>> rose: welcome to the broadcast. as we continue looking at the president's afghanistan strategy, we talk to the chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, senator john kerry. >> pakistan is really central. i believe it is the key. and more important to the outcome of afghanistan than the troops that are going in, will be what happens in pakistan and particularly in person pakistan over the course of the next year. >> rose: john kerry for the hour. next. >> funding for charlie rose has been provided by the following: captioning sponsored by rose communications >> from our studios in washington, d.c., this is a special edition of charlie rose. >> rose: john kerry is here. he's a senior senator from massachusetts. he a chairman of the senate foreign relations committee. after nearly 25 years in the senate, his influence in washington is growing. he's been a key figure on issues like the war in afghanistan, climate change and health-care reform. "the new york times" wrote that kerry has settled into a influential road as legislative bridge builder, international troubleshooter and party elder statesman. he is close to the president during his own presidential campaign in 2004, he chose then senate candidate barack obama from chicago to deliver the keynote address of the democratic national convention. vice president joe biden recently said that he speaks with senator kerry more than anyone else on capitol hill. earlier this week the senator met with president obama just hours before he announced his new strategy for the war in afghanistan. i'm very pleased to have him back on this program. welcome. >> thank you, sir. good to be here. >> rose: good to have you back. >> thank you. >> rose: tell me what the role of the foreign relations committee is now that the president has announced his strategy. >> you know, i grew up in a period where we all saw the impact of the chairman who focused on war. and i think that it's a good model. it's not the only model and it's not, you know, totally applicable to today. but we need to make sure the committee does its homework, informs, asks america to tune in to a conversation that really discusses the pros and cons. in a nonpart stand -- partisan, america national security centric way. and i think that's the key. >> rose: let's move to the president's decision. you fully support not only what he intends to do but what he said in his speech as to why he made the decision he did? >> i support some additional troops going over there. the key here is that the troops we send over are used in the right way. i mean that is really the critical component of this. and i set out at a speech at the council on foreign relations a number of weeks ago, the parameters that i think should apply to their use. specifically, yes, they should go in and clear and hold but only in the circumstances where we have an ability to come in quickly underneath them with the build and transfer. and there must be afghan partnering in those endeavors. if we become too ambitious and too aggressive, proactive in what our troops begin to do, and to get too far ahead of the local governance capacity and development capacity coming in underneath them, we risk undoing whatever good we're trying to accomplish. and we put our troops i think at greater risk. i also believe and i think the president said this the other day. i think he said that pakistan is really central. i believe it is the key. and more important to the outcome of afghanistan than the troops that are going in, will be what happens in pakistan and particularly in western pakistan over the course of the next year. >> rose: are you encouraged by what the pakistanis seem to be doing now? >> i'm encouraged by the steps that a -- that a government does not have blood-based strength or support has taken a certain risk in committing its troops. the army has taken the risk. the generals, the isi have really moved the ball forward by taking on the taliban in the swat valley and now moving into south waziristan, and obviously that's somewhat now the limits because of the winter season. it's really a seasonal fighting effort there. but i think that it is earn couraging. the key here, however, is strengthening the government in pakistan and refocusing on what they're going to do in the course of next year. if they pull back, if they don't keep the heat on, the various entities in pakistan, moshgari, the ala, the quetashura which has a major impact on what happens in pakistan, the pressure has to be kept on all of those entities. and if we do, that will alleviate significantly the difficulties in afghanistan itself. >> rose: do you believe that pakistan the epicentre of terrorism in the world. >> i do. and i have used that term and i think it is. at long as ala, the top op ratives zawahiri and osama bin laden are presumed to be there, as long as we know there are significant ala plots coming out of that region and there are and we have intercepted several of them over the course of the last few years, as long as that is sort of the, sort of the, i hate to use this term but in a sense the spiritual center, the symbolic center of al qaeda, it strengthens their ability to do things in somalia, yemen, germany, great britain, america, elsewhere. and so i think we have to recognize that if they were to drive us into less than keeping the pressure on posture, then their ability to recruit and create further problems in the middle east, with hezbollah, hamas, others, i think, i really believe would grow. that is the central security interest and challenge facing the united states. >> rose: so what do we do to make sure that they do what they're capable of doing? >> well there are a number of things. and we have to -- we have done some of them over the course of this year. we passed what is known as the kerry-lugar legislation which will put a billion and a half dollars into civilian assistance. what we're trying to do is change the attitude of pakistanis towards the united states. it is not been a healthy relationship. and a lot of that stems from the blanket support given by the prior administration to general mush ar -- musharraf. and there was a sense that we were pore government and person-centric and focused, then people focused. we need to dot things that make a difference to the lives of pakistanis. i mean you have people in pakistan who sit there and say you know, since 1947-48y we've been a country but hows that that affected me. and they don't really see positive ways in which it has affected them. >> rose: and doing that, factor in the significance of afghanistan in terms it of pakistan and the stability of pakistan. >> if pakistan were not what i just described, we wouldn't be in afghanistan. afghanistan is not a freestanding threat to the united states of america. it is a threat. >> rose: even though it was, in fact, a safe haven for al qaeda at the time of 9/11. >> correct. and i've heard a number of people talking in the last days and the talking heads process, saying we are there because that's the place we were attacked from. wrong. we went there because that is the place we where we attacked from. but that is not a reason for staying there. the only reason in my judgement for staying there is that the taliban provides sanctuary and are link to ala. and to the degree that the taliban provide instability on the border and in that region through their alliance with ala and the other bad actors, the others, that is a threat to the stability of pakistan, a threat to the region, fundamentally, where you already have a tinderbox with the relationship between pakistan and india. and so, and with iran on another border, it's really important for us to recognize that you cannot allow al qaeda to have a free hand with the taliban. and that's the reason we're focused on the taliban. not to defeat them ultimately but to marginalize them and to ultimately defeat al qaeda. >> rose: do you believe in mcchrystal's strategy as you understand it, is the best way to marginalize the taliban? >> i believe that general mcchrystal's strategy as now fine-tuned by the president and by the process that he put in place over these last months which i think was an excellent, important, vital deliberative process, i think that has sharpened that strategy. >> rose: the idea, just so that he we are all clear, the idea of having an equity strategy, having a date certain in which you would make an assessment to begin to bring them home. >> correct. and i believe that the date certain is in fact a positive, not a negative here. i disagree with those colleagues who have suggested if you set a date certain you are somehow weakening the effort, wrong. it is no different fundamentally from iraq, though we were further along in iraq, i will acknowledge that. but we wasted a lot of time getting to that further along in iraq because nobody ever felt compelled to make a decision. and if your statements are simply we're going to there as long as it takes, they will take as long as they want. and you are there as long as they want you to be. >> rose: so having a date certain will be a leverage against the karzai government in order to do what they need to do -- >> it is not just -- yes. and it's also a leverage to, i think, actions in pakistan and elsewhere, they realize there is an opportunity here where we are committing additional forces, where we will take the initiative, where we will leverage actions in the area that make people safe and give them the breathing. but ultimately it is up to them. and recognizing that it's ultimately up to them is one of the best things we can do. because it will help them face the existential nature of their threat. if they don't, there's nothing ultimately that we can do about that anyway, charlie. and that's what we have to realize. >> rose: how important is it to send a message to the people of afghanistan and especially that you do not want to occupy the country, are you not there to stay there, are you not going to make the mistake that the soviets did as bob gates -- >> well, it's very, very important. but there are many other distinctions with the soviets. first of all the soviets pursued a scorched earth policy. >> rose: but they had numbers there that created the idea of an occupation. >> well, it was an occupation. it literally didn't establish a legitimate government. they were killing major tribal leaders. they were -- there was a terrible ethnic and sect toreial cleansing that took place. and that's part of what created the chaos that the taliban filled. that doesn't exist today. the tajik, the uzbek, the turkiman and others are relative -- managing their fairs in the north relatively well. and in the south where you have the principal insurgency of the taliban, the estimates are that the taliban are somewhere in the vicinity of 20 to 30,000, who knows. you can't be precise. but of those, only somewhere in the vicinity of 5,000, maybe 6 are the hardest core, you know, irreconcilable taliban. the quetashura mullah omar taliban. the other taliban are many of the thugs, criminals, cham il ons, kids out of work and for hire, and the presumption here, part of the strategy is that many of them can be pulled away if we are careful and thoughtful about what we do. >> rose: well, why have they had the momentum? >> because of the absence, the total absence of adequacy of governance with the karzai government. >> rose: and you know president karzai better than most. in fact, it was you that convinced him to stand for an election in a flawed election, to stay the -- say the least. where is he now? what is he capable of doing. >> well, let me say that i think it's important for us in our country to really step back and look very carefully at what the options are here. no one has shown me somebody other than president karzai at this point in time who could necessarily do what has to be done here. secondly, this is a man who took considerable risks on behalf of this country. road a motorcycle with a couple of other people into taliban territory to take on the taliban, post 9/11, who stayed in pakistan, didn't come to this country, didn't expate ree ate himself. i am convinced he is a nationalist, a patriot, somebody who cares enormously about his country. now are there problems in governance? of course. enormous problems in governance. but do they go --. >> rose: but do they go to the core of who he is or not. the charges of a fraudulent election, the charges of corruption, are they simply thing tas that you -- united states can say yes, we understand that but he is capable of building a government that the united states can partner with? >> i believe -- let's make sure that you know we're sort of clear about what the possibilities are and what the realities are. is there corruption in karzai government? yes. does he know it? yes, has he tolerated it in the past, yes. >> rose: does it include his brother. >> i think his brother has been obviously a facilitate never some regards with certain things that have taken place. the cia and the fbi have not produced any hard evidence on request of some particular transaction in narcotics or something which is often alleged. but there are a lot of stories people hear. and there's clearly a way in which that particular, you know, province has been managed that many of us find unacceptable, and complicated. i think some changes is have to be made. i talk about that with president karzai. others have talked about that with him. i believe that there will be changes forthcoming. and i know the president is deeply committed in a very personal way and through his lieutenants to watch very closely and demand very specifically certain kinds of actions. i think the president has no intention of asking young american men and women to go into harm away and not demand from the government there the kind of transformation necessary to meet the level of sacrifice he's asking us to make. >> rose: do you believe that president karzai is up to being what the united states hopes he will be in the next 18 months? >> i think president karzai has great talents. in many ways. and he is a creative, intelligent, and you know, thoughtful person who has the ability if he gets focused and turns his attention to the task at hand by defining his interests properly. if he thinks his interests don't lie with us, for some reason, and i think that's part of the problem that happened over the last year and a half. that he --. >> rose: he thought what. >> i think he began to have serious doubts about whether the united states was keeping faith with him. i think he had a sense that he was being undermined in the election process by number one, certain countries. and number two, certain individuals. >> rose: american diplomats. >> i don't want to -- it's not important to get into who, how, where, what, it's important to understand that he felt less than certain about his relationship with us. and i think that you know, in the course of that, he made the bedfellows that he felt he had to in order to get re-elected. did we like all of them? no. did that maybe drive us into a tougher position during the course of that election. i think yes. >> rose: but the two questions are one, he is essential to american success. >> yes. >> rose: in afghanistan. >> yes, he is. >> rose: and secondly you believe he understands the choices and probably will make the right choice now that he is assured of american commitment to this effort over the next 18 months. >> i think that is our hope. and i can't sit here and tell you will happenment but that is our best hope. and it is critical to our success. >> rose: and what do we do if in the next 18 months or at the end of 18 months that he has not done that? >> well, i think we're going to know much sooner than that, charlie. i think that you though when i was in kabul a few weeks ago general mcchrystal said to me that he will know whether or not this plan is going to work in about ten months. i think the president is banking on that kind of judgement here. >> rose: so by september 20 -- >> by september to december of next year, we will know, i believe, whether or not this can work or not. >> rose: which is the interesting question. if it works, it means what? if it doesn't work it means what? >> what are the choices there? >> well, as i said to you, remember what i said, also. because i'm not just focused on afghanistan. >> rose: i understand. >> pakistan is more critical in my judgement to what may happen in afghanistan. if we can be successful in pakistan over the next year, a lot of this becomes less relevant in terms of afghanistan. because i think we can deal with taliban and other threats that greatly changes the equation of the region. >> rose: said another way if those in afghanistan who want to topple the government there don't have a safe haven in pakistan, then -- >> if they don't have a safe haven and if many of the troublemakers in those sanctuarys are eliminated, you have a very different dynamic. >> rose: you know the president well. you spoke to him about this. tell me how you think, what decision he had to come to. what was it that took place in this review that helped and informed him as to the decision he made. >> i think the president had to make the toughest kind of decision that a president makes. which is sending young americans into war. putting his nation further into a war. it wasn't a war he started but a war that he now is managing. and i think he had to do that realizing that there were enormous tensionsin the country, that many of the people who helped to election him are bitterly opposed to any involvement. and that no mater what decision he made it was going to be subject to criticism from many sides. so it's the kind of situation where you make a pure presidential decision. you do what is best for the country. and that's what i think he did. >> rose: but was it a dual message yes, i'm going to give the troops to general mcchrystal but at the same time i'm going to change the dynamic by setting a date certain that we will reevaluate this. >> i don't think it was just that. i think the president actually narrowed the mission. i think the president made it clear we are not going to engage in a major nation building exercise. we are going to engage in a transfer to the afghans. we're going to build the afghan capacity in a short span of time, recognizing that the major battle is in pakistan. >> rose: let me just come back to swren mcchrystal who told you that he would know by september to december as to whether he was going to be successful. if it's not successful, what then? >> there are a number of different options then, charlie. i think, again, you know, you have to make the tough decision that you are facing at that point in time. i want to believe in the possibility here not just the possibility. i think if we do things correctly here, for our allies come to the table in the way that they ought to, if the pakistanis do the things that they can do, and should do, then i don't think we're going to be confronting that kind of a choice. if we confront that choice we'll have to confront it at the time. but if a general comes to you and says i'm looking at this and it ain't working, i think it's going to be incumbent on a lot of them to say here is what will work based on what we are seeing. and there are other options. there are different footprint options, different ways to do things. >> rose: footprint options mean what, having a limited sort of footprint at the same time doing what sometimes can be described as a terrorist strategy rather than a counterinsurgency strategy. >> i've always personally been in favor of the most limited footprint possible. and i think there might have been, you know, other possibilities here. that doesn't mean that this isn't going to work. and that we