Transcripts For CSPAN2 Capital News Today 20130530

>> to the policymakers and the strategy makers. also, you know, cheaper tactics. what was a little used on this mission. but we have to ask at this grand strategy is working. i would like to hear your comments on so you had a problem with the all volunteer force? so how does that play into civil liberties, and why not just force policymakers to actually work going to were constitutionally? >> well, that is a tough one to handle. let's see. >> i can start that one. the first is the frustrations that we will never get away from. you know, i was a lieutenant. and whenever we were going into battle come you talk to the squad leaders and we were all basically trying to figure things out amongst ourselves. nobody knew the grand strategy. i don't know when you do know the grand strategy. colonel, do you know the grand strategy? i just think that that is -- that is a difficult one. >> the other part was the all volunteer force. i was wondering if maybe you could get america to put some skin in the game by conscripting the. >> i am not asking this in terms of the draft of the military. but i do think that there should be service. we want special people that can do the job. that is no shame but i would want to be in the marine corps with. how to read, teaching them to build service trails. it would be a lot cheaper, they're there are all kinds of things that can be done. the question about civil liberties -- you feel like you are a slave to government? >> this is a republic by the people for the people. it means that you have to pony up. when you pony up the taxes, you are being part of the community. to ask you to devote your time to earn money and then give it to the government, you can go ahead and feel that way. all you have to do is understand that that is community. that is not able liberties issue. and i think the same thing goes for asking people to serve their time between the ages of 18 and 20. do you want to chip in or not? i don't think it's a civil rights issue. >> hello, my name is andrew and i would like to honor you as my brothers and sisters in the audience for your military service. personally and sincerely, i thank you for your service. i'm also really grateful to be able to be here and that you offer this to the public. as he said, we are healing civilians, and as my friend says, it is peacemaking. i am really moved not just by the intelligence coming from you all here, this is important. it is important work, this idea of coming home and it is going to take a concerted effort, military and civilian. we are talking about the stereotype of the vietnam vets. i am not sure that i have this stereotype in my head. because those guys have all kill themselves. the fact is that many have been lost to suicide and many were killed in combat in the war. not just a few, but twice as many. when i first heard that, you got me, i got it. i am not sure which common it is, if you want to pick it up, mr. mcintyre. but your friend who suggested the change from ptsd to posttraumatic stress syndrome, do you have any sense that monica would have a better shot at the entitlement to the purple heart then ptsd does now? >> it would probably have less. i don't know how we will deal with the question of how displaced it is very hard to tell when the problem starts and it's very hard to know what the problem is. it's very hard to address a treatment. so that makes it very hard to assign and award the sacrifice that we have suffered. the thing that i'm operating in is that folks have been wounded come up wrangham home. you people home up to the moment they arrive. what they are thinking, if they come back to combat come back him as a flash forward. i would prefer to invite the state surgeon to comment on that. the vermont national guard state surgeon. this is a thoughtful and brilliant man with five or six tours under his belt and this is not a new issue. would you like to comment quickly? >> along the lines of what our questions are. now there are more people die of suicide and have actually died in combat. so this is one of the signature wounds of the conflict. i think that when you look at these issues, i think the issue of this, we have tried to blast injuries and concussions and there has been migration or not. it is a very hard thing. i think one of the things -- i don't know that there ever will be an answer to that question, you know what i mean? and i guess maybe sometimes the way that i look at that is that if the campaign that we have been given. when i talk about the consequences of the war, i always like to use the example. people ask how rough is it to go to combat. and i said, it is a very minimum thing. imagine going to work one day and not leaving for a year. i said that that is the absolute minimum that every soldier goes into. we say, hey, look, don't ever tell somebody. we are the society to these sheltered deaths. so we are not ready for that. and that is part of our culture. many other cultures have really integrated this into their life experience. that effect creates a lot of care and concern with our soldiers. >> it is very important how wars treat their veterans. the release early part of the 20th century, it was at least public policy. >> it was only with the g.i. bill that bill that was approved in the summer of 1944. we started giving support to anyone who served during the war. and that has been the pattern in the war since then. to okay. since we get several people lined up, that suggests to questions at a time. let's hear the question and we can conclude the answers together. let's talk about the active units on the ground in the military or on the seats. service members and their families, do you think that they will get swept under the rug and forgotten in the next couple of years as to how we dealt with insurgency and japan and how we had to relearn those things. >> my name is ben can tell. my question has to do with the constitutionality of several liberties. what about the constitutionality of forces abroad. and we don't have civilian support. i really don't understand what that means. can we see, and how can we put a change in society where people become involved? >> that's great. it is kind of a composite question, just like you just in the agreement. we even forgot about the wars we were engaged in. and if we keep that information from them, we are taking them out of the constitutional process. you know, electing their representatives to decide whether or not we should go to war and then sending our troops in harms way. you know, we have gotten to the point where we don't even have that discussion. >> there hasn't even been a constitutional declaration of war since december 8, 1941. and all the wars since then, korea, others, others have authorized them to send in their power and vietnam, those that gave lyndon johnson a blank check, both arrive in afghanistan, many think it's okay to take action to defend the united states. it was ambiguous, but it was a blank check and there has never been a declaration of war. and i do think that that is a mistake. we have had these words, we have stepped up the polls, now there is more nationbuilding in afghanistan. that is certainly novel not what we were talking about in october october 2001. there is a part of me that knows that no war is popular. it's a necessary thing and there has to be public and political support. we have not exercised that. most of the time, in the last election, 7% of americans spoke about the war in afghanistan. the fact that the politicians are ignoring it, it speaks to the fact that we have ignored it. >> talking about the fact that in terms of forgetting it, we have opportunities here. the first time in probably the only time that the national guard, separate armies from each state when people look at it have gone. our veterans would be forgotten? this is up to us and the upside is up to us. these are our neighbors and church members and let's remember we were there. we were there in quantity and ali. westminster, each of these towns, they had real people living next door. people there and the like. >> i was just going to answer the question about what we can do about making sure that people are okay. first of all, i think that if we have a clear vote going into war, declaring war, then each of those members of congress are going to go back to the constituency and explain why they voted that way. the way they do now, it is just like well, you know, you don't want any responsibility for that. you stand up and be counted. we must ask them before the vote whether or not they really want to war. number two is i don't think you should never do it on borrowed money. if you go to war, you raise taxes. everyone gets involved. there will be a surcharge. every april 15, the entire nation will look at that and wonder if they ought to. this time. or maybe we ought to stop, or what are we doing about it. my favorite example is that when i was at yale, there was a plaque on the wall as big as the whole stage. there were hundreds of names of those who fought in world war ii and korea. and we lost one soldier in vietnam. i think the universities today, they hardly send anybody today. it is very small. how are you going to get them back involved again? i mean, i don't know how anyone can do this under government money. if your kids are contributing, how are you going to get more money? i mean, it was like, come on, you guys. we are all in the same bowl. >> anything that we are integrating these jobs for our veterans? can you talk with us about veterans not been able to get jobs. this is another question. the social ingratiation of killing. it is accepted. also, if you can talk about spirituality as part of the battle. i'm just curious as i am considering that of a chaplain in a career. even with that, doctor mcintyre come you have mentioned the possibility of social security. i still have a lot of time to go. the people are going to be doing their best. how are they going to put this global footprint on things. because of this idea and your topic of moral integrity and military integrity and questionable leadership. how are we going to be able to identify this? at least from what i have seen so far, this is not something that we are taught. were we going to do in order to combat this? >> i think we denigrate those two questions. doctor roy, you know, with your work with the veterans groups, what helps these opportunities for veterans? is there any special treatment? are they feeling even more isolated because we -- well, i think that this population as a whole. there are still plenty of blue-collar jobs, especially after world war ii, that was the case. it was not the case now. so i do think that the education was critical for this. >> your work on the new g.i. bill is important. i would like to talk about the opportunities for returning veterans. they may not have taken certain courses, they may not have had some of these other situations encourage them. they need individual counseling. that is what i think. >> okay, is the psycho association a fundamental imperative for the soldiers go to war? >> i think so. we read about a british marine and a 14 or 15-year-old kid herding goat. the issue may have been paramount. but he couldn't do it. he was just a kid. if you are able to kill people, they think you're a psychopath or a sociopath. i wanted to address this issue of this young man. for the young man that wanted to be a chaplain. we had a really important football game against north catholic. and the local priest, father from my hometown come he was a real football fan and he came into the locker room before the game and there was none of this nonsense about nobody gets hurt, we all do our best. he came in there and he said, let's beat the other team. and so the father, i'm sitting there at the game and north catholic was the powerhouse. we wanted to go to the state championship. and i'm sitting here saying, but doesn't north catholic have a priest? that is one it hit me. god doesn't care what side we are on. god is upon us fighting each other. why can't we solve it a better way. god is about individual souls and what happens to the individual soul in the crucible of that fiery conflict people have no choice for where they are born, someone grows up in oregon, others grow up in north vietnam, they face each other on some war-torn area. it is a political question. so i think that is a chaplain, we focus on the soles and helping them through the crucibles. >> would you like to quickly answer that? >> i believe that every potential soldier knows what to do. you know what to do. you know what to do. you just get sucked into the hierarchy where we have to make it vision whereby our way out of the situation to save our butts were the commanders but. but i would just ask carl to talk about the kids. he basically said he just couldn't do it. he said he knew better. that is the reason that he wouldn't. in his heart and soul he knew that i am not going to do this. the only guy who came back alive stood up proud of who he was in the decisions he made. and he did not come back with one man or one woman. so where did we lose the idea that we know what to do. but we will do the right thing. we can see it, we just have to act on it. it's not a matter of courage, but it is a matter of necessity. you remember the rest of your life because you have made and i know you'll make the right one. >> i wrote a major character in this novel. every nurse i interviewed said i could not have done my job without a chaplain. i just hung out a striking fact. and that is why i wrote it or he is a recognized that is because you listen to other people doesn't mean you don't have problems too. >> i'm talking about a soldier that had a supportive family. including how society has changed. what i want to ask you is do you think that we should focus more on pushing our young men for our citizens to combat, or should we be more concerned in dealing with what they combat? >> i have noticed over the past few years that there is a bit of an anomaly forming especially with the views within our country are i think that we touched on it lightly earlier. he referred to it as the iphone generation. i have come to call it the xbox generation. but what i am looking at is a very gross misperception of war, and it seems to stem a little bit from media and tv shows and movies and especially from videogames. and i have seen children and adolescents and even young adult. more and more seem to have this complete disconnect between the reality of war and what has been brought to them in this fantasy world. and i'm wondering in the long run over the next decade or maybe the next generation, what kind of affect is this going to have on the military. and if there is a negative effect behind it, the only way to exit, what is that? >> well, let me answer the first one. we have to take care of the soldiers who combat, and we have to have soldiers overseas are this is not a choice. you know, we do not live in a world where this is easy. let me remind everyone that this was the first fireman killed on 9/11, he was killed by civilians the jump from a building because they were roasting to that. we did not make this up. this came to our shores and it will come again and again. the reason we went through a tennis then it because our government approach the taliban and said, you have a loud the people to build camps in their country and train and move equipment and have managed control. and if you will run them out, we won't have to come and get them. that is why we are in afghanistan. we can debate about whether it was done in an intelligent fashion and whether there are smarter ways to do this strategy. the question is about whether we need to have soldiers who combat. i mean, we all sitting here and i wonder what happened in the north korean border. one are chillier man makes a mistake and drops 130-millimeter rounds and kills 50 people. we have a problem. we have a problem. we are back at work. we have news for you about korea. so we have a great question. we have to prioritize what we are going to do and that is what strategy is. that is what resources prioritize and what we have not done as a nation. figuring out what effect we want and how much are we going to pay for it. until then, we have a problem. but whatever that is in it, a better include young men and women willing to do what needs to be done. it is what my son is doing in afghanistan. putting them back together, which is what the nurses are. or take care of them when they get home. the world is full of predators and if you want to find out what life is like as a sheet, one way to do it is in. >> on the second half of that, iphone, xbox generation games, i don't think it makes us killers. my two boys had stayed up all night playing the games and they are not killers. but i do think that there is some danger in the sense that empathy is learned. you were not born with empathy. letting 2-year-old beat up on each other and so forth. when you hit johnny, that her johnny. you know? empathy is learned and video games and xbox's and stuff like that are anti-empathy machines. and i think that is the danger and it takes appearance to say, okay, you just love this thing. but if that was a real person, maybe that would not be good. i think many kids say, i know they are not real. but i think another thing is even more dangerous than the xbox is the reactions of parents. if little mary ann little johnny are sitting on the floor and there is a tv show on. and someone is rudely murdered and their parents to get another beer -- they are like, well, mom and dad were not affected by that and it's no big deal. and again it comes back to the responsibility. to constantly be monitoring. you say, you know, this is horrible, we do not like this if this happened in real life area so this empathy is something that parents need to teach people. >> i like to thank you all for your time. thank you. [applause] >> tomorrow morning we continue with our book coverage on booktv. in a few moments, green corps commandant general james amos on the future of the marine corps. we continue with coverage. donovan campbell with his book, joker one. and later, we will re-air the symposium on the challenges the thing that since returning from combat. >> we have more coverage of nonfiction books here on c-span2 every weekend on booktv. along with our schedule you can see our programs anytime and join our online book club. follow us on facebook and twitter. >> now, general james amos. he spoke at the brookings institution for an hour and a half on the future of the marine corps and the next of automatic spending cuts known as sequestration. [inaudible conversations] >> the center on 21st sentry security and intelligence. all of us at brookings would like to welcome you and include the commandant of the marine corps. the general will speak for 10 or 15 minutes, summarizing some of his thoughts on some broad issues that i know will interest you as well. if i call on you in the course of that conversation, please be sure to identify yourself and we were a microphone before doing so. general john amos is from the great state of idaho where he attended college. he had been in the marine corps for his entire 30 some years career. he is the serving cheap for that illustrious body. a top adviser to the president and of course, the marine corps is top planner, but to tear, combat conceptualize her and so forth. yes had many jobs in the span of his career at different levels of development, different levels of command coming in 2000, with he and general petraeus teamed up to write a counterinsurgency manual to the the u.s. military. prior to that, he was instrumental in his combat aviator mode as a war fighter in the early stages of the invasion of iraq. prior to that, he had had a number of jobs and was deployed around the world and we will discuss this further. i know one of the important priorities is keeping the marine corps expeditionary, global, and responsive, which is a big part of the services well on their way towards withdrawing from afghanistan. although still there with several thousand personnel as we speak. without either of you, please join me in welcoming the commandant of the green corps. [applause] >> thank you, mike, thank you for the kind remarks heard if i had only been in the marine corps for 35 years, and probably look a heck of a lot younger. i have been in it for 42 years. i just realized the other day my wife and i have been married 42 years. we got married right after i joined the marine corps in this is kind of amazing. thank you for that warm welcome. i would like to get a couple of bullets in right here. i do have a couple things i'd like to talk about her. you know, i get asked about what is at that is the main thing that is on your mind and keeps you awake at night and makes you spend time thinking about it. to be honest, it is how to shepherd the marine corps to where we are right now. this period posterity. it is real, it is upon us. all you in this room have done it, going back to look at the oracle view of things after major combat. it's around 32 to 33%. sometimes it is 30, sometimes it is 29. it is at the bottom of the trough and that is a time frame of about 9010 years. it is historical. i would hope that at this time it is not the case, but you just don't know. i try to look at the historical downturn and it is seen as how can we, as a senior leadership, myself as the commandant, how can we shepherd, and that is the right term, shepherd everyone through this period posterity. i thought today, i want to remind everybody as we gather here, there are probably 4500 that are deployed around the world. they are on the marine expeditionary unit, some are sitting out in the gulf, doing combat operations, and we have koreans in the polls, we have marines lying in the gulf and of course we have a significant contribution on the ground in afghanistan. switching around, going out to the asia pacific area, we have groups training in the philippines, training in thailand, we have a company in australia for that renewed relationship or reinvigorate relationship between australia and the united states marine corps. we are optimistic about that. focusing specifically on afghanistan, because even though our nation has grown weary of war, i am mindful and i've asked you to be mindful of what is happening in afghanistan. he were to talk to general john allen when he was still the commander out there, if given the opportunity to complete the mission, not just pull this out and leave, but to complete the mission that both of those general officers -- and i think that they know probably more than any other will anticipate success. success is defined by all of us in different ways. let me focus narrowly on this, which is where many marines are today. about 7200 of them. there's about 8000 uk forces there and they have two battalions and we have jordanians on the ground with us and australians on the roundabouts. and we have a host of special forces. some have been with us for a long time providing a great service. so in this province, we certainly believe that it is one of the more dangerous places. i will be there next month. we spent christmas there before that. i have watched this progressed to the point where i can tell you that there is, with some level of confidence, that things are going particularly well. we have every reason to be confident that if given the opportunity, we will be able to complete the mission and be successful in afghanistan. now, is it going to be maybe in your mind what success is defined as? probably not. but in my mind, the way that i define it, with we give to people that helmand province, the district governors, the chiefs of police, the afghan national security forces, the army police. and the central government to extend the greatest opportunity for success for the future. but the conditions will have been set. it will be up to them to these those conditions and proceed on. i feel very good about what had happened. we are done for the most part, we don't write operations orders now, but we write supporting orders and most plans are in support of the afghan national forces. we feel good about hell that helmand province is going on. we have a new governor and he's doing a terrific job and we have a terrific commander. he has built from one brigade up to four and they are doing so well. i was once represented young men and women in afghanistan. these are tough times we are in right now. it is not a trite statement. i want to remind everyone that i am also a taxpayer and i also pay taxes like many of you in this room, hopefully all of you in this room are paying your taxes. here we are in this unprecedented time where we have the longest war that our nation has been in. we have a fiscal crisis that is real. it is upon us. we are drawing down forces in afghanistan after 12 or 13 years of combat between iraq and afghanistan. we are downsizing the forces that we can pay our bills while we face sequestration which is a 500 billion-dollar bill over the next 10 years. i want to remind you that is on top of $487 billion, which had been passed a year and a half ago during the budget control act. do not lose sight of the fact that under bob gates, we found another $200 billion worth of bills that we had to pay called efficiencies. i will tell you that i do not recall the marine corps getting any of those $200 billion worth of efficiencies are at so for the purposes of discussion, the bill is $1.2 trillion. now, that is significant. it is real. it is real money and it is and have a real impact. so these are the times we are in right now. let me give you my friends what the world is likely going to look like over the next two decades. much of what we are going through right now, i don't see any of it winning. i do not see major war over the next two decades. but i see the thorny of what i call difficult challenging, human intensive. not necessarily technology intensive, but human intensive kind of -- kind of conflicts and challenges over the next few decades. i often call them the nasty little things that happen around the world. quite simply the international community. not just the united states of america, but the international community has responsibilities around the world. global responsibilities. to what degree? is yet to be seen. but my sense is that the world is not getting any nicer and i don't see any indication over the next two decades that things are going to settle down and are going to become peaceful. pick up the newspaper, any major newspaper on a sunday. you can see it on your daily paper. you see it on the nightly news. it is not clear what will happen in syria threatening has the law, okay, you better quit supporting that regime. okay, so then you switch over to the gulf. it is always challenging, our relationship with iran. we lost 851 marines killed in action. and over 8400 warty marines seriously wounded in iraq. so we have an investment. in addition to the monetary investment with the ears of the sweat and toil, there is also our most precious commodity, which is currently of our young men and women. so this is an investment in iraq that can actually pay very close attention to it we watched it last night on the news. he saw it again this morning. so there is no indication that that area is going to settle down. it began on the access. how about just a month and a half ago with a 30-year-old leader of north korea? we think about the rhetoric that was going on daily. i mean, almost hourly. i am close to the oldest person in the room and i distinctly remember in the 60s a guy taking issue often banging his heel of the united nations in new york city. threatening war against the united states. just a month and a half ago, and he now calls himself the supreme leader of north korea. he said that he will destroy the united states thermo nuclear war. i have not heard this since the 60s. that is just the highlight. there are territorial tensions, there are lots of things going on around the world. i was in the united kingdom last week speaking to the command staff and talking with some of my french brothers about what is happening in mali. a very courageous stance on what the french have done. because sooner or later the international community is going to have to address some of these thorny, nasty, tacky little things that are going on around the world. we may think we are done with them. but they do not necessarily -- they are not necessarily done with us. so switching from that and talking a little bit about what we do. now we have this autumn. we have this tension that is going inside. i am with the department of defense. how are we going to pay her bills, how are we going to reorient our focus. but you cannot ignore what i just described. you cannot turn your back on it because actually it is very dangerous. in some cases depending upon what the threat is and where it is and who is involved with, the international community does not address some of these threats. so we may find some of these threats in washington the. we may find them in new york city. we may find them in the major cities all around the world. so somebody has to do something. there has to be a sense of presence and a sense of engagement. you're going to see attempting to this self-serving, but that is why we have the united states during poor and needy. that is what we do. it is paid for. yes we still have bills that are out there and so have new pieces of equipment. our naval vessels are paid for. and this is what we do. we do not need an airfield. we do not need to step on one of our allies. quite honestly, we sail around the world and we interact with nations and we build relationships that cannot be severed in the time of conflict. relationships that are important to build trust right now. that is what we do. when things become just a little bit questionable, there is nothing that quite says the same signal then ships full of marines. not this early doing anything, but everyone understands the seriousness of what could take place. in my experience it has a calming effect. there is an engagement responsibility that our nation needs to acknowledge. so while we are drawing down, we want to come back to the united state. we want to reinvest ourselves inside the department of defense and our nation. the balance is what is that balance between the reality of the world and how you deal with it and how you live in that reality. also how you pay your bills. how you be balance, how you reset your service, august 1 through we sending our forces. my service probably more than others and we took our equipment to war in iraq is and for the most part we left it there. we could actually refurbish it and send it home and then we sent it back again. so most of the equipment that we have found its way over to afghanistan. the equipment that is coming out of afghanistan now has been in that part of the world for a long time. the challenges that i have right now is a service chief is the reality of the budget, sequestration is real. the bill was signed on march 2. i take it as reality. i am not in denial on sequestration. it is real. we are working on the marine corps right now that will pay her bills. that will pay my portion of sequestration. down the road, congress elects the american people who decide that, okay, we need a better way to do business then this sequestration, which by the way is a terrible way to do business, i think. but it certainly has an effect. so if they change, that is great. but for right now, have worked on a plan that we have been working upon for about 90 days and i know precisely how we work. the key then is it okay for us as a nation. and how much is enough and how much do we need to have. because we have global responsibilities. the plan would like to make is that we do have responsibilities as a superpower. now, you could argue with me it means either they or other superpowers out there. and this is not a prideful statement. i think it's not superpower. certainly the most significant superpower in the world. we do more things right than we do wrong. we actually were very hard to try to provide peace and stability. but i think we do. so the issue is what is our responsibility as a nation. if he just turns the asia-pacific area we have five major treaties in the asia-pacific area. five of them. they go back decades. we have responsibility for decades. i would argue that many of the nations in the asia-pacific area rely on the presence of the united state and rely on us as a stabilizing factor. we have those responsibilities in other areas around the world. so as i began with these periods of austerity as i put my joint chiefs out on and my marine corps, i talk about the nation and i think about the nation and that is for the nation. the balance is then how do we fulfill our role as a global superpower. and we at the department of defense, what is our responsibility in that. more specifically, what is my sis and transpacific responsibility as the commandant of the marine corps for that one or 2000 and so we that we have on duty. with that, i will stop and mike and i will jump up here and we we'll take some questions. i think you. [applause] [applause] >> thank you, general. that was excellent. i would like to pick up on a couple of the things that you begin with. really getting right to the sequestration in a little bit more detail. i will begin sort of as a friendly skeptic and raise the issue in terms of the debate we heard last year. certainly secretary panetta and others were saying that question should and was allowed to happen, if that is allowed to happen, the sky will fall. now we are couple months into it in the and the sky doesn't seem to have fallen. i am not trying to defend sequestration. but i think a lot of people will wonder why such a hullabaloo is made of this with so much rhetoric that was devoted to this. and now we seem to be doing okay at least in the short term. and then the obvious, can we just keep this in place and keep this intact over 10 years as opposed to suffering with sequestration for a few weeks or months. >> it is because i read this in the papers just like all of you dear. that was the extent that you are looking to, but i would say that is probably a great question. the fact of matter is that the issue is my 10%. when that is unveiled, when that is unveiled and revealed, which will happen when the president decides that he is outside with what was done for a plan. when that happens, that is when it sends of sequestration, that is what will begin. that will be significant. the fact of the matter is we are in fiscal year 13. the congress help us out by giving us a budget in 2013 while everyone else was on continued resolution. the real significant impact of sequestration are being planned for the next 9.5 years. it has not taken root yet. but it will. it will within the next six months, i predict. >> can you give us a sense just to make this little bit more tenable for people, how our operations and power training regimens changing starting just about now with those who anticipated this under sequestration. how worried about this should we be as long as we don't continue that indefinitely? >> well, i have specifically made a decision that we would take money out of other accounts for this and move it to what we call readiness. what i mean by that is we have taken money out of facilities. .. enthusiasts will be a highest status. i've effectively mortgage near-term readiness, near-term sustainment and other monies to pay for that readiness. i told everybody i could do that for this year. here's what the impact is if nothing changes in sequestration or the way to a continuing resolution for next year. i think we should turn our back on that. it's continuing resolution. so when that happens, my readiness will drop as we go into the january time frame. a little bit less than half my combat units. the aviation scum squadrons to ground combat come and century and unit will be a little bit less than 50% combat ready. half my forces will be less than ready. i want to declare something happens. if something bad happens around the world, were going to go. that's not the way we train and its impact in now. in many cents am not optimistic in the readiness with more cage and the sustainment with mortgage this year will lower the next turn become compound interest. >> with a focus on the major equipment and how they are faring these days. just to remind those who aren't are resetting the marine court in detail you've got the f-35 aircraft. you've got your amphibious vehicle you like to replace any yourself made a decision a couple years ago to cancel the previous version and you're a good custodian making sure, you have an unmet need for a replacement pair. you got the tiltrotor transport aircraft, a few other major programs and a lot of smaller ones. how are those programs. both now and into next year? >> with a debt over the next -- the previous 60 to 90 days retaken the osprey, which is now in its second multiyear contract i probably as well as anybody in this room except for some of the folks we are well beyond that. the squadrons for the most part are about three quarters fielded. i'd be happy to talk about that is somebody's interested in what it's doing. so that's going while we anticipate that contract. the amphibious combat vehicle was further tractors we currently have. it's not a john deere. it's an amphibious vehicle that comes out of the well deck of a ship and sends a short loaded with combat variants inside of it. our vehicles right now are little of her 40 years old. we've download or cause service extension at least twice. we had a program to replace those and that's the amphibious vehicle. by the time the vehicle was fielded, the ones are fully operational cables will be over 50 years old. only one of two ways. you fly off of it or spam off of it. we've got some transport connectors and that doesn't halt the marines. we need it. i work right now. we've been in it for two and a half years to get that rate. i take it very, very seriously. industry is help us out and make a decision this coming fall of what we do and amphibious combat vehicle pair but i'm looking for right now it's just a good vehicle that's reliable, the fee and can move our marines around. the last comment i would like to make him not as please don't just thing this is a vision of the vehicle that is an amphibious assault. only a sudden amphibious ships, five dozen marine about four years ago helping on were going back and forth. read about 450 miles inside of iraq and you know that. there are utility fighting vehicle for us. our place and is doing well. we set out out of moscow's sydney among every end of the year. it is the only short takeoff and vertical landing airplane. it's the only one. the errors we have right now run in the mid-20s. some ran out of service life before then. why do we need something like that? we've got 11 large amphibious ships. anywhere around the world wendy's got a large aviation it in the gulf of aden today, performing national missions. and they would comply and do the bidding of the nation. if we let the hairier die in my head a lot enlarged that carriers the heat helicopter pilots. most programs are funded as we built a budget to the pay of the bills to keep these programs alive. >> thank you katie said a number of things are interesting, but when your opening remarks and you don't see major wars and i know i would agree with you in terms of the relative likelihood of bit versus wars. you're making a point in any capability for a lot of smaller things. if you don't mind like to examine the first part of your sentence and wars which do you think we still have to be ready for? i realize that maybe too sensitive sensitive for hype article to talk about in a public forum. could you give an example or two of the larger campaign that if any you think the country and marines need to ready for. >> i'm glad you asked that and i don't anticipate that. the one thing i remind everybody is actually just wrong more often than right in the past. so it is certainly not pathetic i am a stretch the imagination, but just looking at the proclivity of our nation or 10 years of combat to reengage itself is probably pretty slim. and i don't think for a sack and as a member of the joint chiefs we should every think it will not happen. we cannot have war, world war i and world war ii we really felt we were dominant in 50/50 one. so we have to be prepared for what we used to call nature war. our nation has to be with enough capacity where when something hot as we can -- the american people expect that. they may be struggling with how much and what the cost right now, but when it happens to people of america congress will expect that its military and all the services are prepared to do that. i don't think this becomes just an expeditionary force that handles these crises. we have to be prepared to do major theater war. i've got to tell you a number of this or knew what was going to happen a month and half ago. that probably was not anybody's radar. all of a sudden it just blossomed and none of us knew exactly how that was going to turn out. so there's an example or should our nation never need to, with the nation would have to have the capacity and be able to respond. >> begin to wrap up in a second. how do we get some of these different pieces. protect about sequestration, modernization, smaller operations. can you help us understand how what point the budget cuts really make you in a whole new way fundamentally uncomfortable. obviously you are coping with sequestration in the short term you've explained why is worse than it looks and families to compensate the short term. in terms of longer-term planning, at what point to budget cuts become crippling to our ability to handle the major war? how do you explain this to a skeptical audience? even a sequestration occurs we will have a defense budget of 500 billion a year about the cold war average in real dollars and some people will say why can't you get by with that? what is the real risk? you do in life here and there, but still looks like a pretty good military. is there anyway you can link a certain size budget cut to a fundamental threshold over which we just don't want to go? >> not a monetary figure. in my own service and now he pays sequestration on what was the structure looking like? you and i had an opportunity to talk about this a couple weeks ago. so we know what that would look like roughly in people and equipment capabilities and capacity. so we have a sense for that. there is a dollar figure in my service, but i'll tell you where i worry is that this worse than looking at building to accommodate sequestration, my 10% is going to hear some attributes to that for us, which i think are significant. back to the major theater war, which we talked about, which i have an obligation to do my part and be prepared at the american people and the president. if that happens, the force we are building will go to war and it will come home when the war is over. now that's not something we are use to. my father was used to that. my wife's father was used to that. they were after the war in the pacific and for your site or the bus pulled up in front of the red dirt road in alabama and my father-in-law got off. same thing with my dad. we are used to rotating forces every seven months to relocate a battalion and a logistics battalion or take major headquarters every 13 months. that's not what is going to have been. so that's the first thing that subthreshold. second mesa for us to build under sequestration is what we call significant. the wedding name is that the forest goes away for six months. it deploys. it goes on a ship. it is theater security cooperation, aircraft carrier into the pacific -- asia-pacific area is gone for six months, home for 12 months and goes again. just to get the sense sense of what the site name, during the height of iraq, most of the ground forces are on at least a one-to-one, probably on seven months in home seven months. i'm seven months at home seven months begins to wear on the forest because when you're home from your 30 days in the desert training in preparation, so you're really at your home for five months. we talked five, six years ago when i was at quantico and testify and find the house and senate, were coming out of the war come would build a 471 to three are wanted for deployment to dwell ratio. but there was of three over six months and be home for 18 months so the force we are building in the united states marine corps to pay our bills going to be a one to two. the fact is the marines were probably like that because marines were a young for us and we to deploy. our families are going to be too thrilled about it. there's a little bit of danger in it because the issues that began to come back on the homefront. so it will be a vote to worse day when the war is over from home for us and a war that will be rapidly turning around for us. so that's what we're building under sequestration. >> a few more questions i could ask but i'm going to hold myself in check and turn to you and maybe throw one in later. start with peter singer. please identify yourself amass a general question. >> thank you again for joining us. without a talk that's been interesting. mike has been asking you in many ways about the future in your answer about the future but keep certain historic echoes with the experience. i'm interested in putting on a little bit further. in the marine corps history, is very polar -- a parallel or do they show identity that you keep in mind with questions for the future. is it the 1890s, what are the lessons you think about in terms of a record history? >> i've read the writings of a lot of the previous confidantes. i've read most of what they've written. a couple are challenging times. general carl monday went through some pretty challenging times tried to sort out what was the force structure going to look like? was there a period of time when i recall the trend was to take the marine corps down to 160,000 in general monday ended up with 172, 173,000. says some have been faced with the real challenging budgetary issues. but i don't think anything or coworker today. i really do think these are unprecedented. maybe for 36 or 37 will see the same thing. but if you go back to the 1946 and still astounds me that we as a nation just completely emasculated the entire department of defense. we just talked after that war and realize we were tired of it, but we thought were on two continents with our allies, we were successful. had it not turn out the way, we probably wouldn't be sitting in this room and things would've turned out to not be different. we as a nation took the services and went completely into the basement. i look at that and think about how quickly that turned around to debate in 1948, 1949 within congress and president truman, secretary of war and even a great general officers of the time took lace and all of a sudden in 1950 we were ill-prepared and alert you when i went to korea, the lack of preparedness and readiness probably cost us dearly in the early phases of the war. any of us that are historians read that. we finally caught up and figured it out, but is costly to get there. the marine corps hasn't been below 171,000 since 1951. the marine corps has not. so no administration, note leadership when congress is taking the marine corps below 171. arguably a reason for that. i don't know that i would say that's the reason. i look at at the challenging times and probably the post-world war ii is the one i look at and go okay, we've got to get this right. for all of us in here, we have differing opinions about how much is enough and how much of the service than i do understand that. we are not going to get it exactly right, but what we can afford to do is the nation is get it exactly wrong. when i look at coming out of world war ii i would just ask everybody, take a deep drive people work our way through the budget, work our way through the force sizing a first or mathematics six months or a year. but let's forget about the lessons from that period of time. >> masks question over here in the third row. >> thank you, general for your comments. my question is more along the training and education line. cultural language and scales had training and education. not the force is looking forward to sequestration cut, how important do you see the skill sets for potential missions because of training and education. >> thank you for the question. it's every bit as important in the next two decades. people with intensive kinds of engagement, sometimes actual conflict of various sizes. the lessons we've learned over the last 10, 12 years of war were more critical over the future. this language, culture. we started using the term a year and a half ago come the human terrain. before that we us to talk about war among the people. it's not all war. it's a lot of relationship building, confidence building. among the people is the most important part. we can't afford to lose that and we will not lose that in the marine corps. in fact, our schools, resident schools for noncommissioned officers and made it very clear as we go forward, we're not going to lose the lessons of the counterinsurgency mindset. we did that for vietnam and we forgot all about it. it took a while to relearn. i'm a dirty right now all of us, probably the principal ground force and special operation forces are doing that better than ever before. we don't want to lose that because there's plenty of places around the world for made the a small insurgency. i hear what is happening in mali is facing insurgency. how do you deal with? that's the classic case of trying to deal with something among the people. there are folks that want eke out a living. so what if we are is an international community touchiness communities, we've got to be mindful of the culture of language is that the nuances and things that are important. that's why relationship building is critically important to me. i talked to my officers and every year we select a new team of brigadier generals and spent a lot of time and talk about the importance of relationships because as you go ashore in take some country, maybe we have the benefit of having been there before. we've never been able to pronounce the name of it. the relationships built their will be the thing that will cause us to be successful or not. we are not going to turn our back on it. and by the way, we've doubled the amount of officers to twitter stats and see us. we never used that noncommissioned officers. we send them to get a postgraduate education and the defense language institute. these are primary surgeons and staff sergeants because they can do it. >> for throwing that will come the second row after that. >> you're downsizing the same time the congress and the administration wants you to beef up your embassy security. how are you going to manage the manpower and the budget crunch of downsizing to 182. ologies stop there while still trying to add thousand plus to the embassy security job. what i'll are you doing? >> thanks, otto. when the questions first began, which was probably eight or nine months ago, how many embassies are the marines that? we are at about half of them around the world. we are somewhere around 160 embassies in conflicts around the world. is about twice as many. and so, when moore asks, what could she do, and the answer was we can't do anymore with what we have. so we'll need to put more marines and i think anesthetize the will of congress. how many more do you think it needs? we did some work fairly quickly and the number roughly was about a thousand marines. so congress faithfully one after that was included in the nba languages are well aware and its 1001 marines to add in the discussions while were talking about that are talked about missions of those units. the marine security guard attachment not american embassy is roughly about one senior staff nco on five or six young marines that are corporals and lance corporal's and their highly trained. they have skill sets that other hearings don't necessarily have and they have security clearances that are critical to their jobs. their job is to not only protect the chancery and the media console or embassy, but to secure the classified material that kenmare. the job is not to provide a protection survey says the bachelor whatever nation is in. it's not their mission. so if were going to post this up, how would we do this? we develop training standards. i asked in the discussion for congress, can you do this? the answer is yes. would you like to do this? the answer is yes. how do you pay for her? they would be above my force structure. whatever 182,000 marines would be on top of that and a line item up congress. i don't know it's going to turn out that way. this is a mission i think is important in the marine corps ought to do it. regardless of how this turned that regardless of money, we're going to do this mission. it will be 192.1. 181.1. so you have to be saying. they are six embassies that were received the marine security guard in the next little bit before the end of this year will slowly go at capacity. but it's a deal between nasa and the state department because when you put barring fair commies if that took place for them to live and it's got to be security around the area. we've built that could rapidly sue them to reinforce and those forces become put them on is the one dirty or mp tony t.'s and fly them anywhere in the world that there's indications of warnings that this is probably not an area that is going to be issues. >> kong clark, breaking cents. i'm betting mr. ioc days in the afternoon five is going to be 14 nato have to tell us unless you want to. given that as he looked at his cigar over the last two years high you see this 35 of the 22 and a change in the pacific. >> this may be the first time it is likely going to be in 2015, not 2014. the 10 airplanes, ted cruz, full maintenance to maintain all train up on it. so that's the definition of ioc. the squadron itself will be a full 16 airplanes. that right now we are planning on that happening tours the latter part of 2015. back to the lessons learned of operations and employment and if you look how the amphibious ship in 2003 to go through the experience in this. let's talk about of late to be so aircraft. this is under the secretary gates era when our carriers are pressed into the call center in the business of our nation and we still had other issues in the gulf of a. we need aircraft with precision weapons where you could do precise targeting and the fact of the matter is they hairier came in and really became almost surgically capability for the president and the secretary of defense. since that time it's been years an awful lot in that regard. we've also had the squadron on the ground right now in home and at bastian airfield in your member the terrible attack we had on my september. they been climbing in support of the coalition forces for some time. so there's that. a feature that caught back a little bit with moammar gadhafi in the whole world, nato and the united states say what is it we should do? you might find in a just a note and the ponds since the gulf of age in -- beaten, and run off the coast of libya and sat there. what are they going to do, they actually were during the first two years in a no-fly zone, they were the mere airplanes flying because we needed to get the tankers down from europe so we can tank the nato aircraft. so there's a great example of the flexibility says airplane state. we had 72 areas as i recall and find that all too large amphibious ships and move them ashore. i've got pictures of them on highway one south of carbaugh landing out there right after he just spent up within dunford who was the commanding officer and i landed in helicopter along the highway. i need air support. so we started ringing in a landed our regular rotary which is easier then we started landing on the highway. i asked back will do exactly the same thing. >> before we go back to you, i want to pick up on this point you've made, but i don't want to get you in trouble with your cheese. in the short takeoff. which are the only service find such things. should the air force especially when the airfield are becoming potentially so much more vulnerable than the precision strike. if you look at the u.k. about a year and a half ago, sir david richards approached me and said if we came back on the stove all or be okay with that. we are training with them ever putting u.k. pilots back into her harriers squad and either raf or navy pilot that we have been training right now down at a gun air force base with the 35. if you take a look at a picture of the world, it slides over the world and look at where all the thousands are from rates are versus the 3000-foot and lies, not highways, not parking lots or something like that. there's about 10,000 times as many runways as there are 8000 for. for us, the places will be operating is pretty important. whether the air force should read them or not i won't touch that, but it's important for us because we are an expeditionary force. were designed to go places were quite honestly other people can't or they don't have the sustainment, the logistics. that's what we do. we are more than willing to live hard. we don't need fancy air-conditioning tin can. we don't need it shall call or you can get eggs to work every morning. that's bad for your health. we can actually live off our mr reads. we need to operator equipment and i've got hundreds and hundreds of pictures of airplanes at vehicles and arming them off of highways to add. >> thank you. next question in the back. gentleman the blue striped tie. >> general, i don't want to get you in trouble. reading former secretary harold brown spoke as the protein spoke, really interesting botox about from the time he served as secretary to the president 35 year period, we now have something like four additional undersecretaries commit 12 additional assistant secretaries in the defense department and he made a strong argument for getting rid of service secretaries. without really getting you into trouble and sequestration, can you talk about the pentagon leadership? >> you guys really are trying to get me in trouble. its recognize there's been growth within the pentagon, both in the joint staff in combat commanders and kind of what we call the fourth state. the folks that support the actual services. that's one of the things it has to be addressed in the sequestration. in other words, the actual growth. what it turns out to be with regards to service secretaries, i kind of like myesvice secretary i like what he does for the united stae. he's one of our grat advocate and he understands this. soi'm actually very, very happy with where we are. if you expand, which i think is which your question makes an answer to is how much is enough with everything else? because what happens if staffs grow and the activities grow in the services have to respond because we have to. so we grow. our service pack orders grow in response to the growth of the forces -- that orders above us. it's a natural fee. so outside of the question we are facing right now is okay, how much is enough? to speed whenever the war fighting capacity could be cyber. it could be airplanes. it could be ships. it could be marines. whatever that truth is, how much tail could be affiliated? there has to be headquarters in stats and people that help out. but as we look at the department of defense have a look at the combatant commanders in look inside my own head quarters, there's stealthier than under sequestration is going to have to go on her the magnifying glass and be scrutinized. what we can't have, we can't continue to allow growth to happen at the expense of the war fighting capability in the united states of america. we have the department of defense for one reason and one reason only and it not to be paperwork and answer questions. we headed to defend the united states of america and its interests. that's why we have it. we don't have it for a whole lot of other things. as we work our way through sequestration and impacts, that's her that orders inside of my institution, it builds a plan to pay our bill. i have a lot just outside. i looked inside as well. >> thank you premise, general. i hope my question will be less controversial. i'm wondering it didn't you mention how the post-world war ii in 1946 and subsequently to put everything back up for korea, does the dod, especially the marine corps have a plan for being able to suddenly drop again i forget another strategic surprise as dr. o'hanlon raised earlier and how it such plans be affected by sequestration? >> thank you. when secretary panetta called me about six months, a year before he gave up his job, we started looking -- this is in the budget control act was signed in sequestration is now out there a year later. he said the, as we begin to reshape the fours, several things have got to keep in mind. we have to build a natural for us come a flexible force. we have to build a force that takes care of business that we typically find ourselves involved in today, which is that not the party stuff i talked about at the beginning. and i could take it in 1990. we don't have to go back too far, but he said reversibility is a key fact here. what does that mean? after admiral premier, my shipmates, john premier is worried about the industrial base. he tell you precisely how may she appears we have, but we don't have a lot anymore. we don't have a lot of aircraft manufacturers. so those are pretty important to our nation. regardless, as he tried to force down and reshape the fours, this matter of reversibility relates to be able to what i called blow up the balloon back up. there are some things if you decide that i'll just say this 35 not her, if something were to happen and we said okay that's it, were not going to do that, that's an irreversible decision because nobody in the world is built in the short check out the vertical landing pattern. we built them. the u.k. day. the soviets built them. i think it was called ef 28. but nobody else. so there is a decision that becomes irreversible. there is some unit that we could blow up the balloon back up in a recursive motion or after. you could probably rebuild an institute to take you a couple years, but we actually have the experience of doing that. so reversibility for me is in line with what secretary panetta and exactly in line of a secretary apart as we approached sequestration. sequestration is going to affect that. so as they make decisions and i go in there for some look at how i pay my bills, one of the bumper stickers are things on the wall is the term reverse abilities. with people and equipment and capabilities and capacity, we need to always remember we make is this wrong. they may have to turn this back around. and so, if i'm going to take a capability away company needs to be a purposeful decision. any dissent to myself, okay, i'll never have to get that capability back again. >> next question. >> hi, thank you, mckenzie cooper for the government accountability office. could you address the status of the aoa or acb given my understanding not yet been addressed -- >> ask your question again without the acronyms. do not government accountability office, i don't know i don't know if i say gao. if you could address the analysis of alternatives and the status of it for the amphibious combat vehicle, given my understanding is water speed requirements won't be addressed until the analysis will be complete until the fall. >> i'll tell you right where we are. the office of secretary of defense and congress, we do last year was completed. it was held with an active part of it and not completed in june of last year and reported sometime around the july timeframe. what it did just confirm the requirement for an amphibious vehicle, a tractor as i described earlier, some type of service capability you could use as a combat environment for enforceable entry if you had to do that insert my bk the follow on. not an expeditionary fighting vehicle. it is a replacement, so it confirmed that. we take a look at that and said okay, it didn't say anything about high-speed and for the difference the old expeditionary vehicles to the capability to get up on planes. imagine a water skier getting up on planes. you could go significantly faster. as i recall it was somewhere around 28 knots. i gave you an awful lot of capability and then go someplace where the enemy is not. the current vehicle we have a sober call displacement vehicle. that is the vehicle that goes about the one we have, you literally cannot push a heavy vehicle through the water and a faster than about eight months. so what i asked was that go back as i said earlier, oral to get one more bite of the apple. let's go back and make sure we understand the difference between the value between the high waters be any displacement vehicle. so the analysis of alternative based on, what we do right now is work with industry. but actually cut to corporate partners teamed together and they will report to the marine corps this fall and tell us what the art of the possible is with regard to highlighters speed versus the vehicle. and then i made it clear to everybody, cost is a very helpful in. folks canceled the efe because of cost and a host of other things. so we want a candidate brave. i was confident by the time we get the thought we had enough information to make an educated recommendation to secretary of the navy has had a pc. my sense is to make a decision in the fall and probably around the beginning of next year release what we call a request for proposal on will have money available to do it. they've got a modest amount of money in the future defense plan for research and development. we don't have any procurement dollars, just research and development. >> combat the third row. gentleman in the orange. >> good morning, marine corps times. i want to ask you about the special operators. you've been a huge proponent over the last few years there are many parts therein in transition with more of a maritime field. i'm very proud of operations command is based out of camp lejeune north carolina had ordered some of that battalion encamped hamilton. an integral part of the special operations command would provide the marines. we provide not all the equipment, but we provide the standard equipment in the salaries and all that stuff. so they have done very, very well. if admiral macrae than right here, he would confirm that. so the future is bright in the decades i described. that's why i started with what i thought the world would look like over the next two decades because if you believe that, there's plenty of work available for special operations, so we are partnering it. i've got no intention of downsizing special operations because the value added for a nation is one of those things that's good for a nation. we are looking right now on a common set we will prototype it this fall with the 15th burning expeditionary unit op west coasts on training the special operations forces again with the news, marine expeditionary unit to the dealerships. the period of time in the 90s in the beginning of the turn-of-the-century for every aircraft carrier was in a seal team, but he would be a group of seals supported. every amphibious group, marine expeditionary unit had a team of seals on word and about 2000, 2001 that changed and became a function of other things in the war in iraq broke out and became preoccupied. they've been naval vessels except for unique specific type operation on any routine basis since then. we have created them a try out coming fall of the 15th marine expeditionary unit. we'll have during special operations forces that were trained up with the media as it goes out and allows so averring special operations teams -- liaisons and what they call the theater combatant command, so we will have been habitual should know exactly what is available as they move in and out of theaters. both special operators on board the ship and they will be our eyes and your assembly is on, the ones who know our capabilities and will note fares and don't have the capabilities for special operators in breathing this is a pretty good installment now to provide relevance for this theater combatant commanders. so that's where were headed. the relationship, the fact we are reemphasizing our amphibious screws this pretty well the special operations. so we'll just wait and see. my expectations are very positive. >> time for two more questions. i wanted to get at the issue of how you think about china, but i'll do it in a specific way in obviously with the coming summit between the president, china come united states and all the concerns about china's growing military capabilities and ongoing tensions there's a lot to talk about. i actually want to get at this or more of a force planning and budgeting to mention, more in line with your direct responsibilities to the concept of air sea battle. air sea battle for those of you who don't know much about it is primarily an air force and navy idea. it's getting a lot of attention and seen as a response in some ways to the prevalent that strike weapon and it's not about china specifically, but china has the resources to buy provisions straight weapons more than most. so why support a net buyer the concepts behind air sea battle is an idea, but just to specific questions. one is or the other services and allies becoming part of this comp that because initially was primarily an air force and navy five. you're part of the department of the navy but a separate service. what will a simmering corps played an air sea battle says something that inspires you and you look to for guidance or bus it is thought that the second part of the question is do you think the name should be considered or something else because it goes back to our way until the soviet threat to europe, but fairly confrontational sounding, it's catchy, the confrontational sounding slogan for china in particular seems to pay a bit of a bad reaction to appear at two comments and i think about air sea battle of these days. >> i hadn't thought about changing the name, but you're probably right. it's probably like a lot of things in the first conceptualized as a backing that there's probably a better way we could have marketed it. so what would be a new name? i don't know, but to your point about the concept and it is. it's a concept. i look at it as a phase of an operation and that's the safest way to look at it and put it in context of whatever the overall operation is going to be. by that, it is to maintain access aerial denial. how do you deal in an environment where people don't want you to come in? by the way, that's not new. now the technology has become more advanced to push the floors offshore or push them back in the air. but the actual aerial denial being is historical. it goes way back. so i look at it as a phase. we have an operation where we are actually trying to impose our will summer on the world. the enemies going to try as best to ensure that we don't and he's going to do that through a variety of means, one of which could be kinetic weapons. it could be air breathing weapons. it could be weapons that go, xl atmosphere. they could be cyber. i argue this either is an area where you could be denied. the impact of cybercould prevent it for us from certainly accomplishing its mission in being able to have access. as we think about your rain and think about coming ashore and opposed environment, we take it very, very seriously. it is a phase then you are going against a determined enemy, will go with the enemy expects you to go. if you think about broad coastlines, which you want to do is put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. it's not just the bullet or missile versus missile. you could do that and there's a part of it that it that, but it actually, since most determined enemies can't be found on every frontier, which you want to do is have for us is capable to challenge the enemy on a very wide front and that's where amphibious forces come in and were at 35 comes in. there are a lot of places not only on shapes you could land him ashore around the world without being on a runway somewhere. .. >> how we do we go against is to prevent it from coming ashore? so it is kind of how i see it. some are very cooperative with it. so it is more than just a number of programs that are very costly. it actually needs to be a part how we conceptualize this operation. >> the last question over here. the gentleman in the tan jacket against the wall. >> good morning. i am from the british army. i was interested in an earlier response to lessen about the war. specifically the army's role in us. i would be very interested in your vision over the next 20 years in broad terms, the boundaries and overlaps between the u.s. marine corps and what you have envisioned for the u.s. army. >> just to make sure that i have this correct. over the next couple of decades, how i see the coalition boundaries between the u.s. marine corps and our coalition partners. [inaudible >> [inaudible question] >> okay, the u.s. marine corps and how does relative to it. okay. you know, i think -- let me make a couple comments. we have a phenomenal army and it is designed to be an army that goes toward. to dominate in the battlefield. u.s. greenport operates along the eaves. you know, if you take a look at this, i don't know if i do a good job of explaining the air force. but the u.s. marine corps actually works along this. we really don't have a domain. but depending on what the crisis is, you know, what the need is. most of the needs we have our urgent need. so we have been on the ground now for 12 or so years and i make no apologies for that. we have more than done our mission in iraq. we have more than done our missions with our partners in afghanistan. that is not why america has that. we have the ability to be a will to respond today. something happens not 30 days from now but today. and that is why this is so greatly important for us as a nato force. so i would say just the same way america doesn't need a second land army, america doesn't need a second greenport. so we have a very specific capabilities that and talent pool that we bring to a crisis. as we look around the international community, because the military concludes the army -- and this week i have talked about this. it is kind of how we do business and it fits pretty well with most of the armies around the world. i will tell you that there is almost a -- it is not a fraternal bonding but you are responsive, your adaptive, we would like to have, of course, we would like to fight alongside forces like that. so there is a natural affinity between united states marine corps because of our egos. we are not designed to be a dominant land army. that is not why we have a marine corps. my sense is that most other armies are not designed to be dominant. does that answer your question? >> yes. >> we are very grateful for your time today and your years of service. certainly we want to show our appreciation during memorial day and beyond. thank you so much. [applause] [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> you are watching c-span2 with politics and public affairs weekdays featuring live coverage of the u.s. senate. on weeknights watch key public policy events and every weekend, the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and their schedules at her website. you can join in the conversation on social media website. >> our special booktv programming continues with a look at the military. in a few moments, james johnson freed talks about her the book educating the military. in a little less than an hour, donovan campbell on his book joker one, kids experiences with a platoon in iraq. and a writer's symposium for the military about the challenges facing those returning from combat. on the next "washington journal", look at the yahoo! news corporation. in political reporter chris moody on the latest congressional story. and white house correspondent rachael ray hartman talks about the obama administration and obama's second term and direction it can take in the final 3.5 years. "washington journal" is live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> there tends to be a denigration of the u.s. military by some historians. whenever one german battalion fought an american battalion or one regiment fought in american regiment, that would determine what is tactically superior. that mono mono, this is better. it is which system that can project power in the atlantic, the pacific, the indian ocean, southeast asia. which system can produce the civilian leadership to create a transportation system. the civilian leadership that is able to produce 96,000 airplanes in 1944. >> sunday, pulitzer prize-winning author rick atkinson will take your calls and e-mails and tweets. in-depth for three hours live on sunday at noon eastern on booktv on c-span2. >> next, the author joan johnson freese. she spoke in march in cambridge massachusetts. this is an hour. >> thank you. it is a pleasure to be here on harvard spring break on this rainy night. i am passionate and i appreciate being able to talk about this book. i am passionate about professional military education, which is why rove is. it is quite far out of my field. my usual arc of research is in globalization. so this is a bit of deviation, but one that i felt was very important to write about. i would like to begin by telling you a little bit about what the book is about amaya wrote it. paul: is the system within which most military officers receive their education after enlistment. it is congressionally mandated that this is not a choice or an option. all are required to attend to receive what is called joint professional military education credits. specifically in the book, i am talking about a senior in the institution where the officers are at the captain and colonel level, when they are transitioning from operational positions where they drive planes and votes into strategic areas. making critical policy decisions. it is our job to really educate them from jobs which have been focused on training and that they are very good at. no one is better at these operational johnson on american military officers. two jobs if they are not familiar with in strategic areas and involved economic policy and require knowledge of cultural differences and really proud of the norm, education questions that don't carry a yes or no answer because the officers are very used to when they are flying the plane. that being said, i contend in thekthat we have officers in our country who want to do the best job possible. that means operational strategic positions and that we could in fact be better. but because of structural and systemic issues, we really are not serving officers as well as we might to prepare them for these jobs. and also the country, that we could do a much better job. i would like to just read to you a couple of paragraphs here from the oak that in a nutshell explain the issue. consider as he read. how would you feel is apparent if your son or daughter asked to pay between 57,166,000, which is the range of cost per student for him or her to attend a graduate program where there are no academic admissions standards and everyone graduates in 10 months. unless the college is the military equivalent of the musical will be gone, everyone graduated from an accelerated rate risk rhetoric program or there are no admissions standards, it is highly unlikely. further, this program will constantly make sure that your child is happy with what they are being taught by faculty. some of whom have neither teaching experience or subject matter expertise. you might have qualms about the educational values of the program. so what are these challenges and what might we do to fix them? i contend in the book that but there are some things that we can do that are not particularly difficult. but they are not being done because simply in professional military education there is a all to the way that we have always done. so the first problem i talk about. the students come in because they are congressionally mandated do so. many of them are eager to learn. many of them are very anxious to make this transition. quite frankly some are not. there are no academic admissions standards. some of the individuals have not written a paper in 20 plus years. they are good at what they do, but they are not particularly good students in some cases. yes, because they are very good at their operational jobs and government has spent millions of dollars to train them if they happen to be in a highly specialized field. there is a requirement that they all graduated. no military officer will be failed in their career ruined because of an academic program. when they attend the college, they get 2 degrees. one is this joint professional military education degree, which is congressionally mandated. the other is they always get a masters degree in security. everyone who comes in gets a masters degree. that means the student who works very hard and is sitting next to the student who doesn't necessarily work that hard, they are both going to graduate. now, that is not their fault. it is not a problem of their making. they are the military equivalent of being too big to fail. they are too valuable to the military and the country to fail in an academic program. so you have a system where coming in, the credibility of the program is stretched because there are no failures are occasionally will have someone who, because of family issues or some other issue, they won't complete the program in time and the ugly are recycled. but academically, and teaching professional military education for 20 years now and i have never given a final grade of a c. our range of grades is usually 84 to 94. the second point is the faculty. we have a very strong faculty in many areas. the faculty is very diverse. there are active-duty military is. there are practitioners, which include a high percentage of retired military or is. there are civilian academics, and there are civilian academics were very active in their own field. i make a differentiation here very carefully. what happens very often is we will have a military officers show up with a faculty member who last week was on a ship or flying a plane and next week he is teaching teaching economics or local science or history or some topic which you will work very hard at, but does not have any background in. because he doesn't have this background in the class classroom, the institution goes out of its way to give them ample opportunity to get good at teaching. they give them more classes to give them an opportunity to practice and get better at what they are doing. but what that means is that the stronger experienced teachers who do have the background in the field -- we don't teach as much. when they do get good, usually after about two years, then they are gone and we start the process all over again. so you have a student body with no academic admissions standards, faculty which is very diverse, everyone is well-meaning, but some have a substantive background and others don't. this is all being done by an increasingly large bureaucracy. most of whom have no background in either education or educational administration. this creates basically a situation that i use the example in the book -- it would be like putting me in charge of the helicopter. i would be very well-meaning, but i do not know know what i'm doing. therefore, my job -- everyone be careful. we have a great safety record here. what happens in education is that there is a default position to be conservative as possible, keep everyone happy. well, as a teacher, that is not your job, keep people happy. your job is to challenge them. to really get the students -- i don't like this expression, but it works -- to think outside the box. but what happens is the faculty, unlike a civilian academic institution, they are not tenured. they are not on the tenure track. they are on three or four year contract. these contacts to a very large degree, renewal of these contracts depends upon students and if they like you. well, what is that in the classroom? you don't challenge the students because they becomes imperative that they like you. i am very fortunate. a few years ago we had a naval war college president who had a merit-based program policy of granting tenure to a very small number of people. i am equivalent of tenure. at about the same time, i received this equivalent, there were a lot of retired professional military education faculty members who started writing. much to my dismay, they were maligned by their fellow faculty members in the institution is disgruntled. i didn't see it that way. because i was tenure, i decided that i was going to write a book about it. this is the resulting book. this is the resulting book, which i'm very pleased to say started out very beneficial in getting this topic discussed. i started off writing log articles for aol defense and the u.s. naval institute. i've been wrote an article and there was a lot of controversy regarding it. sometimes not brought to me directly. then i wrote the book. and i am very appreciative to the naval war college for the academic freedom that they very much support that allows me to write the book, talk about the book, and to believe what is my own opinion. this is something, of all the military -- professional military education to war colleges, there is a marine war college, a national defense university, of those, i consider the naval war college ran a faculty member to be the flagship academic institution. because of its strong defense of academic freedom and its increasing willingness to go out and find those who are willing to kind of be in house. i am very careful on occasions like this. but being able to do this is something that is not always the case with all of the other institutions. so i took advantage of my position as a faculty member to write this book. one of the things that i talked about extensively in the book, going back to this idea of administrators, most of the administrators are retired military officers. very well-meaning good americans. again, no background in education, no background in academic administration. that means the things that they are being asked to do, curriculum development, hiring faculty, promoting faculty, tenure in faculty. they have never done this before. i spent eight years as a department chair at the naval war college. we would spend a great deal of time in meetings trying to explain to those in charge how things were done in academia. very often the response responses that we are not in academia. which got us to a system of -- again, when i first started working at the college, everyone -- every faculty member was hired as a professor. in an environment where rank is very conscious, the idea of hiring people -- all faculty members -- it was just unheard of to us. it hurt institutional credibility. the time to ask you not to a kernel as to why they should not currently be part of this -- it is very difficult. the problem of having administrators who really have no experience is, i think, that is part of the problem. the other part of the problem, and i will be honest that i am writing a chapter with another department chair. we are doing any chapter that looks at what is the oversight and supervision. there are two supervising organizations. something called military education coordinating council and congress. also part of the pentagon called joint staff seven. but congress, we all know that sequestration is basically take up all of their time. the economy. now, that allows those in the pentagon and those at the coordinating council to basically ignore what i have been told they consider the noise that this raises, the noise that other articles raise. and things proceed pretty much the way they always have. it is my view we can do some things that would correct the situation. the first thing i think we need to do is to separate the congressionally mandated military education program from the masters degrees. that would mean very simply that those with a masters master's degree, or some of them approaching retirement and feel that they don't need a masters degree, with a fill their requirements. those who wanted a masters degree with would sign off on a separate program, and it would be a more rigorous program. where there was an opportunity to say, you have not met the academic qualifications. you have not filled the requirements. and they would not receive a masters degree. that would get rid of that 100% graduation rate, which i think immediately of ex-credibility. the second thing that i think that we need to do is have some sort of faculty tenure program where faculty are not constantly fearful that they will lose their job if the students aren't happy with them. there is a need pushback from a substantial portion of the military thing that tenure faculty creates this -- it is rather ironic to me. this is being said by individuals who in their own career, when you reach a certain point in the military, you have an expectation that you will continue until you reach your retirement point. which is the same thing that i'm arguing for faculty members. furthermore, this would be not immediately. it would be done the same way as academic institutions where you have a trial. you do not tenure immediately. there would be six or seven years to see the faculty in their profession. are they solid teachers? i think one of the problems that needs to be looked at is in ministry of approach and the administrators who are in charge of these very important programs. my fear is that with all the economic woes in washington, the military education will be seen as low hanging fruit and an easy target for the budget act. it should not be. it is critical. it is something that we need to do more of, not less. there are ways to save money. i mentioned the figures from 57,000 to $166,000 per student. why the big differentiation they met again, i would argue that we have one building in faculty which actually teaches. we also teach an intermediate course. it would be an easy cost saving to combine them. we don't have something called regional studies, which is a very nice two to three week trip. you don't learn anything on a two-week junket to paris. you know, let's be realistic here. it is important to the institution. it is important to students. it is important that we build up rigor and i was asked by the navy to provide the metrics for their return on investment. and this is where we would get into talking about the differentiation between training and education. the military pushes people -- a high number of people to get their degrees in technical engineering field. when they are flying planes and operating nuclear submarines, when they are going into washington, that is not what they are going to be doing. the military, unfortunately, does not differentiate between training and education and in some case as they are governed by the same training education command. give us metrics for how the students are doing. give us metrics for how can we do, how can we do it better, how can we do it after. education is not something that you do quickly. it is something that we need time to do, to read a book and think about it. we are fighting a battle right now over calendar space. well, when you are dealing with the navy, but already things that any day on the ship is a wasted day, that's a problem. for our students, it is important that they have time to read and think, and then we going to seminars. without that preliminary time there is a tendency to say there is an answer. just give me the answer. there is no easy answer but syria. we talk about the difference between mystery. we would get our students to understand that they will be dealing with problems that do not necessarily have these bottom-line guesser no answers. i would like to read one more portion here it is very important to understand why i hoped to get certain things out of it. we want to encourage discussion on how to approve the execution of important missions. the latter purpose stems from the idea that there is always room for improvement before improvement can take place. the goals must be clear. whether college goals are clear and articulated goals are then used with processes of our institution as part of the discussion. there is existing articulation of education goals. as of 2011 by describing his own situation when he arrived in 1991. i knew i was good at and what i knew well, driving a destroyer or a cruiser, navigating through tight waters. planning an air defense campaign, leaving dealers on the deck of a rolling ship. i also sensed what i did not understand well. the importance of the logistics of a nation. had the inner agency community work and what was the power and practice of the world. in essence, how everything fit together and producing security for the united states and for our partners. the goal should be to educate students in the areas they are not familiar with and take them out of their comfort zone. this includes senior military officers transitioning from senior positions where tactical or technical skills are needed. flying planes, driving shifts, two positions requiring a broader view of the u.s. security including areas of non-technical nature. for which some will be responsible in future positions and others will support. too often, educational achievement in those areas get diluted, sacrificed at the nation's war colleges. america is paying for this with what we spend on our work colleges and preparing its military leaders to fight for peace. admittedly, this includes a unique constraints of the military profession to create challenges in the professional military education and it makes it important to continually strive for improvement. i guess as we conclude, there is just one more point. that is that the knee-jerk reaction for the statement of these problems i hear most often have to do with college. the second is close to work colleges and just send all of these military officers to civilian academic institutions. i would argue that closing the work colleges is not a good idea. again, this depends need these educations more than ever. there needs to be a strategic understanding. second, the idea that we can send everyone to civilian institutions is unchangeable. we are talking thousands of students per year. we would want them to go to the top schools with security studies programs. but there are not enough of these programs. so what would happen if these students would end up going to some other school without an appropriate program and take courses that might be relevant to somebody but not to a military officer. so we do not want them just going to any school, taking anything. one of the key benefit of the work colleges to the students is that they meet other students in other branches of the military in other fields. and they have an opportunity to talk with each other. this the center seminar networking is a key part of their educational experience. i have had instances where i have had two individuals from the navy, one in aviation and the other sitting next to each other. it is like someone talking to someone from mars and jupiter and they have no idea what the other does or what their world is like. if we want them to fight as a joint military, which we do for a variety of reasons, we need them to understand each other. so that colleges are important, we have to do a better job, i think. the first step in doing this is encouraging. i wrote my book based on personal experience. i have an opportunity because it was the department chair and i could sit in on meetings come after a lot of things, and a lot of powerpoint slide. by the way, one of the most -- one of the bleakest days as chair was sitting in on a presentation with a three-star admiral who gave us a comment about how we need to strip all the goldplating out of our curriculum and when it ended, there was a very sad looking captain who said that this was so sad. westray got plus i got a call from someone on the navy doctors had we would like a recommendation for how to improve the program. please keep in mind that we do not need for our use. we need for it. so we need to review this. our faculty, are we hiring the right kind of faculty. are they supported by policies and programs to support the goals? what is the situation? this needs to be done by an independent body. i was at a panel not too long ago and it warmer president said that i will have to study. and it's like no, you have the best interest in the result. we need study about where we need to go. i hope all of you will in fact help me raise awareness to this. i feel no phones in encouraging you. i do not only because of the importance of the subject matter but because i am donating my royalties to the wounded warrior project so i feel that i can say, please buy the book. with that, i would like to open it up to questions or climax. >> we are filming this, so if you could wait until we bring up the microphone, that would be great. >> [inaudible question] >> thank you very much. my question has to do with [inaudible] [inaudible question] will you let them know excellence is important. [inaudible question] [inaudible question] >> and give her the question. the question was basically how much have i talk to my colleagues, arguing the point that i argued in the book that i will they did it was a very small caviar, fighting the good fight and we headed various idea about it for a while. the admiral was very willing to listen to us even though he didn't always agree with us. he was very willing to listen. quite frankly the majority of the faculty that we have dealt with -- we are quite entrenched with their physicians and status quo. there is an expression of my students coming this year. and i said, what does that mean. and they said that it is time for promotion. and you earn aviator and everyone in the room is an aviator. and you promote them. everyone in the room is a submariner, no, ducks pick ducks. well, to apply that to the war college, basically when you have a high percentage of the equity members were hired military -- with a higher payment hired military. they tried very hard to put forth the right efforts. someone says you don't need a tenure system. does anyone think that someone would get fired if you buck the administration. two of them raised their hands. the rest of them kind of look at us like, that is not the right thing to say. so i guess that my answer is there are some of us who tried, but in order to get the message further and louder, i wrote the book. this is my colleague from the naval war college. he is a noted counterterrorist individual. >> i find it incredibly fitting that we are having the discussion where we see a great deal of excellence with the u.s. military. calling it anything other than mr. tj failure is important. it is easy to follow the bush administration and there are an awful lot of failures strategically. you know, we had serious reform especially after vietnam to get things right. do you think that we are moving in this direction due to not only your work, but out of the general, and oh, frankly in the early 70s it took a good at all with a much smaller institution. what would it take now? >> that is a great question. to take it into part. iraq was a strategic failure, there was a mandate passed down. we certainly got it in educational tuition. countering ideological support for terrorist, and it basically said that okay, we need to think on a broader strategic level. what that meant was in a very short time, the size of our faculty grew ask potentially. and i was able to hire for the very first time an anthropologist, a religion specialist, a counterterrorism specialist, a historian and much wider range of civilian academics. we are past the tipping point on that. we have a diverse range of faculty members in the department. regional specialist and my area, space, we have nuclear experts and others. we are well at the tipping point in terms of that. whether or not that will continue to evolve, i believe, depends upon the administrators. not just at the institutions. at the institutional level they deal with things like tenures and promotion processes. it is going to depend upon those in the joint staff and whether or not anyone in congress starts paying attention to this issue. you know the expression kids don't misbehave when they know their mother is watching. well, the feedback that i get about this book and about what is going on now at the cme is that it is just noise, pay no attention. so i hope that congress takes this up and carries a forward. they need to do these rather simple changes that i believe need to be done. i would like your opinion, if i missed anything critical in my presentation. >> he did not miss anything critical. i believe that the one thing is coming from the war college, as you said, it is the gold standard in cme and we still have all of these problems. we are not talking about much money at all. it is not a question of money. i think it has a lot to do with how important the service members in congress actually think that this is. i think that we must meet larger goals. and i do not think it can be emphasized enough that as long as there is a lack of rigor and forced upon the students, the message is looming at the end of the day. >> question over here? >> seeking clarification. to understand the full context, i understood you to say that the mandate of the next mandate mandated by congress and that these people are going from tactical military operations, which i assume are more policy driven. the people that do this, are they selected from within the military unit? my impression is that it is not every service person that is going through this. i am wondering what the selection process is there. and the advancement and promotion afterwards. >> that is a great question of verification. it is congressionally mandated that every military officer as they progress in rank received this joint professional oteri education, number one and number two, that is the intermediate course and senior course. you are absolutely right that not everyone attends or college. the vast majority of the officers receive this through such programs. there are many ways that this distance education program is offered. there is basically an online cd-rom program, which is as good as an online from program can be. and then we have a fleet seminar program were at different naval bases around the country they simulate what we do in newport with a seminar and instructor in the classroom so we have this interaction. the vast majority of the students, because it is a wire for everyone to get promoted, a few years ago if you were in a critical position and you were a pilot, your commanding officer could say i need joe smith. you could get a military education. the navy did that so often that they called them labor babies. congress that enough. they have to get their education. then everyone was pushed through the pipeline very ugly and there was a lot of pressure on us to figure out a way to get them through more quickly. this is when a lot of the online distance education programs were started. i am not going out on a limb to say that the air force clearly won the battle for who can get the simplest program to get these people through. it was basically a program where you got it right. that is -- that occurs less so now. we have built some rigor into the program and the business education program is actually quite good. there is a program in washington, a naval war college in washington that is very valuable with one of these fleet seminar programs. it is where a very high percentage of congressional staffers were in whatever it is they know about security. many of them came out of oberlin college with a degree in literature and now find themselves on the armed services committee. they take this distance education program and really give it a strong background. so there is certainly value to it. but the war colleges themselves, way people do this varies by service. the air force and the army, you are able to attend a resident program based on service and promotion. they send their best and brightest as demonstrated by their operational job. for the navy, on occasion, the system still works. they may find themselves on a ship on friday and that the war college on friday. some of them are very annoyed at being there and do not like it. some will say that class is a waste of time. but they will be leaving with their master's degree. yes? >> does congress have to pass legislation or is there a individual somewhere who sits in a closed room and makes these decisions or the changes. >> i wish i could give you a definitive answer to that. it is my understanding. again, this is what my colleagues and i are working on. but there have been proposals with the coordinating council to talk about a master's degree in the education. there is very strong resistance to be considering not by those who have a vested interest in the status quo or just because that is how they see it. i do not know if the decision has been made there. but i do know that if congress told him that they wanted something done, these organizations would get it done. i do not know that it requires congress to initiate and to prove it. but i do know that congress could motivate it and make it happen. are there any other questions? >> i do want to ask a question there. looking at the book, there is interest, what sense, if any, did you -- did you have and how this is being received outside the very narrow amount of those of us who care about it. okay, what is your sense? >> it is getting more attention -- i do know that it is getting more attention by faculty members and people are speaking out. when i wrote this book it was basically a touchy subject. there have been two individuals, retired individuals prior that wrote a book. one but a book and the other wrote a book chapter. and they were victims of disgruntled employees and we paid no attention to them. i wrote this, and since them i am pleased to say that there has been articles and comments and faculty members who are willing to speak up. quite frankly i think because it is understood that if you start to stifle the faculty members, it will be viewed as retribution. in that way there is far more activity. at the institutional level there is at least awareness that there are lines that cannot be crossed. that does whimsical hiring -- that they are less but not gone. i increasingly see it but the problem is that these higher levels where they are tone deaf. one of the reviewers of my book said i was willing to take on the echo chamber of military education and that pretty much sums it up at this level. again, i think the big tipping point is going to come if congress starts paying attention >> talking about what you said about the need for education as people are moving to different focus. what he said about the current system. how does the military see this as an event to itself? >> well, there are many instances. this is a situation where rhetoric and actions don't always match. there is a lot of rhetoric about education. but some are few and far between. there's a lot of rhetoric at the higher level about the importance of education. what they said if they will allow it as long as it is in a technical field. i talk about a former student in my book. probably one of the five best that i have ever taught anywhere. i have had a long teaching career area heated two tours in iraq as an army colonel in he wanted to go on and get a doctorate. as told by the army he army he could do that, but only if he got a degree in engineering. that he needed to be aware that it would probably hurt his career in the army. so the value of education, again, the rhetoric and the action do not really match. in the navy, i mentioned before, there are many animals feel and believe that military officer can learn more by working with him directly and by going and sitting in a classroom and being taught by civilian academics who they see as theory down pinheads, that is an expression i have heard more than once. so whether or not they see it as a value, i am not sure that they even do. one of the mandate mandates that i thought most often as the chair was to speed up the court, make it short. ten months -- we can't spare them for 10 months. this is where they have every afternoon off. if we have them in class from eight to five, instead of 10 months, we could do it in five or that his training, that is not education. it is not education. there is a question in the back? >> yes, i am not sure how much he researched. what possibly could we gain by contrasting and comparing to improve our own military? >> well, actually there are several people who worked on this with military education. we have worked on it ourselves. one of the programs that we have at the naval war college that i am proud of his engagement program with other war colleges around the world, where we go and work with them, we help them set up cricket ones, give lectures, doctor schumer and i were in colombia many times. i have been everywhere from ethiopia to uruguay to south africa. the thing is that most countries build their military education program based on ours. now, the british have somewhat of a different system. in other countries, they do variations as well. the general rule of thumb is the model is the united states. in much of latin america, you will find or college curriculums translated into spanish. now there is really important and strong points about that. in ethiopia, for example, a group of faculty members was there. we were helping them develop a curriculum. ..

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