaudible] >> and blogosphere, the secret service is not active in the blogosphere because it's an era of -- [inaudible] administration. recover all this. >> yeah, and -- >> have special -- [inaudible] who have their own progresses. >> they even created kremlin's school of boogers. [laughter] >> georgetown university. could you say a few words about the relationship between fsb and svr? and, for instance, when we're talking about the, when the russians are talking about the nearer broad, which organization has primacy in looking at that, and to what extent there is subversion sponsored by one or the other organizations in the nearer broad, for instance, the great interest in georgia or ukraine. >> the fsb was given a very special task in carry out operations in abroad. they ask it to supervise the former soviet union, and now have a special department. and they mostly responsible for -- [inaudible] including estonia and -- [inaudible] but the problem is that because there is no mechanism of even internal control, this department because of some bureaucratic reasons began to increase activity. and sometimes the journalists you have to deal with very peculiar things to understand what's going on inside. well, i must say that now this department adopted new and senior, and now it's globe. and at the same time the svr as we understood -- [inaudible] be task it to deal with former soviet union republics. and special web site on the internet -- [inaudible] and it existed only three weeks, but there was a number of documents. and i had no ability to check them, but as far as i can say they looked credible. there was some documents about some operations of the fsb in ukraine, and there was very interesting notes. top secret to the president of russian federation from directer of department of -- [inaudible] we carry out with special operation in ukraine, we created false document to present it to the government of ukraine, and we have to say that the foreign intelligence service recovered this document and reported it to moscow as genuine. so we ask you politely to say it is fake. >> so, andre, they're competing in other words. >> yeah. >> yes. >> chriser schroeder, friend of david's. history is filled with unintended consequences, and i'm sort of curious if you could play back what the fsb has become, and if you could interview putin ten years ago, is this what he wanted? is he stuck in any way in things that happened once these things came unleashed? and second question, if i could, i'm sure it's in the book, could you just give us a quick tour of who to watch, who are the people we're going to be hearing about in the next five to ten years and, you know, who they are? >> i think that because putin had some interview in 1999 and he was quite honest, i think he anticipate something different. because he wanted to create real new lead for russia. kind of junta united by common perspectives on russian present and future. people love the kremlin -- [inaudible] kind of vanguard in the russian state. but, in fact, you know, in 2007 it became even public the big struggle between people inside the secret service against -- [inaudible] and there is an open letter written by, excuse me, by victor, former kgb officer responsible for police -- [inaudible] and then -- [inaudible] close friend of putin. now has become traitors. so i think now fsb -- or, now, putin quite disappointed by this internal crisis because he, as far as we know, he's fully aware of it because he task the agency of victor to go investigate activity of the fsb and -- [inaudible] and some general, and the general responsible for these investigations was sent to jail. so i think he is not quite happy with what now he has. but at the same time i think he might be happy, but in the 1990s one of the big problem for the goth was you have to face -- government was you have to face all these questions from foreign journalists, domestic journalists, and you have to answer these questions. may be honest, maybe not. the political culture became so suspicious, but now if you ask official, first of all, be very difficult to ask him because you need to find him. and the second question is if you ask the question, the answer would be not the answer to the question, but to a kind of search for who paid you for this question, who ordered you to ask this question? and i think that's happened in the 2000s. and i think putin because, you know, he has very strange habit to answer questions, he quite happy with that. >> okay. >> delphine with the center. i had a question about who is resisting in the society, the difficulty of pushing back against the freedoms and the political restrictions. aside from the mass stagnation, surely there are people in addition to the investigative journalists who are trying, different sectors of society, who is doing that and what kind of pressures are on them? >> we have an activity of some local, small groups who are mostly about some local problems. the neighbor, for example, the concern. [inaudible] they had, for example, some very active trade unions in some cities where there's big plants, and so these people, they are very angry about problems if they leave the ship or try to do something. the problem is now they are the subject of the campaign against -- [inaudible] and this campaign is mostly watched not by putin, but by medvedev. because medvedev in 2008 created the new -- he disbanded the department responsible for fighting organized crime and terrorism in his interior ministry, and in the same place he created the new department responsible for fighting extremism. and it was said openly that now we've won the war against russian pfaff mafia -- [inaudible] and now all these thousands of experienced officers and interior minister who were responsible for pep -- penetrating criminal groups or terrorist cells, they now are responsible for these kind of troublemakers. so now we have a lot of example when trade union activities would be ask it to go to the local office of center on fight being extremism. it would be said, well, you are kind of the activities prosock f -- provocative, you tried to undermine the state, and you might be accused. for example, bloggers criticize the activity of the security service and the interior minister they accused of the same thing, extremism. mostly it's about bloggers and the local groups. and we have -- and maybe some small, not very significant liberal political organizations like, for example, cat par of which, to be frank, is very small and -- [inaudible] 2,000 or 3,000 people. that's -- but they are summit of investigation of big department -- subject of investigation of big department. and they were asking for big powers, and they were given these powers, and medvedev signs a new law giving the fsb more powers to, to prevent the crimes of extremism. and for me it's very, very -- i just -- i'm not very sure what does it mean because extremism in russia is something about -- [inaudible] it's not about attacks or bombings, it's about what you say something with might be provocative and while to prevent someone to say something that might be provocative. but now the fsb was given the right, and now two big services, interior ministry and -- [inaudible] they deal with these small number of troublemakers. >> okay. first here and then we'll go to the back. okay. >> andre and irina, i'm from the french daily newspaper, he fig row. i've spent a few years in russia myself, and i was struck about what you said about the fact that nobody really knows what's going on in russia because, you know, investigative journalism is nearly dead. i mean, apart from a few exceptions fighting existence the current. and i was wondering if you would extend this notion to the fact that in the west people are less and less, less and less interested in what's going on in russia as well. i mean, they used to be very big current of information about russia in europe and in the u.s. and you can really see now that it's not the case. it's less and less information about what is really going on throughout russia. so do you feel somehow politically abandoned in your effort to grasp where is your question going, and in connection with that first question i was wondering what you think of the current foreign policy of the west, both the obama administration and people like president sarkozy, what is your feeling about what the west is doing now with russia? >> yes, of course, we feel a little -- [inaudible] on by the intellectuals. we failed to attract attention of the authorities and change some things that we investigate. we can -- [inaudible] and nobody pay attention. sometimes it might be some forcible actions against -- [inaudible] for example. some criminal cases or interrogations, but in general nobody pay attention to our investigations. and the situation is that the -- [inaudible] have now entered the -- [inaudible] because there was a problem. >> be and about foreign governments, i think while it was surprise for us because it's one of the big problems, big issues of the book that we tried to write about it. in the early 2000s and the late 1990s we fought -- [inaudible] experts and dissidents fought what we see kind of kgb revival, and this new power, putin, might change the whole country, economic rules. but, in fact, what we saw -- and i think -- [inaudible] fsb was not so active. they were given the powers. they never tried to gain the power. and some crucial things changed. but political culture and economic -- [inaudible] has the same thing. it has even the same names. there is not talks about property rights. from be except some crucial -- from except some crucial things, there's some currency for investors. putin was very, very generous with the united states just after 9/11 attacks. he even closed down some intelligence facilities, for example, in cuba, and he closed down the base, the intelligence facility in vietnam. it's just a problem of russian -- it looks like for the west pause they quite happy with -- because they quite happy with foreign policy of russian state except for, like, georgia, but, to be frank, i think everybody understand it was not the question of if they are talking about even iran. medvedev is very, very generous. it's not like -- everybody understood and i think in the west that putin's state is not a kind of new russian, new soviet state created in 1920s with the idea of revolution everywhere and undermine the -- [inaudible] in every country. we are not so big threat. just a country with some strange habits to deal with internal opposition. but it's just a problem of internal opposition. >> [inaudible] david's book has been -- >> you mean, will it be published in russian? >> yeah. i mean -- [inaudible] and told very, very well. >> what do you think, andre? is there a chance this book will be published in russian? >> yeah, i think so. the public has heard some talks of russian publishing house -- >> they're going to charge you a lot of money for it. [laughter] >> so i hope. >> has there been reaction to the book inside of russia? >> official, no. there is no official reaction, and there was one interview. [inaudible] that's all. this looks like, well, we think it's very smart because the story would be a big story only if other papers, for example -- [inaudible] might pick up this story. but mostly other papers might pick up the story only if there's government interaction. in this case it be just story. -- [inaudible] well, it's just your choice. >> we had one question in the back here. >> thank you. [inaudible] freedom house. you had mentioned earlier that in 1990s when there was a creation of the fsb as we know it now, it sort of toppled the influence of svr and other agencies. my question is regarding the caucuses of which no one wants to talk about in russia. how much competition is going with in controlling the situation between the -- [inaudible] and fsb? because there is militia units, as i understand, has been squished out and -- [inaudible] has tried to squeeze out the fsb as well but not quite exactly. so who is, exactly, controlling the situation in chechnya, and are the republics especially given the, a new spike in military activity and -- [inaudible] thank you. >> andre, explain what gru is. >> yeah. the problem is, in fact, the fsb used a their powers and, they i -- and to -- [inaudible] not to obtain more responsibility but to avoid it. we have, as you know -- [inaudible] it started in 1999, it ended in 2009. but the fsb was responsible for the operation only for 31 months. it was -- [inaudible] interior minister and mostly to internal troops, and now internal troops are most active force. not only, for example -- [inaudible] and the appointment of -- [inaudible] changed nothing. he still thinks of internal troops are more effective force to deal with terrorists. so it was not the struggle between military intelligence, fsb and -- [inaudible] why is so important is because sometime, because now we have his news of -- [inaudible] he is physically responsible for situation, for whole situation, and he was given just the same people who said to be controlled by kadeerov. hard -- [inaudible] fsb carry out very good operations, yeah, they kill some people, they even detained one permanent leader, but they don't want to be responsible. and for military intelligence because we now i have a very big minister of defense and -- [inaudible] it's a situation that -- [inaudible] so just not in position to do something in chechnya or international caucuses. >> to the fsb, we should say that this year the fsb special forces -- [inaudible] in the caucuses and the special forces on the fsb organized few successful liquidation of terror. and one man was captured, it was big success for them. >> yeah. >> [inaudible] >> okay, i've got two more questions. one? finish. >> bill tucker. i worked in the reagan administration in the white house counsel's office. and i have talked to people, and reagan came into office, and one of his goals was to bring down the soviet union. and he referred to it as, you know, as an evil empire. and to a man, all of these leaders in the former warsaw pact countries have said that reagan calling the soviet union an evil empire gave them the courage and inspiration to fight on. against communism. but i would like to know from your viewpoint what effect reagan and the west had on the pressure they brought on the soviet union to bring, bring down the soviet union and cause it to fall? >> i think, you know, the big evidence of the idea the west was very important in disbanding the soviet soviet union, the kgb personal. and former kgb chief uri -- [inaudible] and many other generals, they talk constantly, talked to press and said, well, there's so many so-called agents of influence in the west, so that's why soviet union collapsed. but, i think, in fact, played important role of the west dissident groups were very small, and andropov was so harsh to persecute them that by the mid 1990s -- mid 1980s they became so insignificant, and there was no support from the population to them. i think it was mostly -- and, of course, listen to radio for voice of america, but it never -- [inaudible] to become active. so just, okay, we can listen to it. that's great. this might be interesting to hear some voices of socialism, for example. but it was not so significant. i think it mostly was internal crisis. and mostly because -- and i think gorbachev was very, very important. it was his decision. because i think if gorbachev decided not to do all these things, might last for another 10 years, maybe 15 years. it was his decision, and some people close to him. but, again, i should be very cautious because i was very young, so i have no abilities to check all these things. >> okay. last question here in the back. >> i'm from safe foundation. i have a question regarding the fsb. i have read that even in hitler's tim