>> see the present debate monday night on c-span, c-span radio and c-span.org. watch and engaged. next a forum on relations between the u.s., russia and syria. a pal discuss the syrian support of the -- a panel discusses russian support of the syrian civil war. this is about an hour and a half. >> we welcome all of you joining us on heritage foundation and on c-span. we ask that you turn off yourself funds as we begin recording for the benefit of today's program. the we will post for everyone's future reference. hosting our discussion today is dr. steven bucci. his focus is special operations and cyber security. he commanded the third battalion fifth special forces and also became the military assistant to donald rumsfeld. at his retirement, -- prior to joining us, he was a leading consultant on cyber security. please welcome the in -- join me in welcoming steven bucci. [applause] >> we have a very timely subjects to discuss, and i think we have a great panel of experts that will be doing be discussing to get us started. i have been interested in this because one of the first things i did was testified before congress about the weapons of mass destruction threat that syria and the somewhat untimely demise might pose. i am interested to hear the answer to one of the questions i was asked. i want to tell you -- won't tell you, but we will hear what the experts have to say. we will have a minute or two for a short wrap up. those of you that have not been the panels have moderated before, if you get past the second piece of the english language and i don't hear a question mark, i will stop you. this is not the time to give speeches. we will make sure that we get as many questions asked and answered as possible. keep your questions to say, get to the question park, and we will let the experts address them. i will do all the introductions and we will go down the line. the speakers are sitting in the order that they will present. we will start with dr. phillips who is the senior research fellow for the heritage foundation. he has written extensively about the middle east and international terrorism since 1978. gm has been interviewed frequently on numerous media outlets. he is an extremely knowledgeable and. -- man. he will be followed by dr. friedman, the professor of political science at baltimore hebrew university. the department of state and the cia, our third speaker will be dr. steven blank. the strategic studies institute expert on soviet bloc and post- soviet world since 1989. he is the editor of the imperial decline, russia's changing position in asia and the co-editor of soviet military and the future. the last speaker, my colleague that heritage is the senior research fellow for russia and eurasian studies. they have often been called to testify on economics and law. they have numerous media outlets both domestically and across the globe. we will start with jim phillips. >> i would like to set the stage for the next three speakers that will focus primarily on russian policy by outlining u.s. policy and how it is factored into the blood packs that we see in syria today with more than 30,000 dead and no end in sight. i think it is fair to say the obama administration was behind the curve of the following the events in syria. i'd say this was because of ideological baggage. it led the wishful thinking about these opposing benefits of engaging in the regime. i think it was a horrible mess reading of that nature of the assad regime. the possibility of negotiating a diplomatic transition to a new government, i think it was due to an insistence on multilateralism, it hamstrung u.s. policy in question decision making to the united nations, which was paralyzed by lack of consensus and the threat of a russian and chinese veto. the obama administration was determined to improve relations with the regime and initially soft color -- soft-pedaled criticism of the regime including violent crackdowns on its own people. the longstanding support of terrorism, second only to iran. the implacable hostility to israel, at the close alliance with iran and russia. syria supported groups killing u.s. troops in iraq and the supporting the lebanese terrorist organization responsible for the death of lebanon on ha. i go back to lebanon on because i think it is worth noting that the marines initially had been deployed to separate israel following the 1982 lebanon on a war. fast forward to 2005, and there was the assassination of another lebanese leader. this time, the former prime minister that courageously stood up to syria and domination inside lebanon on. that led the bush administration to withdraw the u.s. ambassador to syria because they had once again been implicated in the assassination of a lebanese leader. despite the bloody track record, the administration sought to improve relations with damascus and use senator john kerry as an intermediary. it reversed the bush and administration's attempt to mobilize international pressure against the regime and it reversed the decision to withdraw the u.s. ambassador. when the democratic controlled senate balked, named robert ford has -- in december of 2010. unfortunately, sending an ambassador back to damascus have not modified its hostile policies, they sent a message that washington was eager to restore relations despite syria's continued role as a spoiler and the middle east. this also hinted that there would be little price to be paid for future hostile act. one of the principal motivations for the glossing over of the longstanding enmity was the hope to draw up the mess that -- in damascus and the peace negotiations with israel. this has been a pattern followed by other administrations with the comprehensive arab-israeli peace. other administrations have pursued that. that has softened u.s. policy, warren christopher to damascus more than 20 times, which was more than he went to moscow or beijing. these and other efforts to broker peace failed because damascus was interested in participating in a peace process, but not in actually assigning a peace treaty. they were interested in the process because it would diffuse international pressure going back to the '90s what that lost its soviet ally. it would allow them to reap the benefits of participating in a process without paying the costs of signing a peace treaty with israel which would jeopardize its claim to leadership of the arab world, the resistance access. they were adamantly opposed to peace with israel. in any case, the obama administration's engagement policy failed in syria just as it has failed in iran. in both cases, wishful thinking about drawing a hostile regime into a diplomatic settlement of outstanding issues proved to be unfounded and yielded few tangible results. but in the eagerness to a negotiated deal, the administration pulled its punches and initially muted its criticism of the bloody repression. if we saw this in iran in june of 2009. via administration cut days, if not weeks, to toughen the rhetoric on the suppression of the grain movement. or when peaceful protest erupted in march of 2011, the regime responded with a group force including the indiscriminate shelling of artillery and tanks and air strikes. he the administration continued to treat the regime with kid gloves. hillary clinton described him as a reformer in a march 27 statement. this was an embarrassing misreading of the situation in syria. although he had promised to promote reform following the death of his father, he has done precious little to deliver on those promises. in july of 2011, they showed contempt for u.s. policy by orchestrating the attack on the u.s. embassy in damascus. stepping down in august of 2011. russia could easily blocked effective action. no outside force is capable of imposing peace in syria as long as the power struggle, a struggle to the death continues to intensify between the regime and the many opposition groups that spawn. the increasingly bloody conflict, they do little to slow the killing machine this diplomatic trade benefits to them by buying time to crush the rebellion and benefited russia and iran by helping them selvage a brutal middle east ally. it does nothing to advance u.s. national interests and by ridding the middle east of a major regime that the state sponsors of terrorism. the often amounts to little more than an empty euphemism on many critical issues. russia, china, and iran continue to support via sought dictatorship. they have sent arms, the plight revolutionary guards, advising and assisting the security forces in repressing them a. in repressing the iran's green movement home in 2009, although i think we have not heard the last of the grain movement. the bottom line is that the obama administration must abandon wishful thinking about the nature of that regime, the effectiveness of the united nations and the supposed benefits with russia. if this is to successfully address was going on inside syria. the timid syria policy is especially grating when compared to its policy on egypt. there, the administration pressed for mubarak to resign in a matter of weeks despite the fact it was a longtime ally. it took five months to issue similar calls for the resignation of assad. the country gained a reputation for quickly abandoning its friends while courting its enemies. i think we will find it has more enemies and less friends. this is likely to be one of the lasting legacies of the obama administration in the middle east. >> i want to thank the heritage foundation, and especially for inviting me here. it is a pleasure to be here. i have only 12 minutes, as i was promised, and i have a lot to cover. why will speak quickly and if there are questions afterward, please pick them up. a historical look at both soviet and russian relations which go back to 1946. look at putin's policies before the arab spring. look at russia's concern with the arab spring. the most important to look at considerations in dealing with syria during the crisis. leo of the cost to russia on the syrian policy which i believe is quite large. try to explain why russia perseveres and seems to be a counterproductive policy. this goes back a long way. it becomes the soviet diplomatic agency. leading up to soviet support in 1948. a series of cruise and damascus, it is soviet arms ha. the egyptians at the time and did those fears. however, when they broke up in 1961, it quoted damascus. the russia-syria relationship goes back a long way. syria became independent from france, scout established an embassy in damascus and became a major center of soviet diplomatic activity and was the center. for negotiation between the zionist movement and the soviet union leading up to the soviet support of the establishment of the state of israel in 1948. following the death of stalin and a series of coups in domestic, syria became a purchaser of soviet arms and at the time, some fear that syria was going communist. the united arab republic defeated those fears but it was called -- called a leader a heady and men for doing it. when it broke up in 1961, moscow courted damascus and a following the left-wing coup, relationships became quite close and you will recall the soviet efforts to preserve the narrowly-based assets pterygium called for an end to the war. relations grew closer in 1970. syria granted russia enabled installation, supply and maintenance facility, and two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. by 1974, as egypt began to move into the u.s. orbit, syria emerged as the no. 1 ally. not to say there are no problems between the two sides. the syrian intervention in lebanon clearly displeased moscow as did its agreement to security council to hundred 42. it's one of the few states that supported the soviet invasion of afghanistan in 1979 and was richly rewarded with military aid as a result. that continued until the advent of gorbachev in 1985 to turn off the tap of military aid. the chill in the relationship continued until 2005 when a combination of increasing syrian isolation due to policies in lebanon and a much more aggressive russian foreign policy under vladimir putin established a close russian- syrian relationship we see today. let's look at the policies of vladimir putin in his second term. i see is reacting to be setbacks like the school fiasco, the orange revolution in the ukraine, and the increasing vulnerability of the u.s. in the middle east because of the invasion of iraq which -- and because of the revival in the taliban in afghanistan, vladimir putin went on the offensive. first, he tried to improve relations with iran, syria, and turkey. in the case of syria, the soviet era debt was forgiven and vladimir putin authorize new weapons sale. syria was one of the few states in the world to support the russian invasion in 2008. the second step occurred in 2007. the u.s. was still in disarray in the middle east, trying to disband the rogue states to cultivate the remaining states. in 2008, at of libya to moscow's expanding activity. vladimir putin hospitals were for full -- to demonstrate it was a major power in the middle east and the world. no. 2, the investment for industrial projects while selling nuclear reactors and railway systems. number three, as the cost and difficulty of extracting natural gas with countries like saudi aria, libya and iraq. -- saudi arabia, libya and iraq. and to prevent -- keeping the ties with the sunni alignment of the gulf states and the shiite groups of iran and hezbollah was not easy as tensions rose between the two groups. this was increasingly clear with the onset of the arab spring. when you look at russian concerns, it could spread to russia which suffered some of the same problems as the arab states. widespread corruption and rising prices and some of the -- [indiscernible] next stop moscow. and further inspire the islamists. no. 3, investments and a lease could be jeopardized as well as business and arms sales deals. no. 4, when libya occurred, the russians took a major lesson. they abstained from the security council vote over the no-fly zone in libya. therefore continuing the white in russian policy. as the russians say, it was going quite badly as the no-fly zone became a case for regime change and russia lost almost $4 billion in arms sales and several billion dollars in industrial contracts. here we come to the main point. why are the russians doing what they're doing? number one -- no repeated experience -- we will not permit regime change. number two, syria remained an important country in the middle east with ties to hezbollah and much less now to's. the russians don't want to alienate iran, syria's main ally, which is already ancient -- already angry because of the 2002 sanctions. number three, it's a major market for russian arms. number four, the naval facility at targets -- while it is mostly floating docks and warehouses, the only facility open to russia in the middle east of important symbolic value. russian ships visited showing the flag. russia has an economic investment in syria totaling almost $20 billion. number six, and this is the. my colleague is going to talk about -- anti-americanism. syria is a major anti-american force in the middle east and vladimir putin will not let this be overthrown. no. 7 -- islam. if islamists takeover in syria, it will have a negative effect on russian's -- russia's muslim population. when ambassadors were attacked and ambassador stevens were killed, the combat -- the russians said we told you this would happen if you back the rebels -- if you back the revolutions. with streets demonstrations in the midst of the presidential campaign in russia, vladimir putin saw the same forces at work in russia as in syria and the u.s. is trying to do and warned revolution in russia. efficient -- russia in summing up, has vetoed three resolutions, including water down once to syria, continues to ship arms to syria, saying there's no security resolution against arms shipments. it is urging them to open up a dialogue with the regime and supported the ill-fated kofi anan mission is to prolong the life of the regime. moscow has been wooing these states since 2007, especially saudi arabia. number two, alienating key islamic leaders who called for boycotting of products from russia and said several days ago "russian jets are bombing the syrian people. the arab and islamic world must and against russia, boy, russia and consider rush-hour number one enemy." #3, it angers and alienates the united states. and increasingly irritates turkey. why is russia doing this? there is continued disunity in the ranks of the rebels, although after this morning, there's another chance they say to reunify. hopefully, scout, think they won't be able to oust assad. turkey has not been willing to extend their anti-syrian rhetoric. however, the turkish prime minister is quite had strong. if he continues to be provoked by syrian shelling, he may take action. this is why in recent days, following the shelling, forcing down a jet flying to damascus, russia is trying to ply the situation and by increasing the supply of natural gas to turkey, making up for a short fly to iran to maintain good relations between russia and turkey despite what is happening in syria. in conclusion, moscow is taking a major middle east gamble with its policy in syria. if the gamble fails, and i think it will, hopefully if the u.s. get a little more active in the process, moscow's middle east policy will be in deep trouble. thank you. >> thank you very much. steve? >> thank you very much. i want to thank everyone and the heritage foundation for inviting me. a pleasure to be back with some old friends. i have to say my remarks to not reflect the views of the army, the defense department or the u.s. government. i'm going to talk about russian motives, building on what bob just said. i think there are some points that can be added to that discussion. the motives i see operating to draw and russian foreign policy are simultaneously implicated in the policy. you can't just pull out one string and say that is the decisive factor in the policy making process. what we can say and we have observed in the last several years, not just syria, we see an increasing, narrowing policy process in russia. fewer and fewer people are refusing to make policy in general. vladimir putin rarely listens to a large circle of people. he gets his information from a very restricted circle of people. he is not a tech-savvy guy the way dimitry medvedev was. if you have had the misfortune of reading this question me as i do, he lives in what may be called an echo chamber of paranoid reflecting each other's paranoia and that. the russian belief that the country is under siege, and i use that term advisedly, from a western effort to undermine the stability of the russian government and replace it, and that the allies of the west, russian democrats feeds into this. that is the first point. democracy threatens russia. there was an essay in the wall street journal making clear democracy was the biggest threat to democracy and is the -- and still is. there's a profound fear on the part of the government of any manifestation by the public. in russia or elsewhere. the middle east is an example that could spread to russia and the russians know it. russia is quite a long or at least was quite alarmed that you would see in central asia a manifestation of this kind. the deputy foreign minister actually got at and said they were quite worried about this and gave the central asians advice. dimitry medvedev tried to work out a strategy with is pakistan to stretch out any manifestation of what you might call a central asian spring. the motive here is the profound belief that the russian government is under threat from democracy and that democracy is essentially a western invention and that and me at home is the enemy abroad. in