on the subject of exhaustive —— they were the subject of exhaustive cabinet discussion. in were the subject of exhaustive cabinet discussion.— were the subject of exhaustive cabinet discussion. in his witness statement. _ cabinet discussion. in his witness statement, michael— cabinet discussion. in his witness statement, michael gove - cabinet discussion. in his witness statement, michael gove has - cabinet discussion. in his witness| statement, michael gove has said cabinet discussion. in his witness - statement, michael gove has said the wider cabinet were brought into decisions at times too late and too little. mrsaid decisions at times too late and too little. mr said javi in his witness statement that the cavet was designed to place dominic cummings and the prime minister as the decision—makers —— mrjavid. to centralise power at number ten. and in his own witness statement, mr cummings has said the cabinet were largely irrelevant to policy or execution on account of the leaks, your inability to share it, and it because it was seen by number ten is not being a serious place for serious discussion. i not being a serious place for serious discussion.— not being a serious place for serious discussion. i don't think that's true- _ serious discussion. i don't think that's true. i _ serious discussion. i don't think that's true. i think _ serious discussion. i don't think that's true. i think there - serious discussion. i don't think that's true. i think there were l serious discussion. i don't think- that's true. i think there were some really excellent cabinet discussions. about the trade offs. in fact, to make a comment about cabinet as a whole in terms of the speed of lockdowns, which was your... what we're talking about, i think it probably would be fair to say that the cabinet was, on the whole, more reluctant to impose npis necessary then i was, that was true of almost every member of the cabinet but that would be a general comment. the cabinet but that would be a general comment. ,, ., . , ., ., comment. the lockdown decision of the 23rd of march _ comment. the lockdown decision of the 23rd of march 2020 _ comment. the lockdown decision of the 23rd of march 2020 was - comment. the lockdown decision of i the 23rd of march 2020 was debated, as you rightly say, at great length on the sunday, on the monday, by the various bodies, but in particular by cobra but it was debated on monday the 23rd in cobra and the public announcement, we all recall, was made that evening and it went to cabinet on the tuesday. in relation to the first lockdown decision, it is obvious that cabinet debated it after the event. in relation to the second lockdown, that of november 2020, mrjohnson, do you recall whether or not that decision was made by covid ministerial committee or cabinet? i’m made by covid ministerial committee or cabinet? �* . . made by covid ministerial committee orcabinet? . . or cabinet? i'm afraid i can't remember _ or cabinet? i'm afraid i can't remember the _ or cabinet? i'm afraid i can't remember the sequence - or cabinet? i'm afraid i can't i remember the sequence there. or cabinet? i'm afraid i can't - remember the sequence there. just remember the sequence there. just picking you up on the first... the first lockdown, which was actually a sort of crescendo of measures, i'm fairly certain we had a long cabinet call, at least, to discuss it.- call, at least, to discuss it. well, we will look _ call, at least, to discuss it. well, we will look at _ call, at least, to discuss it. well, we will look at that _ call, at least, to discuss it. well, we will look at that in _ call, at least, to discuss it. well, we will look at that in detail - we will look at that in detail later. the inquiry has heard a great deal of evidence, mrjohnson, about the way in which your secretaries of state would naturally enter permissible income at the same issue, whether to have a lockdown, whether to use, whether to have a tiered system from different angles. the secretary of state for health and social care, understandably, would promote the public health consequences and the need to act in the public health. the chancellor would frequently promote the economic considerations. it is obvious that all were aware, to greater or lesser degree, of the societal and economic harm that would result from the decisions that you are having to contemplate making. ultimately, who had to weigh up and determine the competing public interest considerations, public interest considerations, public health, societal harm, economic damage, and so on? on whose shoulders rested that debate? that’s shoulders rested that debate? that's the 'ob shoulders rested that debate? that's the “0b of shoulders rested that debate? that's the job of the — shoulders rested that debate? that's the job of the prime _ shoulders rested that debate? that's the job of the prime minister. - shoulders rested that debate? that's the job of the prime minister. there is only the prime minister who can do that. but i think that that wasn't actually a bad way of doing it. to have different interests represented by different secretary of states and departments. zhau of states and departments. zhou meubl , you need _ of states and departments. zhou meubl , you need at _ of states and departments. zhou meubl , you need at the - of states and departments. zrim. meubl , you need at the advice of your close advisers! presumably you needed. the cabinet secretary and those in the civil service in addition to advice from secretaries of state. could you please give the inquiry an indication as to the identity of the persons upon whom you are most reliant in that debate, in that weighing up exercise? weill. in that weighing up exercise? well, i don't. .. in that weighing up exercise? well, i don't- -- i — in that weighing up exercise? well, idon't... i don't— in that weighing up exercise? well, i don't. .. i don't wish _ in that weighing up exercise? well, i don't. .. i don't wish to... - i don't... i don't wish to... embarrassed distinguished public officials by naming them... i don't know what the... i find that civil servants, on the whole, are quite happy to... to remain... anonymous, but i can certainly tell you that i had superb deputy private secretary, a mathematician, an economist, who is brilliant at understanding health care issues, and an absolutely brilliant private secretary for health care.— health care. the inquiry has obviously — health care. the inquiry has obviously heard _ health care. the inquiry has obviously heard from - health care. the inquiry has obviously heard from a - health care. the inquiry has . obviously heard from a number health care. the inquiry has - obviously heard from a number of advisers. i obviously heard from a number of advisers. ~ obviously heard from a number of advisers. ,, , ., . . advisers. i think you have heard from both _ advisers. ! think you have heard from both of— advisers. i think you have heard from both of those _ advisers. i think you have heard from both of those individuals. | advisers. i think you have heard i from both of those individuals. so, there is no — from both of those individuals. so, there is no debate about their identity, mrjohnson. i there is no debate about their identity, mrjohnson.- there is no debate about their identity, mrjohnson. ithink you ma need identity, mrjohnson. ithink you may need to _ identity, mrjohnson. ithink you may need to make _ identity, mrjohnson. ithink you may need to make the _ identity, mrjohnson. ithink you may need to make the question | identity, mrjohnson. i think you | may need to make the question a identity, mrjohnson. i think you - may need to make the question a bit more _ may need to make the question a bit more specific, mr keith. the evidence _ more specific, mr keith. the evidence is, _ more specific, mr keith. the evidence is, mr _ more specific, mr keith. tie: evidence is, mrjohnson, more specific, mr keith. t't;e: evidence is, mrjohnson, that more specific, mr keith. tt9: evidence is, mrjohnson, that he received advice from advisers in number ten. received advice from advisers in number ten-— received advice from advisers in numberten. yes. your chief received advice from advisers in number ten. yes. your chief adviser, mr cummings. yes. _ number ten. yes. your chief adviser, mr cummings. yes. you _ number ten. yes. your chief adviser, mr cummings. yes. you received - mr cummings. yes. you received advice from _ mr cummings. yes. you received advice from the _ mr cummings. yes. you received advice from the cabinet secretary firstly. advice from the cabinet secretary firstl . , advice from the cabinet secretary firstly-- mark— advice from the cabinet secretary firstly. yes. mark sedwill and then martin ease. _ firstly. yes. mark sedwill and then martin case, the _ firstly. yes. mark sedwill and then martin case, the cmo and general chief scientific adviser. yes. martin case, the cmo and general chief scientific adviser.— chief scientific adviser. yes, i should have _ chief scientific adviser. yes, i should have cited _ chief scientific adviser. yes, i should have cited them - chief scientific adviser. yes, i should have cited them first, | chief scientific adviser. yes, i - should have cited them first, yes. it's apparent that on top of the formal advisory structures, the meetings with the cmo and the cabinet secretary, the meetings with your ministers, you had a profusion of meetings with your chief adviser, mr cummings, with your cabinet secretary, with your principal private secretary, and so on. there were a huge number of rolling meetings with your innermost group of advisers. therefore, i want to know to what extent you came to rely on them in the ultimate decision—making process. {lit on them in the ultimate decision-making process. of course, i relied on decision-making process. of course, i relied on the _ decision-making process. of course, i relied on the advice i was given. . i relied on the advice i was given. but the way it works, advisers advise that ministers decide. you received a _ advise that ministers decide. you received a great _ advise that ministers decide. tm. received a great deal of advice from the chief medical officer and the government's scientific adviser and they were a vital source of advice, that's obvious.— they were a vital source of advice, that's obvious. yes. you were aware that's obvious. yes. you were aware that sa . e that's obvious. yes. you were aware that sage met _ that's obvious. yes. you were aware that sage met hundreds of times, the scientific advisory group for emergencies. did you ever read their minutes or where you wholly reliant on the cmo ngc to essay to relay to you what sage had said. —— cgsa. t you what sage had said. —— cgsa. i looked once or twice at what sage had said and they produced a lot of the documentation. but i think the gsa and the cmo did an outstanding job in leading sage and distilling their views and conveying them to me. .. their views and conveying them to me, ,,., , their views and conveying them to me. ,,. , , : , me. the sage minutes were described as consensus — me. the sage minutes were described as consensus minutes _ me. the sage minutes were described as consensus minutes because - me. the sage minutes were described as consensus minutes because they i as consensus minutes because they were designed to be read at speed and be able to get to the heart of theissue and be able to get to the heart of the issue immediately on reading them. and to ensure that the advice that was being given would be readily and speedily understood. did you ever think of calling, as a general practice, for those minutes, so that you could yourself read them? many of them were only eight or nine pages long. this them? many of them were only eight or nine pages long. abs t them? many of them were only eight or nine pages long.— or nine pages long. as i say, i thinki or nine pages long. as i say, i think! did. — or nine pages long. as i say, i think i did, from _ or nine pages long. as i say, i think i did, from time - or nine pages long. as i say, i think i did, from time to - or nine pages long. as i say, i| think i did, from time to time, or nine pages long. as i say, i- think i did, from time to time, look at the consensus minutes. in retrospect, it might have been valuable to try to hear the sage conversation unpasteurised itself. but i didn't... i was more than content with the... very clear summaries that i was getting from the csa and cmo._ summaries that i was getting from the csa and cmo. they were hundreds of consensus — the csa and cmo. they were hundreds of consensus minutes _ the csa and cmo. they were hundreds of consensus minutes but _ the csa and cmo. they were hundreds of consensus minutes but you - the csa and cmo. they were hundreds of consensus minutes but you were - of consensus minutes but you were only given a fraction of them? —— there were. only given a fraction of them? -- there were-— only given a fraction of them? -- there were. :, ,:, , :, there were. that sounds right to me, es. we there were. that sounds right to me, yes- we will — there were. that sounds right to me, yes. we will look _ there were. that sounds right to me, yes. we will look in _ there were. that sounds right to me, yes. we will look in detail— there were. that sounds right to me, yes. we will look in detail at - there were. that sounds right to me, yes. we will look in detail at some i yes. we will look in detail at some ofthe yes. we will look in detail at some of the scientific _ yes. we will look in detail at some of the scientific debates _ yes. we will look in detail at some of the scientific debates that - of the scientific debates that engage to government, particularly in the middle of march. behavioural fatigue, herd immunity, the debate about the reasonable worst case scenario, and so on.— about the reasonable worst case scenario, and so on. yes. did you not think of... _ scenario, and so on. yes. did you not think of... looking at the scientific horse in the mouth and seen what was actually being said by the government's primary scientific advisory committee on these issues? as now appears to be the case, he became engaged particularly in the debate about behavioural fatigue. why didn't you call for the primary material? t why didn't you call for the primary material? ~ why didn't you call for the primary material? ,, . �* , ~ why didn't you call for the primary material? ,, :, �* , ~ material? i think that's. .. a good question- — material? i think that's. .. a good question- i _ material? i think that's. .. a good question. i was _ material? i think that's. .. a good question. i was very, _ material? i think that's. .. a good question. i was very, very - material? i think that's. .. a good l question. i was very, very much... impressed by and dependent upon the cmo and csa, both of whom are outstanding experts in theirfield. it felt, to me, that i couldn't do better than that. the it felt, to me, that i couldn't do better than that.— it felt, to me, that i couldn't do better than that. the cmo and the csa -- sca _ better than that. the cmo and the csa -- sca were _ better than that. the cmo and the csa -- sca were concerned - better than that. the cmo and the csa -- sca were concerned with l csa —— sca were concerned with medicine and science and sage was concerned, as it says on the tin, with science.— concerned, as it says on the tin, with science. cmo is the professor of ublic with science. cmo is the professor of public health, _ with science. cmo is the professor of public health, he _ with science. cmo is the professor of public health, he knows - with science. cmo is the professor of public health, he knows an - with science. cmo is the professor| of public health, he knows an awful lot about... of public health, he knows an awful lotabout... epidemiology of public health, he knows an awful lot about... epidemiology and public behaviour in an epidemic. ihe lot about. .. epidemiology and public behaviour in an epidemic.— behaviour in an epidemic. he does. you had no — behaviour in an epidemic. he does. you had no advisory _ behaviour in an epidemic. he does. you had no advisory structure - behaviour in an epidemic. he does. i you had no advisory structure around you, however. and, by contrast, dealt with matters such as the economic damage that would be done by the lockdown decisions. there was no pandemic or civil emergency or societal advisory body which might be thought to be an allergist to sage? in hindsight, and with the passage of time, do you suggest that there was an absence of a proper advisory structure to deal with the other issues and the other considerations which weighed in the balance when you came to make those final decisions? t balance when you came to make those final decisions?— final decisions? i thought about that a great _ final decisions? i thought about that a great deal. _ final decisions? i thought about that a great deal. there - final decisions? i thought about that a great deal. there is - final decisions? i thought about that a great deal. there is such | final decisions? i thought about. that a great deal. there is such a body and it is called hm treasury. that is what they do. early on, you referred, mr keith, to the competing perspectives of the whitehall departments and the secretaries of state. and i think for its difficulties, i think it did work well in allowing me to get a balance of the argument. the evidence appears already to suggest that the chancellor of the exchequer and then her majesty's treasury had considerable influence over the ultimate decision—making process because the chancellor would come to see you in bilateral meetings, there were bilateral meetings, there were bilateral meetings in the week of the 16th of march, before the first lockdown decision, in late october, before the second and in the summer of 2! and then again in december of 21, in relation to omicron. and also eat out to help out. but that advice was given to you by the chancellor and her majesty's treasury in a way that wasn't openly transparent to the way that the sage advice was provided to you. there were no minutes disclosed of the advice you are being given to the public, there was no regular production of material or any kind of published economic analysis provided to you. do you think, in hindsight, that that was an error? t hindsight, that that was an error? i think that there was certainly transparent economic analysis of the cost of some of the measures that we were obliged to enact. and the fall in gdp, the cost of cjrs and other schemes was plain to see. that was all public. what was not public and is not traditionally public as ministerial conversations and discussion between ministers. again, the perspective that i was being offered by the treasury was a very useful one, just as a perspective of the department of health was a very useful one. the material, that's _ health was a very useful one. the material, that's to _ health was a very useful one. tt9 material, that's to say diary entries and readouts from minutes and so on, show that the chancellor of the exchequer would, in this difficult context of making the ultimate decisions about lockdowns and easing and tiers and so on, would often get the last word in a bilateral meeting to take place just before you made a final decision. and also the secretary of state for health and social care was occasionally excluded from meetings and public health matters were being discussed. were you aware of that? t discussed. were you aware of that? i think that 's i reject that think that �*s i reject that characterisation of what took place. the overwhelming priority of the government was to protect the nhs, sav